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 INTRODUCTION 
In a detailed bibliography concerning human rights, Gregory Walters 
praises Rights and Christian Ethics by Kieran Cronin for taking «the 
secular philosophical debate seriously, while providing Christian justi-
fying reasons for acting upon rights and human rights»1. In order to 
outline the orientation of his study, Cronin introduces his book by re-
telling a thought-experiment conducted by Joel Feinberg2. The imagi-
native hypothesis is the invitation to imagine a land without human 
rights. Picture a place or places Feinberg asks, where the principle of 
rights is neither conceived nor exist. Let such a society be furnished 
with all the requirements for moral and successful living – except it 
lacks a notion of human rights. It is a thought-experiment also visual-
ised by Steven Lukes. Such thought-experiments or imaginative de-
vices are carefully crafted narratives, used to advance theoretical argu-
mentation. The scenario of a world that lacks «this particular feature 
[the principle of human rights], whose distinctiveness we may thereby 
hope to understand better»3, is visualised in order to ascertain «what 
precisely a world is missing when it does not contain rights and why 
that absence is morally important»4. 
Joel Feinberg envisages a world called Nowheresville, peopled by 
moral and virtuous human beings. Yet without rights, does an other-
wise morally sophisticated Nowheresville differ from our own world? 
Feinberg argues that the most notable difference between the No-
wheresvillians and ourselves is the activity of claiming. 
Having rights, of course, makes claiming possible; but it is claiming that 
give rights their special moral significance. This feature of rights is con-
________________ 
 
1
 G.J. WALTERS, Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 78. 
2
 K. CRONIN, Rights and Christian Ethics, xiv-xviii.  
3
 S. LUKES, «Five Fables about Human Rights», 234. 
4
 J. FEINBERG, «The Nature and Value of Rights», 148. 
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nected in a way with the customary rhetoric about what it is to be a human 
being. Having rights enables us to «stand up like men» to look others in the 
eye, and feel in some fundamental way the equal of anyone […] To respect 
a person then, or to think him as possessed of human dignity, simply is to 
think of him as a potential maker of claims. […] More than anything else I 
am going to say, these facts explain what is wrong with Nowheresville5. 
The thought-experiment allows Feinberg to highlight the link be-
tween rights and claiming. He distinguishes three manners of claiming: 
«(i) making claim to [...], (ii) claiming that [...], and (iii) having a 
claim»6. The first, called a propositional claim, are rights reflecting an 
assertion made by the person who is claiming. The second, which he 
wishes to emphasise, is a performative claim or the active sense of 
claiming. Rights as claims are not possessions like things but actions 
that reveal important aspects of what it is to be considered worthy of 
minimal self-respect in the eyes of others. The third is the substantive 
claim itself, which may or may not be validly and justifiably made 
against others. 
Steven Lukes also begins from an imaginary world that lacks the 
principle of human rights yet is «neither utopian nor dystopian but 
rather places that are in other respects as attractive as you like [...]»7. 
This second thought-experiment envisages a world populated by five 
different societies: each one is a caricature which, according to Lukes, 
represents five persuasive contemporary outlooks. In a satirical manner, 
he conjures up different places, each dominated by a particular princi-
ple. 
In a world without rights three conceivable societies are possible – 
Utilitaria, Communitaria and Proletaria. The Utilitarians, who live un-
der the motto «the Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number», are a 
race who admires technocrats, bureaucrats and judges. With a strong 
sense of common purpose, they live by an agreed principle: that which 
counts is that which can be counted. The Communitarians also share a 
strong societal bond. Obsessed by identity, they understand themselves 
as situated within a tradition and live according to its received wisdom. 
Proletaria is not a state as such for it has withered along with previous 
distinctions – work from leisure, producer from production, employer 
from employee – that alienated humanity from itself and so freed the 
Proletarians from all contradictions.  
________________ 
 
5
 J. FEINBERG, «The Nature and Value of Rights», 149. 
6
 J. FEINBERG, «The Nature and Value of Rights», 151. 
7
 S. LUKES, «Five Fables about Human Rights», 234. 
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According to Lukes, human rights are unknown in such places be-
cause they are incompatible with the dominant principle which orders 
each society. He insists that this incongruity draws attention to the cen-
tral characteristics of rights. They cannot exist in Utilitaria because 
they represent restraints upon the calculation of utility or what is most 
advantageous for society. They cannot exist in Communitaria because 
they represent a kind of abstraction from the specific and the local. To 
use rights, therefore, is to be able to consider people beyond their iden-
tifying characteristics, creating a space for the individual vis-à-vis the 
community. And finally, rights presuppose and accept the imperfect 
human world of egoism, cruelty, and scarce resources which create 
conflicting interests denied in the utopia of Proletaria. 
In the second stage of his thought-experiment, Lukes turns to two 
further societies, Libertaria and Egalitaria, in which rights are consid-
ered to be taken seriously. Libertarians live in a society completely 
dominated by market principles: their most prized possession is the 
right to property. Many other rights are also present, including the right 
to vote, freedom of speech and association. However, Lukes believes 
that rights are not taken seriously in such a place because «the posses-
sors of these rights are not equally respected; not all Libertarians are 
treated as equally human»8. Finally, he asks if Egalitaria could be a 
place where rights are truly respected. «The basic liberties, the rule of 
law, toleration, and equality of opportunity are all constitutionally 
guaranteed. But they are also made real by the Egalitarians’ commit-
ment to rendering everyone’s condition of life such that these equal 
rights are of equal worth to the their possessors»9.  
However, Lukes is that such a place could possible exist10. Back in 
the real world, Lukes argues that the dominant outlooks encapsulated in 
the first four imaginative societies threaten the realisation of human 
rights. The final Promised Land may be impossible to achieve, but he 
argues that political discourse should take place on a «kind of “egalitar-
ian plateau” upon which such political conflicts and arguments can take 
place»11. If rights are to be taken seriously, this plateau of a small list of 
significant rights must be accepted and defended by all.  
________________ 
 
8
 S. LUKES, «Five Fables about Human Rights», 241. 
9
 S. LUKES, «Five Fables about Human Rights», 242. 
10 Two constraints inhibit the realisation of Egalitaria. First, a libertarian constraint 
insists on the importance of economic activity. However, the free market produces a 
disproportion that inhibits true equality. Second, a communitarian constraint insists on 
the importance and value of identity. However, the building of bonds can lead to the 
creation of discriminatory distinctions to the detriment of equality. 
11
 S. LUKES, «Five Fables about Human Rights», 245. 
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1. Scope 
Thought-experiments, given sufficient imagination and rigour, are 
reasoned through according to an internal logic and intuition. They are 
employed in order to explore the boundaries of concepts – represented 
by Feinberg – or investigate the implications and coherence of theories 
– represented by Lukes. The two thought-experiments outlined above 
begin in the same imagined world. Nevertheless, they differ because 
they are reasoned through in two diverse ways: each reflects a different 
level of theorizing. Theoretical reflection in the moral sphere may be 
divided into meta-ethics and normative ethics. Making for a useful 
categorization, H.J. McKloskey defines them as follows:  
Normative ethics which is directed at discovering the kinds of thing, ac-
tions and the like, which are good, right, obligatory, i.e. which judgments 
and principles are to be adopted and why. Meta-ethics which is concerned 
with the analysis of ethical expression, i.e. with their meanings, import, 
and, more generally, their logical functions12. 
Meta-ethics is the study of particular moral notions in order to estab-
lish and explicate an essential internal meaning. To this end, Feinberg 
unpacks the notion of rights as claims. Accordingly, Kieran Cronin ad-
vances the thought-experiment of Joel Feinberg as «primarily a meta-
ethical study rather than a normative one»13. Although Cronin ac-
knowledges the normative dimension of any ethical reflection, he main-
tains the validity of the distinction in order to clarify the parameters of 
his study. He focuses on the meta-ethical level, including the reflec-
tions of secular philosophy, because «Christians use the language of 
rights like nearly everybody else, and they are equally prone to abuse 
moral language by being vague in their understanding of the complex 
relationships between moral terms»14. His study involves two ap-
proaches to rights language. The first devotes its attention to the nature 
of rights language, that is, their internal logical relations and relation-
ship with other moral terms. The second is an imaginative approach 
that appreciates the manner in which ethical, anthropological and reli-
gious concepts are interconnected through the category of imagination. 
He likens himself to a tool maker sharpening the tool and «as a tool 
maker, or better, tool sharpener I try to sharpen this valuable tool by 
clarifying its meaning and value»15. 
________________ 
 
12
 H.J. MCKLOSKEY, Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics, 1. 
13
 K. CRONIN, Rights and Christian Ethics, xvi. 
14
 K. CRONIN, Rights and Christian Ethics, xviii. 
15
 K. CRONIN, Rights and Christian Ethics, xix. 
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The extent to which meta-ethical reflection can be carried out in its 
own terms has been challenged. Indeed, many assert the primacy of 
normative ethics which aims towards the assertion of norms or princi-
ples to direct human conduct16. Lukes’s thought-experiment may be 
classified as a normative one, for it exhorts and attempts to justify be-
haviour according to particular principles. As Cronin takes his orienta-
tion from the first thought-experiment, this study shares theoretical fea-
tures with the second17.  
2. Features 
Let us return to the normative thought-experiment of Steven Lukes. 
To reflect at a normative level is to explore the implications of moral 
theories in guiding human action, decision-making and the ordering of 
society. It is to provide a consistent justification and not merely to pro-
vide an account for human behaviour: it is to pass judgment, to recom-
mend rules and issue warnings. For Luke’s part, he wishes to assert the 
central role of human rights and their acceptance. The article, written 
during the Balkan Wars of the early 1990s, finishes with an impas-
sioned plea: 
I believe that the principle of defending human rights requires an end to our 
complicity and appeasement: that we raise the siege of Sarajevo and defeat 
them by force. Only then can we resume the journey to Egalitaria, which, 
if it can indeed be reached at all, can only be reached from the plateau of 
human rights18. 
Further reflection on Lukes’s narrative brings to light certain relevant 
features – each different from those of Feinberg. Firstly, it has an his-
torical dimension. Some historical events are portrayed in order to pro-
________________ 
 
16
 A. GERWITH, «Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics», 188. The distinction is not a 
radical differentiation «as meaning that normative ethics and meta-ethics are inde-
pendent of one another». This is highlighted by our thought-experiments. On one 
hand, Feinberg includes normative elements. The above quoted extended passage de-
scribes rights as assertions necessary for a minimum of self-respect. Equally, by char-
acterising rights as restraints and necessarily abstract, Lukes adds elements of meta-
ethical analysis. 
17 The fact of a world without rights is far too real for far too many. Yet a theoreti-
cal thesis may make a practical contribution. In the words of one of the central theo-
rists, «Of course I don’t want to denigrate the importance of these empirical and stra-
tegic questions: they are of sovereign and continuing importance. But the philosophi-
cal question […] is also important, practically as well as theoretically, particularly 
now, when we disagree so much about what human rights are, or even whether there 
really are any». R. DWORKIN, «What are Human Rights?», 1.  
18
 S. LUKES, «Five Fables about Human Rights», 246. 
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vide an insight into the implications of each outlook. The narrative 
structure provides a sense of past or historical context; for instance it 
refers to influential theorists that encapsulate each outlook. Secondly, 
the thought-experiment is multivalent: it begins from the acknowl-
edgement of many differing outlooks that are present in the contempo-
rary world. Lukes does not propose to present these theories in a fair 
manner. Rather, he treats each as a caricature19. Such a multivalent fea-
ture recognizes that there are many frameworks providing a normative 
function: each with many adherents. Thirdly, Lukes’s thought-
experiment is implicitly comparative. The narrative proceeds from a 
creation of models (that is, a multivalent feature), refers to selected 
events and theorists (that is, an historical feature) in order to highlight 
implications for ethical human behaviour (that is, a normative purpose). 
But the narrative ends in a judgment in favour of human rights because, 
according to Lukes, the society they imply is comparatively superior to 
the others. A comparative exercise may be positive or negative. The 
former concentrates on resemblance, correlation and compatibility: the 
latter focuses on contrast, distinction and juxtaposition. In this case, 
Lukes creates a strongly negative comparison by constructing extremes. 
However, after creating such opposing societies, he is forced to make 
an impassioned plea for common ground or a shared plateau that will 
cut across the divisions. «On the plateau, human rights are taken seri-
ously on all sides, though there are wide and deep disagreements about 
what defending and protecting them involves»20. Contemporary consti-
tutional democracies appear to reflect such a scenario. At least nomi-
nally, Lukes’s desire already exists: a common ground in the form of a 
basic list of rights is adhered to by many societies. Constitutions, bills 
of rights and legal systems purport to uphold a list of basic rights which 
informs public debate, facilitates adjudication and supports the ordering 
of society. Rights-talk attracts widespread allegiance and assertion in 
public discourse and public policy, particularly in western liberal de-
mocracies. However, this language is not without its problems: criti-
cally, it can lack a universally accepted moral grounding. What is lack-
ing in Lukes’s thought-experiment can also be lacking in society; 
namely, a concerted enquiry that facilitates the justification of rights. If, 
along with Lukes, we wish to defend the principle of human rights, 
mere appeal to their importance is not enough. Rights need to be justi-
________________ 
 
19
 S. LUKES, «Five Fables about Human Rights», 233. He writes, «a caricature be-
ing an exaggerated and simplified representation which, when it succeeds, captures 
the essentials of what is represented». 
20
 S. LUKES, «Five Fables about Human Rights», 245. 
INTRODUCTION 13 
fied and justifiable to all in order that they may be acceptable to all and 
so all may be guided by them. It requires going further than Lukes’s 
appeal. We must agree to more than a common ground. Rather we must 
provide a solid ground – or at least engage in an enquiry that seeks such 
a goal.  
3. Aim 
A normative study will conceive of rights as coordinates within a 
larger theoretical framework that aims to propose criteria of judgment 
in moral issues. The analysis of the «fact» of rights cannot be separated 
from the «value» of rights, that is, from the value they attain within a 
broader historical and cultural framework or frameworks. Joan Lock-
wood-O’Donovan warns:  
The meanings attached to the term «rights» in both popular and scholarly 
usage cannot be properly ascertained in detachment from this theoretical 
context which has been formative for political, moral and theological orien-
tations in this century21. 
In order to ascertain the meaning(s) assigned to the term «rights», the 
conceptual lines of the theoretical context must be traced. Such a study 
is necessarily multi-disciplinary because the conceptual lines cross a 
range of fields; law, jurisprudence, political philosophy, history, ethics 
and theology, to name but a few. Furthermore, the conceptual lines are 
drawn in a different manner according to different theorists and tradi-
tions of enquiry. Therefore, as cautioned by Lockwood-O’Donovan and 
as achieved by Cronin, the secular philosophical debate needs to be 
taken seriously.  
The resulting aim of this study is to trace some of the lines of con-
vergence and paths of divergence between three normative theories, 
each representative of a different tradition of enquiry, in order to con-
sider a foundation of rights that is consonant with Christian theology. 
In the process, I shall parallel the characteristics previously identified 
in the normative thought-experiment of Steven Lukes. Firstly, the study 
will trace the concrete and conceptual development according to three 
traditions of enquiry, thereby acknowledging the many historical proc-
esses informing the reflection on rights. Secondly, by closely reading 
three selected theorists, representative of those traditions, it will involve 
a multivalent approach. It will recognise a pluralism of theories that 
engage in a reflection on rights. Finally, this dissertation shall compare 
________________ 
 
21
 J. LOCKWOOD-O’DONOVAN, «Historical Prolegomena», 43. 
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the theorists (and traditions) in order to highlight issues and arbitrate 
between approaches so that insights may be coherently placed within a 
theological horizon.  
4. On Method 
These characteristics mirror some aspects of Bernard Lonergan’s 
reflections on method22. In the process of moving between data and 
results, Lonergan identifies stages or functional specialisations, 
which reflect the necessary elements of the dynamic structure inher-
ent in all cognitive activity; be that the undifferentiated use of com-
mon sense or a detailed investigation of science. The functional spe-
cialities find their distinctiveness by way of distinguishable and in-
terrelated goals. By relating the ideal goals of the relevant functional 
speciality to the particular goals of this study, it is possible to sketch 
a heuristic framework or schema for the presentation of this study. 
Each successive stage will presuppose the results of the former and 
completes them by moving closer towards a final goal. The histori-
cal, multivalent and comparative characteristics outlined from 
Lukes’s thought-experiment parallel Lonergan’s schema of func-
tional specialties of «History», «Interpretation», and «Dialectic». 
The functional specialty of «Foundation» categorizes the final goal 
which is to view rights from the perspective of Christian theology. 
The stages provide the following schema – unfolding in four 
parts23. Under headings provided by Lonergan, it begins with a de-
tailed «History», in two chapters, in order to place the authors and 
their reflections within their appropriate historical context. The sec-
ond part is «Interpretation», or a close analytical reading of the cho-
sen theorists and central texts, in three chapters. The third section is 
«Dialectic», or a critical and comparative evaluation. Arising from 
this is the final part, «Foundation», placing the insights gained from 
each of the authors within the basic horizon of theology. Taken to-
gether, the stages provide a schema for the study, «moving towards 
an ever greater viewpoint»24. 
________________ 
 
22
 B. LONERGAN, Method in Theology, 133. Cf. ID., Insight; ID., «Metaphysics as 
Horizons»; ID., «Transition». He outlines eight functional specialisations: research, 
interpretation, history, dialectic, foundation, doctrines, systematics, and communica-
tions.  
23
 The listing provided by Lonergan is modified for a more classical order in which 
the historical section precedes the interpretative section.  
24
 D. TRACY, The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan, 243. 
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4.1 History 
Lonergan identifies three levels of history: basic, special and gen-
eral25. This study shall focus on the level of special history: it will dis-
cern the historical theoretical movements which inform each normative 
theory. Theoretical traditions provide dynamic frameworks within 
which theorists reflect. On tradition, the sociologist Edward Shils 
writes: 
They change in the process of transmission as interpretations are made of 
the tradition; they change also while they are in the possession of their re-
cipients. This chain of transmitted variants of a tradition is also called a tra-
dition, as in the «Platonic tradition» or the «Kantian tradition». As a tempo-
ral chain, a tradition is a sequence of variations on received and transmitted 
themes26. 
The continuity of tradition may be connected by common themes, 
means of presentation, or in a lineage from a common origin27. A theo-
retical tradition offers both points of departure for each theorist and a 
guiding pattern to their overall work28. I have added three appendices, 
albeit in an undetailed manner, to the end of the thesis in order to facili-
tate reading the history section.  
A crucial feature in choosing the selected theorists of this study is 
that they act as important contemporary representatives of their relevant 
theoretical tradition. Jürgen Habermas stands in the European continen-
tal tradition of Critical Theory and the Frankfurt School, Ronald 
Dworkin in the American tradition of Liberalism, and John Finnis in 
the natural law tradition of Aristotelian-Thomism29. The goal of this 
section is to draw attention to some historical and theoretical sources of 
these traditions. By doing so, I shall identify the historical and cultural 
orientations associated with present-day rights language. Furthermore, I 
________________ 
 
25
 B. LONERGAN, Method in Theology, 128. Basic history refers to specific events, 
times and places. Special histories tell of movements whether cultural, institutional, or 
doctrinal. General history is a total view, offering an historian’s full expression of 
his/her evaluation. As a point of note, this thesis uses male terms for Part One and 
female references thereafter.  
26
 E. SHILS, Tradition, 13. 
27
 E. SHILS, Tradition, 32-34. 
28
 Because each theorist is deeply informed by their respective tradition, Alasdair 
MacIntyre criticises many historians of ideas for presenting historical context «as 
mere background». A. MACINTYRE, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, 390. 
29
 The names of each tradition are claimed by each theorist. Such claims are often 
challenged by others claiming the same tradition – many of which will be considered 
in the respective chapter.  
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will draw attention to the relationship between contemporary theoreti-
cal conceptions of rights and diverse opinions on the precise beginnings 
of the current understanding of rights. 
4.2 Interpretation 
Interpretation refers to the goal of a clear presentation of texts in or-
der to grasp their «meaning in its proper historical context, in accord 
with its proper mode and level of thought and expression, in the light of 
the circumstances and intention of the writer»30. I will study the central 
texts of three selected theorists: namely, John Finnis’s Natural Law and 
Natural Rights (1980), Ronald Dworkin’s Taking Rights Seriously 
(1978) and Jürgen Habermas’s Fakitizität und Geltung. Beitrage zur 
Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des democratischen Rechtsstaats (1992). 
Other works by these authors are also studied to the extent that they 
throw light on the theme. 
In selecting three theorists, this dissertation is recognizing a pluralism 
of approaches to the explication and justification of rights. Therefore, it 
exhibits the multivalent characteristic of a normative study identified 
previously. Each work maps the many conceptual lines that create the 
framework in which rights derive their meaning. As a result, each work 
is multi-disciplinary. They embrace fields as diverse as philosophy, soci-
ology, jurisprudence, and ethics. However, this study shall only concern 
itself with these fields to the extent that the authors deal with them and, 
more specifically, to the extent that they relate to the theme of rights. 
In order to facilitate exposition and subsequent comparison, each the-
ory will follow broadly similar categories, while allowing for individual 
methodological differences of approach. Generally, each section begins 
with a theoretical location and analysis of the general theoretical frame-
work, followed by a close reading of their texts according to the touch-
stones of right (that is, the order of justice), human rights and law. Each 
chapter will conclude with a presentation of points that link each theorist 
to his tradition (outlined in previous chapters) and critical to the com-
parative study (outlined in subsequent chapters).  
4.3 Dialectic 
In the third stage, the study proceeds beyond the presentations of the 
selected theories and traditions. It moves beyond the fact of difference 
in order to analyze the reasons for disparity and conflict and to identify 
________________ 
 
30
 B. LONERGAN, Method in Theology, 127. 
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similarities and relationships between concepts. It is a comparative ex-
ercise that highlights irreducible differences and acknowledges com-
plementary positions. The goal of this stage of the study will be to out-
line many of the divergences and convergences. Lonergan writes: 
By dialectic, then, is understood a generalized apologetic conducted in an 
ecumenical spirit, aiming ultimately at a comprehensive viewpoint, and 
proceeding towards that goal by acknowledging differences, seeking their 
grounds real and apparent, and eliminating superfluous oppositions31. 
Each theory offers a different perspective on rights because each offers 
different visions of the totality within which they place rights. As a re-
sult, they offer different justifications, evaluations and meanings of 
rights. Some differences are complementary; viewpoints or horizons of 
knowledge may supplement one another and so offer a fuller picture. 
Other horizons may involve genetic differences; a perspective may be 
differing from another because it already offers a fuller more differenti-
ated account. Still others may be dialectical, that is, horizons may be pro-
foundly opposed – what is considered true or good in one is considered 
false or evil in another.  
While complementary or genetic difference can be bridged, dialectical dif-
ferences involve mutual repudiation. Each considers repudiation of its op-
posites the one and only intelligent, reasonable, and responsible stand and, 
when sufficient sophistication is attained, each seeks a philosophy or a 
method that will buttress what are considered appropriate views on the in-
telligent, the reasonable, the responsible. There results a Babel32.  
Many commentators have referred to the Babel-like situation that 
surrounds the use of a rights language33. To vary the metaphor, con-
temporary western society may use the one language of rights but many 
within that society differ in the grammar of rights. By way of dialectic 
and the mapping of divergence and convergence, I will proceed to-
wards a judgment on an authentic grammar of rights. 
4.4 Foundation 
The final stage proper to this study is «Foundation». It is at this level, 
that the study will reach its final goal. The manifold possibilities exhib-
ited in dialectic, with regard to rights, are put in the light of Christian 
________________ 
 
31
 B. LONERGAN, Method in Theology, 130. 
32
 B. LONERGAN, Method in Theology, 247. 
33
 Cf. A. MACINTYRE, After Virtue; M.A GLENDON, Rights Talk; C. WELLMAN, 
The Proliferation of Rights.  
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theology. Theological categories are made to bear on the insights 
gained through dialectic. By doing so, this study shall discern the level 
of appropriateness between rights as categories of ethical argumenta-
tion and the fundamental categories of theology. In the words of Lon-
ergan,  
So as theology is an ongoing process, as religion and religious doctrine 
themselves develop, the functional specialty, foundations, will be con-
cerned largely with the origins, the genesis, the present state, the possible 
developments and adaptations of the categories in which Christians under-
stand themselves, communicate with one another, and spread the gospel to 
all nations34. 
By doing so, the thesis wishes to respond to the invitation of John 
Paul II: «It is thus the task of the various schools of thought – in par-
ticular the communities of believers – to provide the moral bases for 
the juridical edifice of human rights»35. It therefore wishes to contribute 
to the growing awareness, as observed and encouraged by the Second 
Vatican Council, of the «sublime dignity of the human person, who 
stands above all things and whose rights and duties are universal and 
inviolable»36. 
5. Status Quaestionis 
The above conventional distinction between meta-ethics and normative 
reflection may be characterised by certain central questions. The former, 
concerning the formal analysis and clarification of terms, tends to focus on 
questions such as «what is a right?», «how may a right be identified?» or 
«what separates it from other terms?» The latter, concerning with the justi-
fication and guidance of social behaviour, tends to focus on questions such 
as «what are the grounds for using rights?» or «who or what do they 
serve?». But the distinction is neither sharp, nor sustainable. Therefore, to 
raise the question of rights is necessarily to engage with a cluster of ques-
tions. As a result, the evaluation of justificatory frameworks shall neces-
sarily move from normative to meta-ethical considerations. The above 
methodology is proposed as a creative means by which to chart these 
questions and issues. It moves from exposition (history and interpretation), 
to evaluation (dialectic) and finally to a judgement or commitment (foun-
dations). These categories provide a means by which the research may be 
organised. By way of the conclusion at the end of each chapter, and refer-
________________ 
 
34
 B. LONERGAN, Method in Theology, 293. 
35
 JOHN PAUL II, «Address to the Diplomatic Corps», 243.  
36
 Gaudium et Spes, 62. 
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ences through the footnotes, certain ideas will be flagged in order to facili-
tate the reader in making connections between the categories.  
Although at each stage many issues are considered, one question guides 
the thesis as a whole: what is morally and theologically at stake in the use 
of human rights37? In other words, what is implicit in their use? Whom do 
they serve? What do they protect? And what fundamental values or 
grounds are they manifesting? Is rights language worth using? Simply put, 
what can be said is happening when a person reasons about moral issues in 
the language of rights? It is the question of what is at stake in the use of 
rights – for instance, justice, protection of the individual, or ownership – 
that motivates the contemporary defence of human rights. But it is also the 
key question to the scepticism or caution regarding rights: the stake or 
price is considered dangerously high and potentially detrimental to more 
important moral values. Furthermore, the question divides many of its 
supporters: each propose different ideas of what is exactly at stake.  
This thesis may be characterised as an investigation. It explores, and 
evaluates by way of comparison, the historical and contemporary stances 
on the above question(s) and considers the findings in light of the com-
mitments of Christian faith. The level of theorising, aim and method 
shapes the parameters of this thesis. For example, by considering general 
normative frameworks, the thesis will not consider particular rights as such 
– except in so far as it develops the broader normative discussion. Fur-
thermore, in taking three significant theorists and traditions, it excludes 
consideration of other philosophical traditions – for instance, feminism or 
pragmatism38. Finally, in placing the resulting comparative study in the 
light of Christian theology, the thesis does not take account of other world 
religions or cultures39. I hope, however, that the dialogical spirit of the the-
sis could be open to such reflections absent from consideration in this the-
sis40.  
________________ 
 
37
 Indeed, it is the question that dominates Luke’s thought-experiment. The central 
question he proposes: «what way of thinking does accepting the principle of defend-
ing human rights deny and what way of thinking does it entail»? S. LUKES, «Five Fa-
bles about Human Rights», 234. 
38
 On rights and Feminism, cf. N. MCGLEN – K. O’CONNOR, ed., Women’s Rights; 
E. WOLGAST, Equality and the Rights of Women. On rights and Pragmatism, cf. R. 
RORTY, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.  
39
 Cf. A. POLLIS – P. SCHWAB, ed., Human Rights; T. DUNNE – N. WHEELER, ed., 
Human Rights in Global Politics.  
40
 It is conceded that the central selected theorists and those theorists chosen to 
represent the respective traditions of enquiry are all men and, in the main, European. 
Because of the predominance of its use in historical text, the male pronoun will be 
used in the historical section before transferring to the female pronoun for contempo-
rary discussions.  
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6. Conclusion 
The purpose of this study is to portray clearly, and compare fairly, 
three normative theories of rights, each a representative of a different 
tradition of enquiry, in order to present a foundation of rights that is in 
harmony with Christian theology. As a study on the normative aspect 
of rights, it complements meta-ethical studies similar to that of Kieran 
Cronin. In comparison to his image of a tool-sharpener, I suggest that 
by entering into a reflection on differing normative theories in order to 
create a comparative study, an appropriate analogy may be «conversa-
tion». By way of comparison, this study facilitates a conversation that 
may lead to a fusion of horizons. Of course, a horizon is broadened and 
furthered when one moves to raised ground. Perhaps, therefore, such a 
study will facilitate the establishment of the plateau, or common and 
solid raised-ground, longed for by Steven Lukes.  
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 CHAPTER I 
Genesis of Rights 
1. Introduction 
In the Prolegomena to De jure belli ac pacis libri tres, published in 
1625, Hugo Grotius concedes: 
Throughout the Christian world I observed a lack of restraint in relation to 
war such as even barbarous races should be ashamed of […] it is as if, in 
accordance with a general decree, frenzy had openly been let loose for the 
committing of all crimes1. 
The three volumes that follow advance an ethics of war and a sys-
tematic account of a proposed international law. In order to promote 
peace and place restraints on the excesses of war, Grotius (1583-1654) 
claims a common law binding between nations. He argues that in oppo-
sition to «the doctrine which some promote, that all rights disappear in 
war, we should never undertake a war except for the prosecution of 
Right, nor should we wage it except within the limits of Right and good 
faith»2.  
To this end, he outlines three meanings of the word ius or right in 
Book One. Firstly, and by way of referring to the title of his work – the 
Right of War and Peace – he writes, «Right in this context means sim-
ply, what is just»3. Ius is synonymous with iustum or justice. It is the 
most general meaning of the term, applying to social relationships, and 
________________ 
 
1
 De Jure Belli, Prol. 28. Cited in J. ST. LEGER, The “Etiamsi Daremus”, 23. 
2
 De Jure Belli, 797. Unless otherwise stated, all translations and page numbers 
from O. O’DONOVAN – J. LOCKWOOD-O’DONOVAN, ed., From Irenaeus to Grotius, 
787-820. 
3
 De Jure Belli, 797. 
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is negatively defined by Grotius as that which is not in conflict with the 
nature of society. After some short references to authors of classical an-
tiquity, he promptly progresses to a second meaning. 
There is a second distinct sense or «right» deriving from the first, which is 
attributed to a subject. A right is a moral quality attaching to a subject ena-
bling the subject to have something or do something justly. A right, in this 
sense, attaches to the subject even though it is sometimes associated with a 
thing4. 
The second sense of ius is attributed to the individual. According to 
Grotius, such a moral «quality» may be either a «faculty» (facultas) or 
a «fitness» (aptitude). Right as a faculty is «a legal right properly or 
strictly so called»5. The designation of ius as facultas includes power 
over oneself, by which he means liberty, or power over others or things, 
by which he means ownership. Right as fitness refers to fairness or a 
reasonable claim that is not enforceable by law. His primary interest 
concerns the former. The third and final sense of ius is lex or «law», 
that is, «“law” in a broad sense as a rule of moral action obliging us to 
do what is correct»6.  
It is the second meaning, or more specifically the first part of the 
second meaning, that is of central importance for the development of 
Grotius’s case for restraint in war. Right, as a faculty or power in an ac-
tive manner over oneself or one’s property, acts as a means of defining 
the first meaning of right, that is, justice. It gives content to what is just. 
If the law of nations is to reflect a true justice, then rights will also pro-
vide the content for the third sense of ius, that is, to the law.  
Grotius’s theory resonates with the modern understanding of rights. 
He justifies a definition of right according to the capacities inherent in 
or predicated upon an individual: the person possesses intrinsic «rights» 
simply as a human being. By making this second sense of right relate 
«specifically to the abstract ‘person’ (persona), Grotius was believed 
by several of his contemporary jurists to have departed significantly 
from the traditional or Roman sense of the term right (ius)»7. 
________________ 
 
4
 De Jure Belli, 797. «Ab hac juris signifcatione diversa est altera, sed ab hac ipsa 
veniens […] Qualitas moralis personae, competens ad aliquid juste habendum vel 
agendum». Latin citations from B. TIERNEY, The Idea of Natural Rights, 324-326. 
5
 De Jure Belli, 797. «Ab hac juris significatione diversa est altera, sed ab hac ipsa 
veniens […] Qualitas moralis personae, competens ad aliquid juste habendum vel 
agendum». 
6
 De Jure Belli, 799. «Est et tertia juris significatio quae idem valet quod Lex […] 
ut sic Regula actuum moralium obligans ad id quod rectum est». 
7
 R. H. COX, «Hugo Grotius», 388. 
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In the history of the development of rights, Hugo Grotius stands at a 
juncture. Observing the theorists who follow, Richard Tuck, in Natural 
Rights Theories, maintains that Grotius’s theoretical innovations «made 
the political theories of the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
possible. He is the most important figure in the history which we are 
tracing […]»8. But equally, we may look to those who preceded him. In 
The Idea of Natural Rights, Brian Tierney asserts that «his conceptual 
apparatus of law and rights, the ideas that would under-gird the whole 
subsequent work, was of medieval origin»9. Many lines of medieval 
thought converge in his thinking and many lines of early modern 
thought diverge in response to his work. Therefore, he stands at a 
threshold between two eras – the medieval and the early modern – dis-
cernable by the significant development «in the theopolitical tradition 
[of] a new and distinctive approach to political thought, effectively in-
dependent of theological premises»10. With specific regard to rights, 
this point concludes the period in which language of rights first ap-
peared and developed and initiates a second period «of what can be 
termed the classic texts of rights theory, stretching from Grotius 
through to Locke»11. 
To facilitate an historical study, an approximate typology of a rights 
theory may be sketched from Grotius’s account. Michel Villey refers to 
it as a characteristic if inelegant model12. The three senses of ius – as a 
simple relation, a subjective right and an objective norm13 – reveal 
three significant matters of concern. Firstly, it relates to justice: it fo-
cuses on the ordering of social relationships and human life within so-
ciety in a just manner. Secondly, it emphasises the ability or power of 
individual persons associated with reason or freedom to make specific 
claims as persons. Villey refers to the former as an objective right and 
the latter as a subjective right14. Finally, a rights theory is bound to is-
________________ 
 
8
 R. TUCK, Natural Rights Theories, 58. 
9
 B. TIERNEY, The Idea of Natural Rights, 326. 
10
 O. O’DONOVAN – J. LOCKWOOD-O’DONOVAN, ed., From Irenaeus to Grotius, 787. 
11
 R. TUCK, Natural Rights Theories, 2. 
12
 M. VILLEY, Leçons D’Histoire, 221. 
13
 P. HAGGENMACHER, Grotius, 462. «Dans ce chapitre liminaire du Traite, Gro-
tius lui attribue au contraire trois sens nettement distincts: le terme ius y désigne tan-
tôt une simple relation; tantôt le droit subjectif; tantôt la norme objective». 
14
 M. VILLEY, La formation, 242. He defines subjective right as follows: «Le droit 
subjectif de propriété, c’est par exemple le pouvoir d’user, de jouir, de disposer de la 
chose, attribue au propriétaire, lui-même reconnu, garanti, sanctionne juridiquement. 
Cette notion complexe résulte de l’association de deux idées, celle de droit et celle de 
pouvoir».  
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sues of the law in its capacity to guide human behaviour. The three as-
pects are mutually interconnected. Yet, the primary and constitutive 
role is performed by the second axiom. This typology or model of a 
rights theory involving three broad interconnecting and essential 
themes – archetypal in Grotius – presents a means of identifying its 
origins and development15. For, «if we are to explore origins we need 
to know first what we are seeking the origins of»16. To chart the evolu-
tion of rights in theory and socio-political history is to trace the devel-
opment of this typology. Furthermore, the typography will act as pri-
mary categories by which the thought of the central theorists of this 
dissertation may be organised.  
Tierney writes that within «patterns of language»17 a term such as 
a «right» is defined by its place within a larger framework, that is, 
by its association with other ideas. A term is delineated and de-
scribed by its correlation or equivalence with other cognate terms. 
Therefore, the history of an idea encapsulated in a term, such as the 
term right, is necessarily the history of a language or discourse in 
which that term is employed. Furthermore, the meanings of terms 
are to a degree theory-dependent. As such, an exposition of a com-
plex term requires a consideration of the theories that involve such a 
concept, «and in general those theories are embodied in particular 
texts»18.  
This, and the following chapter, is organised accordingly, by un-
packing the crucial associations within the «lattice work». It takes 
the primary texts that comprise the canon of a tradition (or those that 
help mould the tradition) and highlights the relevant terms to which 
the term right is connected. It does so by outlining the broader the-
ory within which the terms find their relative value – for instance, 
ius and iustum in Aquinas’s account of the Natural Law in the 
________________ 
 
15
 Tierney claims that a right as normally understood in contemporary discourse is 
«a sphere of personal autonomy within which an agent is not obliged to act but is free 
to determine his or her own course of action, for instance to exercise the right or not 
exercise it as he or she chooses». B. TIERNEY, «Natural Law and Natural Rights», 
395. Tuck writes that it is «this sort of rights theory which is the most important and 
interesting, for it is the only sort in which the concept of a right has a truly independ-
ent role». R. TUCK, Natural Rights Theories, 7. However, others argue that such defi-
nitions may place rights within a «straight-jacketed conceptual structure». J. FINNIS, 
«Aquinas on Ius», 409. In presenting a rights theory as a typology of interrelated rele-
vant themes, rather than a specific definition, this chapter attempts to avoid pre-
empting the contemporary debate into the definition(s) of a right. 
16
 B. TIERNEY, The Idea of Natural Rights, 48. 
17
 B. TIERNEY, The Idea of Natural Rights, 54.  
18
 R. TUCK, Natural Rights Theories, 2. 
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Summa Theologiae. In turn, the text needs to be placed within a 
wider «context that sustains a particular style of discourse and ren-
ders it intelligible»19. An account of the history of the language of 
rights therefore entails both text and context, that is, significant 
theoretical texts and the influential socio-political events and devel-
opments20. However, the contextual sub-sections of this thesis that 
situate the textual analysis can only give an impressionistic picture – 
leaving open the charge of obscuring some movements or miscon-
struing others.  
The purpose then, of this and the following chapter, is twofold. 
Firstly, it traces a history of the language of rights. Secondly, and by 
way of the historical exercise that maps theorists and theories, 
thereby identifying the main concerns of each tradition (and how 
they differ or interrelate), it sketches important points relevant to the 
central discussion. A fuller picture is created. 
The study begins with the revival of legal studies in twelfth cen-
tury21.  
2. The Twelfth Century 
In the middle of the twelfth century (1139/40), Gratian began his 
Concordatia discordantium canonum – a Concord of Discordant 
Canons, commonly known as the Decretum – with several texts and 
comments on the different sources and distinctions of ius. The aim 
of the Decretum was both to compile and attempt to unify the vari-
ous canon law declarations and collections. In this regard, it mir-
rored the purpose of the Justinian Code Corpus Iuris Civilis, which 
provided a central text for Roman law, five hundred years earlier. 
Rediscovered in the eleventh century and nurtured by the newly es-
tablished universities, such as that in Bologna (1113), it inaugurated 
a revival in legal studies and influenced Gratian’s work22. Together 
they became authoritative texts in jurisprudence and political reflec-
tion of the Middle Ages.  
________________ 
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 B. TIERNEY, The Idea of Natural Rights, 47. 
20
 Cf. App. A. Appendix A provides a timeline of texts, contexts, major historical 
events and commentators. 
21
 Commentators mostly agree that individual rights did not exist in Greek phi-
losophy and Roman Law; cf. J. W. JONES, The Law and Legal Theory, 191; G.B. 
HERBERT, The Philosophical History of Rights, 1-47; A MACINTYRE, After Virtue, 69. 
Others argue that rights are compatible and present; cf. F. MILLER, Nature, Justice 
and Rights. 
22
 Cf. K. PENNINGTON, «Law, legislative authority». 
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2.1 Ius and Facultas 
The Decretum begins: 
The human race is ruled by two (means) namely by natural law and by us-
ages. Natural law (ius naturale) is what is contained in the Law and in the 
Gospel by which each is commanded to do to another what he wants done 
to himself and forbidden to do to another what he does not want done to 
himself23. 
Gratian follows this description by distinguishing between catego-
ries of human law: unwritten custom, civil law, the law of a city or a 
people, and the different types of laws in classical Rome. He consis-
tently uses the term ius to refer to either a moral code or an objective 
law, revealed by Scripture or accessible by reason. Although an im-
portant step in medieval jurisprudence, «he presented only raw, un-
assimilated ideas»24. For it was the Canonists or Decretists that fol-
lowed, who based their reflections and teachings on the text, who 
expanded Gratian’s scheme and definitions with more precise termi-
nology.  
In particular, they needed to discriminate between the different 
senses of ius naturale. Brian Tierney claims that «It soon became a 
common exegetical technique among the early Decretists to provide 
long lists of all the possible meanings of the term ius naturale 
[…]»25. To Gratian’s designations of ius naturale, they added a sub-
jective definition, that is, they defined ius in terms of the ability, 
faculty, power, force, of the individual itself. He quotes Rufinus (c. 
1160): «Natural ius is a certain force instilled in every human crea-
ture by nature to do good and avoid the opposite»26; and Odo of Do-
ver (c. 1170), «more strictly, natural ius is a certain force divinely 
inspired in man by which he is led to what is right and equitable»27; 
________________ 
 
23
 «Humanum genus duobus regitur, naturale videlicet iure et moribus. Ius naturale 
est, quod in lege et Evangelio continetur: quo quisque iubetur alii facere quod sibi vult 
fieri et prohibetur alii inferred quod sibi noli fieret». Cited in B. TIERNEY, The Idea of 
Natural Rights, 58.  
24
 K. PENNINGTON, «Law, legislative authority», 425. 
25
 B. TIERNEY, The Idea of Natural Rights, 60; ID., Rights, Law and Infallibility.  
26
 «Est itaque naturale ius vis quedam humane creature a nature insita ad facien-
dum bonum cavendumque contrarium». Cited in B. TIERNEY, The Idea of Natural 
Rights, 62. 
27
 «In tertia significatione et strictiori dictur isu naturale uis quedam diuinitus 
homini inspirata qua ad id quod iustum est et equum ducitur». Cited in B. TIERNEY, 
The Idea of Natural Rights, 63. 
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and Sicardus, «ius is called natural […] from human nature, that is a 
certain force or power naturally instilled in man […]»28.  
The legal anthologies of the Decretum and the Codex differed in one 
crucial respect. By and large, the authoritative text of Roman law was 
fixed in the sixth century. Canon law, however, was continually being ex-
panded. Canonist scholarship, through the newly-established universities 
and a series of lawyer-popes such as Innocent IV (c.1200-1254), played a 
key role in how canon law – and the related issues of jurisdiction, author-
ity, and nature of law – developed29. «In a world where rights were con-
stantly being asserted and demanded, the language of the jurists reflected 
the realities of their age»30. The source of a subjective definition was the 
everyday discourse and context of the twelfth century.  
The interpretations and definitions of ius by the Decretists suggest the 
origins of the language of rights. Although they do not offer an overt and 
coherent theory of rights, they do echo the typology identified and outlined 
above in embryonic form. Turning to the everyday sources, we may sche-
matise the «realities of the age» according to broad three broad themes that 
reflect the typology – social relations, the status of the individual and the 
role of law. They parallel the three categories by which Anthony Black 
discerns the «salient political values» of the medieval era – the purposes of 
political communities, the relation of the individual to the community and 
the state in relation to law31. 
2.2 Historical Context 
First: although the jurists of this period developed an explicit concep-
tion of a right as a faculty or power of the individual, they «were not 
concerned with the degree of self-determination individuals have or 
ought to have, so much as with the type of entity or structure a society 
may be said to be»32. A wide range of Medieval Latin terms reflected 
the strong social bonds of the era33. According to Walter Ullmann, cor-
________________ 
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 «Nam ius naturale dicitur […] ab humana natura, hoc est quedam uis et potential 
homini naturaliter insita ad faciendum bonum et uitandum contrarium». Cited in B. 
TIERNEY, The Idea of Natural Rights, 63. 
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 J.P. CANNING, «Introduction: politics», 358. 
30
 B. TIERNEY, The Idea of Natural Rights, 58. 
31
 Cf. A. BLACK, Political Thought in Europe. 
32
 J. BURNS, «The Individual and Society», 598. 
33
 A. BLACK, Political Thought in Europe, 15-16. There are many words applica-
ble to society and legal or political groupings (civitas, universitas, corpus, provincial, 
ducatus, commune) and similarly numerous words for rank (status, honor, ordo, 
gradus, dignitas). 
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pus or a body offered a favoured organic analogy. Inspired by Pauline 
theology, it suggested, firstly that the members (membra: limbs) related 
to society as separate functions within a wider whole, and secondly that 
society had a necessary order, social harmony and common purpose34. 
Applied to the public sphere, an organic model created a descending 
model of government and law and provided legitimacy to the social hi-
erarchy. In this system, rights inhered in the offices that people held 
and resulted only after being granted by a higher authority. For exam-
ple, a bishop or a baron could resist a royal command, but only by ap-
pealing to his status as bishop or baron.  
Yet along side a theocratic model, Ullmann distinguishes a second 
and opposing model of society in which individual rights could be 
claimed. Feudalism, the practical system of government, was based on 
strong bonds of fidelity between lord and vassal. «There were rights 
and duties on both sides: the lord had rights and duties against the vas-
sal, and the vassal had rights and duties against the lord»35. The con-
tractual nature of feudal society created a reciprocal arrangement that 
could recognise the individual. To a degree, feudal law was capable of 
accommodating some of the political, social and economic develop-
ments of the early medieval era. Henrich A. Rommen argues that the 
growth of rights and liberties for more and more groups proceeded 
pragmatically. The many charters that established new urban centres 
across Europe conceded from the feudal lords «immunities and privi-
leges» to the Burghers and merchant guilds. Though mediated through 
the guild or town, he argues that rights were granted to individuals. The 
charters held all duty bound and could not be arbitrarily revoked. 
Rommen identifies both substantial and procedural rights throughout 
Europe. He lists the freedom to marriage, freedom from arbitrary taxa-
tion, freedom of movement to facilitate trade and pilgrimages, and 
freedom of disposition of property. Examples of procedural rights in-
clude trial before courts of one’s own town, protection against arbitrary 
arrest, and presumption of innocence36. These charters were to fore-
shadow the Magna Carta (1215). 
Second: in contrast to the many terms for society or rank, this period 
does not have a term for the individual37. Yet this period is, according 
________________ 
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 W. ULLMANN, The Individual and Society, 11.  
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 W. ULLMANN, The Individual and Society, 63. 
36
 H.A. ROMMEN, «The Genealogy of Natural Rights», 406-414. 
37
 A. BLACK, Political Thought in Europe, 31. Instead the individual is referred to, 
according to contexts, as homo, fidelis, civis, subiectus, singularis persona or just 
quisque (‘anyone’). 
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to Colin Morris, the point of the discovery of the individual38. The 
sources of this twelfth century humanism were in Christianity and the 
classical Greco-Roman era. On one hand, Ullmann argues that Chris-
tian doctrine fostered a strictly social model39. On the other, Morris 
points to the essential role of Christianity in highlighting the worth and 
value of the individual: «From the beginning, Christianity showed itself 
to be an ‘interior’ religion […] Ultimately a Christian origin can be 
ground for many elements in the European concept of the self»40. Al-
though the community was strongly corporate, the emphasis on com-
munity in everyday Christian practice diminished. Instead, the devel-
opments of devotio moderna, private confession and Eucharistic prac-
tices, gave rise to strong personal devotion and awareness of the self. 
The second source of the respect of the individual was the classical, 
Greco-Roman past. In particular, Morris points to the influence of 
Cicero and Seneca. The social and political transformations in the early 
Middle Ages, encouraged by the urbanisation and new economic reali-
ties, supported in the medieval mind a turn to the individual. He writes: 
If there is any one force which may be particularised as creating the new 
individualism, I have tried to show that it was the uncertainty created in the 
minds of men by the opportunities and challenges of a more complex 
world41.  
This insight by Morris becomes a recurring motif throughout the fol-
lowing centuries. 
Third: writing of the early formation of western law, Harold Ber-
man observes the close connection between the turn to the individual 
and developments in law after the revival of legal studies in the 
twelfth century. In particular, canon law as a living adapting law 
code began to express and further develop the focus on the individ-
ual intention, consent and will. For example the developments in law 
concerning crime were associated with the exploration of individual 
________________ 
 
38
 Cf. C. MORRIS, The Discovery of the Individual. The central characteristics are 
the conscious and deliberate concern for self-discovery, an interest in the relations be-
tween people and in the role of the individual within society and an assessment of 
people by their inner intentions rather than by external acts. Cf. R. L. BENSON – G. 
CONSTABLE, ed, Renaissance and Renewal. 
39
 Cf. W. ULLMANN, A History of Political Thought; ID., Jurisprudences; ID., Law 
and Jurisdiction; ID., The Church and the Law; ID., The Papacy and Political Ideas.  
40
 C. MORRIS, The Discovery of the Individual, 11. Previously, the term humanitas 
was used in a pejorative sense to mean human weakness, yet within a theological 
framework, it becomes a more positive term. 
41
 C. MORRIS, The Discovery of the Individual, 160. 
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intent; law relating to marriage led to reflections on consent; and law 
relating to contract revolved around the expressed will of the indi-
vidual42. Law in the middle ages had an elevated position because it 
was associated with the expression of justice. Issues of injustice 
were considered in the light of the law. The great theoretical project 
of the era, therefore, was the relationship between law and justice – 
as implied by the next section.  
3. The Thirteenth Century  
Although warning against an overly artificial connection between an 
intellectual history and the larger social and political history, Stephen 
Ozmant writes, «The intellectual history of the high Middle Ages, like 
its larger political and social history, is also marked by self-discovery 
and definition»43. The primary catalyst was the encounter with the phi-
losophical corpus of Aristotle: «The absorption of Aristotle’s writings 
in the Latin West from the early twelfth to the late thirteenth centuries 
created an intellectual watershed that left no theoretical inquiry unaf-
fected»44. Of itself, the rediscovery of Aristotle may not have initiated 
an intellectual revolution. C.H Lohr claims the philosophical and scien-
tific principles and categories proposed by Aristotle facilitated and ad-
vanced a spirit already present in the age and noted in the previous sec-
tion. 
The works of Aristotle which were thus made available by about the year 
1200 did not gain the influence they had because they were fortuitously 
translated, but they were translated because the masters wanted no longer to 
simply transmit, because they wanted to learn themselves. The spirit of rea-
son, of curiosity, of criticism which they found in Aristotle matched their 
own spirit and helped to crystallise their self-image45. 
The appropriation of Aristotle mirrored the influential role of Roman 
law in the twelfth century. Indeed, advancements in ethical, legal and 
political theory and the consequent developments in rights language 
were primarily produced by an assimilation of Roman law and the 
________________ 
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 Cf. H. BERMAN, Law and Revolution. 
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 S. OZMENT, The Age of Reform, 5. 
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 O. O’DONOVAN – J. LOCKWOOD-O’DONOVAN, ed., From Irenaeus to Grotius, 237. 
45
 C.H. LOHR, «The Medieval Interpretation of Aristotle», 84. Lohr distinguishes 
three stages in which works of Aristotle were made accessible to Latin Christendom. 
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study of Aristotle46. They confronted and engaged with each other and 
with the surviving feudal and Christian models – outlined in previous 
section – in order to respond to the new social and political exigencies 
of the time. 
The assimilation of Aristotle through new texts and the subsequent 
commentaries provided a comprehensive and systematic view of the 
natural world47. Firstly, this section shall outline the central points in-
forming the debate concerning ius and nature (natura), which was 
transformed in this period. Secondly, it will consider the culmination of 
the synthesis of Aristotle into the Christian framework provided by 
Thomas Aquinas and the relationship he charts between ius and justice 
(iustum). 
3.1 Ius and Natura 
In the previous section, it was observed that the Decretists systemati-
cally listed the many different senses of ius naturale (natural law):  
natural law is the teaching of Scripture, or it is what is left undetermined by 
divine command or prohibition; it is the human capacity to distinguish right 
from wrong; it is natural equity; it is also the natural instinct of all animals 
and as well as a general law of all creation48.  
In the process of providing such a list, the canonists also provided for 
an understanding of ius as a right as facultas or power belonging to an 
individual – that is, a possessive, active or subjective right. 
At first, such lists gathered accepted authoritative definitions. How-
ever, the Decretists consciously attempted to respond to the problems 
concerning conflicting definitions of the natural law presented to them 
by the preceding traditions by trying to provide a coherent account49. 
This methodology can be seen as part of a wider enterprise of concor-
dia discordantium that attempted to harmonise relevant texts taken 
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from divergent authorities50. By doing so, jurisprudence created their 
own resources – including rights – to be drawn upon by later scholas-
tics in their engagement with the philosophy of Aristotle. Such juris-
prudential reflection is one of three elements informing scholastic re-
flection on the ius naturale according to Michael Bertram-Crowe51.  
As noted above, the Decretum firstly associated the natural law to 
Revelation and the Gospel, before considering various types of law52. 
In this, Gratian was accepting the authority of the early Church Fathers 
and the authority of the Stoic influenced Roman law categories con-
served by Isidore of Seville (c. 570-636) – representative of the other 
strands influencing early Medieval thought.  
The former refers to the authoritative role of St. Paul and the Church 
Fathers. It is not a completely independent tradition for the early 
Church fathers were greatly indebted to stoic moral philosophy. But the 
Christian tradition found in St. Paul (Rom 2: 14-15) a confirmation of 
their own views. The Fathers were content to use a conception of the 
natural law similar to that of Cicero but they placed it within a Chris-
tian framework: «the impersonal deity or nature of the Stoics gives way 
to the Christian God, sovereign lord and lawgiver; and the knowledge 
of the natural law and its precepts becomes more intimately a matter of 
conscience»53.  
The latter refers to Stoic philosophy transmitted by way of Roman 
Law. In the Book V of Etymologies, concerning legal terms, Isidore of 
Seville replicates a tripartite categorisation found in the Digest. The 
Justinian Digest distinguished the ius naturale (the law of nature) from 
two other types of law: ius civile or the law of the state, ius gentium or 
the law of the nations. But the Roman jurists, and subsequently the 
canonists, differed on the definition and interpretation of each of these 
terms. For instance, Ulpian (c. 170-228) viewed the ius naturale as that 
which is common to all animals – sexual union, procreation, and educa-
tion of offspring. He categorised the ius gentium as specific to human 
beings only and concerned such issues as slavery, private property, 
honouring of contracts, free access to the sea, and the like. Others, such 
as Gaius (c.180), remained closer to the stoic ideal. He defined the 
natural law or natural right as similar to the ius gentium dictated by 
natural reason (ratio naturalis) and arising from the origins of human-
ity. Similarly, another Roman jurist, Paulus, wrote that the natural law 
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consisted of what is equitable and good54. The exact definition of the 
terms and their mutual relationship provided much of the dynamic of 
the debate in the Medieval Era. Isidore presented a definition of natural 
law similar to that proposed by Gaius and influenced by Stoic philoso-
phy: «what is common to all nations and is set up by a natural instinct 
and not by any positive institution»55.  
Stoic philosophy entered into the Latin West by way of the influen-
tial writings of Cicero (106-43 BC). The formerly mentioned Rufinus 
«drew upon Cicero to describe man’s capacity to distinguish between 
good and evil as a natural power»56. Cicero, in De Legibus, asserted the 
natural law as independent from convention. An early Church Father, 
Lactantius (d. 320), records Cicero’s characterisation of law:  
There is a true law, right reason, agreeable to nature, known to all men, 
constant and eternal, which calls to duty by its precepts, deters from evil by 
its prohibitions […] Nor is there one law at Rome and another at Athens, 
one thing now and another afterwards; but the same law, unchanging and 
eternal, binds all races of men and all times; and there is one common, as it 
were, master and ruler – God, the author, promulgator and mover of this 
law. Whoever does not obey it departs from (his true) self, condemns the 
nature of man and inflicts upon himself the greatest penalties even though 
he escapes other things which are considered punishments57. 
The stoic tradition also provided a wealth of ethical and political 
ideas. Medieval society was open to ideas concerning duty, friendship, 
community and the virtues, including justice, found in De Officiis and 
De Senectute of Cicero, were all judiciously placed within a wider 
Christian framework. Therefore, when Aristotle’s teaching on «the 
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naturalness of the polis became available in the West in the thirteenth 
century, it served to reinforce a position already familiar through 
Cicero and the Roman Law»58. 
By providing a relatively comprehensive system, the texts of Aris-
totle helped continue the enterprise of concordia discordantium which 
was bringing together the three above traditions. However, they also 
provided a new framework that deepened reflections on the meaning of 
nature and its place in judging right and wrong and thereby guiding the 
law59.  
Aristotle’s (384-322 BC) framework, outlined in the Nichomachean 
Ethics, is a teleological structure: all objects of inquiry, such as physical 
nature, ethics or politics, may be understood by identifying its telos, that is, 
the purpose or end to which that object necessarily orientates itself60. In-
herent laws guide everything in nature, including man, towards its purpose 
or fulfilment. For the human person, well-being or happiness (eudaimonia) 
is the ultimate goal of a moral or practical life. It is the aim then of ethics 
and politics to determine the means to achieve eudaimonia – for instance, 
ethics concerns the virtues or good human character required to attain this 
goal which is experienced as the good. By identifying the proper ends, it is 
possible to discern the laws that attain that end. The human person is 
uniquely capable, by way of reason, to identify the laws that guide its own 
actions. By observation of the actions of people, the natural law or moral 
principles may be discerned. One conclusion drawn by Aristotle is that 
man is by nature a political animal. In the Politics, Aristotle asserted that 
man is naturally sociable and inclined towards others for it is only through 
society that man may achieve well-being. The state therefore is a natural 
occurrence that serves and is guided by serving the moral well-being or the 
good of its citizens.  
In the ferment of the three traditions and the Aristotelian framework, 
the central issue of theologians and lawyers concerned the scope and 
meaning of the ius naturale, its corresponding relationship with the ius 
gentium, and the wider context of Christian revealed law (ius divinum).  
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3.2 Thomas Aquinas 
The response to Aristotle created two extremes: on the one hand, a 
reactionary rejection of the new philosophy by the theological schools 
of the Augustinian tradition, and on the other, an overenthusiastic ac-
ceptance of the Latin Averroists who subordinated theological doctrine 
to philosophical rigidity and consequently incurred ecclesiastical con-
demnation61. Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-1274) articulated a third way – 
a via tertia. To this end, he compiled a series of detailed commentaries 
on Aristotle’s major works and integrated many of the ideas into his 
own works that were responding to the intellectual, pastoral or political 
needs of his time62. This is particularly true of his time spent as profes-
sor in Paris (1268-72) and in Naples (1272-73), during which he pro-
duced the second part of his Summa Theologiae. 
3.2.1 Ius and Iustum 
The place of Aquinas’s exposition on right takes place in the second 
part (Seconda Pars) of the Summa Theologiae. It develops «the ethical 
implications of the theological and philosophical anthropology intro-
duced in the Prima Pars (first part)»63. The Prima secondae examines 
general subjects relating to human nature and conduct. The Seconda 
secondae considers particular matters in morality, consisting of indi-
vidual considerations of each of the theological and cardinal virtues and 
their corresponding vices. 
The article «On right» (De jure) immediately precedes the definition 
of justice (De justitia) and an extensive examination of the virtues and 
vices associated with justice. Aquinas, by following the method of Ar-
istotle, needed to firstly identify the end or object of justice – for each 
moral virtue is understood in terms of the moral goodness towards 
which it aims. To this end, he asks «if right is what justice is about?»64 
Aristotle, in Book V of the Nichomachean Ethics, identified dikaion as 
that object which concerns the virtuous disposition of the just person65. 
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Translated as iustum, or the just thing or what is just in a given situa-
tion, it is immediately paralleled by Aquinas with the then more au-
thoritative tradition of Isidore, «who tells us that ius is so named be-
cause it is iustum»66.  
As the just thing, ius or right is defined as objective or independent 
justice: «the right and just is a work that is commensurate with another 
person according to some sort of fairness»67. There are two features to 
this definition. Firstly, the just thing always concerns the other: «that 
which is correct is constituted by a relation to another, for a work of 
ours is said to be just when it meets another on the level, as with the 
payment of a fair wage for a service rendered»68. What is right is that 
which is due to another. Secondly, it is objective. It is determined by 
the demands of the equity (aequalitas) intrinsic to a relationship: «an 
impersonal objective interest is fixed. We call it the just thing, and this 
is indeed a right. Clearly, then, right is the objective interest of jus-
tice»69. As a result, ius as that which is due to another is according to 
the proper ordering in the external relations between people as estab-
lished by natural or positive law.  
On this foundation, the following articles turn to the categories as-
sociated with ius presented to him in the traditions outlined in the 
previous section. He agrees to the question «if natural right and posi-
tive right is a fair division of right?»70 The division is based on a 
twofold means of ascertaining what is due or right. On one hand, 
positive right accrue from reasonable agreements between parties as 
in the case of private contracts. On the other hand, natural right arise 
from the very nature of things created by God. Ius, therefore, is es-
tablished by rational judgement in reference to both natural and 
positive law. Stephen Pope writes: «What is right constitutes the 
deepest intelligibility of human laws, and it is the task of human law 
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to render specific formulations of what is right in particular con-
texts»71. 
Aquinas had developed the definition of law as an ordinance of rea-
son in earlier questions of the Prima Secondae, which concerns the in-
trinsic (power and habit) and extrinsic (law and grace) principles of 
human action72. Law and grace, as extrinsic principles, move the hu-
man person from without towards their ultimate end: «Law explicitly 
teaches one how to act and grace grants the power to do so»73. The 
analysis of the concept of law is based on an analogical division into 
five categories: eternal, natural, human, divine law, and the law of sin. 
Aquinas based the natural law on the teleological principle that all be-
ings by their nature have ends or goals towards which they are inclined. 
The end of all action and the practical reasoning involved in moral ac-
tion is the good, «For every agent acts on account of an end and to be 
an end carries the meaning of to be good»74. Therefore, achieving such 
an end is the first and primary principle of action and practical reason. 
«Hence, this is the first precept of law that ‘good is to be done and pur-
sued, and evil is to be avoided’»75.  
He categorised more specific precepts of the natural law according to 
our natural inclinations. First, man, in as much as he is part of all 
things, has a natural inclination towards the good of self-preservation. 
Second, man, in so far as he is an animal, has inclinations such as pro-
creation. Third, by virtue of his rational nature which is proper to him, 
«he has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in 
society»76.  
Aquinas did not offer a full account of the content of natural incli-
nations. He did propose a distinction between the primary and secon-
dary precepts77. The primary precepts are self evident and embrace all 
animal behaviour. The secondary precepts are established by a proc-
ess of reasoning on the natural ends of man. By arguing for two 
senses to the natural law, he could combine two elements of the Ro-
man Law tradition. Although he doesn’t mention him by name, the 
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first sense is associated with the Ulpian’s definition of the natural law 
«in which all animals share». The second sense is associated with the 
named Gaius and his definition of the ius naturale as that which is 
«between all men». 
To return to his exposition of ius, Aquinas asks «is the ius gentium 
the same as a natural right?»78 In deference to the tripartite division 
which was given authoritative status by Isidore, he acknowledges 
that the ius gentium is a separate category of law. However, he as-
serts that it is a form of the ius naturale. Following the distinction 
made earlier between primary and secondary precepts, Aquinas ar-
gues «by looking at it purely and simply in itself» that there is a 
natural law in the strong sense. He gives a biological example of the 
natural right of procreation or of parents to care for, that is, to give 
their proper ius or due, «to their young in order to rear them»79. 
There is another sense to the natural law. It arises from reflection on 
human behaviour in its appropriateness to human nature. The ius 
gentium is part of natural law in this sense and, according to Aqui-
nas, provides legitimacy for the institution of private property and 
servitude80.  
In the final article, he distinguishes the rights of a father and a 
master from political right because they lack the full sense of other-
ness present in the latter81. Justice, then, and the ius which is orien-
tated towards it, is in its fullest sense within political society. 
After determining ius to be the object of justice, Aquinas turns to 
the definition of justice itself. His point of departure is the definition 
provided by the Justinian Digest: «the lasting and perpetual will of 
rendering to each one his right»82. From this point, Aquinas goes on 
to consider the specific aspects of justice as a virtue and injustice as 
a vice. Aquinas’s claim that justice is the moral virtue proper to the 
will is consistent with the connection between justice and right.  
Since the will is a rational appetite, it is not surprising to find that the 
proper object of its characteristic moral virtue [ius or right] is not only dis-
cerned through rational judgement (this is true of every virtue), but is de-
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termined by reference to laws, whether natural or positive, which are by 
definition ordinances of reason83. 
In sum: right, and natural rights, for Aquinas is determined by iustum 
(justice), rationally conceived and established in natura (nature).  
3.2.2 Excursus: Aquinas and Rights 
The place of Aquinas in a history concerning rights is coloured by 
the overall narrative of the history of ideas. According to the many 
works of Michel Villey, in defining ius as the right objective state of 
affairs Aquinas briefly restored classical meaning of ius and the true 
foundation of a philosophy of law provided by Aristotle84. He argues 
that there is a breakdown of this position in the history of ethics and ju-
risprudence (by William of Ockham and the nominalists), which facili-
tated the first developments a subjective rights theory. The account 
provided by Villey views subjective rights as a corruption of the classi-
cal position85.  
Aquinas, therefore, is placed outside the historical development of 
rights (except as a counter-foil to which following theorists may be said 
to react). The exclusion is sustained by a rigorous division of the right 
into a dualism of subjective and objective right.  
Villey has devised a sort of Manichaean universe. There is an Aristotelian 
thought-world, full of light and sweet reason, and an Ockhamist thought-
world, where all is darkness and blind will. The good theory of objective 
right can flourish only in the first thought-world, the bad theory of subjec-
tive rights only in the second86. 
Aquinas’s presentation of ius as objective appears to contradict the 
possibility of a subjective meaning but such a view is too constricted 
for three reasons. Firstly, a simple two-fold division does not allow for 
the full plurality of meanings of the word ius. Annabel Brett, in Liberty, 
Right and Nature writes,   
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The language of rights today is fluid between several different senses of the 
term. However, history of subjective right has not been written in a way 
that reflects the pluralistic nature of the present concept. The plurality of 
the concepts of subjective right today has been recognised largely through 
attention in the way the term «right» – as attributed to the individual – 
functions as an element in the languages of legal, moral and political dis-
course […] the subject is still largely shaped by the attempts to locate an 
origin for the idea of subjective as opposed to objective right87.  
In order to identify the many meanings the term acquired, the history 
of right(s) needs to be a history of language – in this case, a history of 
the usage of the Latin term ius. This leads to the second objection; a 
strict dualism does not allow for the plurality of concepts to which ius 
is correlated. A history of the use of language (that is, a textual history 
in the light of social context) ought to allow for the development and 
intermingling of many correlative terms which together help define the 
many senses of right. Examples of such terms are the headings to the 
sections by which the historical section of this thesis is organised.  
Thirdly, Villey’s dualism portrays two competing notions and there-
fore does not allow for the fact that they may be mutually related. Some 
models of ethics and jurisprudence may create such a contradiction, but 
it need not be the case for all the proposed theories in the history of 
ideas. This final point can be discerned of Aquinas. In the article «De 
jure», Aquinas harmonises the definitions of justice offered by Aris-
totle and Roman Law by utilising the language of due and duty – the 
right thing is due from the just man to another citizen. But, as Annabel 
Brett argues, implicit is the right that a citizen may claim from another 
according to what is established in justice: it becomes his right – ius 
suum – a phrase commonly used by Aquinas to refer to justice. As a re-
sult, subjective rights may be implied. It is in this light that Aquinas can 
consider particular issues of justice and injustice. «This enables him to 
cover topics such as restitution, which involve the notions of dominium 
and suum, in the same terms of iustum defined as the obiectum iusitiae. 
As we shall see, future Thomists would make the shift in sense ex-
plicit»88.  
Brett’s study refers to the Thomists of the seventeenth century89. But 
the establishment of natural rights from the natural law – that is iura 
possessed by the person established by the ius naturale – is proposed 
«at every stage in the development of the doctrine – in the twelfth-
________________ 
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century renaissance of law, in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, 
and still in the twentieth-century discourse»90. For example, in the con-
temporary resurgence of rights-language and theoretical reflection on 
rights, Jacques Maritain argued that natural rights are consistent and 
founded on the natural law: «How could we understand human rights if 
we had not a sufficiently adequate notion of natural law? The same 
natural law which puts down our most fundamental duties, and by vir-
tue of which every law is binding, is the very law which assigns to us 
our fundamental rights»91. John Finnis, one of the central theorists, ar-
gues that a doctrine of natural rights is contained in the works of Aqui-
nas92. His own account, inspired by Aquinas, will be analysed as part of 
the central discussion of this thesis.  
3.3 Historical Context 
It was maintained previously that the appropriation of Aristotle into 
Latin Christian Europe in the thirteenth century marked a turning point 
in the Middle Ages. Differently, H.R. Pirenne denies that an intellectual 
revolution took place. Instead, a social and economic revolution took 
place: increasing urbanisation and economic activity were creating new 
social conditions. He writes 
Every department of social life was transformed; […] Never, until the end 
of the 17th century, was there such a profound social – I do not say intellec-
tual – revolution. Hitherto men had been mainly restricted to the relation of 
producer and consumer. Now they are increasingly ruled by their political 
relations93. 
Prudently, he subsequently warns that we must not, of course, exag-
gerate. Yet significant social changes were occurring and, as outlined in 
the previous section, influencing the origins of a rights-language. The 
growth in trade and urbanisation developed most strongly through the 
North Italian city-states, the marine republics of Venice, Genoa, and 
Pisa, and the cities of the Hanseatic League in Northern Germany. The 
status of the individual was enhanced within the environs of the city. A 
German proverb of the time Die Stadtluft macht frei – the air of the city 
makes free – referred to protection from feudal serfdom94. By end of 
the twelfth century a «form of Republican self-government had come to 
________________ 
 
90
 B. TIERNEY, The Idea of Natural Rights, 34. 
91
 J. MARITIAN, Man and the State, 95. ID., The Person and the Common Good. 
92
 J. FINNIS, Aquinas, 132-186. 
93
 H.R. PIRENNE, A History of Europe, 225; ID., Economic and Social History. 
94
 H.R. PIRENNE, The Medieval Cities, 201. 
PART ONE: HISTORY 44 
be adopted almost universally by the leading cities of Northern It-
aly»95.Yet, such freedom was still within a corporate framework.  
The high Middle Ages had no more characteristic feature than the organisa-
tion called the guild, formed by people pursuing the same craft or trade, 
partly for the advancement of common interests, partly for charitable pur-
poses and common religious devotion, partly for purely social purposes96.  
The individual, albeit rooted within a corporate framework, was fos-
tered by the new models of self-governance and self-reliance that char-
acterised the guild and would help fracture the traditional feudal model.  
From the eleventh to the fourteenth century the primary political 
struggle in Europe lay between the Holy Roman Empire and the Pa-
pacy. On one hand, the Roman Church following the Investiture Con-
troversy and the ecclesial reforms of Gregory VII (c. 1025-1085) and 
St. Bernard of Clarveaux (1090-1143) gained in self-confidence. On the 
other the Holy Roman Empire continued to think of itself as the true 
heirs of the authority in Europe and protector of Christendom. Yet, it 
was not a struggle of disparate entities. Rather, the spiritual authority of 
the Papacy widened the scope of its jurisdiction and temporal power. 
Theoretical justifications of authority, sourced in motifs of scripture, 
were based on an elaboration of the St. Peter’s vicariate as the con-
tinuation of the earthly kingship of Christ. Given further validation by 
the developing studies in canon law, the doctrine of plenitude potestatis 
– fullness of power – was advanced and deepened by canonists. 
Equally, the role of the Emperor was endowed with the sacred and 
claims for its authority were deepened by the influence of the newly 
studied Roman Law. The Emperor and other emergent royalties coun-
teracted Papal claims by defining their own jurisdictional identity as a 
corpus or independent body. Although originating as the corpus mysti-
cum by assimilating the term it also transferred the authority to the 
temporal head97. At a political level, the imperialistic intentions of both 
developed militarily; beginning with Frederick Barbarossa’s (1152-90) 
first expedition to Italy in 1154 to deepen his claim as Roman Emperor 
and continuing for the following two centuries. Against both parties, 
the cities of Northern Italy, growing in economic independence, as-
serted their political autonomy with greater assurance, inspiring new 
ideals of liberty98.  
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Rights language would develop against the backdrop of these two 
trends – economic and political. New economic advancements high-
lighted and focused attention on the laws and rights of ownership; and 
papal and political pretensions to supreme power focused attention on 
the rights over one’s own destiny. The next section shall focus on the 
development of rights-language in the light of these two trends.  
4. Late Medieval Era: 1250-1400 
In Opus nonaginta dierum, reputedly written in ninety days as the ti-
tle suggests, sometime during 1332-1347, the Franciscan William of 
Ockham writes 
although it may be conceded that in the state of innocence our first parents 
had dominion, in some sense, over temporal things, nevertheless it should 
not be conceded that they then had ownership of temporal things: this is 
because the term dominium [lordship] has some meanings which the term 
proprietas [property, ownership] does not have99.  
Ockham (c. 1285-1349) draws attention to the different meanings of 
the term in order to refute the strict correlation of dominium to posses-
sion of property. Instead, he attributes to Adam and Eve, our first par-
ents, a power of ruling or governing that did not involve the possession 
of the material goods of the first creation. Although strictly referring to 
lordship with associated ideas of control, mastery and power, there are 
two fundamental conceptions of dominium in the later medieval era. 
Jane Coleman writes, 
The dominus is the proprietor, the possessor of land and of servi attached to 
the property, and he draws revenues from the exploitation of both. This 
dominus possesses dominium which is essentially an economic capacity 
[…] The dominus was also he who possessed jurisdiction, authority to gov-
ern, to establish justice, to levy taxes in return for maintaining the security 
of his subditi, and to wage war within established limits100. 
The two conceptions – ownership and jurisdiction – lie at the heart of 
Ockham’s contention regarding Adam and Eve. What may appear to be 
a mere exegetical point, in fact arises from two deep polemical and po-
litical struggles concerning property and power of the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries which coalesce in the writing of the text. First, 
Ockham’s treatise is a polemical attack on the Papal bull, Quia vir 
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reprobus (1328), of John XXII (1249-1334), which questioned and 
condemned the earlier doctrinal and legal basis for the Franciscan 
evangelical rejection of property. Second, it was written, in exile, under 
the protection of Ludwig of Bavaria (d. 1347) who was a German King 
and a secular ruler in long jurisdictional struggle with the Papacy.  
This section shall trace the development of two conceptions of do-
minium, and their mutual relation to ius in which the notion of subjec-
tive rights moves from jurisprudence to the centre of political dis-
course, by way of the Franciscan poverty dispute and the Conciliarist 
movement. As a result, the presentation of this section moves fre-
quently between text and context, making for a brief historical sub-
section. 
4.1 Ius, Dominium and Property 
Richard Tuck, in Natural Rights Theories, agrees with the suggestion 
of Brian Tierney, in which the first modern rights theory was estab-
lished among medieval jurists of the twelfth century. However, he 
maintains their theory was not of subjective rights, as defined in the in-
troduction to this Chapter, but «one built around the notion of a passive 
right»101. Instead, the rights expounded by the early jurists were those 
that upheld that which was granted to the claimant. The basis of the 
right, therefore, was the duty of others to recognise the justice of 
claims. Such an approach to rights, according to Tuck, was connected 
to canon law.  
Ecclesiastical law was of course greatly concerned with general questions 
of welfare: in the Church, Europe had an institution unprecedented in the 
Roman world in that it was actually designed (at least in part) for charitable 
purposes. It is not surprising that a theory about rights as claims should 
have evolved from within an institution which was so concerned with the 
claims made on other men by the needy or deserving102. 
This understanding of ius, however, began to change significantly 
by later medieval jurists. Active rights implied the imposition of a 
duty upon another and so determined how they ought to act towards 
the possessor of that right. In this transition, the key relationship, ac-
cording to Tuck, is between ius and dominium, normally translated 
as «property» and «right». He maintains that by the «fourteenth cen-
tury it was possible to argue that to have a right was to be the lord or 
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dominus of one’s relevant moral world, to possess dominium, that is 
to say, property»103.  
Taking classical Roman law as their point of departure, the early me-
dieval jurists maintained a clear distinction between dominium (owner-
ship) and possessio (possession, use). In particular, they distinguished 
between dominium and usufruct, or the advantageous use and gain of 
profit from a piece of property belonging to another. The former strictly 
speaking entitled property: the latter did not104. A decisive shift away 
from this distinction was made by Accursius (c.1191-1263), a commen-
tator or post-glossator of the University of Bologna in the early thir-
teenth century105. In his gloss, or interpretations, dominium was taken 
in a looser or more extended sense than earlier accounts. Accursius dis-
tinguished between ownership as dominium utile and possession as do-
minium directum. The former described what the usufructury pos-
sessed, while the later described what a superior lord possessed. Such a 
schema applied the notion of dominium, that is, the concept of control 
or mastery over one’s own world as ownership to both parties. What 
was the preserve of the lord was now extended to the vassal or the usu-
fructury. Therefore, dominium utile could be taken as any claim over a 
thing (ius in re), and that claim could be defended against all other 
men. The picture shifts: a tenant making a claim to his right to his 
tenement makes a claim of dominium utile rather than merely posses-
sio; the lord makes his claim to his right of dues as dominium decretum 
rather than simply dominium. As a result, the picture is «now two-sided 
rather than mutual»106. According to Tuck, «The process had begun 
whereby all of a man’s rights, of whatever kind, were to come to be 
seen as his property»107. 
The degree to which the account of Accursius was accepted by sub-
sequent jurists reflected the ongoing social and economic transition 
from the older customary feudal relationship to the one based on mone-
tary contract. In practical terms, what was happening was that the law 
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was beginning to protect the users108. Subsequent jurists began to em-
phasise a more active meaning to ius. Jacques de Revigny wrote: «it is 
a ius to demand something, as when you promise me a horse I have the 
ius to demand it, but not a ius in it»109. Bartolus (1313-1357) defined 
dominium directum as «the unrestricted ius of disposing of a corporeal 
object unless prohibited by law»110. Accordingly, the sense of ius was 
becoming an active claim rather than a passive grant. According to 
Tuck, the deepening association of dominium and ius was to lead to 
later explicit rights theories. 
On one hand, the transitions reflected new economic and political re-
alities. On the other hand, the terminology was later appropriated and 
adapted in ideological disputes. The first significant dispute concerned 
the nature of property or, more specifically, the controversy regarding 
apostolic poverty practised by the Franciscans; «its importance is that 
the late medieval natural rights theories undoubtedly grew out of it 
[…]»111. 
4.1.1 The Franciscan Controversy 
St Francis, in the Regula Prima (1221), writes: 
Let the brothers appropriate nothing to themselves, neither house nor place 
nor any thing. And like pilgrims and strangers in this present world, serving 
God in poverty and humility, let them go trustingly forth to beg for alms, 
nor should they be ashamed, for the Lord for us made himself a pauper in 
this world112. 
Poverty was believed by Francis (c.1181-1226) to be a spiritual 
way of perfection that imitated the poverty of Christ. In comparison 
to other mendicant orders such as the Dominicans, it was considered 
the defining characteristic of the Franciscans113. But, in the words of 
Gordon Leff, what began as  
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a personal quest by St. Francis and a handful of followers was gradually 
transformed into an organised way of life, embodied in an institution 
which, to remain in being, demanded the possessions and organisation St. 
Francis had shunned. It was from this contradiction that conflict sprang114.  
Within the new Franciscan community, there existed a tension in 
theory and in practice between remaining authentic to the founding ide-
als and the requirements of being an organised religious order. But it 
was also a normative issue; it implied a more perfect way of following 
Christ and therefore a model of life to be followed by all Christians and 
the institutional Church115. Furthermore, it was also an exegetical and 
theological issue: were the Franciscans correct in interpreting the life of 
Christ as one without property at all?116 In order to embody the ideals 
of their founder in an institution, the early leaders of the Franciscan or-
der attempted to schematise a systematic doctrine of apostolic poverty. 
Such a doctrine would allow them to use material goods without having 
ownership or dominium of them. As a result, the controversy focused 
attention on the justification of property, the scope of dominium, and 
the extent of its association with ius. Initially, under the terms of Greg-
ory IX’s (c.1145-1241) pronouncement Quo Elongati, the Franciscans 
were allowed usus of goods but the dominium would be held by the Pa-
pacy. However, the tension remained and widened further.  
Further distinctions, originally outlined by St. Bonaventure (1221-
1274), were given papal approval by Nicholas III, in a bull entitled 
Exiit qua seminat (1279)117. Types of dominium were distinguished 
from simplex usus facti or simple use. The former was applicable to the 
Franciscans, the later not. The fundamental difference was marked by 
fact that in order to have dominium the material object or commodity 
may be disposed of in some manner, i.e. sold or used for further gain. 
In the latter category, the material object could only be consumed. The 
Franciscans were claiming that it was possible to step outside the rela-
tionships of exchange, by asserting that consuming goods did not count 
as having property rights. But the conflict radicalised after the death of 
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Bonaventure. The Franciscans polarised; one wing known as the Spiri-
tuals, made of uncompromising friars, such as Peter John Olivi (d. 
1298), insisted on abject poverty as the true imitation of Christ’s per-
fection118. They were forcibly removed from the order and ultimately 
condemned by John XXII in 1326. Earlier in 1321, the same pope 
called for a public debate on the issue. In part, his concern may have 
been due to the dangerous conclusions that could be drawn from the 
doctrine of apostolic poverty119.  
From a theoretical point of view, the controversy turned on the justi-
fication of dominium: the extent of ownership implied by the term de-
pended on its justification. Up until this point, the theologians of the 
medieval era viewed ownership of private property (dominium rerum 
temporalium or potestas appropridanda res temporales) to be justified 
by a necessity resulting from the consequences of the Fall. On one 
hand, the Franciscans needed to show that although ownership was a 
social necessity it was not simply deducible from the ius naturale. Fur-
thermore, they had to maintain that it was precluded and upheld by 
Revelation in the poverty of Christ and the apostles. In this regard, 
Richard Tuck maintains that a major source of the Franciscan case was 
Duns Scotus (c.1270-1308)120. Duns Scotus argued that that property 
rights are not strictly speaking de jure naturali. He argued that the ius 
naturale ruled it out. It was incompatible with man in a state of inno-
cence becuase property possession is a human institution with a con-
ventional, legal, positive character121. On the other hand, opponents to 
the Franciscan doctrine needed to show that it was more than merely 
conventional; it was at least compatible with, if not implied by, the 
natural law122.  
The final judgement on the issue by John XXII, in Quia vir reprobus 
(1329), claimed that man’s dominium over the earth and its goods was 
conceptually the same as God’s dominium over the earth. Therefore, in 
the «state of innocence» man did have ownership or dominium over 
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temporal things, including that which was for his own use. Ownership 
in positive law reflected the natural order. Positive property rights were 
based on natural right. It was a significant development because prop-
erty was no longer a mere product of the Fall or a necessary human in-
stitution. Dominium was an inescapable fact of nature. The Franciscans, 
therefore, necessarily owned the goods which they used. 
In his response, William of Ockham, as quoted in the opening of this 
section, acknowledged the papal position that Adam and Eve held do-
minium over the material things of the world. But he denied that it was 
of the type asserted by the Papacy. The difference in position, there-
fore, depended not on the fact of dominium but on its scope. According 
to Tuck, by trying to place limits, Ockham actually conceded the essen-
tial point – dominium is a characteristic of the human person. In effect, 
Tuck inverts the influential position of Michel Villey, which proposes 
Ockham is the father of subjective rights: «Villey may have got this (in 
a sense) completely the wrong way round»123. Tuck contends that the 
remote origin of rights is in the tradition of canonists to which John 
XXII belonged, and was appropriated by Ockham in course of the po-
lemics. Commenting on the outcome of the debate, he writes: 
The end result of this debate was that the conservative theorists had been 
led to say that men, considered purely as isolated individuals, had a control 
over their lives which could correctly be described as dominium or prop-
erty. It was not a phenomenon of social intercourse, still less of civil law: it 
was a basic fact about human beings, on which their social and political re-
lationships had to be posited124. 
The result of Tuck’s analysis is to downplay the role of Ockham in 
the history of rights. However, the eclipse of Ockham’s role is overes-
timated by him. He too strictly translates dominium as property and 
therefore, as Ockham complained, does not take into full account of all 
its meanings. As a result, he neglects other historical threads in the de-
velopment of rights. In this particular case, it leads him to misjudge the 
role of Ockham. The next sub-section shall give a more in-depth pres-
entation of Ockham’s definitions of ius in the light of dominium as ju-
risdiction.  
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4.2 Ius, Dominium and Authority 
Inspired in part by the universalist conception of the Roman emperor 
found in the Corpus Iuris Civilis, Frederick Barbarossa considered 
himself Dominus Mundi (Lord of the World)125. Such a title brought 
him in direct conflict with any papal claims of universal authority and 
continued the struggle between Church and state that defined the me-
dieval era126. In particular, the struggle concerned the extent of domin-
ium or lordship in the sense of authority and jurisdiction appropriate to 
either the Church or the state. 
The claim of plenitudo potestatis, or «fullness of power», essentially 
held that a duly elected Pope could not be held accountable to another 
human authority. Drawing on many sources, the so-called Curialists de-
fended the position on the basis of the supremacy of the spiritual over 
the physical. Anthony Black, in The Political Thought in Europe, gives 
the examples of Aegidus of Rome (1243-1316), who argued that the re-
lation of clerical to lay power is determined by the priority of the soul 
in relation to the body and of the spiritual in relation to the cosmos 
generally, and James of Viterbo (1260-1307), who wrote that temporal 
power pre-exists in the spiritual as to its first and highest authority127. 
Such a hierocratic doctrine held that all secular rulers derived their au-
thority from the Church: they required papal legitimation and could be 
judged by the pope if deemed to be defective. This era was the climax 
of medieval papalism as a political theory. Yet, as Black also notes: 
«these most far-reaching claims ever made for the papacy came at the 
time when its political power was most in question»128.  
As outlined previously, early medieval jurisprudence used a language 
of rights that expressed the «liberties» and «immunities» of individuals 
or groups against the authority of the King or their Lords129. The politi-
cal struggles of the later Medieval Era promoted a deeper theoretical 
reflection on the source and limits of such authority and the corre-
sponding «liberty» of individuals or groups or nations. It marks another 
movement of rights language from jurisprudence to philosophical and 
theological speculation. It is unsurprising then that those theorists who 
would advance the reflection on rights are those who sought to limit au-
thority or the notion of dominium as plentiudo poestatas.  
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The adoption of the Aristotelian notion of a natural political purpose 
to the person and the community facilitated a clearer distinction be-
tween the Church as an ecclesiastical structure and the state as a politi-
cal community. The clearer distinction facilitated a systematic compari-
son of the two institutions by many theorists, and so to the varying pos-
sible conclusions regarding the position of the Church130. Acknowledg-
ing a valid role for ecclesiastical jurisdiction, Aquinas and John of Paris 
(c.1240-1306) maintained the essentially spiritual nature of the Church. 
However, emphasis on the spiritual nature of the Church as the mysti-
cal body of believers also led to a denial by some, such as Marsilius of 
Padua (c. 1275-1342), of any need for any government or jurisdiction 
in the Church131. Others, such as William of Ockham and Jean Gerson 
(1363-1429), placed ecclesiastical authority within wider frameworks 
of the political community. With regard to the origins of rights, the fi-
nal two writers are the most significant, and the following sub-sections 
are devoted to their texts.  
4.2.1 William of Ockham 
Ockham’s political theory was primarily motivated by his disen-
chantment with John XXII132. The Pope had placed the Franciscans 
in a contradictory position. If they renounced all rights to ownership, 
they must also have renounced rights of use. Any use, therefore, of 
such things must be unjust and wrong. In response, Ockham rightly 
points out that the position of John XXII is jurisprudential: «he 
speaks of lordship which in the legal sciences is called owner-
ship»133. By insisting on meanings beyond jurisprudence, Ockham is 
appealing to meanings beyond positive law. Ockham refuses to 
equate lordship with property because ownership implies exclusivity 
and the consequent ability to alienate or transfer temporal things – 
primarily to grant or to sell134. Instead, he argues that our first par-
ents living in abundance had no need for such division.  
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Ockham goes on to make a distinction between the right of the forum 
(ius fori) and the right of heaven (ius poli) – in effect, between positive 
law and natural law. It was possible to renounce the former (right of 
ownership) but not the latter (the right of using). He interprets the licen-
tia utendi granted to Franciscans to use material goods as not confer-
ring a legal right, as John XXII maintained, but more importantly as 
removing an obstacle to exercise a natural right to use such things135. 
Ockham writes, «The permission […] merely removes the impediment 
preventing one who has a natural right of using from going on to an act 
of using, and does not give him any new right»136. By acting according 
to natural right, the Franciscans are acting justly. (By considering the 
law of ownership to be a limitation or obstacle to the natural right of 
using, Ockham prefigures the transformation in the relationship be-
tween law and rights that took place in early modernity. Thomas 
Hobbes went far further than Ockham in identifying all rights as free-
dom and all law as restrictive.) 
John XXII, by insisting on the necessity of positive legal rights ac-
cruing from permissions or licences to use (licentia utendi), had placed 
an insurmountable obstacle or impediment to the claims of the Francis-
cans to renounce rights of ownership. This may be seen as the crux of 
Ockham’s disillusionment: John was impeding the evangelical freedom 
of the Franciscans to follow the way of perfection manifested by a 
commitment to poverty. It is the assertion of liberty, rather than prop-
erty, around which Ockham’s contentions regarding ius and dominium 
(lordship) turn – and underlie his further considerations of papal au-
thority137. 
Ockham, who had joined Ludwig, the King of Bavaria, desired on the one 
hand to establish limits of papal power and on the other hand to found the 
independent rights of secular rulers. The dominium over temporal things – 
ie private property rights – and the dominium juristictionis of temporal rul-
ers could both be supported by the same philosophical arguments138. 
Ockham asserts the traditional argument against the curialist de-
fence of papal absolutism: «an unlimited power is at least limited by 
the realisation of the common good, which again contains respect for 
the jura naturalia of the subjects»139. Yet as Arthur McGrade argues, 
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«Ockham’s appeal to the gospel as a law of liberty was his most sig-
nificant argument against curialist views of plenitudo potestatis»140.  
Following the traditional course, Ockham proposes ius nauturale as 
dictamen rectae rationis, that is, the dictates of right reason or the natu-
ral law. Further to this sense, Ockham also identifies iura naturalia, 
which he defines as potestates or facultates or subjective rights: «the 
right of heaven is nothing but a power conforming to right reason»141. 
A natural right is a licita potestas to act because it conforms to the 
natural law and therefore is licit. Most significantly, the right – licita 
potestas – to act is a libertas or an autoritas. It is not a permission to 
act or own granted by a superior. The primary emphasis is placed on 
the power or the inherent moral faculty of the individual. The font of 
natural rights is this source and not primarily from the role or position 
of an individual within society. The duties of others are a response to 
such rights. To have iura is to have dominion, in the sense of control 
(jurisdiction) over one’s own moral world which can never be denied or 
undermined. Ockham accuses John of denying the Franciscans their 
evangelical liberty or personal jurisdiction over their own moral world 
to adhere to the ideals of Francis in imitation of Christ. 
Liberty as a natural right colours his whole political philosophy. 
Heinrich Rommen writes that for Ockham «the essential characteristics 
of the person are independence and self-determination»142. It is in light 
of this that Ockham considers papal authority to be specifically spiri-
tual, respecting the rights of others, whether rulers or individuals. He 
argues against the plenitudo potestatis doctrine and insists that the pa-
pacy is bound to the authority of the Ecumenical Councils, influencing 
the conciliarist debates of the following generations. Rommen argues 
that Ockham’s ideas gave the pragmatic rights and liberties of the era a 
philosophical foundation. «What Occam [sic] discovered was precisely 
the pragmatic attempts of the citizens in the cities and even of the peas-
ants to limit the jurisdictional authority of their rulers […]»143. After 
all, as he notes, Ockham grew in England, the land of the Magna Carta.  
Michel Villey asserts a more direct link between Ockham’s philosophy 
and politics: Ockham’s political philosophy (written as an excommuni-
cated refugee in Munich) is a logical outcome of his earlier ethical and 
philosophical systems (written at Oxford University). Villey argues that 
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Ockham is the first to truly define the ius naturale as licit postestas144. He 
attributes to Ockham a foundational and originating role because he pro-
vides the philosophical underpinning for the language of rights and there-
fore supplies a more complete definition145. His theory of logic and 
knowledge – nominalism – denies the existence of universal concepts in 
order to emphasise the particular. When transferred to the political reflec-
tion, it leads Ockham, and those who followed, to emphasise the individ-
ual over abstract social concepts. It began the process, according to Villey, 
by which «the individual […] becomes the centre of interest for legal sci-
ence, which henceforth strives to describe his legal attributes, the extent of 
his faculties, and of his individual rights»146. His moral theology – volun-
tarism – proposes that moral actions can only be judged according to the 
will of the individual, playing down the role of reason. When transferred 
to political reflection, it led those who followed Ockham to emphasis the 
will of authority as the source of law, eclipsing the role of reason. Villey 
and others point out that later Ockhamists pushed such theories to their 
logical conclusions and so provided a philosophy that was radically indi-
vidual, leading to a social atomism147. However, A.S. McGrade points to 
«affinities» between Ockham’s nominalism and his political concepts, but 
denies that one can make the logical inference from the former to the lat-
ter148.  
William of Ockham is significant because he prefigures the transforma-
tions in modernity that place rights firmly in the foreground. However, I 
argue that Ockham’s via moderna is not of the modern tradition. He still 
works within a medieval framework and not a modern one, which will be 
outlined in the next chapter.  
4.2.2 Jean Gerson 
The normative force of rights associated with the two aspects of domin-
ium – that people ought to have secure ownership of their material goods 
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and they ought to be free – were slowly taking shape as philosophical 
truths during the fourteenth century; both trends come together in Jean 
Gerson (1243-1316)149. 
The end of the property dispute coincided with the death of William of 
Ockham in 1349. More significantly, it was superseded by a greater dis-
pute. In the near forty years after 1378, the Great Schism divided the Ro-
man Papacy in two and finally three. The exigencies of the new context 
gave renewed urgency to considerations of dominium as jurisdiction. As a 
response, those involved in the Conciliar Movement sought to justify the 
authority and primacy of a general council in order to overcome the scan-
dal of a divided papacy, to initiate Church reform and to counter heresy. 
Jean Gerson, a French theologian, one time chancellor of the Paris Univer-
sity and the primary conciliarist theorist, «pursued these aims throughout 
his public life. His distinctive doctrine of individual rights grew out of his 
strivings to achieve them»150. The movement owed its ideas to collective 
government or corporation theory already embedded in medieval canon 
law151. But in this era, conciliarism moved away from its canonical forms 
and towards a more thorough theological grounding152. As a reflection on 
the sources and justifications of authority, it echoed the issues of Ockham 
outlined in the previous section153.  
In accordance with the tradition, he asserts that power of dominium is a 
gift freely bestowed by God. It is a state natural to the human person and 
was not lost, for all people possess some kind of ius by the very fact that 
God created them. In De vita spirituali animae, he continues 
There is a natural dominium as a gift from God, by which every creature 
has a ius directly from God to take inferior things into its own use for its 
own preservation. Each has this ius as a result of a fair and irrevocable jus-
tice, maintained in its original purity, or a natural integrity […] To this do-
minium the dominium of liberty can also be assimilated, which is an unre-
strained facultas given by God154. 
In effect, Gerson brings together dominium as ownership and liberty.  
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Firstly, dominium confers the ius or right to take to oneself and own 
the things required by the need of self-preservation. Ownership and 
property rights are the result of our natural state and cannot be legally 
renounced or lost by the removal of grace. This is the same position 
adopted by John XXII and is used by Gerson in order in order to defend 
the Church against the heresies associated with John Wyclif (d. 
1384)155.  
Secondly, the dominium bestowed by God includes the power of 
liberty. Added to the natural dominium quoted above, Gerson also 
identifies a human and evangelical dominium, both of which were 
constituted after the Fall. Human dominium was instituted by the law 
and therefore could be alienated. This is the position taken by Ock-
ham and is appropriated in order to defend against abuses in the pa-
pacy. Human dominium, as constituted by law, could be lost in ac-
cordance to the law: an unjust ruler could lose «title» to rule after 
judgement and condemnation by those with the authority to do so. 
For Gerson, attempting to overcome the scandal of three papal 
claimants, such competency lay with a general council of the 
Church. If, for Ockham, rights are asserted in resistance to a per-
ceived over-reaching authority, then for Gerson rights are linked to 
internal reform. 
In another work, Definitiones Terminorum Theologiae Moralis, 
Gerson defines: 
Ius is a facultas of power to appropriate to someone and in accordance with 
the dictates of right reason. Libertas is a facultas of the reason and will to-
wards whatever possibility is selected […] Lex is a practical and right rea-
son according to which the movements and working of things are directed 
towards their ordained ends156. 
In Richard Tuck’s analysis of the source of subjective rights, he ar-
gues that this is, in fact, the «first time that an account of ius as a facul-
tas had been given»157. Furthermore, Gerson «had converted the claim-
right theory of the twelfth century completely into an active right the-
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ory, in which to have any kind of right was to be a dominus, to have 
sovereignty over that bit of one’s world»158. 
4.3 Historical Context 
Writing of this past period, Tierney maintains: 
To understand fully the growth of right theories in the late medieval period 
one has to bear in mind, not only the obvious facts of medieval life – the 
obsessive concern of many persons and groups to maintain their «rights and 
liberties» – but also the pervasive influence of Christian attitudes to indi-
vidual and community at every level of thought and action159. 
The story of rights in this past period is of the movement from juris-
prudence towards the polemics of politics. If jurisprudence is ostensibly 
guided by justice then it is hardly surprising that some elements of its 
language would be used in the struggles for wider political and social 
justice. The whole story of rights, therefore, may be told as a struggle 
of justice.  
5. Renaissance, Reformation and Second Scholasticism: 1450-1600 
In the city of Mains, around the year 1450, Johannes Gutenberg in-
troduced printing with movable type, making it possible to reproduce 
identical copies of a single text rapidly and economically. Facilitating 
an unprecedented dissemination of texts and ideas, printing became a 
powerful tool of social and political change with «repercussions beyond 
those previously imagined»160. On one hand, texts and the ideas they 
contained became more widespread. On the other, the availability of 
early and foundational texts allowed for a renewed critical investigation 
of the originals, thereby enhancing their authority as sources. Three 
significant «returns» are reflected in three movements of the era: the 
Renaissance returned to the authorities of classical antiquity; the Ref-
ormation returned to the authority of scripture; and the so-called Sec-
ond Scholasticism returned to the authority of Aquinas. The three 
movements of return did not merely imitate older ideas. Rather, such 
ideas were appropriated and adapted in response to the new exigencies 
of the time; such as, the discovery of the new world, the rise of central-
ised monarchy, the abuses of power and a new rapid economic devel-
opment (in some parts of Europe).  
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The reformers and Renaissance humanists sought the authentic word 
of God and legal scholars searched for the original intent of Roman 
law. «Openness to the authority of sources, together with awareness of 
their distance from the received medieval traditions of thought, was a 
pervasive and sometimes explosive agent of change»161. A search for 
the authentic undercut prevailing political models. For example, exege-
sis confronted Papal claims and a rejuvenated jurisprudence challenged 
imperial pretensions. In turn, the quest provided a theoretical support 
for the rising strength and confidence of the nation-state and the na-
tional Church. 
This section shall only sketch an idea central to the significant con-
tributions offered by both the Renaissance and the Reformation – the 
centrality of the individual. Although not immediately concerned or 
framed in a rights-language, they advanced the continuing focus on the 
individual. Any specific developments in the term ius «stayed firmly 
within a Thomistic framework, and sometimes ran along more volun-
tarist and individualist lines, inspiring later, more unambiguously 
«modern» formulations»162. Therefore, considerations of the Scholastic 
tradition will continue by way of a textual analysis of two representa-
tive theorists.  
5.1 Renaissance Humanism 
The advent of printing facilitated the diffusion of Renaissance culture 
throughout Europe from its origins in the city-states of Italy163. «No 
group was quicker to perceive the vast potentialities of the new medium 
than the humanists»164. In a more far-reaching manner, this era repeated 
a dynamic already noted of the twelfth century165. 
Specifically, they returned to and disseminated the sources of classi-
cal antiquity such as Cicero and Plutarch. The term Humanitas, which 
had previously developed positive connotations, became a central con-
cern in this era. Theological issues were not eclipsed; God remained as 
Creator and supreme authority. However, the humanism of this period 
placed previously unparalleled emphasis on man and his status, impor-
tance, powers, achievements, interests or authority. For example, the 
advances in science associated with this time were a specifically hu-
manist development; it was presupposed by, and with its successes en-
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couraged, the ability of man to enquire into the nature of the universe 
and to control it. In style and method, the humanists were far removed 
from the scholasticism of previous centuries.  
Quentin Skinner, in the first volume of The Foundations of Modern 
Political Thought, concerning the Renaissance, presents the Humanist’s 
inquiries on ethics and politics as a revival of concern for the dramatic 
interplay between virtus and fortuna – that is, the struggle between the 
will of man and the wilfulness of fortune. The essential motif of Ren-
aissance humanism «is the proposition that vritu vince fortuna – that 
virtu serves to overcome the power of fortune to control our affairs»166. 
Such optimism in the ability to shape the social world according to 
man’s own desires was born of a considerably positive view of the hu-
man nature and of man’s freedom and powers.  
The social world with which they were concerned was primarily the 
city-states of Northern Italy. The city-states jealously expanded the 
«liberties» and «rights» afforded to them in the earlier feudal era. Fur-
thermore, they attempted to defend them against enemies from within 
and without. The defence motivated an ideology inspired by a revival 
of the notion of republican liberty associated with Rome and Greece. 
The humanists defended republican liberty and its form of government 
because only liberty can truly enhance the virtuous person. Despite the 
fact that the city-states were to fall into the tyranny of powerful fami-
lies and lords (signori), republican values of liberty as a noble and vir-
tuous ideal became central to political thought167.  
5.2 The Reformation 
Despite initial similarities and shared concerns between the Human-
ists and the Reformers – overcoming abuses and returning to a purer 
era – Skinner notes in the second volume of his study that two books 
published in rapid succession bear titles that reveal a decisive differ-
ence. In 1524, Erasmus (1466-1536) published On Freedom of the Will, 
to which Martin Luther (1466-1536) responded with The Bondage of 
the Will. The former proposed a highly optimistic vision of man’s abil-
ity to transform himself and society; the latter Reformer contended the 
very opposite.  
The ground of Luther’s theology and «of the spiritual crisis, which 
precipitated it, lay in his vision of the nature of man. (Luther was ob-
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sessed by the idea of man’s complete unworthiness)»168. The heart of 
the Lutheran project was soteriology – justification by faith alone. The 
nature of man is such that he is unable to save himself by any action or 
mediation but must rely on the loving grace of God alone (sola grazia). 
The only response open to man is the way of faith alone (sola fidae) in 
a God revealed in scripture alone (sola scriptura). There is no media-
tion. Ultimately, it may be said that man is alone (sola humana) before 
God.  
The implications drawn by Luther were similar yet surpassed other pre-
ceding reformers. «The real focus of Luther’s attack, however, was not so 
much on the Church’s abuses of its powers, but rather on the Church’s 
rights to claim any such powers in Christian society at all»169. The height-
ened awareness of the uniquely spiritual implied a radical distinction from 
the corrupted worldly. It is a division between two spheres, realms or 
kingdoms (Reiche) and their corresponding authorities (Regimente). On 
one hand, is the temporal (das veltliche Reich), or kingdom of the Devil or 
of the world (Teufels Reich/Reich der Welt), and on the other is the spiri-
tual (das geistliche Reich), or the kingdom of God or of Christ (Reich Got-
tes/Christi). The individual lives in both simultaneously. In the former, he 
lives as the Christ-person, in self-sacrifice before God, and in the latter, he 
lives as the Welt-person, caught in the relations of the social world. The 
twofold division ran through his ecclesiology, ethics and politics, and pri-
ority is given to the former to the detriment of the latter. In ecclesiology, 
the conclusion drawn was the radical separation between the ecclesial and 
civil worlds. The Church is the uniquely congregatio fidelium; thus radi-
cally challenging the claims of institutional and judicial necessity and the 
superiority of the sacerdotal state. All temporal power is passed to the civil 
authorities, further deepening the separation.  
The gulf was never more unbridgeable for him than in the ethical realm: be-
tween the gospel ethic of self-sacrificial love contained in the Sermon on 
the Mount and the civil law of public judgement and punishment, of «natu-
ral» rights setting bounds to individual and collective self-seeking170. 
The Lutheran pessimistic vision of human nature – or more precisely 
his vision of man before God – undermined the role of the natural law. 
The person is so corrupted by sin that the only means to perceive the 
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good is by way of the grace of God rather than by way of any natural 
human faculty.  
The reforming spirit against authority inspired many to resistance 
against local governance, most notably the Peasant Uprising in Ger-
many (1525). In Pauline fashion, Luther condemned such acts: or-
dained by God, civil authority is the only point of temporal power and 
must be submitted to by the true Christian and a true Church. 
The place of the Reformation and the Renaissance in the story of 
rights offers apparent and real contradictions. On one hand, both ini-
tially disregarded the juridical edifice to which the language of rights 
was bound. On the other, they provided key impulses to its develop-
ment, if somewhat paradoxically so. For instance, the Lutheran model 
elevated the role of civil society, thereby providing another justification 
for the continued centralisation of power towards a state absolutism, 
against which rights would to define themselves171. But liberty is also, 
in the words of Steven Ozmant, «its basic legacy»172. Crucially, both 
movements emphasised the centrality of the individual, to which the 
claim of rights would further attach itself. No longer is the individual 
merely a part of the community but is one who is set apart. The com-
munity is further reduced to the background and the individual moves 
towards an elevated status. 
5.3 Ius and Gens: Second Scholasticism 
The theoretical endeavours of the second scholasticism responded to 
the extraordinary religo-political developments of the time173. The old 
Christian Roman Empire was giving way to the Protestant polities of 
Northern Europe and the new Catholic Spanish Empire beyond Europe. 
There was no longer an overarching Pope and Emperor but a common-
wealth of (some) sovereignties in spiritual obedience to the Pope – 
power not from but under the Vicar of Christ. In the milieu of the 
counter-reformation, the scholars of this movement challenged the pes-
simistic Lutheran view of human nature. In response, they asserted the 
central Thomistic belief in the capacity of reason to supply the moral 
foundations of political life and reacted against the nominalists who 
followed Ockham. But their return to the via antiqua was never fully 
completed174. Indeed, «the very incompleteness of that turning away 
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was a source of theoretical originality and power»175. The Spanish 
Thomists integrated elements of the Ockham-Gerson tradition in their 
interpretation of Aquinas, particularly with regard to rights. Brian Tier-
ney writes: 
The combination of a professed Thomism with an acceptance of a rights 
language [transmitted by way of Ockham and Gerson and] derived ulti-
mately from medieval jurisprudence was characteristic of the greatest 
thinkers of the Spanish «second scholasticism», whose works provide the 
principal link between medieval and modern rights theories176.  
This following sub-sections shall focus on Francesco de Vitoria and 
Francesco Suárez and the new conceptual emphasises on ius and gens – 
right and nations or people.  
5.3.1 Francesco de Vitoria 
Prior to the sixteenth century, the basic text of theological study was 
the Sentences of Peter Lombard. In 1509, at the Collège de Saint-
Jacques, in Paris, Peter Crockaert replaced it with Thomas Aquinas’s 
Summa Theologiae177. Already a central text in schools of the Domini-
can Order,  
what was new and fertile […] was the exploitation of the Secunda pars and 
in particular the Secunda secundae. For those Dominicans, who were 
committed to the via Thomae, the Secunda secundae formed the equivalent 
of Sentences IV […] it offered it commentators an opportunity to engage 
with the political side of moral theology178.  
A pupil of Crockaert, Francisco de Vitoria (1483-1546) collaborated 
in editing the Prima Secundae of the Summa. Yet during his later ca-
reer, Vitoria published nothing of his own. Instead, the texts that sur-
vive are a series of student dictations or relectiones made in Salamanca. 
Nonetheless, by his new commentaries and applications of the princi-
ples of Aquinas to the issues of the day (De relectiones Indes) initiated 
a significant revival of Thomism in Spain and beyond179.  
In his commentary on the De Iustitia of Aquinas’s Summa, Vitoria 
accepted the original definition of right in the objective sense of the 
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term180. However, in turning to the applications of justice in a text 
called De restitutione, Vitoria offered a more subjective meaning, while 
still claiming to be a faithful commentator on Aquinas.  
He (Aquinas) says therefore that right is that which is licit in accordance 
with the laws. And so we use the word when we speak. For we say, «I have 
not the right of doing this», that is, it is not licit for me; or again, «I use my 
right», that is, it is licit181. 
This is a move to the possessive or active form of right – having or 
using a right. On one hand, the law indicated what is right, in an objec-
tive sense, according to Aquinas. But in applying what is right, Vitoria 
took this to mean that the law indicated what rights are available (in a 
subjective sense). But, as we have seen, such a subjective account is not 
present in the actual text of Aquinas. Instead, the Vitoria turned to a 
definition influenced by Gerson: «He says then, that ius is a power or 
faculty pertaining to anyone in accordance with the law»182. He relies 
on both Aquinas’s teaching on justice and Gerson’s doctrine of 
rights183.  
The extent to which such a combination is possible or desirable di-
vides the commentators. Vitoria may be viewed as a betrayer of the 
Thomistic ideal184. For instance, Richard Tuck considers the Second 
Scholastics to have returned to an objective sense of ius and therefore 
writes them out of the history altogether185. Others argue that rights are 
«implicit» in Thomistic assumptions and are open to giving Vitoria an 
innovative yet faithful role186. For example, Tierney notes that Aquinas 
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had acknowledged that ius may have various meanings and so argues 
«that he [Vitoria] was carrying further the process of metonymic asso-
ciation used by Aquinas himself when he added various derivative 
meanings of ius to his primary definition»187. Vitoria was associating 
an old term – inherited from medieval jurisprudence and transmitted by 
way of Ockham and Gerson – and connecting it to implications to be 
drawn from Aquinas.  
The language of rights in these centuries is being shaped by the crea-
tive reinterpretation of theologians and jurists in response to new con-
texts188. In the case of Vitoria, and many other Thomists189, that context 
was the treatment of the native population of newly discovered Ameri-
cas. Relectio de Indes is an exploration of the issues arising from the 
moral outrage at the oppressive and exploitative treatment of the native 
population by the Spanish190. Specifically, it investigates the right (ius) 
or titles of dominium, and the consequent limitations and responsibili-
ties, by which the Spanish claimed power and «possession of all the 
lands inhabited by non-Christians they might discover in the Atlan-
tic»191. The investigation is organised into three sections.  
The first considers the grounds by which the barbarians may be de-
nied true dominium, that is, political jurisdiction and ownership of 
property. They are: being sinners, infidels, irrational, or insane. There-
fore, the argument turns on the qualities that bestow or delimit rights on 
a person. It is a matter of who are right-holders? He disposes of the first 
two grounds – being sinners or unbelievers – by asserting that man is 
made in the image of god which cannot be taken from them. Further-
more, he re-asserts the essential Thomistic thesis that all forms of hu-
man dominium flow from natural and human law. Natural dominium 
belonged to man by virtue of who he is and not his spiritual state – ei-
ther as sinner or unbeliever192. «Natural dominium belonged to man as 
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a creature made in the image of God, Vitoria pointed out, but his like-
ness to God inhered in man’s power of reason and this was not lost by 
sin»193. The final two grounds – being irrational or mad – are denied as 
obstacles to bearing rights. Humans may never be put on a par with ir-
rational animals. It is only human beings and not all of creation that 
may possess rightful dominium because it is only against other human 
beings that an injustice can be done. By affirming the primary status of 
the human being as the one to whom natural dominium belongs, Vitoria 
deduces: 
The conclusion of all that has been said is that the barbarians undoubtedly 
possessed as true dominion, both public and private, as any Christians. That 
is to say, they could not be robbed of their property, either as private citi-
zens or as princes, on the grounds that they were not true masters (ueri 
domini)194. 
Dominium, therefore, was an active right that belonged to the native 
population, placing responsibilities on the Spanish Empire – sadly un-
realised.  
Skipping the second section of Relectio de Indes, the third involves a 
series of arguments concerning Spanish activity considered under the 
ius gentium. The strong association made by Vitoria between rights and 
people (gens) would allow for added advancement in the language of 
rights by providing a space for further reflection on the ius gentium. 
The developing reflection on the unique and separate place of human-
ity, and the laws held in common by it, gave new impetus to the status 
to the hitherto eclipsed category ius gentium. 
5.3.2 Francesco Suárez 
Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae continued to grow as the seminal text of 
theological reflection. In the following generations, the revival of Thom-
ism passed from his own Dominican Order to the newly founded Society 
of Jesus. Thomism was conducive to the mission aims of the Society in the 
immediate socio-political concerns of religious division and in response to 
the growth of state power which threatened Church freedoms195. Fran-
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cesco Suárez (1548-1617), a Spanish Jesuit and one-time holder of the 
chair of theology in the Society’s distinguished Roman College (1580s), 
wrote De Legibus ac Deo Legislatore as a commentary on the treatise on 
law of the Summa Theologiae; but there were significant innovations196. 
Suárez is self consciously a Thomistic theorist197. However, he is far 
more inventive than Vitoria, deepening the combination of Aquinas and 
the tradition of Ockham-Gerson. He argues for a central ground be-
tween the extreme realism of some of the followers of Aquinas and ex-
treme nominalism of the followers of Ockham. With specific regard to 
the law, he argues that it is both intrinsically reasonable and the will of 
God, by arguing for the inseparability of the reason (intellectus) and the 
will (voluntas). «On one hand, law is conceived as a rational judgement 
about good and evil (a Thomistic tendency) and, on the other, it is de-
fined as externally imposed commands (a nominalist tendency)»198. He 
repeatedly implores that extremes on either side must be avoided and a 
middle course should be adopted199. 
In the preface of De legibus ac Deo legislatore (1612), Suárez de-
fends a theologian’s contemplation of the law, for the law is necessary 
for the way of salvation. The opening chapter, entitled «The Meaning 
of Ius», continues the practice of acknowledging and listing the many 
meanings of ius. In a complex examination of the many senses of the 
term, Suárez begins from the etymology of the word. Firstly, ius can be 
derived from the term iustitia (justice). Citing the Summa, and faithful 
to Aquinas, ius is that which is justly due to someone, that which is 
right, or a sense of objective rightness. But then Suárez follows the lead 
of Vitoria: 
According to the latter and strict signification of ius, (that which is due) it 
is customary to call ius properly a certain moral faculty that anyone has ei-
ther regarding his own thing or something due to him; and so the owner of 
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a thing is said to have a right in the thing (ius in re) and a workman is said 
to have a right to his wage (ius in rem ad stipendium) […]200. 
Suárez is confirming a practice commonly held since Vitoria201. A 
right, observes Skinner, is «a capacity in effect to justify engaging in 
certain kinds of normative action»202. Suárez is deepening the signifi-
cant transition towards the possessive (ius possessed as a thing) and to 
the beneficiary (ius as a claim over another to uphold their duty). To 
use his own examples, the owner of a thing has control over something 
actually possessed (ius in re), and a labourer has a right to claim his 
wages (ius ad stipendium), effecting the duty of the employer. 
Secondly, the etymology of the term may be derived from the 
iubendo – commanding. Ius therefore is analogous to lex (law) because 
it is a form of commanding. Positive law is defined by Suárez as the 
«common, rightful (iustum) and stable precept which has been suffi-
ciently promulgated»203. But the law is not an arbitrary force of author-
ity. Authority is limited by the fact that genuine laws must prescribe 
what is just. And, being just, they must be directed towards, and so be 
limited by, the common good204.  
In a sense, this chapter has come full circle. The typology – objective 
right, subjective rights and the law – that appears in Grotius may be 
discerned in the developed Aristotelian-Thomist tradition as interpreted 
by Francesco Suárez205. 
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But the more immediate contribution of Suárez and influential on 
Grotius is the creation of a conceptual space for the study of interna-
tional law. Aquinas asserted that the ius gentium is associated with the 
first and therefore collapses the category of the ius gentium into that of 
the ius naturale206. However, Suárez maintains that it refers to both, 
«effectively creating a third class»207. The ius gentium is universal cus-
tom and is comprised of general conclusions from the natural law 
which are constituted as positive law by the will of human legisla-
tors208. He takes a more postivist approach to the category of the ius 
gentium – effectively tying commonly accepted custom to positive law 
and the will of legislators. International obligations are not simplisti-
cally deduced from the natural law; rather, they are concluded from it 
by way of universal customary law, enacted and accepted by commu-
nity of nations. It is «the law which all peoples and diverse nations 
ought to observe among themselves»209.  
The ius gentium arises from the bond of fellowship (corpus mysti-
cum) between the community of nations. It is made positive by the will 
of that community and entered into by free consent. The critical point, 
and in continuity with his tradition, is that man is inclined to live in 
community. The desire to become a community, rather than a mere 
multitude, created the volition by which natural and free men came to 
be bound together by some compact. (The compact as a means of un-
derstanding the nature of political relationships was later to take a more 
significant role.) The power to legislate resides in the power of the 
community and not in individual members or several members210. The 
move is analogical – the community is seen as a corpus mysticum and 
has power over itself as a person over their own body211. The transfer 
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of power to an authority does not imply blind subjection to the King, 
for the ruler is bound to the obligations according to the pact. He 
may therefore be disposed of but only in extreme cases. In this re-
gard, Suárez follows the moderate conciliarist tradition of Jean Ger-
son.  
There are, therefore, many issues that resonate and gain impetus 
within modernity to be found in the Thomism of the High Middles 
Ages – rights, the importance of consent in state creation, international 
law, among others.  
5.4 Historical Context 
The sense of emancipation that motivated the Renaissance and the 
Reformation led to the breakdown of Medieval Christendom in Europe. 
The Papacy itself was already seriously weakened by the scandal of the 
Great Schism. On one hand, it led to the collapse of international politi-
cal arrangements and the subsequent international wars and civil wars, 
lasting until the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. On the other, it led to the 
crumble of the relatively homogenous world-view of the medieval era. 
It is in response to both situations that a new political structure which 
prioritised the nation-state and a new mode of thinking were to arise. 
Both are in contrast with the previously prevailing Aristotelian-Thomist 
model. Both are traced in the next chapter.  
6. Conclusion: Some Inferences 
Although many questions cluster around the issue of rights, the ques-
tion that may be said to guide this thesis as a whole is; what is morally 
and theologically at stake in the use of human rights?212 A number of 
initial inferences may be drawn from the study thus far that will aid the 
later response to this question.  
Firstly, the course of this chapter mapped a dynamic in which rights 
were initially developed213. It was defended that a specific rights-
language initially grew out of a medieval world that intermingled law, 
theology and Aristotelian philosophy. Although rights will gain further 
impetus in contrasting traditions of enquiry, I wish to defend the con-
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clusion that rights were, and so may continue to be, consistent with 
such models of moral reasoning214.  
Secondly, some characteristics of rights may be inferred by their his-
torical development. Importantly, they arose in response to the increas-
ing complexity and insecurity of society, in which the individual gained 
in status. They grew in limiting the authority of an ever-strengthening 
centralised power by protecting property ownership in the developing 
mercantile system of economics and in defence of freedom against ab-
solutist claims of power. The historical origins and development of 
rights bear witness to the fact that they are necessarily normative: they 
prescribe and express the demands of how society ought to be fash-
ioned. Rights, in a phrase, express the demands made in the name of 
justice. Such a dynamic continued into the following centuries. 
Thirdly, the debates and justifications on social and political matters, 
although appropriating Roman law and Greek and Stoic philosophy, are 
primarily theological. They are placed within larger Christian narrative 
such as the creation story, the poverty of Christ, the power of Peter and 
within the evolving Christian institutional frameworks, such as the 
power of a Council and Church-state relations. Indeed, rights gain ini-
tial momentum from the theological assertions of a rational created or-
der, evangelical liberty and the equal dignity of all. Although later re-
moved from a theological background, I wish to defend the conclusion 
that theology may continue to inform the development of rights215. 
Fourthly, a wide «conceptual neighbourhood»216 of crucial associa-
tions to other terms were identified in this chapter. A partial list of the 
more important ideas in this era is outlined in the headings and sub-
headings of this thesis, including nature, dominium, property, authority, 
freedom, individual, society and state. For the purposes of this thesis, I 
wish to focus on four: justice, freedom, law and state-society. These 
terms are inter-relate and are structured according to an organised mode 
of reasoning. The natural law model is teleological: terms are identified 
by their telos, purpose or end to which they orientate themselves. In the 
so-called human sciences such as ethics and politics, the model holds 
that it is possible by way of reason to discern the laws and associated 
virtues that move people towards their natural ends. To hold them in 
mind, they may be briefly characterised as follows: justice is the objec-
tive right-relationship between people measured by their common 
good; freedom is achieved in the happiness of human person, facilitated 
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by adherence to moral and legal norms; the law is those norms that fol-
low the dictates of reason in pursuit of justice and the common good; 
the state or structures of authority are an essential aspect of civil society 
considered to be natural to the human person and necessary for the 
good of each individual. In short, these terms will help to further 
unlock what is at stake in the use of rights217.  
Fifthly, the distinctive marking of this tradition of enquiry I wish to 
infer may be described as «Order». What is at stake in this model of 
reasoning utilising rights may be summarised as order. The term may 
be taken in some of its various nuances – structure, organisation, har-
monious condition, or command. For example, society, and conse-
quently the state are conceived as having a natural order, as in «struc-
ture», to which it must adhere. It is an objective state of affairs. The 
purpose of justice and the law therefore is to order, as in «organise», 
society accordingly. The individual finds fulfilment by way of the cor-
rect ordering, as in peaceful or the «harmonious condition» of society 
and of his own internal well-being. The term also has a regulatory 
meaning, as in decree or «command», which admits a paternalistic, or 
indeed potentially oppressive, view of society, justice and the law. 
These differing characteristics will reoccur through the rest of this the-
sis.  
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Growth of Rights 
1. Modernity and Rights  
To return to the Prolegomena of De jure belli ac pacis libri tres, 
Hugo Grotius considers: «What we have been saying would have a de-
gree of validity even if we should concede that which cannot be con-
ceded without the utmost wickedness, that there is no God, or that the 
affairs of men are not of concern to Him»1. 
On the basis of this phrase, Grotius is often portrayed as the founder 
of modern natural law and associated rights2. The modernity of Grotius 
is claimed on the basis that he reflects some of the characteristics of the 
early foundations of modernity – belief in new scientific advances and 
criticism of Aristotelian moral and political philosophy and, most sig-
nificantly, the rejection of a central theological framework3. On the fi-
nal point, «Modern natural law», concludes Leo Strauss in Natural 
Right and History, «was partly a reaction to this absorption of natural 
law by theology»4. 
In A Philosophical History of Rights, Gary Herbert writes that the 
liberation made by Grotius of natural right and the law of nature «from 
the classical theological moorings puts him with those seventeenth-
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century philosophers who are the true authors of the modern, subjective 
theory of modern rights»5. Richard Tuck refers to the passage as mak-
ing «its untheistic character obvious»6. The originality of Grotius, ac-
cording to Tuck, is further advanced by his rejection of much of the Ar-
istotelian tradition in favour of mathematics as the model for morality7. 
Tuck admits to scholastic influences8. However, he maintains the view 
that Grotius ushers in the beginning of the classical era of the natural 
rights tradition: in effect, «he promulgated a manifesto for a new sci-
ence of morality, in which the radical disagreements of the previous 
generation could be subsumed into a consensus on a minimalist moral-
ity and theology»9. In light of the laicisation of ius naturale in the mod-
ern era, A. P. d’Entrèves writes that Grotius’s aim  
was to construct a system of laws which would carry conviction in an age 
in which theological controversy was gradually losing the power to do so 
[…] His successors completed the task. The natural law which they elabo-
rated was entirely «secular». They sharply divided what the Schoolmen had 
taken great pains to reconcile10.  
To return to the typology: the scholastics in the medieval era envisaged 
a reconciling and constituting inter-connection between ius as objectively 
right (justice), subjective right and law. «In the language of the law-
schools, ius could be used in an “objective” as well as in a “subjective” 
sense; but the latter always presupposes the former. There is a facultas 
agenda in as much as there is a norma agenda. There is a “right” in as 
much as there is a “law”»11. According to d’Entrèves, early modernity dis-
tinguished an acute division within the notion of ius. Justice and law be-
come separated, only to be bridged and so defined by the central claim of 
rights. «The modern theory of natural law was not, properly speaking, a 
theory of law at all. It was a theory of rights. A momentous change has 
taken place under the cover of some verbal expressions»12. 
The issue of modernity assumes an understanding of the distinguishing 
features that constitute modern moral and political thought and separate it 
from its medieval predecessor. O’Donovan and Lockwood-O’Donovan 
observe: 
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There is a set of political principles and ideas broadly accepted as «mod-
ern» that were also influential in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centu-
ries. Most notable are those of social and governmental compacts, natural 
and political subjective-rights, public utility, majority vote, constitutional 
structures and constraints on political authority, popular representation, 
communal will and the rule of law13.  
The Modern Era may be characterised as the elaboration of these 
ideas apart from or in opposition to «the traditional Christian theologi-
cal framework of divine and natural law, providence and salvation, jus-
tice towards God and neighbour, Church and commonwealth, public 
and private righteousness and virtue»14. Such frameworks may be de-
scribed as the theoretical structures that contain and define substantive 
ideas or principles. Grotius, they assert, epitomises modern principles 
within an older framework.  
What, therefore, is the framework that marks modernity from the 
medieval with regard to ius naturale and rights? The previous chapter 
located the embryonic origins of subjective rights within twelfth cen-
tury jurisprudence and legal studies, traced its development within the 
framework of the scholastic tradition indebted to Aristotle, and charted 
its adaptation in response to the socio-economic challenges. In a study 
of the natural law in relation to the state, Noberto Bobbio outlines a 
contrast between an Aristotelian framework and a model that character-
ises the early modern framework of natural law. He writes that «all the 
major political philosophers of the modern age employ this model 
without modifying its structural elements, although they do subsume 
under them a remarkable wide range of substantive features»15. The be-
ginnings of the modern period of natural law theory in relation to the 
state, and therefore law and rights, may be recognised according to the 
contrast between what he terms as «Conceptual Model of Natural Law 
Theory» and the Aristotelian «Alternative Model»16. 
The structural elements of the Aristotelian Model – which have vari-
ous substantive differences throughout the medieval period – that con-
stitute the earlier division in the dichotomy are as follows: first, the ini-
tial analysis begins with naturally occurring associations, primarily ac-
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knowledged to be the family; second, such a natural state is progressed 
and fulfilled in the civil state conceived as a perfect association; third, 
the structure of the state is seen as an aggregation of organised groups; 
fourth, the pre-political condition is within an already occurring rela-
tionship of superiors and inferiors; fifth, the foundation of the civil state 
is in an evolution from pre-political through a natural process; sixth, the 
principle of legitimation of the state is its necessity in facilitating the 
fulfilment of the person17.  
In contrast, Bobbio outlines the characteristic features of the Concep-
tual Model of Natural Law Theory: first, the analysis begins with the 
state of nature, an apolitical or pre-civil condition; second, civil society 
is held to be in contrast to the state of nature and required to remedy the 
problems of the state of nature; third, the state of nature is primarily 
made of individuals who do not live in society; fourth, individuals are 
free and equal, hence the state of nature is a condition of freedom and 
equality; fifth, the move towards civil society occurs by convention or 
contract arising from the willed acts of individuals creating an artificial 
state; sixth, legitimacy is the result of consent18. 
Six dichotomies emerge. In turn they are: the new modern frame-
work of the natural law in the seventeenth century prioritises the ration-
alistic rather than the historical-sociological conception of the state; the 
state is the antithesis rather than the compliment of natural man; there 
is atomistic or individualistic rather than social or organistic conception 
of the state; an idealised conception of the state of nature results in 
natural rights rather than a realistic conception that accepts inequality; 
the understanding of the foundation of state power is contractual rather 
than naturalistic; legitimation of political power is by consent rather 
than by the nature of things19.  
The principles, including rights, named by O’Donovan and Lock-
wood-O’Donovan, that have roots in the late medieval period, take new 
impetus in the modern era when placed within this new framework. 
The present and subsequent sub-sections will trace the evolution of the 
structural elements of the new framework and the substantial issues that 
the framework contains, including rights. Leo Strauss implies Grotius 
when he comments that «None of Hobbes’s forerunners attempted that 
definite break with tradition in its entirety […]»20. Noberto Bobbio 
concludes that «Hobbes and only Hobbes is the initiator of modern 
________________ 
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natural law theory»21. In response, Tuck argues that «In some ways 
Hobbes is the true heir of Grotius […]»22. Perhaps it is better to refer to 
Hobbes as a founding father of a new line in the genealogy of rights23. 
2. The Seventeenth Century 
The seventeenth century is marked at either end by the consequences 
of religious and political divisions originating in the Reformation24. 
The Thirty Years War (1618-48), ended by the Peace of Westphalia, 
carved out the religious geography of Europe. However, the religious 
wars significantly reduced the authority of papal power in national af-
fairs and ecclesial theology in political and legal thinking. In its place, 
the state continued to strengthen and took to itself the primary role of 
arbiter and true guarantor of security and society. As a result, rights-
theories became bound to reflections on the state and claims made 
against the state – not to ecclesiology as before.  
2.1 Historical Context 
Developments occurred in an unprecedented manner in astronomy, 
physiology, physics, and mathematics25. Progress in the physical sci-
ences due to new empirical methods and the example of certainty 
portrayed by mathematics provided models for thought in the human 
sciences of ethics and political philosophy. Francis Bacon (1561-
1627) encapsulated the spirit of deductive reasoning, a confidence in 
reason and the belief that it could facilitate moral and social pro-
gress. Certainly, it did lead to improvement of living conditions in 
some areas of Europe – the last plague in England occurred in 1665. 
But it also transformed the economic market place. For example, 
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new agricultural techniques such as controlled breeding led to the 
enclosure of common pastures – and so furthered the issue of private 
property. 
Intellectually, major theorists were no longer simply associated with 
universities, the vernacular replaced Latin, and interest moved from 
commentaries to writing original treatises. Frederick Copleston ob-
serves that it is a transition from predominantly theologians to primar-
ily scientists. Although they differed in their epistemological and meta-
physical approaches, philosophers of the early modern era were influ-
enced by the mathematical ideal. Furthermore, they attempted to re-
found philosophy according to irrefutable first principles that derive 
primarily from reflection on the subject or the person as opposed to na-
ture26.  
In England, «the seventeenth century was the epoch of a revolution 
of the most cardinal importance in the history of political and legal the-
ory»27. England moved through three stages: Civil War in the 1640s, 
republicanism under Oliver Cromwell (1649-69), and finally the resto-
ration of the monarchy by William of Orange in the so-called Glorious 
Revolution of 1688. This turmoil, which formed the impetus for the 
theoretical reflections of this era, essentially concerned the nature, 
scope and origins of authority – in particular, monarchical and parlia-
mentary authority. Each side accused the other of subverting ancient 
legal rights and liberties of the people and distorting the balance of the 
English constitution between King, Lords and Commons. England, un-
der the influence of the Magna Carta, limited and guided power ac-
cording to documented principles. In this century two significant 
documents entered into the canon of the unwritten English Constitu-
tion. The Habeas Corpus Act (1679) was enacted in order to protect 
against improper imprisonments28. The English Bill of Rights (1689) 
concluded the century-long conflict by making the monarchy condi-
tional on the parliament and protecting the English people from the 
abuses of arbitrary power29. Religious and political conflicts in the con-
tinual power struggle between the English monarch and parliament 
provided the milieu for the theorists of the seventeenth century outlined 
in this sub-section. 
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2.2 Thomas Hobbes 
As Hugo Grotius was forced to leave his homeland of Holland due to 
strife, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), some short years later, also fled 
from turmoil in his native England – coincidentally, both settled for a 
period in Paris. Hobbes claimed to be the first of all who fled in fear at 
the outbreak of the English civil war in 164030. Fear lies at the heart of 
the Leviathan, in which he wrote: «The Passions that encline men to 
Peace, are Feare of Death; Desire of such things are necessary to com-
modious living; and a Hope by their Industry to obtain them»31. 
However, his writings are far from apprehensive. Hobbes condemned 
the tradition as a failure because it based principles on the highest of 
aspirations and goals: «For there is not such Finis ultimus, (utmost 
ayme,) nor Summum Bonum, (greatest Good,) as spoken of in the 
Books of the old Morall Philosophers»32. Instead, Hobbes attempted to 
deduce his principles, «from what is most powerful in most men most 
of the time: not reason, but passion»33. 
2.2.1 Rights and Freedom  
Hobbes wrote extensively on matters of physics34. In A Philoso-
phical History of Human Rights, Gary Herbert argues that Hobbes’s 
account of the sources of the human behaviour was inspired and 
guided by the contemporaneous scientific revolution35. According to 
the scientific claims of Hobbes, nature is in continuous and neces-
sary motion. All animate beings are driven by continual motion; hu-
mans experience this as endless desire, «because Life it selfe is but 
Motion, and can never be without Desire, nor without Feare, no 
more than without Sense»36. Hobbes’s peculiar understanding of 
physics and nature made possible «or at least plausible, a revolution-
ary new account of natural right»37. Lawrence Berns asserts that such 
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a materialist philosophy allows Hobbes to base his moral code on a 
mechanistic psychology38.  
In comparison, Leo Strauss maintains that Hobbes’s political phi-
losophy is independent of his natural science because its principles «are 
provided by experience which every one has of himself, or to put it 
more accurately, are discovered by the efforts of self-knowledge and 
self examination by every one»39. The basis therefore is human nature 
rather than nature itself40. C.B Macpherson offers a third source. He 
discerns aspects of Hobbes’s principles in the strengthening model of 
the competitive and property-orientated market economy society in 
England: the description of the natural condition at the centre of 
Hobbes’s theory is «got primarily from observation of contemporary 
society, and incidentally confirmed by examining definitions»41.  
The natural condition, or state of nature, is proposed by Hobbes near 
the end of the first part of the Leviathan entitled «Of Man», in which he 
presents an account of the psychology of the person. In contradistinc-
tion to the preceding Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, the passions are 
«those forces in man, which so to speak, push him from behind; it is 
not to be understood in terms of those things which could be thought of 
as attracting man from in front, the ends of man […]»42. Man is charac-
terised as driven by desire43. The primary desire of natural man is self-
preservation, hence fear. Power enables the individual to fulfil that de-
sire and alleviate their fears through establishing security. In the natural 
condition, Hobbes posits the fundamental equality and freedom of each 
to fulfil their desires. But, as each strive for the same thing, some must 
lose out. In a natural state of freedom and equality, people become 
enemies: «the condition of man […] is the condition of Warre of every 
one against every one»44. 
As a result, Hobbes is at odds with the previous tradition, including 
Grotius, which asserted that man by nature is social45. Man is alienated 
from the other, incapable of trust and therefore radically individuated. 
The growth of individualism traced in the previous chapter becomes 
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central to the theoretical foundation of the moral and political order. In 
such a natural state, the laws of nature are those which incline men to-
wards peace – allowing for the partial fulfilment of desire. Hobbes de-
fines the ius naturale as  
The RIGHT OF NATURE, which Writers commonly call Jus Naturale, is the 
Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the 
preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and conse-
quently, of doing any thing which in his own judgement, and Reason, he 
shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto46. 
What is critical is the assertion that each is free to judge for themselves 
what is required for self-preservation. There is no law or arbiter to judge 
between rival claims. The conflict not only arises from the pessimistic 
view of human nature; it is «a necessary jural conflict between people 
whose rights overlap or conflict in the some sense with one another until 
they have been renounced»47. Immediately after proposing the right of na-
ture, Hobbes defines freedom: «By LIBERTY, is understood according to 
the proper signification of the word, the absence of externall Impediments 
[…]»48. The freedom of each individual therefore is a negative one – free-
dom from external restraints. The fundamental right and the basic charac-
teristic of all rights is the free fulfilment of a self-discerned need.  
It results in Hobbes defining liberty and its associated rights in contra-
distinction to the laws or demands and obligations required of nature. He 
defines «A LAW OF NATURE, (lex naturalis) is a Precept, or generall Rule, 
found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is de-
structive to his life […]»49. The precepts of the law of nature are no longer 
conceived as paths to freedom but restrictions of freedom. Hobbes there-
fore concludes: 
For though they that speak of this subject, use to confound Jus, and Lex, 
Right and Law, yet they ought to be distinguished; because RIGHT, con-
sisteth in liberty to do, or to forbeare; Whereas LAW, determineth, and bin-
deth to on of them: so Law, and Right, differ as much, as Obligation, and 
Liberty; which in one and the same matter are inconsistent50. 
The previous tradition had conceived of natural rights and natural 
laws as mutual. Hobbes, however, defined them as detached and mutu-
ally exclusive. The basis of right is not derived from an obligation to do 
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the right thing but the freedom or power that each individual has to 
claim whatever is judged by them to be necessary for them. The subjec-
tive element of ius, traced in the previous chapter, comes to the fore 
and is given primacy over and against the other elements of justice and 
law. Furthermore, the central characteristic of early modern natural 
rights theories is that they are based on freedom, conceived as a lack of 
impediment to what is judged for one’s own self-preservation.  
The central right, according to Hobbes, is self-preservation. Three laws 
of nature and the obligations or duties dictated by it are derived and subor-
dinate to this right and associated rights51. In order to advance self-
preservation, the first and fundamental requirement is to create peaceful 
conditions. In order to attain peace, the second law is to agree to the same 
freedoms for each, requiring the laying down of some rights or freedoms. 
The mutual laying down of rights creates a contract. The third law, there-
fore, requires that all commit to their contracts. This social contract is the 
commitment to constituting civil society in order to escape the natural 
condition. Again, in contrast to the previous tradition, civil society is not a 
natural evolution but «radically conventional»52. Civil society is required 
in order to overcome the natural condition: natural forces drive us from na-
ture. It is the task of reason and civic virtue to redirect and manipulate 
these natural desires in order that they do not become self-destructive. The 
contract or the transferral of right or liberty is the basis of justice.  
For where no Covenant hath preceded, there hath no Right been transferred, 
and every man has right to every thing; and consequently, no action can be 
Unjust. But when a Covenant is made, then to break it is Unjust: And the 
definition of INJUSTICE, is no other than the not Performance of Cove-
nant53. 
The primary purpose of the contract is to provide a means for judg-
ing between different claims. It transfers powers, particularly the capac-
ity to judge what is right for oneself. But, as noted, trust is not a feature 
of natural man. Therefore, a greater power than all or any is required to 
maintain the contract – a sovereign, «the Leviathan» or «the Artificiall 
Man»54.  
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The sovereign reserves the right to punish and to police, the right 
to adjudicate justice and the right to legislate law in his duty to 
maintain the peace desired by all who have entered the contract. The 
power of the sovereign, therefore, becomes absolute. The rights of 
the subject, on the other hand, are transformed into positive actual 
rights defensible in law under the power of the sovereign. Law re-
sults from the will of the sovereign but because the sovereign is con-
stituted by the will of the people, the law enacted by the sovereign is 
in fact self-imposed by the people. In this regard, Hobbes breaks 
with the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition by dissociating law from 
reason and creating the deeply modern association of the law to the 
will55. Of the three models of commonwealth – monarchy, democ-
racy and aristocracy – Hobbes argues for the appropriateness of the 
rule of a single person56. But in any form, Hobbes emphasises the 
absolute duty and obedience of all to the sovereign. Hobbes’s com-
mitment to absolute authority to provide peace is a salient reminder 
of the conservative or totalitarian tendency of many natural rights 
theories57.  
Leo Strauss observes: «Modern and classical political philosophy 
are fundamentally distinguished in that modern political philosophy 
takes “right” as its starting point, whereas classical political philoso-
phy has law»58. Modern natural law is a natural rights theory. Fur-
thermore, «To the extent that modern liberalism teaches that all so-
cial and political obligations are derived from and are in the service 
of the individual rights of man, Hobbes may be regarded as the 
founder of modern liberalism»59. But, according to Ian Shapiro in 
The Evolution of Liberal Rights Theory, Hobbes represents a transi-
tional moment. Although lacking some elements, Hobbes’s work 
«contains many elements of what was to become the classical vari-
ant of the liberal ideology of individual rights […]»60. Early modern 
natural law and seventeenth century liberalism are co-original; if the 
former represents the structural elements, the latter represents the 
subsequent political ideas. The full expression of this theory was to 
be worked through in the following generations. 
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2.3 The Levellers 
Hobbes fled England before civil war finally broke out in March 
1642. The power struggle between the assertions of parliamentary 
rights and the privileges of royal prerogative spilled over into armed 
conflict between the Puritan Parliament of Oliver Cromwell and the 
royalist supporters of Charles I. But further divisions developed within 
the Parliamentarians between the officers and many from the ranks of 
the disaffected Puritan New Model Army, named The Levellers. In Oc-
tober 1647, the two sides came together to debate constitutional pro-
posals – The Agreement of the People – at Putney Heath in Surrey, 
Southern England. Against the divine right of kings the Agreement 
stipulated: 
That the power of this and all future representatives of this nation is inferior 
only to theirs who choose them, and doth extend, without the consent or 
concurrence of any other person or persons, to the enacting, altering, and 
repealing of laws[…]61. 
It was the extent of the franchise that divided the Parliamentarians.  
2.3.1 Rights and Participation  
On one side of the debate was Cromwell himself, who, as Lieuten-
ant-General of the New Model Army, chaired the debate. In the often 
heated discussions, Henry Ireton spoke for a limited franchise based on 
property.  
All the main thing that I speak for is because I would have an eye to prop-
erty […] For here is the case of the most fundamental part of the constitu-
tion of the kingdom, which if you take away, you take away all by that. 
Here men of this and this quality […] do comprehend the whole permanent, 
local interest of the kingdom62. 
They insisted that the election of representatives must remain only 
with the landed gentry and owners of property, fearing a constitution of 
universal manhood suffrage on the basis that the rich would become 
governed by the poor, leading to the destruction of private property – 
and therefore the propertied classes – and ultimately to a collapse into 
anarchy and immorality. Voting should be limited to those of property 
because they have a permanent and vested interest in the country and so 
know what is best for all.  
________________ 
 
61
 THE LEVELLERS, «An Agreement of the People», 92-101, 94. 
62
 H. IRETON, «The Putney Debates», 107-108. 
CH. II: GROWTH OF RIGHTS 87 
The other side was led by John Lilburne, Richard Overton and other 
elected representatives of the Leveller movement from within the rank-
and-file of the army. They were a short lived and extreme element of 
the Puritan movement, inspired by a radical Christian equality. They 
pressured for constitutional reform and in particular universal manhood 
suffrage. In A Short History of Ethics, Alasdair MacIntyre writes that 
the Levellers were the first to assert the doctrine of rights in its revolu-
tionary form63. Their claims were given theoretical expression in earlier 
pamphleteering. For instance, Richard Overton, in An arrow against all 
tyrants, proclaims: 
No man has power over my rights and liberties, and I over no man’s. I may 
be but an individual, enjoy my self and my self-propriety and may right 
myself no more than my self, or presume any further; if I do, I am an en-
croacher and an invader upon another man’s right – to which I have no 
right. For by natural birth all men are equally and alike born to like propri-
ety, liberty and freedom […]64. 
Overton is asserting the domain and mastery that each individual has 
over his own life; those who encroach on such a natural condition are 
automatically tyrants. He is maintaining many of traditional English 
rights of the Magna Carta; but they gain revolutionary momentum by 
being associated with new conceptions of the individual. The claims of 
equality and freedom presupposed in rights are motivating claims for 
participation in authority and government. Rights therefore cut across 
the social hierarchy. At the debate, Thomas Rainborough argued that 
every man «born in England cannot, ought not, neither by the Law of 
God nor the law of nature, to be exempted from the choice of those 
who are to make laws for him to live under – and for him, for aught I 
know, to lose his life under»65. As MacIntyre writes: 
This doctrine [all men are equal in the sight of God] in secular form, as a 
demand for minimum equal rights for all men and hence for a minimum of 
freedom, is Christianity’s chief seventeenth-century achievement, […] The 
left-wing movements in the parliamentary army in the English civil war ex-
press for the first time secular concepts of freedom and equality which 
break with all traditional forms of social hierarchy66. 
The Levellers were a rather momentary movement within the wider 
power struggles of the time. A further second agreement watered down 
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their claims of universal manhood suffrage; but by this time, political 
events had left them marginalised67. Furthermore, within a short time 
religious Puritanism was transformed, according to MacIntyre, from a 
critique of the social order to a justification of the new economic or-
der68. However, the seventeenth century made significant gains in pro-
gressing the idea of the necessity of popular consent to law by way of a 
representative body.  
2.4 John Locke 
The so-called Glorious Revolution (1688), which crowned William 
of Orange, finally secured the triumph of the Parliamentarians and the 
establishment of constitutional arrangements in England. Although 
John Locke’s (1632-1704) Two Treatises of Government was published 
anonymously the following year, it was written before the Revolution. 
Whether it was Locke’s purpose or not, «It did in actual fact justify the 
Revolution to posterity, as well as to contemporaries»69. 
It was written to refute a defence of absolute monarchy and the di-
vine right of kings made by Sir Robert Filmer. Locke summarises Fil-
mer’s model as follows: «His system lies in a little compass, ‘tis no 
more but this, That all Government is absolute Monarchy. And the 
Ground he builds on is this, That no Man is Born free»70. The first trea-
tise attacked such a system; the second presented his own model, in 
which, according to Robert A. Goldwin, 
Locke’s own political teaching may be stated in opposite terms but with 
similar brevity, in this way: All government is limited in its powers and ex-
ists only by the consent of the governed. And the ground Locke builds on is 
this: All men are born free71. 
2.4.1 Rights, Property and Limits of Authority 
According to Locke, Filmer’s argument that power is linked to the 
divine ordering of superiority of some over others means that «Gov-
ernment in the World is the product of only Force and Violence»72. 
In order to reveal the true source of political power Locke begins 
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with an account of the state of nature. Similarly to Hobbes, he pre-
sents it as a state of perfect freedom and equality. However, Locke’s 
account of freedom is not of unbound self-interested desire or «a 
state of licence»73. The law of nature, discernable by reason, firstly 
«teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal 
and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, 
Liberty or Possessions»74. Secondly, it requires that each must do as 
much as possible for the preservation of mankind. The state of na-
ture, therefore, is a more benign place for Locke than posited by 
Hobbes.  
Equality and freedom assert, according to Locke, that everyone in 
the state of nature is self-governing. Each person has an executive 
and judicial power to interpret and enforce the laws of nature. Politi-
cal power inheres in each individual. Locke admits this to be a 
«Strange Doctrine»75. James Tully comments: «His premise of po-
litical individualism is strange: it is one of the major conceptual in-
novations of early modern thought»76. As self-governing, everyone 
has the natural right to punish those who act against the law of na-
ture in order to secure that law for the benefit and preservation of 
each. It is not simply an historical pre-civil description: any condi-
tion or human relationship in which there is no shared arbiter or ap-
peal is to live in the state of nature.  
In contrast to the state of nature, in civil or political society the 
right to judge the requirements of the natural law are entrusted vol-
untarily and conditionally into the hands of an appropriately con-
structed government. People must move towards a political society 
because of the confusion and difficulties that arise from each indi-
vidual claiming to interpret the requirements of the natural law, that 
is, self-preservation and the preservation of all. In this regard, Locke 
is breaking with the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition that linked the 
natural law to the virtues. Godwin observes that they are simply dis-
regarded.  
For that matter, he barely uses or does not use at all, in the Second Treatise, 
such words as charity, soul, ethics, morality, virtue, noble or love. They are 
not essential to his explanation of the foundation of civil society. For that 
________________ 
 
73
 J. LOCKE, Two Treatises of Government, 270-271. 
74
 J. LOCKE, Two Treatises of Government, 271. 
75
 J. LOCKE, Two Treatises of Government, 272-273. 
76
 J. TULLY, «Locke», 620.  
PART ONE: HISTORY 90 
task he names other, more powerful and universal forces in human nature – 
and, above all, the strongest […]77. 
The strongest principle is that of self-preservation, further echoing 
Hobbes. They both consider civil government to be the proper remedy 
for the burdens of the state of nature. However, for Locke, the main 
threat against a person is not other people; instead, it is nature itself or 
the condition of poverty and hardship. 
It is at this point, Locke makes an innovative turn, «which few had 
considered in the context of political origins, and none had given much 
prominence. He abruptly injects into the discussion the concept of 
property»78. The traditional view, shared by Locke, was that all mate-
rial goods were originally held in common. However, he admits of one 
exception; each person has ownership of themselves and the fruits of 
their labour. The produce of man helps him to fulfil the need for self-
preservation. As a result, the natural right associated with self-
preservation attaches itself, by way of labour, to what a person pro-
duces or appropriates. As Locke writes, «For this labour being the un-
questionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to 
what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough and as good 
left in common for others»79. Ownership of land is appropriated in the 
same way. Material goods have value conferred on them by people and 
the labour which they invest in their goods. Originally property was 
limited to what could be feasibly used. According to Locke, the inven-
tion of money allowed for the freedom to accumulate and secure further 
conditions of self-preservation. It preceded the establishment of gov-
ernment and was created by mutual consent and tacit agreement by the 
community80. But in time, and in order to protect the resources of self-
preservation, people needed to leave the state of nature in order to set 
up a source of power: «the great and chief end […] of Men’s uniting 
into Commonwealths, and putting of themselves under Government, is 
the Preservation of their Property»81. For Locke, property is meant in 
its broadest sense: «Lives, Liberties and Estates, which I call by the 
general name, Property»82.  
The innovative turn to the concept of property provides three inter-
esting consequences. First, in connecting the origins of government 
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with economics, Locke was to prefigure later models in which politics 
serves economics83. Secondly, although positing the basic equality and 
freedom of all, Locke ends up justifying inequality: «it is plain that men 
have agreed to a disproportionate and unequal possession of the earth 
[…]»84. Thirdly, Locke deepens the notion of natural man being an 
owner well beyond elements of older Aristotelian-Thomist tradition. 
The actual move towards civil society is the transfer of the powers and 
associated rights of each individual in the state of nature to a sovereign. As 
Hobbes, political power is enacted by way of a social compact. In contrast 
to Hobbes, rights are not alienated but entrusted to those who govern. Ab-
solute power is not created; people are not «so foolish that they care to 
avoid what mischiefs may be done them by polecats or foxes, but are con-
tent, nay, think it saftety, to be devoured by lions»85. Correct political 
power requires limitations because the government can only act according 
to the rights of nature entrusted to it. The obligations under the law of na-
ture not to harm the lives, liberty or property of others also apply to gov-
ernment. Rights, except the right to self-preservation, are transferred 
through the explicit consent of the people. The resulting community ex-
presses the three forms of power that inhere in each individual – legisla-
ture, judiciary and executive86. That they inhere in each individual allows 
for the people’s right to take back power in a tyrannical situation and re-
establish a new compact. Politically, his theory justified the new contrac-
tual relationship with William III, the new monarch of England, and would 
provide the ideology for the American Revolution a century later. 
2.4.2 Excursus: Liberalism and Rights  
As noted previously, Richard Tuck asserts that Locke is the culmination 
of the classical period of rights theory87. Ian Shapiro categorises Locke as 
the «classical moment» of the associated liberal tradition. I wish to pro-
pose five central tenets that may be discerned of the theories of Hobbes 
and Locke and shape «so powerfully both the vocabulary and the grammar 
of the [liberal] tradition»88.  
________________ 
 
83
 For example, laissez-faire economics of Adam Smith (1723-1790) or historical 
materialism of Karl Marx (1818-1883). 
84
 J. LOCKE, Two Treatises of Government, 302. 
85
 J. LOCKE, Two Treatises of Government, 328. 
86
 Locke accepts the possibility that all three powers may be held in one set 
of hands.  
87
 R. TUCK, Natural Rights Theories, 58. 
88
 I. SHAPIRO, The Evolution of Rights in Liberal Theory, 59; 59-79, 278-305. Pa-
renthesis added. The five consequences outlined here differ somewhat from those 
 
PART ONE: HISTORY 92 
First: the central conceptual place of the individual. It is the private 
individual, separate from others, who is the subject of all legitimate 
rights. Being predicated to the individual, they are truly subjective 
rights. The individual remains private, even on entering civil society. 
By way of the social contract, both Hobbes and Locke conceived the 
state to be the result of a conscious transferral of some or all of an indi-
vidual’s rights. Hobbes’s pessimism regarding human nature required a 
strong state initially taking away all rights in order to maintain peace. 
However, Locke’s more benign vision of human nature added an essen-
tial element to the liberal tradition – the capacity of the individual to be 
a right-holder independent of the government.  
Second: rights are conceived separate from obligations. In the older 
tradition, rights were within the wider context of just social relation-
ships. But in the liberal tradition that followed Hobbes and Locke, 
rights are expressions of the human capacity for autonomous action, in-
dependent, in the first place, from consideration of others. In the state 
of nature, rights concern what individuals can do: in civil society, that 
capacity or power is regulated by the law to allow for equal space for 
each. This implies three corollaries for the law: the law then must carry 
most of the burden of obligation; the law is separated from morality; 
and the law is conceived as the limitation of freedom.  
Third: the substance of rights is defined in terms of negative free-
dom. Negative freedom is freedom to pursue one’s own goals with-
out the interference of others. A conception of negative freedom is 
the basis of the central marking of liberal theory – the principle of 
non-interference. This principle underpins two political conse-
quences. Firstly, it grounded the liberal value of toleration of a di-
versity of religious commitments independent of political interfer-
ence, particularly advanced by Locke; albeit in a limited manner. 
Fourth and connected to the above is a second political conse-
quence: rights are linked to the justification and legitimate pursuit of 
individual property. The theory provided the conceptual tools for the 
growing capitalist social framework. For instance, negative freedom 
required limited political interference in economic practices. Again, 
an image of the individual as property-owner and as naturally ful-
filled by way of possessions is fostered. The liberal tradition, there-
fore, is intimately interconnected with market economics. But at its 
heart is a profound ambiguity. As more fully explained by C.B. 
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Macpherson in The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, it 
posits the equality of all yet supports a system of inequality89.  
 Fifth: the primary purpose of the state is based on the previous four 
tenets. The concept of the state reflects the dichotomy identified by 
Noberto Bobbio between the Conceptual Natural Law and the earlier 
Aristotelian Model90. Conceptual Natural Law or early modern natural 
law theory, I wish to claim, is the root of Liberal Law Theory. The civil 
sphere is based on the relationship between private individuals and 
conceptually conceived as a contract. The resulting state structures 
regulate and facilitate private interaction and, in order to do so, the state 
enforces obligation by law. But, because rights are defined apart from 
obligations, rights are conceived to be held against the state. The state’s 
legitimacy then is based on the extent to which it allows individuals to 
pursue their own goals, whether religious, economic or moral; hence, 
the common association of the liberal tradition with minimal govern-
ment and resistance to overarching authority.  
Based on the posited ideals of freedom and equality, these character-
istics define much of the liberal tradition and re-appear as critical issues 
in contemporary liberal theorists; namely, for the purposes of this dis-
sertation, Ronald Dworkin.  
Locke’s theory not only came to justify a revolution already under-
taken in England but would motivate further calls for resistance against 
arbitrary power. In particular, Locke would be very influential on the 
revolutionaries in the British North-American colonies (1776). How-
ever, as Shapiro argues, Locke’s theory is socially conservative91. Al-
though emphasising the limitations of authority, it lacks a fuller com-
mitment to the rights of participation in authority. Such an emphasis – 
pre-figured in the Leveller debates – would create a further division in 
the branches of the family tree of rights in the following century92.  
3. The Eighteenth Century 
William Edmundson, in An Introduction to Rights, suggests that a 
time-line charting the prevalence of rights rhetoric would show two ex-
pansionary periods93. He writes of «the peculiarity that rights-rhetoric, 
as a historical fact, has had its ups and downs and, looked at in sche-
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matic profile, resembles a Bactrian camel – it has two humps»94. The 
first expansionary period approximately coincides with the American 
Declaration of Independence (1776) until the French Reign of Terror 
(1794). The two political revolutions may be viewed as a culmination 
of a period of modern intellectual history known as the Enlightenment. 
3.1 Historical Context 
The Enlightenment is best described as a mood or temper that domi-
nated Europe during this period95. Initiated in the transformations of the 
early seventeenth century, noted at the beginning of this chapter, it is 
characterised by a faith in the power of reason to advance humanity be-
yond the perceived limitations and oppressions of traditional authority 
or religious and metaphysical orthodoxy96. Immanuel Kant (1724-
1804), in What is Enlightenment? (Was ist Aufklärung?), proclaims an 
age of independent reason. 
Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Im-
maturity is the inability to use one’s own understanding without the guid-
ance of another. This immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of 
understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the 
guidance of another. The motto of enlightenment is therefore: Sapere aude! 
Have courage to use your own understanding97.  
As testified by the previous chapter, confidence in reason reoccurs 
throughout the history of ideas, but the Enlightenment period is marked 
by unbounded optimism and belief that intellectual progress, and there-
fore moral and political progress, was being achieved and could be 
maintained for the betterment of all. Everything was open to rational 
scrutiny and could be reconstructed according to rational principles – 
including religion. The process of secularisation cut off analysis of hu-
man experience from religion. Reflection proceeded from man as he is, 
rather than man as he is in relation to God, which may be said to char-
acterise earlier turns to the individual. The point of departure was more 
truly anthropocentric.  
Capturing the spirit of the age is The Encyclopaedic Dictionary 
(1749), edited by Denis Diderot (1713-1784) and Jean-le-Rond 
d’Alembert (1717-1783). They gathered together a wide range of con-
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tributors to a project attempting to coordinate and systematise knowl-
edge. The drive to systematisation was influenced by the successes of 
the physical sciences in deducting universal laws from collected em-
pirical evidence. Such spirit also motivated, in part, the initial codifica-
tions of the law – exemplified by the Napoleonic Code98.  
Writing early in the following century, Alexis de Tocqueville ob-
served,  
Thus, though their ways diverged in the course of their researches, their 
starting point was the same in all cases; and this was the belief that what 
was wanted was to replace the complex of traditional customs governing 
the social order of the day by simple, elementary rules deriving from the 
exercise of the human reason and natural law99.  
In Europe, such an intellectual mood clashed with the political and 
social structures. Turmoil in England had concluded in the establish-
ment of political representation within a constitutional monarchy. But 
the lack of such a system on continental Europe, particularly in France, 
frustrated and radicalised political thinking, creating conditions in 
which rights became the widespread rallying cry for justice. The desire 
for change was also driven by socio-economic transformations. Politi-
cal stability, colonisation, a protestant work ethic and scientific ad-
vances facilitated the industrial revolution in Britain in the latter half of 
this century. Across much of Europe, a new self-confident middle class 
grew and desired to assert its political will, clashing with the monarchi-
cal social order. 
This section is not organised in a strict chronological manner. Firstly, 
it briefly explores The American Declaration of Independence (1776) 
as it is philosophically closer to the theorists of the previous section. 
Secondly, it will move to the two dominant theorists of the eighteenth 
century with regard to rights – Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel 
Kant. 
3.2 The American Declaration of Independence  
As a prerequisite to the overthrow of authority and the subsequent 
recovery of the natural right to form a new government, Locke pre-
scribed the requirement to clearly list alleged abuses. If the list is 
compelling, «‘tis not to be wonder’d, that they should then rouze 
themselves, and endeavour to put the rule into such hands, which 
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may secure to them the ends for which Government was first erected 
[…]»100. 
In 1776, The United States Declaration of Independence announced 
the secession of thirteen North American colonies from Great Britain. 
They followed Locke’s direction and listed abuses under the sover-
eignty of King George III, and concluded that after «repeated injuries 
and usurpations, all having, in direct object, the establishment of an ab-
solute tyranny over these States»101. It then proceeded to list twenty-
seven dissensions. At first, the resistance to perceived and real abuses 
was as Englishmen asserting their traditional rights. The declaration it-
self records: «In every stage of these oppressions, we have petitioned 
for redress in the most humble terms; our repeated petitions have been 
answered only by repeated injury»102. 
Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826), the chief architect of the document, 
was greatly influenced by Locke. The contractual aspect of government 
and the commitment to natural rights of all are present in the document. 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that 
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that 
among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure 
these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just 
powers from the consent of the governed; that, whenever any form of gov-
ernment becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to 
alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its founda-
tion on such principles, and organising its powers in such form, as to them 
shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness103. 
The American Declaration employs Locke’s conception of man as a 
bearer of natural rights bestowed by his Creator. Locke’s central rights 
of life, liberty and property are modified to life, liberty and the pursuit 
of happiness. But even the pursuit of happiness is considered along 
Lockean lines: within the boundaries of non-interference by govern-
ment, particularly in matters of property, people are tolerated to pursue 
their own goals. Similarly, it holds a Lockean view on the construction 
of government: it is viewed as a contract with the people in whom sov-
ereignty remains. It can be abolished if it impedes man’s natural rights. 
This model was further expressed in the enactment of the Constitution 
and a Bill of Rights. The latter, «consisting of the first ten amendments 
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annexed in 1791 to the United States Constitution of 1787, although us-
ing as its practical model the English Bill of Rights in 1689, clearly be-
longs in the doctrinal tradition shaped by Locke»104. 
3.3 Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
For the previously mentioned Encyclopaedic Dictionary, Diderot in-
vited Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) to contribute a number of ar-
ticles – Book V included Rousseau’s Discourse on the Political Econ-
omy. It was Diderot, ironically as it turned out, who encouraged Rous-
seau to first write an essay in response to a prize offered by the Dijon 
Academy: Has the progress of the sciences and arts done more to cor-
rupt morals or improve them?105. Rousseau proposed, in Discourse on 
the Arts and Sciences, that far from ennobling man, civilisation cor-
rupted man’s original innocence. The theme underlies all his work and 
guides Rousseau’s efforts to give a true account of man’s state of na-
ture in order that it may be regained. By doing so he directly opposed 
the belief in progress held by Diderot and the philosophes of the 
Enlightenment. According to Leo Strauss, Rousseau was the first critic 
of modernity106.  
3.3.1 Rights and Popular Sovereignty 
Rousseau turned to moral and political inequalities in The Discourse 
on the Origin of Inequality. Critical of Hobbes and Locke for incor-
rectly describing natural man, he observes: «Every one of them, in 
short, constantly dwelling on wants, avidity, oppression, desires, and 
pride, has transferred to the state of nature ideas which were acquired in 
society; so that, in speaking of the savage, they described the social 
man»107. It is civil man that is alienated from others; a distortion that is 
projected unto natural man. Corruptions that belong to civilisation are 
justified by the claim that they are natural.  
Rousseau does agree with Hobbes and Locke on the normative im-
portance of natural man and proceeds to give his own account. He radi-
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cally sheds man of all attributes associated with civil living, including 
language. Natural man is at peace with his surroundings: he is not radi-
cally alienated from each other by the aggressiveness or competition, as 
conceived by Hobbes108. He lives guided by nature, with a sense of 
immediacy, following his instinct, desires and passions. But like 
Hobbes and Locke, natural man is still an individual, living freely and 
equally without any authority. However, he has the capacity to be 
moved by others, motivated by only the simplest of desires – self-
preservation or self-love (amour de soi) and compassion or pity (pitie) 
for others109. According to Gary Herbert, Rousseau is asserting the so-
ciability of man and it is this that marks him from the early modern tra-
dition110. However, unlike the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition, the socia-
bility of man does not necessarily require that man be a political ani-
mal. 
Initially, man develops social skills of speech, reason and familial 
ties and continues to live a peaceful life. As with Locke, property is 
an essential element to the foundations of civil society. However, 
due to private property, amour de soi develops into amour propre – 
true self-love mutates into vanity and selfishness. He concludes: 
«The first man, who, having enclosed a piece of ground bethought 
himself of saying “This is mine”, and found people simple enough to 
believe him, was the real founder of civil society»111. War ensues, 
requiring the need for peace. Unlike Hobbes or Locke, who view the 
origins of civil society as the product of rational self-interest of all, 
Rousseau sees civil society as a means of reinforcing and legitimis-
ing the interests of the powerful and the propertied. At base it is a 
deception – a trick. They propose peace under the guise of a wise 
sovereign power. As a result, «All ran headlong to their chains in 
hopes of securing their liberty»112. Society is founded on vanity and 
selfishness; hence, the inequalities present in society. It contrasts 
with the view of society as necessary for the fulfilment of man as 
proposed by the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition or as a means of se-
curity of self or protection of property as proposed by the early 
modern liberal tradition.  
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David Muschamp argues that Rousseau’s account of the essential 
goodness of man challenges the Christian account of man’s fall from 
grace, which was emphasised in his native Calvinist Geneva.  
It was not disobedience, rebellion and ungodliness which caused the misery 
of mankind, as the theologians proposed, but unnatural and vicious social 
arrangements which produced the inequality, the injustice, the loss of free-
dom and the consequent degradation of civilised mankind113.  
Redemption is possible according to Rousseau. By way of education 
towards civic virtue, people may refocus their passions. In this, he was 
very influential on the Romantic Movement, which responded to the ra-
tionality of the Enlightenment114.  
The division between freedom and bondage, nature and society, man 
and citizen organises all of his work115. It gives rise to a problem, ad-
dressed in Of the Social Contract (1762):  
The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect 
with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and 
in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, 
and remain as free as before116.  
As «born free and everywhere in chains»117, the dual nature of man 
creates a problem of legitimacy. On one hand, freedom and equality is 
man’s natural condition, but on the other, social order is the «right 
which provides a basis for all others. Yet this right does not come from 
nature; it is therefore founded on conventions. The problem is to know 
what these conventions are»118. In order words, how can society be 
non-coercive in order that all may legitimately claim to be truly free 
and equal?  
Civil society is not grounded on natural right for there are no moral 
commitments in the natural condition. An act of commitment is re-
quired in order to establish civil society and morality. Society and mo-
rality, therefore, are conventional. That act is the social contract, in 
which each individual person hands over their power. The contract, 
«rightly understood, all come down to just one, namely the total alien-
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ation of each associate with all his rights to the whole community»119. 
Such an act of association is an act of unity that creates a body politic, 
an artificial person who encapsulates the individual will of all.  
The contract constitutes a regime in which the free will of each coin-
cides with the will of all. Rights are neither transferred to one individ-
ual (Hobbes) nor to many representatives (Locke). It is the people as a 
whole who become sovereign. Popular sovereignty becomes the defin-
ing feature of «political right» or civil rights and therefore the legiti-
macy of a civil regime. The tacit agreement underlying Locke’s social 
contract becomes the continual and active consent of all. The participa-
tion and agreement of all means that the will of one is not enforced on 
another. The social contract, popular sovereignty and therefore political 
right are sustained by what he calls the General Will. In obedience to 
the sovereign, each is obeying what is truly themselves; by disobedi-
ence, one is following one’s own instincts of selfishness and vanity and 
is therefore unfree. «What man loses by the social contract is his natu-
ral freedom […] what he gains is civil liberty […] the obedience to a 
law which we prescribe to ourselves»120. 
Rousseau distinguishes between sovereignty inhering in the people 
and the government which applies the law. Allan Bloom writes, «This 
distinction is new in Rousseau and works a fundamental break with his 
predecessors, especially those of classical antiquity. It prefigures the 
distinction between state and society so important today»121. The pri-
mary focus of study becomes society and government a derivative ex-
amination. 
Rousseau is ambiguous on determining the General Will and particu-
larly on the nature of the Sovereign who encapsulates it. The General 
Will allows for no individual will; society must be homogeneous. Ac-
cording to Herbert, «The title of Rousseau’s most famous book, The 
Social Contract, is somewhat ironic. The “immovable keystone” and 
real constitution of the state is to be found, not in self-representation, 
but in the common origins of its citizens»122. All factions within society 
must be repressed and education in citizenship is required to help serve 
the general will. The individual will is transformed by civil virtue – by 
true love (and patriotism) of our common life together. According to 
Gouervitch, the title refers not so much to the actual functioning of the 
social contract as to its purpose – that legitimate rule must be based on 
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the authorised consent of the people. It is an ambiguity which lies at the 
heart of Rousseau and divides his commentators. On one hand, he may 
be read as a republican asserting the role of popular sovereignty. On the 
other, he may be read as ushering in an unlimited powerful sovereign 
and the totalitarian state. Such ambiguity that linked tyranny with uto-
pian republican ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity were to express 
themselves politically in the French Revolution and its aftermath.  
3.3.2 Excursus: Critique and Rights 
In the history of ideas, Leo Strauss writes, «The first crisis of moder-
nity occurred in the thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. […] But Rous-
seau was not a “reactionary”. He abandoned himself to modernity»123. 
Alan Bloom observes, he «undertook to clarify the meaning of modern 
theory and practice, and in so doing he brought to light radical conse-
quences of modernity of which men were not previously aware»124. 
Certain characteristics, beginning in Rousseau, may be highlighted of a 
tradition that includes Karl Marx, The Frankfurt School and Jürgen 
Habermas125. The primary element of this tradition is critique: it is 
critical of modernity and the associated liberal tradition. Importantly 
however, its criticisms are by way of the very structures of thought cen-
tral to modernity. As such, important features may be outlined in paral-
lel to the excursus concerning liberalism126.  
First: the individual is considered as social127. It is only in the social 
context that rights come to have meaning. In time, the social sciences 
were to become an important resource in the development of the Criti-
cal tradition. However, unlike the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition, and 
similarly to modernity, it views society as conventional.  
Second: rights are re-conceived to be connected to social obligations. 
It is only by way of society that man can be free again. His rights there-
fore are defined by his commitment to society. It is this characteristic 
that has facilitated the many totalitarian impulses that have accompa-
nied elements of this tradition.  
Third: rights primarily concern participation. Commitment to society 
requires participation in the authority that orders that society. To be 
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free is to be politically free, that is, to determine the structures of soci-
ety. This element echoes through the democratic movements associated 
with this tradition such as the Levellers and the Chartists (a nineteenth 
century British movement).  
Fourth: the existing structures of a society are perceived to favour ex-
isting power and vested interests. In particular, it is often critical of pri-
vate property and the capitalist economics. Reformation of society and 
the state is required if people can claim to be truly free. It is this ele-
ment that inspired the political vanguard ideologies of the communist 
movements and the more incremental assertions of socio-economic 
rights by labour or trade-union movements.  
Fifth: as with the liberal tradition, the primary purpose of the state is 
based on the previous four tenets. The focus being on society makes for 
a derivative conception of the state – loyalty is primarily offered to the 
former rather than the latter. Suspicions of the structures of power in 
society make for a willingness to change government or even to bring 
about its eventual demise. It contrasts to the earlier Aristotelian-
Thomist and the liberal tradition, which considered the establishment of 
government necessary for society; therefore, to destroy government 
was to destroy society. State and government in the Critical tradition 
primarily find legitimacy to the extent that it facilitates the participation 
of all in the many aspects of society. 
3.4 Immanuel Kant 
In contrast to many of the theorists previously discussed, Immanuel 
Kant (1724-1804) was not directly active in political or religious affairs; 
neither did he travel far from his native Königsberg in East Prussia, and 
the university in which he studied and lectured. However, Kant was not a 
recluse. He keenly engaged with the intellectual currents of his time. In 
particular, David Hume (1711-1776) and Jean Jacques Rousseau provided 
the points of departure and motivation for his philosophy. Of his meta-
physical writings, he confessed that it was after reading the scepticism of 
Hume that he was «first interrupted from my dogmatic slumber many 
years ago and gave my investigation in speculative philosophy an entire 
altered direction»128. Concerning morality he wrote, «Rousseau has set me 
right […] I learned to honour mankind and I would be less worthy than the 
average worker if I did not believe that [philosophy] could contribute to 
what really matters, restoring the rights of mankind»129. 
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3.4.1 Right and Duty  
Kant responded to Hume in the first of three Critiques, entitled Cri-
tique of Pure Reason (1781)130. Hume, a radical sceptic, had rejected 
the empirical reality of causality131. Observation, he argued, merely 
perceives certain events regularly occurring immediately after certain 
other events. Causality is simply a means employed to make sense of 
these events and is uncritically accepted as certain by metaphysics. 
Kant agreed but drew a different conclusion. He argued that experience 
involves both the impressions of the senses (a posteriori) and the ele-
ment provided by the mind (a priori). The certainty of causality is re-
vealed through reason reflecting on itself; for causality is a notion that 
cannot but be employed. Along with other categories, such as time and 
space, it creates a framework by which we understand nature. They are 
necessary preconditions or elements or tools supplied by the mind, by 
which we understand the sense information of our experiences.  
The basic division rests on the distinction of the phenomenal and 
noumenal world or that of appearance and the thing in itself (Ding an 
sich). Howard Williams, in Kant’s Political Philosophy, argues that it is 
of central importance because «it provides Kant with his conception of 
man»132. It is a dualistic conception: man is both subject to nature and 
autonomous of it. Attached to the former are our needs and our desires 
and associated with the latter is reason and freedom. In Kant’s System 
of Rights, Leslie Arthur Mulholland admits that Kant’s response to 
moral questions (partly) parallels his approach to metaphysics – reason 
analyses itself in order to reveal the universal principles of its own 
working133.  
In the dual character of the human person, the moral act may be di-
vided between felt experiences (phenomena), and the freedom to will a 
particular outcome (noumena). As previously with metaphysics, the 
universal laws of morality may be discerned by way of analytic judg-
ments on the process of practical reasoning because they are independ-
ent of experience. The moral domain is demarcated apart from the ex-
perience of sense perceptions, emotions or desires. To make moral 
choices implies freedom and true freedom requires that man be capable 
of being independent of the forces of nature or the mere calculation of 
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consequences134. Kant begins Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Mor-
als: «it is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or indeed 
even beyond it, that could be considered good without limitation except 
a good will»135. The will is affected by desire but, unlike Hobbes, it is 
not determined by desire. In fact, it is identifiable by its capacity or 
power to make choices independently from our desires and act instead 
according to the imperatives demanded by practical reasoning. This ap-
proach and the resulting consequences were to have a lasting influence 
on the development of moral philosophy. Not knowing the things in 
themselves, objective nature no longer has a primary normative role. 
Morality turns to the subject’s self-understanding of his moral acts – 
creating a Copernican Revolution. 
 Morality, therefore, implies a pure will independent of any inten-
tions except what the will itself intends. In willing particular behaviour, 
one can choose a particular way of behaving that reflects one’s impera-
tives or rules or, in Kant’s term, maxims. Maxims become evident in 
the self reflection on reasons of behaviour to which one is committed. 
But not all maxims are truly moral. Only maxims that can be univer-
sally applied to everyone may be called moral laws136. The demand of 
reason that moral law be universal is asserted as the categorical impera-
tive: «act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can 
at the same time will that it become a universal law»137. The formula-
tion is based on the unconditioned and autonomous will. The criterion 
of moral judgement, therefore, is universalisation. It requires that an in-
dividual should ask himself if an intended action could become a uni-
versal law of action for all. If it contradicts itself, it is not appropriate to 
a rational being. The recognition of the freedom and dignity of all pro-
duces a second formulation of the categorical imperative: «So act that 
you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any 
other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means»138. 
If the former principle refers to the reasoning of what to do, the second 
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guides action itself. The duty that is demanded by this maxim corre-
sponds to a profound respect for others. To violate the duty to respect 
others – abuses of liberty or property, or in other words, rights – is to 
treat others as a means or an instrument rather than free beings of in-
herent dignity. It is this formulation that «provides the moral basis of 
the political doctrine of the rights of man»139. This is reinforced by 
Kant’s third formulation: «every rational being must act as if he were 
by his maxims at all times a lawgiving member of the universal king-
dom of ends»140. Each person willing a universal maxim appropriate to 
all and respecting the freedom and dignity of others creates a self-
legislating environment. This formula refers to communal living and 
the required social order. Similarly to Rousseau, each person is a par-
ticipant in the rule over themselves: the limitations of freedom in duty 
to the self-applied legislation are placed on themselves and so are not 
coercive.  
Three characteristics may be discerned of Kant’s moral system. 
Firstly, it is strongly deontological, and, as a result, formal. Kant is not 
making substantive claims – but providing the means by which we may 
judge the rationality of substantive claims. In contrast to teleological 
approaches, it rejects any calculative judgement of consequential ends 
as proposed by utilitarians or conceptions of specific good lives as pro-
posed by the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition. The distinction of just 
principles of morality independent of the good is a hallmark of modern 
moral philosophy – particularly of the liberal tradition in which Kant 
becomes very influential. Secondly, individuals who live morally are 
placing themselves under maxims or laws they would will for all, for 
free people are self-legislating. Unlike Hobbes and the liberal position, 
freedom is not lawless but the ability to live according to self-given 
laws. This second characteristic places Kant in a tradition from Rous-
seau to Critical Theory141. Thirdly, the deontological principles are 
bound to duty – for it is duty which motivates the actor to be moral. 
Duty is a basis for the foundations of rights but is a duty toward princi-
ple – perhaps better described as a conviction – rather than duty arising 
from a social role. 
In the introduction to Metaphysics of Morals, Kant proposes the uni-
versal principle associated with right. The book is divided into two sec-
tions: namely, «The Doctrine of Rights» and the «The Doctrine of Vir-
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tue». In his introduction to the «Doctrine of Rights» (Rechtslehre) he 
writes, 
Why is moral (Moral) philosophy usually (for example by Cicero) titled the 
doctrine of duties and not also of rights? Since duties and rights are related 
to each other. The ground is this: we know our own freedom (from which 
all rights as well as duties are derived) only through the moral imperative, 
which is a proposition commanding duties; […] the concept of a right can 
be derived from this imperative142. 
The maxim or universal principle of right is: «Every action which by 
itself or by its maxim enables the freedom of each individual’s will to 
co-exist with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a univer-
sal law is right»143. Right, according to Kant, is only concerned with 
external actions «for each individual can be free so long as I do not in-
terfere with his freedom by my external actions […]»144. In its strict 
sense, it is sharply distinguished from virtue. Rights, therefore, are 
purely a matter of the regulation of society according to justice and 
should not be associated with any concept of the good life. 
The universal principle of right, as pointed out by Mary Gregor is the 
application of the universal maxim – the categorical imperative – to the 
sphere of law145. It is the law that externally coordinates and facilitates 
the co-existing freedom of all. If it is to be just, it must cohere to the 
universal principle of right. Not to do so, that is, not respect the equal 
freedom of all in accordance to a universal imperative, is to undermine 
the law itself and therefore the freedom of all. The German legal tradi-
tion of the Rechtstaat, or the state governed according to the rule of law 
can, in part, be attributed to Kant.  
Rights specifically concern the extent to which people can be free to-
gether. As a means to regulate external relationships, they presuppose 
and help constitute a social harmony. In contrast to Hobbes and Locke, 
freedom is not characterised by the lack of law. On the contrary, free-
dom is exercised according to self-applied laws. Rights result from af-
firmative mutual recognition of each other’s freedom. The external 
freedom of each is sustained in the relationship with other free people – 
that is, the acknowledgement of obligations on oneself and on others of 
moral imperatives such as treating others as ends and not means. It is 
the third formulation of the categorical imperative in action. Applied to 
________________ 
 
142
 I. KANT, The Metaphysics of Morals, 132. 
143
 I. KANT, The Metaphysics of Morals, 133. 
144
 I. KANT, The Metaphysics of Morals, 133.  
145
 M. GREGOR, Laws of Freedom, 13.  
CH. II: GROWTH OF RIGHTS 107 
politics, the universal principle requires «A constitution allowing the 
greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws which ensure 
that the freedom of each can coexist with the freedom of all the oth-
ers»146. 
Kant presents rights as the necessary preconditions or presupposi-
tions inherent to being free in the context of social existence. He denies 
the Hobbesian conclusion that rights are prior to social living and lead 
to social strife. He also avoids the apparent denial of individual free-
dom in the reduction of rights to the social, as concluded by Rousseau. 
In the intellectual development of rights, Gary Herbert claims that:  
One could say, with some justification, that Kant’s theory of rights repre-
sented an attempt to mediate the dispute between Rousseau and Hobbes, 
that is to restore the Hobbesian natural right of the individual without the 
burdens created by the brutality of natural behaviour, but also without dis-
solving the individual into the collective consciousness as Rousseau ap-
pears to have done147. 
The section concerning right in Metaphysics of Morals concludes 
that «moral-practical reason within us pronounces the following irre-
sistible veto: There shall be no war […] For war is not the way in 
which anyone should pursue his rights»148. It is only in peaceful 
conditions (which even include cessation from preparations for war) 
that a co-existing freedom under law may be achieved. However, he 
concedes that a perpetual peace may be beyond reach149.  
Kant responded enthusiastically to the French Revolution (in spite 
of his own conservative tendencies). But it proved to be the zenith of 
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the Enlightenment; both it and the rights that it espoused were to 
come under attack in the following century. 
3.5 The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen 
The struggle for American independence effected events in Europe and, 
in particular, its ally, France. Military support of the American cause con-
tributed to an overwhelming national debt. It directly caused the calling of 
the Estates-General, comprising of representatives of the nobility, clergy 
and propertied classes, in 1789 for the first time since 1614 and the rise of 
absolute nation-states epitomised by the Bourbon kings of France. More 
significantly, the American experience also inspired political aspirations 
among the propertied classes represented by the Third Estate.  
In opposition to voting procedures, the Third Estate proclaimed itself 
the National Assembly and committed itself to the establishment of a new 
constitution and challenging the abuses of the ancien régime. Marquis de 
Lafayette (1757-1834), who had fought in the American War of Independ-
ence, and in part consultation with Thomas Jefferson who was Ambassa-
dor to Paris, proposed a number of drafts. The final document was ac-
cepted and published due to quickening political events and disorder. The 
subsequent revolution, symbolised in the storming of the Bastille, over-
turned the social order and promised new beginnings. 
The preamble asserts that it is «ignorance, forgetfulness or contempt of 
the rights of man» that causes the abuse of authority. In response, the dec-
laration of rights is to act as a «constant reminder», a means to hold legis-
lative and executive authority accountable and to guide the citizens in 
«support of the constitution and the common good»150. It continues  
In respect of their rights men are born and remain free and equal. The only 
permissible basis for social distinctions is public utility 
The final end of every political institution is the preservation of the natural 
and imprescriptible rights of man. The rights are those of liberty, property, 
security and resistance to oppression. 
The basis of all sovereignty lies, essentially in the Nation. No corporation 
nor individual may exercise any authority that is not expressly derived there 
from151.  
The rest of the document includes articles stating that freedom is 
«the capacity to do anything that does no harm to others»; that legis-
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lation is «the expression of the general will» and «All citizens have a 
right to participate in shaping it either in person, or through their 
representatives»; that arrests are according to due process and pun-
ishments appropriate; the freedom of conscience and that «free 
communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the most precious 
rights of man»; the presumption of innocence and that the purpose of 
a police force, funded by taxation «according to means» is for «the 
public weal»; and that «property is an inviolable and sacred 
right[...]»152. 
After the publication of the document, the revolutionaries frac-
tured and, in the ensuing power struggles, France descended into the 
Reign of Terror in which many thousands were killed and the pillars 
of the ancien régime and Catholic Church were destroyed, leading 
finally to the rule of Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821) and Euro-
pean-wide wars.  
At the end of the eighteenth century, rights proved themselves to 
be a revolutionary force in society. «If the American and French 
Revolutions were to be considered as experiments in the practical 
value of making the concept of rights central to our understanding of 
our political arrangements, the results were decidedly mixed»153. The 
French Declaration is an expression of the broad natural rights tradi-
tion but, according to John Kelly, it «was not a pure expression of 
natural rights ideology nor a mere imitation of admired English and 
American precedents»154. Certainly the social conditions and the ex-
ercise of state power were considerably different. Jeremy Waldron, 
in Nonsense Upon Stilts, writes that the French Declaration is the 
product of a different intellectual climate than the United States 
(originating in Great Britain): the former resulting from a Lockean 
legacy and the latter associated with Rousseau155. Of the French 
Declaration, he writes: 
It is easy to exaggerate his [Rousseau] influence: the Declaration was mod-
elled mainly on the manifestos set out by the Americans some years earlier. 
But to the extent that it incorporates democratic ideas and ideas about 
popular sovereignty in law-making and in government, it is certainly Rous-
seauesque in inspiration or at least inspired by a theoretical milieu in which 
the influence of Rousseau’s ideas and Rousseauesque language was consid-
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erable. Certainly there is precious little in the Lockean heritage on which 
this particular strand of revolutionary thought could be based156. 
The French Revolution received mixed reaction. Many responded en-
thusiastically to the initial stages but became despondent; others were 
radically critical of the rights-rhetoric it espoused. Following the struc-
ture of Jeremy Waldron’s study, the critical response to the French 
Declaration provides the organising structure to the next section. By 
outlining the ideas which motivated a critique of rights, the next section 
attempts to clarify the conceptual terrain by highlighting the ideas to 
which rights appear to contradict.  
4. The Nineteenth Century 
The pace of socio-economic and political change quickened in the 
nineteenth century. The industrial revolution initiated in Britain, under-
pinned by an ideology of laissez-faire economics and championed by 
theorists such as John Adams (1723-1790), quickly spread to continen-
tal Europe and the United States. Related transformations, such as ur-
banisation and population growth, and technological advancements in 
agriculture, transport and communications, ruptured older social ties in 
an unprecedented manner. 
As the social structures broke down, new forms of social identity 
were created. At a political level, this expressed itself in the rise of na-
tional pride and the creation of class consciousness. The former led to 
the unification of Germany and Italy and the renaissance of cultural 
identities among many peoples. Furthermore, it helped solidify the self-
confidence of the state. Nationalism, allied to the drive for economic 
expansion, fuelled colonising ambitions throughout the world – the 
overseas possessions of Britain were formally declared an Empire in 
1877157. The latter responded to the creation and exploitation of large 
industrial working populations and led to a variety of ideologies which 
may be broadly categorised as socialism. At times, the two came to-
gether as in the Europe-wide attempted revolutions of 1848. 
The push for better working conditions and participation in authority 
occurred incrementally through the development of trade unions and a 
politically capable labour movement. For instance, in Britain, the elec-
toral franchise, although still tied to property and only to men, was 
widened in 1832, 1867, and 1884. Often, such developments were justi-
fied according to political pragmatism, rather than the granting of 
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rights. The underlying moral theory, which came to dominate the era, 
was utilitarianism, exemplified by John Stuart Mill (1806-73). Mill ad-
vocated a strong liberal notion of liberty as non-interference supported 
by a principle of utility which proposed the greatest happiness for the 
greatest number of people158. (The current theoretical interest in rights-
language exemplified in the central part of this thesis may be viewed as 
a reaction against this model.) 
In the United States, the issue of slavery finally resulted in civil 
war159. The preamble of the Constitution asserted that all were endowed 
with inalienable rights. Cases brought before the Supreme Court, there-
fore, relating to the slavery turned on the question: who are properly 
conceived as right-holders?160 Some cases excluded; others granted 
rights based on a common humanity. The answer, perhaps, was only 
truly worked through in the U.S. civil rights protests of the 1960s.  
At other times, the desire for better conditions took an aggressive 
form which pitched and defined social classes against one another. The 
more radical forms of socialism were driven by the utopian ideal of the 
classless society, in which power resided in the proletariat. Its most in-
fluential theorist, Karl Marx, believed in the inevitability of capital-
ism’s downfall. Others, however, desired to hasten the process led by a 
vanguard. 
By 1891, the fear of social convulsion resulting from revolution was 
echoed in the title of the encyclical Rerum Novarum of Pope Leo 
XIII161. Considered the first explicit Roman Catholic teaching on socio-
economic matters, it called for social reconciliation by both reaffirming 
the rights to property which underpinned the capitalism system and as-
serting the basic just claims of the working classes. It encourages,  
Some opportune remedy must be found for the misery and wretchedness 
pressing so unjustly on the working class […] a small number of rich men 
have been able to lay upon the teeming masses of the poor, a yoke little bet-
ter than slavery itself162. 
It marks the origins of a tradition of Church teaching that would later 
incorporate a rights language. However, it is a point of considerable 
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note that Church authorities, theologians or jurists made little contribu-
tion to its development since the early seventeenth century. Although 
juridical rights-claims may have developed within a scholastic and 
theological framework, rights-rhetoric since that period was intertwined 
with Enlightenment rationality. As a result, at a theoretical level, theo-
logical consideration of justice or law was not framed in terms of 
rights. At a social level, anti-clericalism and the enforced separation of 
Church and state in some countries, such as revolutionary France, along 
with the growing Church anti-modernist stance, created further en-
trenchment163. 
Edmundson characterises the nineteenth century as one of consolida-
tion and retrenchment after the first expansionary period. An expan-
sionary period may be identified as those times in «which “rights-talk” 
was so prevalent that its very prevalence became a matter of comment 
and criticism»164. This section turns to three main critiques of the nine-
teenth century resulting from the first expansionary period.  
4.1 Rights and Scepticism  
Jeremy Waldron, in book entitled Nonsense Upon Stilts writes: 
«Misgivings about rights are not a new phenomenon […] many of the 
issues have remained remarkably constant»165. He gathers together 
three texts – Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), Anarchi-
cal Fallacies (c. 1791) and «On the Jewish Question» (1884) – all of 
which directly respond to the French Declaration of the Rights of 
Man. They offer critical assessments of natural rights proposed by the 
dominant liberal tradition and offer alternative model of rights – as 
traditional liberties (Burke), as legal fictions (Bentham) or as partici-
pation in authority (Marx). Jeremy Waldron summarises the common 
dissent.  
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Each of them offered a wider vision – the altruism of Bentham’s principle 
of utility, the intergenerational wisdom of Burke’s traditions, and the co-
operative fulfilment of Marxian species-being. For all of them, human life, 
to be bearable, involved a substantial commitment to living together in 
community that is belied by the abstract egoism of a theory of human 
rights166.  
Thus far, the term right has been paired with other significant terms. 
In this section, the term may be viewed as being placed in a negative 
correlation: it is being defined by what it is perceived to contradict.  
4.1.1 Edmund Burke: Rights and Tradition 
Edmund Burke (1729-1797) responded to the French Revolution by 
lauding liberty but immediately asserted that it must always be placed 
within a real context or «circumstances»167. His central critique turns 
on the fact that rights as declared in France are abstracted out of con-
text, history and tradition. He writes, 
I think I envy liberty as little as they do, to any other nation. But I cannot 
stand forward, and give praise or blame to any thing which relates to hu-
man actions, and human concerns, on a simple view of the object as it 
stands stripped of every relation, in all the nakedness and solitude of meta-
physical abstraction. Circumstances […] give in reality to every political 
principle it distinguishing colour, and discriminating effect168. 
The distinction between «metaphysical abstraction» and «circum-
stances» constitute his critique of the French Constitution and praise 
of the English Constitution. The Reflections are as much a celebration 
of the English Constitution as it is a critique of its French counterpart. 
He defends rights based on traditional liberties using the analogy of 
inheritance by which society remains secure and orderly; thereby, fa-
cilitating true freedom and rights. In comparison, he considers the ab-
stracted rights of metaphysicians contained in the French declaration 
as dangerous because they lack context in the political and social real-
ity. They become constructs that destroy hard-earned real rights and 
liberty.  
________________ 
 
166
 J. WALDRON, Nonsense Upon Stilts, 44-45. 
167
 Burke foresaw much of the degeneration of the Revolution. Conor Cruise-
O’Brien argues that Burke’s «insight is so acute as to endow him with prophetic 
power […] not from any mystical intuition, but from penetrating powers of observa-
tion […] Burke had immense respect for circumstances, and observed them with pro-
portionate attentiveness». C. CRUISE-O’BRIEN, The Great Melody, 402. 
168
 E. BURKE, «Reflections», 97. 
PART ONE: HISTORY 114 
They despise experience as the wisdom of unlettered men; and as for the 
rest, they have wrought under-ground a mine that will blow up at one grand 
explosion all examples of antiquity, all precedents, charters, and acts of 
parliament. They have «the rights of men». Against these there can be no 
prescription; against these no agreement is binding: these admit no tem-
perament, and no compromise: anything withheld from their full demand is 
so much of fraud and injustice169.  
Natural rights are destructive; what they destroy are the necessary 
social and historical bonds that hold a society together. Above all, they 
destroy tradition – whether transmitted or expressed in the norms of po-
litical rules compromises and practicalities, the experience or wisdom 
of the ruling classes or the symbols and awe associated with the rituals 
that surround governance. Real rights are hard-won through the give-
and-take of politics. Abstracted rights, on the other hand, admit no ne-
gotiation. Everything may be sacrificed in light of their demands – in-
cluding the inherited principles, wisdom and symbols of a tradition.  
The critique of Enlightenment reason is that it refuses to take account 
– and in fact destroys – the wisdom of a tradition within a society. It is 
an «arithmetic reason» that denies the intricacies of practical political 
thinking. Claiming metaphysical perfection, they foster selfishness and 
arrogance: «By having a right to every thing they want every thing»170. 
In contrast, tradition cultivates political duty and virtue. Ultimately ab-
stracted rights will undermine real rights because they undermine the 
social order on which real rights may be based.  
4.1.2 Jeremy Bentham: Rights and Utility 
In comparison, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) was confident in 
Enlightenment reason and its ability to emancipate and provide a more 
sound social order171. He represents currents in the intellectual devel-
opment of the Enlightenment that are hostile to natural rights: «natural 
rights is simple nonsense [sic]: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhe-
torical nonsense – nonsense upon stilts»172. He condemns natural rights 
as fallacious in theory and anarchical in practice: «in the first place, the 
errors it contains in theory; and then, in the second place, the mischiefs 
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it is pregnant with in practice»173. They are nonsense because they are 
meaningless and contradictory; they are anarchical because they un-
dermine what is truly necessary for good government.  
Firstly, natural rights are nonsense. Bentham maintains that terms 
cannot be understood in abstract from their general use. In the case of 
jurisprudence, this means that terms such as right, duty or justice are 
required to be translated into the practical workings of the law. They 
can only make sense in the light of empirical observations such as the 
power of the sovereign, positive enactment of commands and the fear 
of sanction. Accordingly, rights may only be conceived as legal rights – 
there is no such thing as natural rights.  
That there are no such things as natural rights – no such things as rights an-
terior to the establishment of government – no such things as natural rights 
opposed to, in contradistinction to, legal: that the expression is merely figu-
rative; that when uses in the moment you attempt to give it a literal mean-
ing it leads to error, and to that sort of error that leads to mischief – to the 
extremity of mischief174. 
Furthermore, they make no sense because they are riddled with con-
tradictions. They make absolute claims yet are always in need of some 
constraints. They claim to be independent of the government yet it re-
quires government to legislate for their meaning. Secondly, rights are 
anarchical. The errors lead to mischief because they undermine the role 
of law in social order. In making no sense, they will lead to violence for 
there is no other means by which one can adjudicate between rights or 
judge on the application of rights. Therefore, rights imply that people 
are bound to revolution, rather than disobedience, in the pursuit of what 
they assert.  
The claims that rights are fallacious and anarchical reflect the influ-
ential categorical division initiated by Bentham for the proper exposi-
tion of the law. He distinguishes between descriptive or «expository ju-
risprudence» that accounts for the law as actually existing and observ-
able, and «censorial jurisprudence» that analyses the law from a moral 
point of view, that is, it identifies weaknesses and proposes reform. In 
his Introduction to the Principles of Moral and Legislation, Bentham 
proposes the principle of utility for evaluating the law. Based on the 
premise that «Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two 
sovereign masters, pain and pleasure»175, the principle proposes that 
________________ 
 
173
 J. BENTHAM, «Anarchical Fallacies», 49. 
174
 J. BENTHAM, «Anarchical Fallacies», 52. 
175
 J. BENTHAM, Introduction to the Principles of Moral and Legislation, 1. 
PART ONE: HISTORY 116 
calculative judgements may be made about what will increase general 
and individual happiness. Legislation therefore may be reduced to the 
interests of individuals.  
The categorical distinction is critical in the historical development of 
rights. According to the typology outlined at the beginning of this the-
sis, the development may be traced as follows. In the pre-modern era, 
ius developed into a tripartite and mutually interrelated connection of 
objective right (iustium), subjective or natural rights (iura) and law 
(lex). At the turn of the modern era, Thomas Hobbes reduced objective 
right to the demands of natural rights and placed them in contradistinc-
tion, rather than in relation, to the law – three became two. In denying 
natural rights all together, Bentham effectively isolated the law. Two 
became one. Rights became defined solely according to the functions of 
the law, independent of the requirements of justice and morality. It was 
the birth of legal positivism.  
According to Bentham, rights are legal fictions arising from the central 
observable facts of law. The only real entities in law are people (sover-
eigns and governed), commands and sanctions. Legal duty is be subject to 
a command or prohibition of a sovereign or his representative. 
A law commanding or forbidding an act thereby creates a duty or obliga-
tion. A right is another fictitious entity, a kind of secondary fictitious entity, 
resulting out of a duty. Let any given duty be proposed, either somebody is 
the better for it or nobody […] If it be any other party then it is a duty own-
ing to someone other party: and then that other party has at any rate a right: 
a right to have this duty performed: perhaps also a power: a power to com-
pel the performance of such duty176.  
To have a legal right is to be the beneficiary of a legal duty. Following 
Bentham, jurisprudence limited itself to the level the conceptual analysis 
of rights. Although it could reveal interesting and influential classifica-
tions, a positivist account sidelined moral considerations. Much of con-
temporary discussion, exemplified by the three central theorists of this dis-
sertation, has reacted strongly to the reductionism of rights and justice to 
positive law.  
4.1.3 Karl Marx: Rights and Class 
From German philosophy, French politics and English economics, 
Karl Marx (1818-1883) drew together the basis for a powerful cri-
tique of the basis of the emerging industrial society. Yet despite an 
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extensive output, Karl Marx paid very little attention to rights as 
such.  
The primary text considering the issue is an early essay called «On 
the Jewish Question» in 1844177. Of the American and French Declara-
tions, Marx writes, «none of the of the so-called rights of man goes be-
yond egoistic man, man as he is in civil society, namely an individual 
withdrawn behind his private interests and whims and separated from 
the community»178. Such rights represent an alienation of man from his 
true self and his true place in society. The rights of man are not merely 
symptomatic expressions of the current organisation of society; rather, 
they are a factor in the very constitution of the capitalist state. Rights 
only make sense in the capitalist phase of history. Reminiscent of 
Rousseau, Marx argues that rights create, justify and safeguard the 
conditions in which the powerful and propertied classes can flourish, to 
the detriment and exploitation of the masses. They are sustained by the 
mystifying ideology that declares them to be natural and universal. 
They are presented as beyond the sectional interests that they actually 
serve but in fact are fictions defending bourgeois class power. Vulgar 
or orthodox Marxism continued to view rights in such a manner. 
He insists that the right to liberty is illusory, appearing to offer 
emancipation but in reality it debases the person. The Rights of man 
conceive of man as alienated from others and himself, egotistical and 
individualistic. The ensuing society based on such rights will necessar-
ily be in conflict. Tom Campbell observes, «Marx’s emphasis on the 
role of conflict in social relationships is reminiscent of Hobbes, but 
Marx sees social conflict as between groups or classes rather than be-
tween individuals […]»179. But as Gary Herbert comments, «Marx was, 
in a sense, returning to Rousseau’s famous critique of Thomas Hobbes 
that Hobbes illegitimately transferred to human nature characteristics 
acquired by men only in civil society»180. 
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Marx makes a distinction, albeit left undeveloped in his later work. In 
the text, Marx asserts two categories of rights: «the rights of man in so far 
as they differ from the rights of the citizen»181. On one hand, there are 
rights of the citizen: «rights which are exercised only in community with 
others. Participation in the community and specifically in the political 
community, in the state, constitutes their content. They fall under the cate-
gory of political freedom […]»182. Such rights need not isolate but are 
conducive to participation in a community and enable true control over the 
material conditions of life by all. Marx condemns the illusionary priority 
of the former over the latter. He argues that the French Declaration of the 
Rights of Man creates a situation in which «citizenship, the political com-
munity, is degraded by the political emancipators to a mere means for the 
preservation of these so-called rights of man […] it is not man as citizen 
but man as a bourgeois who is called the real and true man»183. 
The second category – rights that facilitate participation – is in sub-
stance still limited according to Marx because it is part of the capitalist 
phase of history. But in a formal manner they do coincide with Marx’s 
communal vision. Jeremy Waldron writes: «Full-blooded emancipation, 
therefore, requires not just the existence of a political community, but the 
involvement of that community in the democratic organisation and run-
ning of productive economic life»184. In Marxism and Morality, Steven 
Lukes observes that of the Rights of the Citizen, Marx  
failed to consider their positive, world-historical significance, their applica-
bility to non-egoistic, non-bourgeois forms of social life, and their conse-
quent relevance to the struggle for socialism, because his mind was so ex-
clusively fixed upon the critique of the egoism of bourgeois society and the 
mystifying ideology that pervaded it, from the perspective of a future he 
imagined as emancipated from both185. 
However, contemporary neo-Marxists, such as Jürgen Habermas, 
considered in the central part of this dissertation, have moved beyond 
many Marxian categories. This has allowed them to draw upon a wider 
tradition based on the insight that democratic participation is necessary 
for true communal living and emancipation186.  
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5. The Twentieth Century 
In the history of rights, the twentieth century is starkly divided. In the 
first half of the century, theoretical reflection on rights narrowed to be-
come a functional analysis of the legal discourse. But the horrors of 
Second World War (1939-1945) and the subsequent publication of the 
United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (1948) marked a water-
shed, followed by a resurgence of rights claims in both populist eman-
cipatory movements and in the political agenda187. However, it took a 
further generation before theoretical reflection paid serious attention of 
the justification of rights188.  
5.1 The Historical Context 
The contextual sub-sections that situate the textual analysis in this 
thesis can only give impressionistic picture. It is even more so of the 
twentieth century as the pace of events hasten and the historical forces 
multiply – leaving open the accepted charge of obscuring some move-
ments or misconstruing others. 
The first half of the century is dominated by the two world wars. The 
rise of the nation-state since the beginnings of modernity (made explicit 
in the Treaty of Westphalia) was strengthened by the rise of national-
ism, which in turn justified militarism and imperialism. Democracy in 
Europe was unable to successfully replace the old monarchical order 
after the First World War, particularly in the face of extreme inflation 
(1923) and economic hardship (1929). Dictatorships became wide-
spread, bound to ideologies of the state and nationalism. The religious 
wars of Europe gave way to national wars, descending into world-wide 
conflicts. The horrors of the two wars provided the motivation for two 
attempts in institutionalising human rights. The first, the International 
League of Nations (1919), proved to be very ineffectual in the face of 
national demands. The second, the United Nations (1945), has of 
course lasted, despite limitations. In particular, the Shoah and wide-
spread genocide during wars and dictatorships provided the moral out-
rage to stimulate a reassertion of rights. But the first half of the century 
did see significant transformations. In particular, the suffragette move-
ment successfully widened the franchise to include women in most de-
mocracies. The labour and trade union movement also won recognition 
of significant rights for workers, aided by the extension of the state into 
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the economic sphere. These rights protected them against the worst ex-
ploitations of laissez-faire capitalism and were to help lay the founda-
tion for the welfare-state. 
If the first half of the century was dominated by actual war, the second 
half was overshadowed by the threat of a final war and nuclear holocaust. 
The political scene moved to a global level, subject to two superpowers of 
opposing ideologies. The rhetoric of rights surged due to the success of 
emancipatory movements, particularly in the 1960s. Many nations asserted 
their rights to self-determination in independence movements from colo-
nial control. The civil-rights movements challenged racist structures in the 
United States and other parts of the world. The women’s movement chal-
lenged implicit patriarchal power structures that discriminated against the 
rights of women. Rights language was extended to include all claims for 
freedom from perceived coercive and exploitative authority – sexual re-
production rights, gay rights, environmental rights, language rights, etc. 
The extension of rights is often categorised as three generations: the first 
are the traditional liberal rights, the second are socio-economic rights and 
the third concern cultural and environmental rights189. They became the 
vocabulary of a bourgeoning international law; the European Charter on 
Human Rights and the corresponding European Court of Justice being the 
most sophisticated. By the end of the century, globalisation and global na-
ture of events continues to deepen – perhaps in part due to the end of the 
cold war and the apparent triumph of a capitalist economic and social or-
dering of society. But, if history is ideological struggle, as asserted by 
Marx, history has not ended, for there are still forces, such as religious 
fundamentalism, which are challenging its hegemony190. 
5.2 Wesley Hohfeld 
Similarly to Bentham, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld (1879-1918) was 
motivated to the desire to counter legal confusions and equivocations. 
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Concerned with the usage of rights only within legal reasoning, he pro-
vides a positivist account, shying away from metaphysical or ethical 
considerations. His analysis, published posthumously in Fundamental 
Legal Conceptions (1919), argued that the terminology of rights in le-
gal use is not adequately accounted for by the simple duty-right correla-
tion, as outlined by Bentham. 
5.2.1 Rights: A Taxonomy 
Hohfled agrees with Bentham that a right in the strictest sense is the 
claim-right: rights are claims recognisable in law and are strictly corre-
lated to the duty or obligation legally bound on another191. However, 
legal reasoning which uses rights terminology may be used in a manner 
other than right-claims: «the term “rights” tend to be used indiscrimi-
nately to cover what in a given case may be a privilege, a power, or an 
immunity, rather than a right in the strictest sense»192. Accordingly, he 
classifies four different categories of rights, as used in actual legal rea-
soning, and their corresponding legal relationships made of jural corre-
lations and jural opposites193. The four categories are claims, powers, 
liberties, and immunities.  
Firstly, a claim is that legal assertion made by one party against an-
other party in order that the first party may perform a specific duty-
bound action. An example of a claim right is the right to have a loan 
repaid to a creditor resulting from the corresponding duty on the part of 
the debtor to make the repayment. The correlation to a right then is 
duty. For instance, a student’s claim to confidentiality is directly related 
to the counsellor’s legal duty not to reveal any confidential information 
without her permission. The opposite of a right is a no-right, that is, no 
claim on the duty of another.  
Secondly, a liberty is that freedom whereby one party is legally pro-
tected against another party to perform a particular action in situations 
where the former party has no duty to perform that action. An example 
may be the protection in court afforded a spouse not to give evidence 
against her partner. A professor’s academic freedom to express un-
popular ideas in a classroom without fear of upsetting benefactors is di-
rectly related to the absence of any legal duty to the president by the 
professor in this regard. The correlation to a liberty-right is a no-right 
or the recognition of a duty not to. The opposite then is a legal duty.  
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Thirdly, a power, if recognised by the law, is the legal prerogative of 
one party over a second party to bring about a legal situation. For ex-
ample, the right to distribute property by will allocates further rights to 
the beneficiaries. Or, a student may waive her right to confidentiality 
because the action of giving consent extinguishes the counsellor’s re-
lated legal duty not to do so. The correlation to a power-right, Hohfeld 
calls a liability; and the opposite is a disability.  
Fourthly, an immunity is the legal recognition and protection of one 
party against a second party to bring about a legal situation. For exam-
ple, the right to join a union may be seen as a guarantee of immunity 
from the action of an employer who might seek to forbid this194. Or a 
student is immune from parents waiving her right to confidentiality. 
The correlation is a disability; and the opposite is a liability.  
The taxonomy and conceptual framework proposed by Hohfeld be-
came very influential in the course of the twentieth century. Although 
Hohfeld was primarily concerned with legal rights, scholars such as 
Carl Wellman have applied his distinctions to moral rights195. Others, 
including Margaret MacDonald, H.J. McKloskey and Joel Feinberg, 
have considered rights to be «an argument over linguistic usages, and 
have adopted Hohfeld’s analysis of legal rights as the appropriate para-
digm for understanding non-legal, moral rights. The concept of “rights” 
has been replaced almost exclusively by the concept of “rights-
talk”»196. 
5.3 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights  
Founded in 1945, in order to facilitate international security in re-
sponse to the Second World War, the United Nations unanimously 
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) three 
years later197. The document was the product of many contributors from 
diverse cultures, chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt198. The document begins 
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with a simple statement recognising «the inherent dignity and of the 
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the 
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world» in response to 
«barbarous acts» before listing human rights «as the common stan-
dard of achievement for all peoples and nations […]»199 . 
One framer, René Cassin, describes the subsequent articles contained 
in the document under the manifesto headings of dignity, liberty, equal-
ity and brotherhood200. The first two articles refer to the common value 
of all individuals regardless of creed, race or gender. For example, Ar-
ticle One states «All human beings are born free and equal in dignity 
and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience […]». Arti-
cles Three to Nineteen relate to the basic rights of liberty, life and secu-
rity. For instance, they forbid slavery, torture, arbitrary arrest and de-
fend due process, freedom of movement and political asylum. Articles 
Twenty to Twenty-Six concern equality and concentrate on equality 
and political participation and, as Article Twenty-Two states, the «eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and free 
development of his personality». Articles Twenty-Six and Twenty-
Seven refer to education and creative achievement. The final articles 
concern the responsibilities of individuals and states to foster condi-
tions in which the rights may be realised. 
The Declaration deliberately uses the term human rights in order «to 
avoid any insinuation that only males are qualified to possess them [as 
implied by “rights of man”] and to eliminate the dubious presupposi-
tions of traditional theories of natural rights»201. But many consider 
human rights to be natural rights under a new guise. As Peter Jones ob-
serves: «Historically, the idea of human rights descended from that of 
natural rights. Indeed some theorists recognise no difference between 
them; they regard “natural” and “human” as merely different labels for 
the same kind of right»202. However, Gary Herbert disagrees. The con-
cept of human rights gained force precisely because it is necessarily cut 
from its moorings in a metaphysical human nature. He argues that hu-
man rights in modern political discourse are best seen as amplified civil 
rights that hold governments and societies to account. He writes, «The 
concept of human rights is not only not descended from the concept of 
natural rights; it is a repudiation of the concept of natural rights, both 
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ancient and modern [For] neither required nor recognised human dig-
nity as its foundation»203.  
Dignity is not defined in the UNDHR or any of the subsequent decla-
rations or instruments of international law. Oscar Schachter notes, «Its 
intrinsic meaning has been left to intuitive understanding, conditioned 
in large measure by cultural measures»204. Capturing the idea of worth 
(dignitas), it attempts to appeal to all religious and philosophical tradi-
tions that acknowledge the importance of respect for or value of the 
person. The extent to which each tradition can do so has become a mat-
ter of continued debate. Other cultures may see rights as intimately 
bound to the Western experience and therefore incompatible with their 
chosen goals and common identity205.  
However, the ability to cut across traditions allowed for human rights 
to become a central part of political discourse in the second half of the 
twentieth century. At an international level, the UNDHR is now sup-
plemented by a host of further declarations and instruments and a deep-
ening international law. The United Nations, although still submitted to 
the primacy of the sovereign state, has proved more effective than the 
preceding League of Nations. At a national level, rights-language came 
to dominate the political discourse, particularly after the civil-rights 
movements of the 1960s and associated movements for discriminated 
ethnic minorities, women’s rights and the anti-nuclear movement. 
5.4 Pacem in Terris 
In 1963, Pope John XXIII issued the encyclical letter Pacem in Ter-
ris (Peace on Earth). According to John Langan, it represented, along 
with the experience and documents of the Second Vatican Council, a 
resolution of Catholicism’s «long struggle with modernising and secu-
larising culture of the West»206.  
Against the cold war backdrop, the encyclical asserts the necessary 
interconnection between justice and peace. In an unprecedented exten-
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sive manner, rights language is appropriated within a wider context that 
informs much of the Catholic tradition207. As a point of departure, 
John XXIII writes, 
Any human society, if it is to be well-ordered and productive, must lay 
down as a foundation this principle, namely, that every human being is a 
person, that is, his nature is endowed with intelligence and free will. By vir-
tue of this, he has rights and duties, flowing directly and simultaneously 
from his very nature. And as these rights are universal and inviolable so 
they cannot in any way be surrendered208.  
The central axle is the relationship between the human person, under-
stood as a moral being orientated towards truth (that is, with intelligence 
and free will) and a successful social order based upon and capable of fa-
cilitating this vision. At one end of the axle, both rights and duties are con-
sidered to flow from a holistic account of human nature, that is, the human 
being as a unitary person. Resulting from an account of human nature the 
foundation of rights and duties is presented as universal and therefore open 
to all. The theological doctrines that inform the vision are the Incarnation 
and creation of human beings «in the image and likeness of God» (Gen 
1:26). Revelation then is, «essentially confirmatory»209. On the other, the 
human person is necessarily orientated towards society.  
Since men are social by nature they are meant to live with others and work 
for one another’s welfare. A well-ordered society requires that men recog-
nise and observe their mutual rights and duties. It also demands that each 
contribute generously to the establishment of a civic order in which rights 
and duties are more sincerely and effectively acknowledged and secured210.  
The social order is based on a social interdependence that mutu-
ally requires both right and duties. It has two aspects. Firstly, rights 
may be viewed as corresponding to the obligations bound on moral 
and successful living. Rights protect and duties strive toward the 
common good and individual goods which are essential to human 
flourishing and therefore part of human nature. It states: «The right 
of every man to life is correlative with the duty to preserve it; his 
________________ 
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right to a decent standard of living, with the duty of living it becom-
ingly; and his right to investigate the truth freely, with the duty of 
pursuing it every more completely and profoundly»211. Secondly, 
rights and duties are bound the mutual recognition of the interper-
sonal dependence – another’s rights require acknowledgement of 
one’s duties. The comprehensive list of rights and duties are further 
presented with the social institutions natural and necessary to the so-
cial order, all of which are necessary for the common good212. These 
three characteristics – a comprehensive account of the human nature, 
the necessary sociability of the human person, and the natural neces-
sity of the social institutions – place the language of rights back 
within the older Aristotelian-Thomist tradition213. From a historical 
perspective, Brian Tierney writes,  
The popes of our age, who have embraced so enthusiastically the idea of 
natural rights, after their predecessors condemned it for many years as an 
irreligious, Enlightenment aberration, have been returning, unwittingly per-
haps, to a tradition rooted in the Christian jurisprudence and philosophy of 
the Middle Ages214.  
Allied to Pacem in Terris is the critical place of Dignitatis Hu-
manae, promulgated at Vatican II. It asserts the religious freedom of 
all as a necessary aspect of recognising the dignity of each person. 
To each is the God-given obligation to search for truth, «in a manner 
proper to the dignity of the human person and his social nature»215. 
As a result, coercion of religion or for religion is inappropriate. In-
deed, religious freedom a necessary precondition of a just order. It 
places limits on the extent to which the state may interfere with reli-
gious affairs; and the extent to which religion may use the means of 
state to impose belief. Together the two documents provide the 
founding principles and initial manifesto of much of the contribution 
of the Roman Catholic Church as an advocate of human rights 
worldwide216.  
________________ 
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A fuller account of scripture, tradition and the teaching of the Magis-
terium on rights will be provided when the thesis turns to consider the 
theological horizon.  
6. Conclusion: Some Inferences 
A number of relevant points, which parallel the final observations of 
the previous chapter, may be drawn from the second part of the histori-
cal study. They are proposed in order to respond to the central question 
guiding this question – what is morally and theologically at stake in the 
use of human rights?217  
Firstly, Chapter II charts the rise, fall and rise of rights in the modern 
era, focusing on two traditions – the Liberal and Critical tradition – 
both of which are bound to the characteristics and categories of thought 
associated with modernity. The liberal tradition arises from the origins 
of modernity and a new version of natural law. The critical tradition 
may be described as a critique of modernity using categories provided 
by modernity218. As a result, evaluation of rights is often connected to 
an appraisal of western society. On one hand, they may be viewed as 
moral progress; on the other, they may be associated with moral de-
cline. Either way, a thorough reflection on what is at stake in rights 
must take account of their contributions.  
Secondly, recent history confirms an inference drawn in the last 
chapter – they express the demands made in the name of justice. In fact, 
they take on a motivational force in the modern era. Most commonly, 
they justified revolutionary or social reform, such as change in author-
ity structures. They became slogans in the name of justice, particularly 
in defence of the discriminated or in advocacy of the marginalised. 
However, they were also used to justify socially conservative concerns, 
such as defence of private property and so protecting the economically 
powerful. 
Thirdly, one of the distinguishing features of the modern era was the 
growth of a secular world view and the corresponding eclipse of a 
Christian theological framework. The Enlightenment optimism in the 
power of human reason, inspired by advances in science, excluded jus-
tifications according to divine revelation. However in recent genera-
tions, rights-rhetoric has been re-appropriated and has found new 
sources of justification in theology, facilitated in part by a renewal in 
________________ 
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the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition of natural law. A number of impor-
tant questions may be inferred. Can older models of moral reasoning 
take account of modernity’s achievements?219 Furthermore, is it possi-
ble for a Christian rapprochement with modernity, with regards to hu-
man rights?220 
Fourthly, the central typology of a rights theory (justice, rights and 
law) and the associated lattice work of ideas undergo a significant 
change in this era. Significantly, rights are sceptically undermined lead-
ing to a breakdown of the typology, isolating justice and law from one 
another. The liberal and critical traditions propose differing frame-
works, presenting the associated terms in a different manner, thereby 
prioritising and delineating rights in different ways. In contrast to the 
teleological model of the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition of natural law, 
they may be described as deontological: terms are defined according to 
principles independent of considerations of ends, purposes or goals. 
Such goals are left for the individual to choose. The principles then are 
bound to the conditions that provide for freedom, that is, the equal 
freedom of each to pursue a chosen good. Matching the previous chap-
ter, four terms of the lattice work – state-society, justice, law and free-
dom – may be characterised as follows. Liberal theory presents the 
state as an artificial construct based on the consent of individuals and in 
service of the needs of individuals; justice is primarily accounted for in 
the protection of negative rights, which protect the equal freedom of 
all; the law is the command of the will of the sovereign and so charac-
terised as positive enactment and coercive; and freedom concerns the 
ability to make personal choices without restraint. Critical theory shares 
similar characterisations but the terms are viewed through the lens of 
perceived oppressions. For instance, the state is an artificial construct 
that is capable of being manipulated into being a tool of domination or 
emancipation; justice is primarily viewed in terms of positive rights, 
which provide for socio-economic and political needs; the law is a 
means of social integration; and, finally, freedom may be described as 
empowerment221.  
Fifthly, the distinctive markings of the liberal and critical traditions 
may be described respectively as «Tolerance» and «Participation». 
They capture the central values that move each tradition. They act as 
both core principles that organise the enquiry and the virtues by which 
an individual or society may be gauged. From this inference, I wish to 
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propose that these terms represent the core of what the respective mod-
els of reasoning assert to be crucially at stake in defending the individ-
ual in the name of justice. It is these aspects, therefore, that a dialogue 
about rights between traditions must turn222.  
I now turn to the central theorists of this thesis, each of whom stand 
as a contemporary representative of each tradition, in order to give an 
exposition of the complexity of their ideas.  
________________ 
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 CHAPTER III 
John Finnis: A Natural Law Theory of Rights 
1. Introduction  
John Mitchel Finnis (1940- ) is recognised by many, including 
critics, as a leading theorist in contemporary moral philosophy and 
jurisprudence. Writing of his central text, Natural Law and Natural 
Rights, Neil MacCormick comments that it makes «a radical impres-
sion by a careful restatement of an old idea, bringing old themes 
back to new life by the vigour and vividness with which they are 
translated into a contemporary idiom»1. Such a translation, accord-
ing to Terence Kennedy, is to expound «the Rule of Law in society 
in terms of human rights as the modern idiom for Natural Law»2. 
Henry Veatch may be critical but he acknowledges that Finnis’s cen-
tral text is «a book that bids fair to being the one really definitive 
treatment of natural law in the present day»3.  
Although born in Australia, John Finnis currently teaches juris-
prudence, law and ethics on both sides of the Atlantic. He graduated 
in law from Adelaide University in Australia (1961) and, as a Rho-
des Scholar, completed his doctoral studies from Oxford University 
in the United Kingdom (1965). He is joined the English Bar; but his 
career primarily has continued at Oxford in which he has held posi-
tions of Lecturer, Reader and Professor of Law and Legal Philoso-
________________ 
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phy4. In addition, he became a member of the Philosophy sub-faculty 
in 1984. Since 1995, he has divided his commitments and holds pro-
fessorial appointments at Oxford and at Notre Dame University in 
the United States.  
His writings have explored the morality of many social issues includ-
ing abortion,5 sexuality,6 and the strategy of deterrence that perpetuates 
the threat of nuclear holocaust7. In promoting public ethical reflection, 
he acted as governor to the Linacre Centre for Health Care Ethics in 
London (1981-1996), and as a leading Catholic intellectual, he served 
on the International Theological Commission (1986-1992) and the Pon-
tifical Council De Iustitia et Pace (1990-1995). Currently, he assists at 
the Pontifical Academy Pro Vita (2001- )8. In 1990, he became a Fel-
low of the British Academy.  
In this chapter, I will analytically examine Finnis’s framework by 
which he understands human rights in moral reasoning. I refer to Fin-
nis’s analysis of particular right-claims only where it clarifies the gen-
eral discussion. This main section is followed by an outline of his re-
flections on Christianity before concluding with a presentation of sig-
nificant points that link back to previous chapters and look forward to 
pending chapters.  
2. Situating Finnis 
In Natural Law and Natural Rights, Finnis presents his primary 
aim as the «re-presentation and development of the main elements of 
the “classical” or “mainstream” theories of natural law»9. This is the 
common purpose of all his significant works. While his primary in-
fluence and explicit point of departure is the canon of natural law 
________________ 
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writings10, he argues «in detail for his revisionist view of Aquinas’s 
theory of natural law»11.  
Finnis self-consciously stands within the classical tradition, drawing 
upon much of its systematic framework, exemplified by Thomas Aqui-
nas, Aristotle and Plato. He has never attempted a systematic history of 
natural law but prefers to engage with the fundamental structure of 
classical natural law thinking as presented by the canon. In particular, 
Aquinas plays a pivotal role, having a «uniquely strategic place in the 
history of natural law theorising»12. Drawing upon the systematic 
framework of the tradition, Finnis maintains the necessary inter-
connection between justice as the right thing, the rights of individuals 
and the law, in the light of a deep understanding of the human person. 
Accordingly, he «insisted that the justification of the modern rule of 
law [and associated rights] required the exposition of a substantive the-
ory of human nature and the moral goods and values necessary to its 
perfection»13.  
In an early article, entitled «Blackstone’s Theoretical Intentions», 
Finnis argues that a fundamental break occurred between the classi-
cal and the modern traditions of legal reflection14. He rejects the 
models of the law represented by Bentham (legal positivism) and 
Blackstone (Lockean liberal rights) for within these frameworks the 
person is abstracted from their actual political and legal relation-
ships, marginalising the concept of the common good as a means of 
justification for positive law. The good is posited by these theories 
as individual and pre-social and the law is considered as nothing 
more than the protection of rights – whether natural (Blackstone) or 
merely positive (Bentham). Ultimately, these two modern ap-
proaches to law must base legal obligation on superior will rather 
than on reason, which characterised the earlier tradition. Finnis con-
tends that a return to pre-modern accounts of law is best able to 
counter such a voluntarist approach.  
The re-integration of the theoretical concerns of classical natural 
law with the justification of rights language was influentially under-
________________ 
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taken by Jacques Maritain (1882-1973)15. He argued that individual 
human rights are directly derivative from the natural law. In Man and 
the State, published in 1951, he asserted that each person’s «right to ex-
istence, to personal freedom, and the pursuit of the perfection of moral 
life, belongs, strictly speaking, to natural law»16. However, according 
to Finnis, the neo-scholasticism exemplified by Maritain tended to be 
inaccurate in its exposition of Aquinas and muddled in its philosophical 
reflections17. 
Such a two-fold criticism may be seen as points of departure in the 
re-appraisal of the natural law of Thomas Aquinas18. In order to su-
persede neo-scholasticism, Finnis has collaborated with Germain 
Grisez and Joseph Boyle in a re-articulation of the natural law capa-
ble of responding to contemporary philosophical objections and 
modern social concerns in a manner that they claim is true to Aqui-
nas19. This project he calls the New Classical Theory20. Firstly, it re-
jects the previously standard interpretation of Aquinas’s theory of 
natural law as «unsound». Initially articulated in an article entitled 
«The First Principle of Practical Reason» (1965), Germain Grisez 
denied the prevalent interpretation of the natural law tradition. In or-
der to deduce moral imperatives according to this model, a person 
________________ 
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«examines an action in comparison with his essence to see whether 
the action fits human nature or does not fit it. If the action fits, it is 
seen to be good; if it does not fit, it is seen to be bad»21. Instead, 
Grisez gives an account in which the specific commandments of the 
natural law are self-evident principles of practical reasoning orien-
tated towards the good. As a result, and secondly, Grisez responds in 
an astute manner to the primary modern philosophical criticism of 
the natural law – the fallacy by which an ought can be logically de-
duced from is. He does so by actually accepting the principle but de-
nies that it undermines a correct reading of the natural law proposed 
by Aquinas. Instead, Grisez argues that practical reasoning requires 
no direct referral to theoretical truth. In the same article he writes,  
The theory of law is permanently in danger of falling into the illusion that 
practical knowledge is merely theoretical knowledge plus the force of will 
[...] The way to avoid these difficulties is to understand that practical rea-
son really does not know in the same way that theoretical reason knows. 
For practical reason, to know is to prescribe. This is why I insisted so 
strongly that the first practical principle [Good is to be done and pursued, 
and evil is to be avoided] is not a theoretical truth [...] This point is pre-
cisely what Hume saw when he denied the possibility of deriving ought 
from is22.  
The moral life lived according to the natural law is ordered in harmony 
with the principles of practical reasoning and the goods towards which 
they aim. The project of New Natural Law – which includes the primary 
works of John Finnis – is to unpack and deepen this insight attributed to 
Aquinas23. Their approach has been restated and refined in many collabo-
rative and individual works and articles of the American Journal of Juris-
prudence, formerly known as The Natural Law Forum. Although they 
claim to be faithful to the exposition and spirit of Aquinas, they do admit 
that their project advances his theory:  
it uses some language common in the (broadly-speaking, Thomistic) natu-
ral-law tradition from which we developed the theory. But what we say 
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here differs in various ways from the theories articulated by Aristotle, 
Thomas Aquinas, and others24. 
Within the Thomist tradition, the project – most frequently re-
ferred to as the New Natural Law Theory – has been critiqued by 
many for failure to be true to Aquinas25. In common, negative 
commentators wish to reassert the necessary role of metaphysics in 
revealing a human nature that can provide facts from which norms or 
values may be deduced. For example, the previously mentioned 
Henry Veatch argues: 
For it really isn’t necessary, [Finnis] seems to say, that so-called natural 
laws in law and ethics should be laws of nature at all, or in any sense dis-
coverable in nature. No, and as if to puzzle and perplex his readers even 
more, Finnis apparently wants to claim no less a one than St. Thomas 
Aquinas as being on his side in this regard. For St. Thomas, Finnis sug-
gests, was one who was never taken in by any such notion as that one might 
be able to derive ethical principles from nature, or that one would ever need 
to suppose that ethics had to be based on metaphysics26.  
Veatch maintains that the Grisez-Finnis re-interpretation is charac-
terised by modernity. In particular, the central assertion that ethics 
may be pursued in an autonomous manner independently of meta-
physics and nature is the result of Kantian philosophy and therefore 
unfaithful to the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition of natural law. In 
Human Rights: Fact or Fancy, he writes,  
Was it not Kant, after all, who decisively turned his back on Aristotle and 
on the entire tradition of natural-law ethics, in his unequivocal repudiation 
of nature as being able to provide a foundation for morals or ethics? Ac-
cordingly, just as Kant in his ethical deontology sternly refused to make 
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even the slightest concessions to natural teleology, may we say that Grisez 
[and Finnis] would appear to be following Kant’s suit27? 
Finnis rejects Veatch’s description of his position because it creates 
gulfs between logical distinctions and therefore does not take account 
of the explicitly asserted relationship between ethics and human na-
ture28. This chapter further explains Finnis’s position. 
Teresa Iglesias-Rozas maintains that «he is to be counted as a sui-
generis Aristotelian-Thomist»29. In the history of the Aristotelian-
Thomist model of natural law, the mark of modernity in the return to 
Aquinas by Finnis (inspired by Grisez and in collaboration with others) 
parallels the previous great return to Aquinas of the Second Scholasti-
cism. As Vitoria and Suárez returned to the via antiqua in the light of 
nominalism30, so also Finnis and Grisez turn towards Aquinas in the 
light of post-Kantian modernity. Perhaps what has been observed of the 
former can be applied to the latter: «the very incompleteness of that 
turning away was a source of theoretical originality and power»31. I 
will later contend that this is particularly true with respect to the par-
ticular issue of providing a theoretical support for rights32.  
Like Vitoria and Suárez, Finnis claims to be true to the Aristotelian-
Thomist tradition. Out of such fidelity, he condemns elements of con-
temporary moral theology and  
their characteristic moral principle and method: Pursue the course which 
promises, in itself and its consequences, a net greater proportion of good 
states of affairs, or (again, too casually supposed to be a coapplicable crite-
rion) a net lesser proportion of bad, overall, in the long run. For the sake of 
a label, let us call this «proportionalism»33. 
He criticises the proponents of such an approach on the grounds that 
it is philosophically unsound and unfaithful to the Christian and 
Thomist tradition34. In summary, he writes, «the tradition, both of phi-
________________ 
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losophy and of faith, treated as obviously untenable what proportional-
ists today profess to be self-evident»35. This critique is part of a wider 
analysis of moral methodology that excludes as untenable the possibil-
ity of any final measurement or prediction of consequences36. The rea-
sons for his critical assessment are further outlined in the course of this 
chapter. 
The central proponents of the New Natural Law Theory may be 
taken as a group37. However, John Finnis is considered separately for 
the purposes of this dissertation because, as a legal philosopher, he pro-
vides the explication and application of the theory in the light of juris-
prudence. As a result, he presents a greater delineation of the issues 
surrounding justice, rights and law – thereby making for a clearer sub-
sequent comparative study. His published works include Natural Law 
and Natural Rights (1980), Fundamentals of Ethics (1983), Moral Ab-
solutes: Tradition, Revision and Truth (1991) and Aquinas: Moral, Po-
litical, and Legal Theory (1998). References to collaborative works, 
such as Nuclear Deterrence, Morality, and Realism (1987), will be 
made to the extent that it expands and deepens the discussion.  
Of Natural Law and Natural Rights, Finnis writes, «Almost every-
thing in this book is about human rights (“human rights” being a con-
temporary idiom for “natural rights”: I use the terms synonymously)»38. 
His ethical and jurisprudential reflections regarding rights are the result 
of the application of a general conceptual framework. This chapter pro-
ceeds accordingly: first, it outlines the elements of his framework; sec-
ondly, it focuses on the resulting reasoning about rights. It is supported 
by reference to his other ethical woks. 
3. General Theoretical Framework  
Natural Law and Natural Rights begins 
There are human goods that can be secured only through the institutions of 
human law, and requirements of practical reasonableness that only those in-
stitutions can satisfy. It is the object of this book to identify those goods, 
and those requirements of practical reasonableness, and thus to show how 
________________ 
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and on what conditions such institutions are justified and the ways in which 
they can be (and often are) defective39. 
In other words, the purpose of this particular work is to justify the 
rule of law and its associated institutions and to outline the criteria by 
which it may be evaluated by way of a substantive account of the ele-
ments that constitute human good and the practical demands of being 
reasonable. Accordingly, Finnis’s primary concern is to propose a nor-
mative account of the law or a consistent theory which supports the 
moral authority of law to guide human action.  
His reflections rest primarily on reasons for actions. In pursuing a 
particular course of action, a person (or community) invokes reasons by 
which that action is justified to oneself and others, that is, she engages 
in practical reasoning: «Practical thought is thinking about what (one 
ought) to do»40. Reflection on the reasons for particular acts exposes 
values inherent in that for which we strive.  
Human affairs are properly understood in the light of their purpose or 
significance to those who participate in them. Social practices in which 
people participate and which guide human affairs, such as law, can be 
fully understood «only by understanding their point, that is to say their 
objective, their value, their significance or importance, as conceived by 
the people who performed them, engaged in them, etc»41. To describe 
law, therefore, is to implicitly evaluate it. Finnis explicitly rejects those 
legal philosophies that claim to be merely describing law, and so are 
value-neutral, for being methodologically blind or naïve42. An explana-
tion of the law is never merely its description. Such descriptive theories 
claim to be neutral on the matter of what ought to be done, yet it is the 
normative claim – what is to be done? what purpose is being pursued? 
– that inheres in the social practice of law. The normative element is 
necessarily a part of any descriptive theory of law: ethics and legal the-
ory are inextricably bound. He maintains therefore that there is a mu-
tual necessity between the two elements. There is a to-and-fro move-
ment leading to a reflective equilibrium between the values held to be 
important and the descriptions of the human and cultural context.  
 A methodologically-aware jurisprudence allows for the priority of 
the practical viewpoint – that is, for value, purpose, significance, or the 
________________ 
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human good. Therefore, a sound legal theory must be one that provides 
a coherent account of practical reasoning. Such is the claim that Finnis 
makes for a theory of natural law. 
A sound theory of natural law is one that explicitly, with full awareness of 
the methodological situation just described, undertakes a critique of practi-
cal viewpoints, in order to distinguish the practically unreasonable from the 
practically reasonable, and thus to differentiate the really important from 
that which is unimportant or in important only by its opposition to or un-
reasonable exploitation of the really important. A theory of natural law 
claims to be able to identify conditions and principles of practical right-
mindedness, of good and proper order among men and in individual con-
duct43.  
3.1 The First Principles of Practical Reasoning and Natural Law 
The conception of practical reasoning proposed by Finnis is of the 
Aristotelian-Thomist tradition. In Central Issues in Jurisprudence, N.E. 
Simmonds contrasts Finnis’s approach with the «Humean conception 
of reason», that is, the model commonly associated with David Hume 
and the Enlightenment44. According to Finnis, the second model origi-
nated in Thomas Hobbes and is founded on «the Hobbesian and 
Humean claim that practical reason is founded on pre-rational desires 
of which all we can say is ‘we happen to have them’»45. Chapter II out-
lined the role of Hobbes in the development of this assertion46. The 
model holds that reasons for actions are simply justifications for desire. 
Reason is instrumental to attaining the object of our desires but cannot 
discern what ought to be desired – one desire is as good as another and 
may not be deemed to be reasonable or unreasonable. Finnis rejects 
such a model: a correct model of practical reasoning begins not from 
desires but from the basic human goods which are perceived to be de-
sirable. The former gives precedence to desire: the latter, prioritises the 
human good.  
According to Finnis, in coming to understand our actions, 
the revealing question is the question «Why», not interpreted blankly as if 
one were investigating iron filings jumping to a magnet or the ricochet of 
billiard balls, but humanly and intelligently as «What for?» Only thus will 
one be able to describe one’s actions as they really are, and oneself as the 
agent one really is. And only thus will the relations between desire and un-
________________ 
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derstanding in the identification and pursuit of human good be accurately 
known47. 
Such a question is the primary concern of practical reason. Practical 
reasoning reveals itself by way of reflection on the basic motivations 
for doing the things a person does in the actual lived human experience 
in the every-day world. Importantly, practical reasoning presumes the 
free choice of individuals to shape their own destiny according to intel-
ligible purposes or goals, that is, it pre-supposes that an individual has 
the capacity to know what they are doing and to act accordingly48. Ac-
tions initiated by free choice «are done for the sake of something; they 
are rationally guided (whether or not they are morally good and entirely 
reasonable in other respects)»49. As rationally guided, the principles of 
action may be discerned by practical reason reflecting upon itself. Re-
flection on the lived-experience of pursuing some purpose reveals the 
reasons why one is interested in that outcome. Distinct from a purpose 
itself, the reasons provided, which explain why a particular goal is de-
sirable and an action is motivated by it, reveal in turn a good.  
For example, among goods are winning and being healthy, considered inso-
far as they can be realised – protected, promoted, and so on – not only by 
one action but by many possible actions. In entering a contest or going to 
the doctor, one’s purpose of winning or regaining health only participates 
in the goods of winning and health, in which one is interested more gener-
ally50.  
In other words, to achieve a purpose is to instantiate the good in 
which a person is interested. «Good in the widest sense in which it is 
applied to human actions and their principles, refers to anything a per-
son can in any way desire»51. The good that is desired directs human 
action: in order to instantiate a good, a person must act in certain ways. 
Therefore, the dynamic of moral action, that is, the willed act initiated 
by free choice, is moved according to goods rather than desires. It 
stands in contrast with the model of Hobbes and Hume. Defending this 
mode of reasoning, Robert George writes that the goods 
far from being reducible to desires, (they) give people reasons to desire 
things – reasons which hold whether they happen to desire them or not and 
________________ 
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even in the fact of powerful emotional motives which run contrary to what 
reason identifies as human good and morally right52. 
Deliberation or the persistent purposive questioning – why are you 
doing that? and Why should we do that? – will uncover a small number 
of basic goods. They are irreducible to any prior motive and need no 
further explanation except that they are rationally judged to be for the 
benefit of the person: «The basic goods are basic reasons for acting be-
cause they are aspects of the fulfilment of persons, whose action is ra-
tionally motivated by these reasons»53. Such goods have motivating 
power because they are perceived to have intelligible value and are 
worth following. In the last analysis, they are experienced as aspects of 
our well-being, full-being, or human flourishing. They are not abstract 
entities but real elements that actually constitute people as persons. 
Through acted-out choices, people achieve their purposes. But it is only 
by the same means that people also form their own characters: it is «by 
a free choice I willy-nilly constitute myself a certain sort of person»54. 
It is by choosing to instantiate the basic goods, a person participates in 
human flourishing; by choosing otherwise is to limit or hinder human 
flourishing.  
Such basic goods «concern the evaluative substratum of all moral 
judgements [...] in which we grasp the basic values of human existence 
and thus, too, the basic principles of all practical reasoning»55. The ba-
sic values or basic goods are the first principles of practical reasonable-
ness to be pursued as an opportunity for human flourishing. They are 
the first principles of the natural law.  
An account of practical reasonableness can be called a theory of «natural 
law» because practical reasoning’s very first principles are these basic rea-
sons which identify the basic human good as ultimate reasons for choice 
and action – reasons for actions which will instantiate and express human 
nature precisely because participating in those good, i.e. instantiating (actu-
alising, realising) those ultimate aspects of human flourishing56.  
3.2 The Basic Goods 
Practical reasoning reveals those goods or basic principles that are 
pursued as opportunities of human flourishing. Initially, they arise from 
________________ 
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a reflection on the motives or intentions in action: «At this point in our 
discourse (or private meditation), inference and proof are left behind 
(or left until later), and the proper form of discourse is ‘… is a good, in 
itself, don’t you think?’»57.  
By means of such discourse, basic goods are recognised as those that 
remain irreducible to any other. They cannot be logically deduced from 
something else nor are they instrumental in bringing about another 
good. Rather, they are basic or intrinsic and are made plain and evident 
in the commitment, action and decisions of all human beings. «Goods 
like these are intrinsic aspects – that is, real parts – of the integral ful-
filment of persons. We call these intrinsic aspects of person full-being, 
«basic human goods»: basic not to survival but to human full-being»58. 
They facilitate self-realisation, self-actualisation or self-fulfilment. 
They are universal modes of interest and commitment that underlie all 
practical pursuits at an individual and communal level (such as moral-
ity, politics and law and their respective codes)59. As a result, they are 
the indemonstrable but self-evident principles of practical reason. Co-
inciding with the recognition of each basic inclination in the human 
person is a basic good or value for which a person strives and together 
they constitute human flourishing.  
While there is a limitless diversity of pursuits and commitments, 
there are only a small number of basic goods. In Natural Law and 
Natural Rights, Finnis lists seven such basic goods. They are life, 
knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, sociability, practical reasonable-
ness, religion60. They correspond to the fundamental inclinations of the 
human person as follows: life, in all its aspects including self-
preservation, health, shelter and procreation of life; knowledge, that is, 
an inclination to know the truth for its own sake and not as an instru-
mental towards another good; play, or that which has no point beyond 
its own enjoyment and therefore its own value – later to be supple-
mented by the good of excellence achieved through work; aesthetic ex-
perience, or the appreciation and creation of beauty; sociability, or the 
natural inclination to live together with a minimum of peace and har-
mony or, at most, a real friendship; practical reasonableness, which 
brings to bear effectively one’s own intelligence in order to shape one’s 
own life, character and future – that is, the other basic goods – in order 
________________ 
 
57
 J. FINNIS, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 85-86. 
58
 J. FINNIS – J. BOYLE – G. GRISEZ, Nuclear Deterrence, 277. 
59
 J. FINNIS, Moral Absolutes, 42. 
60
 Cf. J. FINNIS, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 81-92; ID, Fundamentals of Eth-
ics, 51, 124. 
PART TWO: INTERPRETATION 146 
to bring about inner peace, authenticity and self-determination61; and 
finally religion, or the inclination beyond ourselves to meaning itself 
and the corresponding value of engaging with the ultimate order of 
things62.  
The list of the basic goods has evolved since it was first compiled by 
Grisez in the founding article of New Natural Law Theory63. James 
Bernard Murphy questions the extent to which the basic goods may be 
called self-evident if they are open to continual modification. In par-
ticular, Murphy argues for the place of work as an intrinsic good that 
facilitates self-realisation and fulfilment and which was initially over-
looked by Finnis and Grisez64. The recent addition of the basic good of 
marriage – linked to the human inclination of sexuality – has produced 
a good deal of response65. In an article entitled «The Basic Dimensions 
of Human Flourishing: A Comparison of Accounts», Sabina Alkire 
________________ 
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compares the list provided by Finnis to other lists offered by other phi-
losophers, psychologists and anthropologists, while taking account of 
his criteria. The result is the identification of nine basic reasons for ac-
tion, similar yet in some manners different to that of Finnis66.  
However, the Natural law, as argued by Finnis, is not a static theory 
but an ongoing and continual reflection of practical reason to discern 
and clarify the principles of action – that is, the basic goods as revealed 
by practical reason. He accepts that the list may be modified.  
There is no need for the reader to accept the present list, just as it stands, 
still less its nomenclature (which simply gestures towards categories of 
human purpose that are each, though unified, nevertheless multi-faceted) 
[...] It seems to me that those seven purposes are all the basic purposes of 
human action, and that any other purpose which you or I might recognise 
and propose will turn out to represent, or be constituted or, some aspect(s) 
of some or all of them67. 
In fact, a vigorous debate on what are the basic values that univer-
sally inform our actions would be welcomed by Finnis for it would 
continue the re-establishment and an advancement of the natural law 
model of reasoning68. Indeed, it will be later maintained that continued 
deliberation (and therefore, disagreement and debate) is essential and 
inherent to the working of the natural law69. In some form or another, 
the basic goods «have been called in the Western philosophical tradi-
tion the first principles of natural law, because they lay down for us the 
outlines of everything one could reasonably want to do, to have, and to 
be»70. Taken together they are all indispensable aspects of what was 
later described as «integral human fulfilment»71. 
________________ 
 
66
 Cf. S. ALKIRE, «The Basic Dimensions of Human Flourishing», 73-110. They 
are: life; understanding for its own sake; skilful performance and production; creative 
expression (play, humour, sport), friendship and affiliation; meaningful choice and 
identity; inner harmony between feelings, judgements, and behaviour; harmony with a 
greater-than-human source of meaning and value; harmony with the natural world.  
67
 J. FINNIS, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 92. 
68
 Olaf Anderson observes «there does need to be a corrective mechanism in natu-
ral law theory as there is in science. Where science can hypothesise and falsify and 
thus correct itself, natural law needs a similar tool». O. ANDERSON, «Is Contemporary 
Natural Law Theory a Beneficial Development?», 478-491, 490. For other contempo-
rary philosophers influenced by Aristotelian models, who attempt similar projects to 
Finnis, cf. M.C. NUSSBAUM, Women and Human Development; D. BAYBROOKE, 
Natural Law Modernised.  
69
 Cf. Ch. VI, Sec. 6.2 ff.  
70
 J. FINNIS, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 97. 
71
 G. GRISEZ – J. BOYLE – J. FINNIS, «Practical Principles», 131. 
PART TWO: INTERPRETATION 148 
There are three important features of the basic goods. Firstly, the ba-
sic goods are intrinsic to themselves and therefore recognisable as be-
ing irreducible. As a result, Finnis insists that the basic goods are inc-
ommensurable, that is, one may not be measured against another. No 
objective hierarchy exists between them, by which it may be judged 
one to be more important than another. Each may be regarded as having 
priority or importance according to the attention that it receives. It is, 
rather, the real life commitments of an individual which give priority to 
one over another. For example, a scholar may choose to commit herself 
to the value of knowledge. In order to so, she may need to sacrifice an-
other basic value such as play. Secondly, the basic goods are independ-
ent of one another. This is an important distinguishing characteristic of 
the systematic presentation of the New Natural Law Theory, represent-
ing a development of the Thomist tradition. Aquinas does not present 
such a list and offers only three inclinations – self-preservation, pro-
creation and rationality-sociability72. Furthermore, Finnis denies the 
view commonly attributed to the scholastics, that there is a sole unify-
ing good in the contemplation of God. Instead, the goods have no ob-
jective unification arranged according to their fulfilment in one sole 
good. Terence Kennedy observes: «Finnis, therefore, propounds a view 
of the last end of man not as the single good of the contemplation of 
God but as the fullness of life with all its complex and multiple goods 
in the Kingdom»73. Thirdly, the basic goods are pre-moral, that is, they 
are identified as an objective part of human nature. They are human 
good rather than the moral good – simply they are those things that 
make life worthwhile. Moral norms do not inhere within them as such. 
However, they are directive of morality. In order to participate in the 
basic goods, that is, for a person to flourish and experience fulfilment, 
an active life must be pursed in a particular manner – to which I now 
turn74.  
3.3 Requirements of Practical Reasoning 
In order for good to be achieved, that is, in order for a person to 
flourish, action must be pursued in a particular manner. The goods that 
facilitate flourishing direct practical reason. Practical reason, therefore, 
________________ 
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demands a coherent purpose or «integral directiveness»75. Finnis ex-
horts:  
Do not act pointlessly. The fundamental principle for moral thought is sim-
ply the demand to be fully rational: In so far as it is in your power, allow 
nothing but the basic reasons for action to shape your practical thinking as 
you find, develop, and use your opportunities to pursue human flourishing 
through your actions76.  
It is the concrete lived experience that reveals the means, or prin-
ciples, by which a person may participate in all the goods. The prin-
ciples are the basic requirements demanded of a person in her strug-
gle to follow the right course of action in order to achieve good77. 
Philosophically speaking, methodological requirements may be dis-
cerned, each representing the normative principles of practical delib-
eration and human action, to «guide the transition from judgements 
about human goods to judgements about the right thing to do here 
and now»78. By bringing practical reason to bear on achieving the 
basic goods the norms of morality are produced – they become 
moral goods. «Thus, speaking very summarily, we could say that the 
requirements to which we now turn express the ‘natural law method’ 
of working out the (moral) ‘natural law’ from the first (pre-moral) 
‘principles of natural law’»79.  
Finnis argues that there are nine requirements of practical reason-
ing – which, taken together, constitutes practical wisdom or pru-
dence80. The nine requirements of practical reasoning are as fol-
lows81: first, to have a coherent life plan, which is the ability to see 
our life as a whole guided by commitments or projects, that is, to 
have a purpose; second, to make no arbitrary preferences amongst 
values, which requires that in the commitment to one good or some 
goods one should not deny any of the other values; third, to make no 
arbitrary preferences among people, which responds to the basic 
________________ 
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human dignity of each person; fourth and fifth, to have detachment 
and commitment, that is, to live a commitment but not to the extent 
that failure will lead to personal collapse; sixthly, to account for the 
(limited) relevance of consequences, which is to be efficient in at-
taining goals without reducing our goals to a mere measurement of 
utility; seventh, to have respect for every basic value in every act, as 
each act affirms or denies a basic value; eighth, to foster the re-
quirements of the common good – which is the point of departure in 
Finnis’s reflections on justice and human rights; ninth, to follow 
one’s conscience, that is, to hold fast to what one believes to be a 
correct and reasonable judgement.  
The application of these nine principles, or modes of responsibil-
ity, gives rise to morality. If an action is to be reasonable or to fol-
low its own dictates, then it must take account of all these principles. 
By following such dictates of reason, one comes to discern the right 
thing to do in a given situation. In order to achieve human flourish-
ing, we are bound to act according to the requirements that will 
bring it about. Practical reason, therefore, is the source of moral ob-
ligation; its principles «contribute to the sense, significance, and 
force of terms such as ‘moral’, ‘[morally] ought’, and ‘right’»82.  
3.4 The Natural Law and Nature 
The role of nature and, in particular, human nature has a critical 
place in the development of the natural law tradition. Outlined in Chap-
ter I, changes in the conception of human nature effected developments 
in the natural law83. It continues to mark many of the lines of debate.  
The first principles of natural law, according to Finnis and the school 
of the New Natural Law Theory, are to be discerned from a thorough 
account of practical reason, that is, from ethical reflection on lived ex-
perience. They cannot be logically deduced or derived by theoretical 
reflection on human nature. To do so is to succumb to the naturalistic 
fallacy, or the impossibility of deriving an «ought» from the «is». Fin-
nis claims that the natural law tradition, as epitomised by Aquinas (and 
Aristotle), does support his position: 
for Aquinas, the way to discover what is morally right (virtue) and wrong 
(vice) is to ask, not what is in accordance with human nature, but what is 
reasonable. And this quest will eventually bring one back to the underived 
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first principles of practical reasonableness, principles which make no refer-
ence at all to human nature, but only to human good84.  
As noted in a previous subsection85, this present point – the impossi-
bility of deriving moral claims from factual premises – is rejected by 
many others who claim to be aligned to the Aristotelian-Thomist tradi-
tion. At the heart of the critique is the claim that it ultimately under-
mines natural law theory86. Of the argument that moral claims cannot 
be derived from factual premises, Jean Porter, in Natural and Divine 
Law, observes 
No scholastic would interpret reason in such a way as to drive a wedge be-
tween the pre-rational aspects of our nature and rationality [...] In particu-
lar, [the scholastics maintain] the pre-rational components of human nature 
have their own intelligible structures, in virtue of which they provide start-
ing points and parameters for the exercise of practical reason87.  
Pauline Westerman, in The Disintegration of Natural Law Theory, 
maintains that «the – professed – anxiety to commit the naturalistic fal-
lacy as well as his foundation in ultimate and incommensurable values 
testify to the dominance of (Neo-)Kantian assumptions»; a strategy 
which, she argues, «turns out to be a dangerous one: once the enemy is 
encapsulated, it undermines natural law theory from within»88. The 
previously mentioned Henry Veatch agrees. In Human Rights: Fact of 
Fancy?, he writes: «[from] a Kantian transcendental turn, it must inevi-
tably follow that any attempt to find a proper justification for morals 
and ethics will thereby become hopelessly compromised»89. The Kant-
ian assumption is that the norms of morality are not to be found in na-
ture but in the inescapable pre-conditions and structures of freedom 
________________ 
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characterised by practical reasoning90. By accepting such an assump-
tion, Finnis is accused of eclipsing metaphysics or the study of reality91.  
In response, The New Natural Law argues that the accusation does 
not apply92. The naturalistic fallacy does not lead to the removal of na-
ture from ethical discourse. «The logical distinction is not at all a “wall 
of separation”»93. Finnis does not deny the important role to be played 
by theoretical (or metaphysical) knowledge of human nature. Drawing 
upon Aquinas in an article entitled «Natural Inclinations and Natural 
Rights: Deriving “ought” from “is” according to Aquinas», he writes 
that the ontological  
presupposes and thus entails that the goodness of all human goods (and 
thus the appropriateness, the convenientia, of all human responsibilities) is 
derived from (i.e. depends upon) the nature which, by their goodness, those 
goods perfect. For those goods – which as ends are the rationes of practical 
norms or «ought» – would not perfect the nature were it other than it is. So, 
ought ontologically depends on – and in that sense certainly may be said to 
be derived from – is94. 
Such theoretical reflection is a derivative aspect of the one intelligi-
ble reflection. Finnis is focusing on the awareness of that intelligibility 
or the awareness of our coming to know. He is prioritising the role of 
epistemology, or more specifically the awareness of practical reasoning 
in coming to a full knowledge of the human person. And: 
Epistemologically, (knowledge of) human nature is not the basis of ethics; 
rather ethics is an indispensable preliminary to a full and soundly based 
knowledge of human nature. What one can and should say about human na-
ture as the result of one’s ethical inquiries, is not mere rhetorical addition; it 
finds a place in the sober and factual account of what it is to be human95. 
Ethics, or the disciplined reflection of and on practical reason, re-
veals the self-evident truths of the basic goods: they cannot be the con-
clusions of a theoretical (or metaphysical) knowledge of human nature. 
Referring again to Aquinas:  
For we come to know human nature by knowing its potentialities, and these 
we come to know by knowing their actuations, which in turn we know by 
knowing their objects – the objects of the characteristically human inclina-
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tio and actus, the will, are precisely the primary human good. (So, if any-
thing, an adequately full knowledge of human nature is derived from our 
practical and underived knowledge of the human goods [...]) In this sense 
«ought» is not derived from «is»96. 
Reflections on the facts of human nature do have a role for they help to 
deepen our understanding of the basic goods97. In other words, studies of 
human nature, such as metaphysics, anthropology, sociology or psychol-
ogy can provide knowledge from which norms can be inferred (but not 
deduced) «by way of an assemblage of reminders of the range of possibly 
worthwhile activities and orientations open to one»98. What results is the 
previously outlined reflective equilibrium perceived of law and all the hu-
man sciences. There is a mutual necessity between the practical and the 
descriptive, creating a to-and-fro movement which deepens a full under-
standing of values and the human and cultural context99. 
In Fundamentals of Ethics, Finnis explicitly appreciates Kant’s cate-
gorical imperatives as attempts to formulate the first principles of practical 
reasoning. In the principle of respect for humanity, Kant «rightly envis-
ages a rational end (i.e. that which gives point to a choice) [...] but [...] fails 
to observe that human understanding grasps intelligible ends». As a result, 
Kant has «evacuated them of all content save the power and activity of 
reason itself»100. According to Finnis, practical reason is able to discern – 
aided but not strictly derivable by theoretical reflection on human nature – 
the actual ends or basic goods which guide all human action.  
4. The Common Good 
To return to the pursuit of integral self-fulfilment of the person:  
Integral human fulfilment is not individualistic satisfaction of desires or 
preferences. The ideal of integral human fulfilment is the realisation, so far 
as possible, of all the basic goods in all persons, living together in har-
mony101. 
Its achievement is necessarily attained together. On one hand, the re-
alisation of all the goods can only take place in partnership with others. 
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The human person is a social being and the well-being of one is intrin-
sically bound with the well-being of others. Human fulfilment therefore 
is intrinsically other-orientated102. On the other hand, sociability (or 
friendship) is the basic good with a corresponding inclination in human 
nature – the person is a social being.  
The general good of sociability can be instantiated in many forms, 
from intimacy to political association. Human relationships are natural 
and not simply conventional103. In this regard, Finnis is perfectly in 
tune with the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition104. However, Finnis main-
tains that for Aquinas – in comparison to Aristotle – the notion of a 
person as a political animal (zoon politicon) primarily refers to it as a 
social being and not narrowly political105.  
Each person acts within a network of overlapping relationships creat-
ing a unifying relationship or community. The human community is 
formed in part by common action. Community, therefore, should not be 
regarded as simply an association, in the sense of an entity or a thing 
but primarily as a sharing of life, action and interests, in the sense of re-
lationship. It results from human interaction: «Every community is 
constituted by the communication and co-operation among its mem-
bers»106. A community’s purpose – which is the vital question in the 
process of practical reasoning – is the facilitation of the flourishing of 
all its participants. The common good, therefore, is not the same as a 
common enterprise, but neither is the common good a simple sum-total 
of individual goods. Because it is through action and participation in 
the basic good of sociability that one may be fulfilled, a person should 
never be reduced to a cog in the wheel. To do so, is to deny human 
well-being107. Each community or association ought to be allowed to 
prosper within its own sphere, thereby justifying the principle of sub-
sidiarity. But even the deepest natural association such as the family 
has limitations. A further community is required:  
There emerges the desirability for a complete community, an all-round as-
sociation in which would be co-ordinated the initiatives and activates of in-
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dividuals, of families, and of the vast network of intermediate associations. 
The point of all-round association would be to secure the whole ensemble 
of material and other conditions [...] that tend to favour, facilitate, and fos-
ter the realisation by each individual of his or her development108. 
The «complete community» is the political and legal community be-
cause it is the fullest and expansive means of securing the good of its 
members. Political authority, therefore, is naturally necessary in order 
to solve co-ordination problems. In turn, legitimacy arises from the 
claims and success of the political and legal order to realise such an 
end. It is established by the ability of the political community to act in 
accordance to its own point or purpose, which is «the securing of a 
whole ensemble of material and other conditions that tend to favour the 
realisation, by each individual in the community, of his or her personal 
development»109. In other words, the legitimacy of authority arises 
from the co-ordination of conditions that facilitate human flourishing – 
the common good. 
On one hand, the political community is a manifestation of the good 
of sociability: participation in some community is necessary if an indi-
vidual is to flourish. On the other, it also consists of the set of condi-
tions which makes possible the exercise of practical reasonableness and 
achievement of fulfilled lives by its participants. The primary concern 
therefore of the political community is the public ordering of the con-
crete conditions which facilitate the individual good – that is, the com-
mon good. Therefore, good governance involves the provision of the 
essential pre-conditions for choice (a necessary requirement of human 
flourishing) and should not make basic choices for the citizens them-
selves. In short, the public good (or the common good as pursued by 
the instruments of the state) relates to justice, peace and public order. 
The public good is instrumental to the facilitation of the basic 
goods110. Claiming to follow Aquinas, Finnis writes « – the public good 
– is not basic but, rather, instrumental to securing human goods which 
are basic (including other forms of community or association, espe-
cially domestic and religious associations) [...]»111. However, Lawrence 
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Dewan in «Aquinas, Finnis and the Political Good» argues that Aqui-
nas did conceive the political good to be a basic good because of its 
central and necessary role in directly cultivating personal virtue112. Of 
the position of Finnis, Dewan observes, 
What is to be understood here is the rather «thin» character of the «public 
good» has in this picture. Its limitation to externals […] In short, the focus 
is heavily upon the role of politics in maintaining external order, leaving 
free a space for the inner life and private life of the human being113. 
Finnis contends that the natural law argues from principle for the 
limitation of government and not for an all-encompassing coercive 
promotion of virtue and repression of vice114. Accordingly, N.E. Sim-
monds deduces, 
Finnis’s account of the common good helps to underpin the conclusion that 
our moral concern for the common good need not be an obsessive concern 
with how well other people’s lives are going, but is primarily a matter of 
fulfilling one’s particular obligations in justice performing contracts, and so 
on115. 
In sum, Finnis is making an appeal for the modern constitutional 
state116. This stance recalls characteristics identified in previous chap-
ters. Firstly, the principle of limited state authority that respects the 
freedom of each citizen is a primary characteristic of the liberal tradi-
tion117. Secondly, the insistence that the state is secondary to and in 
service of society is characteristic of the Critical Tradition118.  
4.1 Justice 
Practical reasonableness is directed by the basic goods. In order that 
they may be achieved, a common good must be secured and respected. 
Promotion of the common good is, therefore, a requirement of practical 
reasonableness. According to Finnis’s listing, this is the eighth re-
quirement of practical reasonableness – or mode of responsibility – to 
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guide our actions. In turn, the requirements of justice «are the concrete 
implications of the basic requirement of practical reasonableness that 
one is to favour and foster the common good of one’s communities»119. 
Justice entails three elements: other-directedness, duty and equality 
(proportionality)120. Other-directedness refers to the aspect of justice or 
injustice which is primarily concerned with relations between people; 
justice is always interpersonal or inter-subjective and therefore con-
cerns their interaction. Duty is that which is owed or due to another. 
Conversely, this gives rise to the right of the other, «or at least his 
“due” by right». Finally, equality – or more appropriately, proportional-
ity or equilibrium – refers to that entailed by justice which is fitting to 
each of the parties involved. 
The three elements resonate with the characteristics of justice identi-
fied by Aquinas and outlined in Chapter I121. Aquinas defines justice as 
follows: «the right and just is a work that is commensurate with another 
person according to some sort of fairness»122. Accordingly, justice al-
ways concerns another, that is, it is other-directed123. Furthermore, it is 
determined by the demands of equity appropriate to the particular rela-
tionship124. Justice, therefore, concerns the duty to give that which is 
owed to another. Aquinas wrote: «justice is the steady willingness to 
give others what is theirs»125.  
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 This is justice in its general sense: it is a general disposition towards 
others in giving what is their due in an equitable manner. As such, it is 
an aspect of person’s character or their virtue. Finnis writes, 
Justice, as a quality of character, is in its general sense always a practical 
willingness to favour and foster the common good of one’s communities, 
and the theory of justice is, in all its parts, the theory of what in outline is 
required for that common good126. 
Many contemporary commentators on Aquinas emphasise the virtue 
of justice as a character trait of individuals127. Finnis, however, is pri-
marily concerned with the external and effective collaboration of soci-
ety. The common good requires the co-ordination of conduct and the 
subsequent sharing of benefits and burdens of communal enterprises. 
Justice, therefore, refers to «the good of a fair method of relating bur-
dens to benefits, and persons to persons over an immensely complex 
and lasting but shifting set of persons and their aspirations and transac-
tions»128. 
General justice is particularised into distributive and commutative 
justice. Distributive justice refers to the range of problems concerning 
the issue of distributing «resources, opportunities profits and advan-
tages, roles and offices, responsibilities, taxes and burdens – in general, 
the common stock and the incidents of communal enterprise»129. 
Commutative (or corrective) justice responds to the range of interac-
tions that are not directly concerned with the issues of distribution. It 
concerns the correct regulation of relationships between individuals and 
issues like business contracts, murder and defamation130.  
Practical reasonableness is reflection on the lived reality of people in 
order to ascertain what leads to human flourishing. Accordingly, the as-
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sociated «theory of justice is to establish what is due to a person in the 
circumstances in which he is, not in the circumstances of some other 
‘ideal world’»131. As a result, Finnis strongly argues against the imposi-
tion of an ideal state of affairs to which which society and individuals 
must conform, thereby ruling out utopian ideologies. But more signifi-
cantly, it rules out any accurate measurement of a future society, 
thereby also ruling out simple utilitarian measurement and balancing of 
future consequences as impossible. Both cases amount to a reduction-
ism of the common good and, in particular, of the individual. The flour-
ishing of an individual demands that she may not be subsumed into the 
common enterprise to her detriment.  
To benefit the common good is to benefit the individual. But the com-
munity cannot be reduced to a mere collection of individuals. A tension 
exists, therefore, between individual pursuits and the common enterprise 
which the requirements of justice address. Because of the complexities of 
societies, «the requirement of general justice varies with time, place, and 
many different circumstances»132. As a result, there can be no absolute 
models of organisation. For example, the extent of private-public owner-
ship depends on the actual requirements of human flourishing in particular 
cases. For instance, the redistribution of wealth requires attention to a 
number of criteria; namely, a minimum level of needs must be met in or-
der to facilitate individual growth, certain roles and responsibilities within 
the community require different resources, etc133. However, practical rea-
soning dictates that the extremes of private or public ownership limit hu-
man flourishing which the common good seeks to secure.  
Essentially, this model emphasises the responsibilities that each person 
has to another by virtue of the web of commitments and dependencies that 
facilitate human fulfilment134. Equality refers not to sameness but a set of 
conditions by which «all members of a community equally have the right 
to respectful consideration when the problem of distribution arises»135.  
5. Natural Law and Natural Rights 
Natural Law and Natural Rights makes no effort «to give an ordered 
account of the long history of theorising about natural law and natural 
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rights»136. At certain points, however, in order to clarify definitions and 
relationships between concepts in their contemporary form, Finnis re-
views their historical development. In particular, the text shows an in-
terest in the transformation of the ethical and legal conceptual frame-
work, «for this history has a watershed [...]»137. 
To take the example of justice: the earlier Aristotelian system (attrib-
utable also to Aquinas) classified distributive and commutative justice 
as applications of general justice – they were two categories of concrete 
norms guiding the virtue of justice exercised by the individuals of soci-
ety. However, following the interpretations of Aquinas in the Second 
Scholasticism138, the schema became three separate but related catego-
ries. Briefly: general justice concerned the virtue of individuals, dis-
tributive justice concerned the workings of the state and commutative 
justice concerned the regulation of the interaction between individuals. 
According to Finnis, this transformation created the modern identifica-
tion of distributive justice with the role the state. In turn, it facilitated 
the view that justice concerned the claims of individuals against the 
state, creating the impression that there is an unavoidable tension be-
tween the person and state. It eclipses the members of society as the 
true source of responsibility. Instead, the state is an instrument, not a 
coercer, of the requirements of practical reason in order that all may at-
tain human flourishing139.  
The watershed also affected the conceptualisation of rights: he claims 
it affects the meaning of right in comparison to its antecedent, jus (ius). 
Broadly following the meaning of the Roman lawyers, Aquinas defined 
the primary meaning of jus as, the just thing itself, or «[O]ne could say 
that for Aquinas “jus” primarily means “the fair” or ‘the what’s 
fair’»140. Finnis then jumps three centuries later and presents the differ-
ing analysis of Francisco Suárez in which jus is defined as a moral 
power over property or that to which he is due141. Jus or right has be-
come something someone has: above all, it is a power or liberty that 
one possesses. It is «Aquinas’s primary meaning of «jus», but trans-
formed by relating it exclusively to the beneficiary of the just relation-
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ship, above all to his doings and havings»142. The outcome was to place 
right outside the sphere of law which regulated the just relationship and 
thereby creating a contrast between law and rights143. It corresponded 
to the transformation in the conceptualisation of justice: justice became 
defined by rights understood as liberty or freedoms which are pos-
sessed by an individual over and against the state.  
The historical tangents are implicitly directed against models and 
traditions of justice and rights widespread since the sixteenth century 
and the assumptions drawn from it in the following centuries144. Finnis 
maintains that contemporary legal practice and public moral debates 
have overly narrowed the picture of rights to issues of boundaries of 
freedom between individuals and the relation between the state and its 
citizens.  
In Natural Law and Natural Rights, Finnis had maintained that «the 
meaning which for Suárez is primary does not appear in Aquinas’s dis-
cussion at all. Somewhere between the two men we have crossed the 
watershed»145. A later debate, in The Review of Politics, turned in part 
on the timing of the watershed. Of Finnis, Brian Tierney wrote, «The 
only thing wrong with this account is that the “watershed” did not come 
after Aquinas»146. Instead, he argued that the genesis of rights occurred 
in twelfth century canonical jurisprudence147. On the other hand, Ernst 
Fortin defended by David Kries, had argued that it occurred with 
Hobbes and the birth of modernity: «Contrary to what is suggested, the 
real “watershed” in the history of the rights doctrine is not to be located 
somewhere between Thomas and Suárez; it occurs with Hobbes 
[...]»148. 
The central topic of the debate was the relationship between the natu-
ral law and natural rights. Finnis admits in a footnote that «Natural Law 
and Natural Rights treats the differences between Thomist and modern 
idiom in right(s)-discourse as more significant and interesting than I do 
now think they are»149. The watershed is no longer decisive. Part One 
of this dissertation presented a continual innovation in response to 
socio-economic challenges – the most dramatic development being the 
birth of modernity. Chapter I contended that rights may, and in fact 
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were, inferred from the Thomistic framework. Aquinas himself, how-
ever, did not make use of an explicit doctrine of subjective rights. Simi-
larly, in a work entitled Aquinas, and as suggested by the chapter title 
«Towards Human Rights», Finnis gives an exegetical re-reading of 
Aquinas, by which the idea of subjective rights may be coherently 
educed150.  
The critical concern, however, is not the intention of Aquinas but the 
legitimacy of deducing natural rights from the Aristotelian-Thomist 
tradition of natural law151. In his contribution to the above debate, 
David Kries argues that post-Hobbesian natural rights anthropology is 
fundamentally opposed to the traditional natural law position. It is a de-
fence of the position held by Ernest Fortin. He insists «that the natural 
law and natural rights theories are radically opposed to each other be-
cause they imply incompatible anthropologies»152. Throughout his ca-
reer, Fortin argued that natural rights may not be deduced from the 
natural law because «In the last analysis, we are confronted with two 
vastly different conceptions of morality»153. Because they are incom-
patible, to incorporate the logic of modern rights is to do violence to the 
earlier framework. In Culture and the Thomist Tradition, Tracey Row-
land agrees. She warns against the incorporation of rights-rhetoric by 
Finnis because it distorts the Thomist tradition in serious ways such as 
to make it incoherent and lead to further social marginalisation of the 
tradition154. In contrast, Finnis proclaims rights to be an invaluable ad-
________________ 
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dition to the natural law tradition. They advance the tradition – when 
placed in the context of practical reasonableness about human flourish-
ing – because rights rhetoric stresses the equality of all, undermines the 
utilitarian reduction of individuals and society to measurable entities, 
and finally provides a useful listing of «the various aspects of human 
flourishing and fundamental components of the way of life in commu-
nity that tends to favour such flourishing in all»155. 
Finnis argues that it is possible to view rights within a Thomist 
framework. In the later re-reading of Aquinas, Finnis admits that al-
though Aquinas «never uses a term translatable as “human rights”, he 
clearly has the concept»156. The watershed is no longer significant. Jus-
tice, according to Aquinas and, as outlined above, is necessarily other-
directed; it involves a relationship guided by an equality or proportion-
ality between two people. As a result, Finnis argues that there is  
an essential element in Aquinas’s conception: one cannot properly think of 
ius without thinking of the other to whom an act, forbearance, or accep-
tance is, in justice owed [...] Which other? The one who, as Aquinas 
promptly and constantly says, HAS the relevant ius. Thus ius can closely 
match our word «right», signifying something someone has157. 
Rights therefore are precepts of justice viewed from the perspective 
of the other. The precepts of justice, although presented as violations of 
the just thing, are implicitly a list of rights based on the radical equality 
of all. He surmises:  
Aquinas would have welcomed the flexibility of modern languages which 
invite us to articulate the list not merely as forms of right-violation (in-iur-
iae) common to all, but straightforwardly as rights common to all: human 
rights.158 
Finnis may have changed his position on rights and Aquinas, but he 
always presented rights as a legitimate continuation to the Aristotelian-
Thomist tradition. In the earlier Natural Law and Natural Rights, he 
writes, 
There should be no question of wanting to put the clock back. The modern 
idiom of rights is more supple and, by being more specific in its standpoint 
or perspective, is capable of being used with more differentiation and pre-
cision than the pre-modern use the «the right» (jus) [...] there is no cause to 
________________ 
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take sides as between older and the newer usages, as ways of expressing the 
implications of justice in a given context159.  
5.1 The Grammar of Rights 
Finnis maintains that «The modern language of rights provides [...] a 
supple and potentially precise instrument for sorting out and expressing 
the demands of justice»160. Translated into a natural law terminology, 
they are a contemporary concretisation of the demands of justice that 
facilitate the common good. They are the principles that make possible 
the participation in the basic goods by an individual according to re-
quirements of practical reasonableness. 
In order to uncover the logic of rights as instruments of justice, 
Finnis draws upon the comprehensive taxonomy of the uses of 
rights-language in law compiled by Wesley Hohfeld161. In particular, 
he draws attention to the distinction between a claim-right and a lib-
erty. A claim-right has a correlative in another’s duty and involves 
two dimensions: positively, it is a right to be given something or 
supported in some way; negatively, it is a right not to be interfered 
with or dealt in a certain manner by another. A liberty is one’s free-
dom from duty and concerns the rights that relate to one’s own acts 
or omissions162. The former is characterised as relational; the latter 
by independence. In the complex dealings that constitute a commu-
nity, they often overlap and are mutually supportive. The emphasis 
given to either type will reflect an underlying model of rights. 
Firstly, rights may be categorised as benefits protected for an indi-
vidual by the rules that regulate the relationships between people. 
Accordingly, rights secure various advantages for an individual; the 
assistance of others, the freedom to act, the freedom to change one’s 
mind, and many others. Secondly, rights may be categorised accord-
ing to the rules that entail or create a recognition and respect for a 
person’s choice. Accordingly, rights make sense within an analysis 
of freedom and how people’s freedoms ought to be balanced. The 
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first position is called the Benefit Theory and the second is named 
the Choice Theory (or Will Theory) of rights163.  
The Choice Theory of rights presents justice as an accepted balance 
of the claims of independent individuals. By contrast, a Benefit Theory 
of rights reflects the necessary relational aspect of justice. Finnis de-
fends the second model because, conceived as that which is owed to 
another, rights are propositions that reflect a fuller model of justice. In 
particular, they reflect the needs and subsequent claims of the benefici-
aries of a justice – they assert that which is owed to the right-holder. 
Finnis, therefore, defines the human rights discourse as follows: 
In short, the modern vocabulary and grammar of rights is a many-faceted 
instrument for reporting and asserting the requirements of other implica-
tions of a relationship of justice from the point of view of the person(s) who 
benefit(s) from that relationship. It provides a way of talking about «what is 
just» from a special angle: the viewpoint of the «other(s)» to whom some-
thing (including, inter alia, freedom of choice) is owed or due, and who 
would be wronged if denied that something164. 
In contemporary western culture, legal practice and public moral de-
bate tend to view rights to be attached to only particular benefits; 
namely the freedom of action or the power to impinge on the freedom 
of others. According to Finnis, this narrowing of the perspective has 
potentially damaging consequences. Rights restricted to individual 
freedom will in turn restrict the scope of justice and eclipse the vision 
of the common good165. It is within the context of the common good 
that duty or responsibility takes on a more important role (as strategi-
cally prior to rights) in analysing the requirements of justice, «for the 
common good is precisely the good of the individuals whose benefit, 
from fulfilment of duty by others, is their right because required of 
others in justice»166. In order for a right-holder to claim the benefit of a 
relationship in justice, duty must be upheld and fostered as essential to 
a just society. 
5.2 Rights and the Common Good 
Aimed towards one or more of the basic goods yet in respect of them 
all, individual human flourishing is multi-faceted. Innumerable judg-
________________ 
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ments are required therefore within the necessary network of relation-
ships of a community.  
The strength of right-talk is that, carefully employed, it can express pre-
cisely the various aspects of a decision involving more than one person, in-
dicating just what is and is not required of each person concerned, and just 
when and how one of those persons can affect those requirements167. 
Rights are the propositions that express the practical wisdom of living in 
community. They express in formulaic fashion the outcomes or end-results 
of reflections on justice – they have conclusory force. The Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights (and its derivative and parallel documents) is an 
example of the listing of conclusory prescriptions.  
Finnis highlights two important features of the document. Firstly, the 
document uses two legal formulas or canonical forms: «Everyone has the 
right to [...]» and (B) «No one shall [...]». That there are two forms where 
only one would have sufficed is due to the second feature of the document 
(and all similar documents). It recognises that the «exercise of the rights 
and freedoms» proclaimed are to be «subject of limitation». For example, 
Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides a gen-
eral limitation for all rights previously proclaimed in the document. Finnis 
argues that the first canonical form («Everyone has the right to [...]») refers 
to positive or legal rights, and the second canonical form («No one shall 
[...]») refers to those human rights that are capable of claiming an absolute 
(in the sense of exception-less) priority. Rights of the first formula have 
guiding force in the process of rational decision-making. Although they 
are inalienable, some limitations are allowed for in their application within 
society. Rights of the second formula have conclusory force. Limitations 
may not be applied to rights of this sort: for example, Article 5, «No one 
shall be subjected to torture [...]».  
Article 29 (2) prescribes four possible grounds by which rights may be 
limited. It reads: 
In the exercise of his rights and freedom, everyone shall be subject only to 
such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing 
due (a) recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of 
meeting the just requirements of (b) morality, (c) public order and (d) the 
general welfare in a democratic society168. 
Finnis regards the last of these grounds (the general welfare in a de-
mocratic society) to be without meaning because an aggregate common 
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good is incoherent and therefore beyond rational identification. The 
general welfare cannot be gauged in simple utilitarian terms. Rather, it 
is according to the first ground that is the basis of effective limitations 
of rights, namely, the recognition and respect for the rights and free-
doms of others. The declaration proclaims such rights including, life, 
liberty, security of person (art. 3), equality before the law (art. 7) par-
ticipation in government (art. 21) and education (art. 26)169. According 
to Finnis,  
When we survey this list we realise what the modern «manifesto» concep-
tion of human rights amounts to. It is simply a way of sketching the out-
lines of the common good, the various aspects of individual well-being in 
community170.  
Human rights are implications of the common good. For that reason, 
they are the moral prescriptions which must be considered at all times 
by those responsible in society in order to facilitate the common good. 
On one hand, to foster human rights is to foster the common good. 
However, rights are subject to or limited according the wider demands 
of that common good. Therefore, it is the discernment of the common 
good that provides the specification of the rights. In other words, what 
rights we actually have is determined by the perceived common good. 
Finnis explains that, 
There is no alternative but to hold in one’s mind’s eye some pattern, or 
range of patterns, of human character, conduct, and interaction in commu-
nity, and then to choose such specification of rights as tends to favour that 
pattern, or range of patterns. In other words, one needs some conception of 
human good, of individual flourishing in a form (or range of forms) of 
communal life that fosters rather than hinders such flourishing171. 
The pattern(s) should not be imagined in abstraction from the real in-
teractions of people; neither should they be cast-iron moulds in which 
society must shape itself. Rather, the resolution of issues regarding hu-
man rights is a process guided and fostered by practical wisdom. Prac-
tical reasoning may produce various reasonable solutions to facilitate 
human flourishing. The ensuing debate «should be settled by some de-
cision-making procedure which is authoritative but which does not pre-
tend to be infallible or to silence further rational discussion or to forbid 
________________ 
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the reconsideration of the decision»172. The law, which co-ordinates 
community relations in accordance with the demands of justice, must 
be guided and therefore embody some conception or range of concep-
tions of human flourishing. Justice and law are intimately bound with 
the good. Finnis’s response to those who argue for the necessary neu-
trality of justice in matters of the good life will be considered in Chap-
ter VI173. 
In the many patterns of life that may be stipulated in order to discern 
appropriate models of human flourishing, Finnis argues that there are 
unchanging co-ordinates or «fixed points». Finnis invites the question: 
Are there no fixed points in that pattern of life which one must hold in 
one’s mind’s eye, in resolving problems of rights? Are there no «absolute» 
rights, rights that are not to be limited or overridden for the sake of any 
conception of the good life in community, not even «to prevent catastro-
phe»174? 
In response, a utilitarian must deny absolute rights, in the sense of 
exceptionless, because of the moral priority of circumstances. Circum-
stances may always be perceived or imagined that appear to make an 
absolute right intolerable, and it is accounting for this possibility that 
restrains governments and ruling elites from applying absolute rights in 
practice, despite declarations of commitment. For example, govern-
ments are willing to make credible threats against potential enemies. 
Military policy necessarily prepares itself for inflicting harm and death 
on others and clearly admits to the possibility of exceptions to absolute 
rights. Indeed, many of these governments are freely elected and their 
policies advocated by their people175. 
Yet, Finnis avows the contrary. The seventh requirement of practical 
reasonableness states that it is always unreasonable to choose against a 
basic value or good for others or ourselves. This entails exceptionless 
duties towards others. Correlative to such duties are exceptionless hu-
man right claims. These include: the right not to be have one’s life 
taken as a means rather than an end; the right not to be positively lied 
to; the right not to be condemned on knowingly false charges; the right 
to respectful consideration in any assessment of the common good. 
«The solid core of the notion of human dignity»176 is the immeasurable 
value of the human person in each of its basic aspects and demands to 
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be protected. Yet catastrophes do loom that threaten to destroy the 
common good of all. Concrete judgements have to be made that respect 
the human good of each and those who fall under our care. This can 
only be made by a steady determination of the conditions that allow for 
the flourishing of these goods for all. 
6. The Law 
As noted quoted above, Natural Law and Natural Rights begins with 
the assertion that it is necessarily through the institutions of law that the 
conditions which enable people to flourish may be secured. Simply put, 
the law has meaning in the context of the common good. In order that an 
individual may flourish, she requires a somewhat ordered society consist-
ing of reliable expectations about the behaviour of others. Human conduct 
must be co-ordinated or ordered and this is only possible by way of law.  
It is the role of the political community to serve the requirements of so-
cial co-ordination. The problems of social co-ordination require solutions 
based on reasonable choices that respect the reasonable needs of all. Ac-
cording to Finnis, «There are, in the final analysis, only two ways of mak-
ing a choice between alternative ways of co-ordinating action [...] either 
unanimity, or authority»177. Political authority is ultimately based then on 
the needs of social co-ordination in situations in which unanimity is im-
possible.  
Political institutions in all its [sic] manifestations, including legal institu-
tions, is a technique for doing without unanimity in making social choices – 
where unanimity would almost always be unattainable or temporary – in 
order to secure practical (near-) unanimity about how to co-ordinate the ac-
tions (including forbearances) of members of the society178.  
Social co-ordination of the common good is the end or purpose of 
political authority and is given to those who can effectively solve the 
problems of co-ordination179. Authority, then, is not a good but is in-
strumental to the securing of the basic goods. It is only in this light that 
authority may be legitimised, for in doing so it accords to the demands 
of practical reasonableness, «which are the limits, side-constraints, rec-
ognised in the conscientious deliberations of every decent person»180.  
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Authority is limited by the demands of the common good – it is lim-
ited by its own goal, purpose or rationale. In other words, it is limited 
according to the protection and ascertainment of human rights which 
provide a «usefully detailed listing of the various aspects of human 
flourishing and fundamental components of the way of life in commu-
nity that tends to favour such flourishing in all»181. Significantly, au-
thority can be held accountable because all actions must be publicly ac-
countable, since «morality is a matter of what reason requires and rea-
sons are inherently intelligible, shared, common»182.  
The actions of authority require continual justification on the basis of 
realising the basic goods of all183. It is in this way that authority be-
comes acceptable to those over whom authority is held184. Furthermore, 
it grounds the obligation of the governed to follow the law. In a sense, 
following the law is in our own self-interest. However, unlike Hobbe-
sian self-interest, the necessity of following the law is not selfishly mo-
tivated; rather it is motivated by desire for fulfilment because we are 
moved by the good. In the end, obligation and authority are based on 
the reciprocity necessary for human flourishing.  
The law is the exercise of authority guiding social coordination – 
which, in its respect for human rights, embodies the requirements of 
justice and so promotes the common good. Because authority is 
sourced, guided and accepted by the demands of practical reasonable-
ness, the force of the law is derived from its reasonableness and not 
from the will of the authority. In this regard, Finnis rejects a strand of 
the natural law tradition, from Ockham to Suárez that sourced the law 
in the will of the sovereign.  
He further rejects the position of Aristotle, which held that authority 
could legislate for virtue. Instead, the proper function of the State’s law 
and government is necessarily limited. «In particular, its role is not (as 
Aristotle has supposed) to make people integrally good but only to 
maintain peace and justice in inter-personal relationships185. He argues 
that integral human fulfilment is only possible through the chosen ac-
________________ 
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tions of individuals themselves – according to the sixth principle of 
practical reasoning. It cannot be directly imposed or coerced by way of 
legislation: government in principle must be limited186. Legislation 
should limit itself to the conditions that facilitate such fulfilment. There 
is a pluralism of goods and the state must recognise all of them. It may 
not be neutral in the face of the various goods. In fact, neutral govern-
ment is illogical and impossible.  
Conversely the abuse of authority – motivated by ideology or exploi-
tation or both – is an act against the common good. Autocrats and dic-
tators subvert the law towards their own ends rather than the true ends 
that constitute human flourishing. Finnis is claiming that abuse of the 
law or authority is the destruction not only of society but also of indi-
viduals187. Unjust laws exercised by an abusive authority are best de-
scribed, in Aquinas’s pithy phrase, as «not law but the corruption of 
law»188. They may retain the character of law but, according to Finnis’s 
terminology, they no longer adhere to the «focal meaning of the 
law»189. He does not discuss at length the resulting rights of citizens to 
reject unjust laws or engage in civil disobedience190.  
The practical concern of natural law theory is the relationship(s) be-
tween the particular laws of particular societies and the permanently 
relevant principles of practical reasonableness. In other words, how 
may the former be brought into accordance with the latter; or as tradi-
tionally stated, how may positive law be derived from natural law? 
Aquinas had proposed two means: by way of deductive reasoning to 
conclusions (primary precepts) or by way of careful working through 
the implications of general principles (secondary precepts)191. For Fin-
nis, Aquinas’s general idea is fundamentally correct «but vaguely 
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stated and seriously underdeveloped»192. Finnis argues that for the most 
part the working of a modern legal system follows the second mode193. 
It is because some societies are homogenous, such as that of Aquinas, 
that it often appears to those within those societies that the former is the 
the case. John Harris comments, 
Finnis’s problem with Aquinas may be explained by the different intellec-
tual culture he is called upon to address. Aquinas could presume a certain 
unity of intellectual purpose within the medieval culture whereas for the 
modern pluralistic western culture a more detailed explanation of what Fin-
nis is proposing is required. Aquinas speaks from within a theological vi-
sion that is eudaemonistic while Finnis is intent on justifying the norm liv-
ing in a world of ethical studies that is basically deontological194.  
The working of a modern legal system is based primarily on the 
determinations of the legislators and judiciary. The draughtsmen and 
interpreters of the law are required to take into account a whole vari-
ety of issues: «The effort to integrate these subject-matters into the 
Rule of Law will require of judge and legislator countless elabora-
tions»195. Finnis draws upon Aquinas’s analogy of architecture. An 
architect has to determine the correct proportions of a door that will 
fit the overall plan of a house. Likewise, legislators need to deter-
mine the role and place and correct definition of a piece of law 
within the overall framework of the law – guided, of course, by the 
general principles of practical reason, which comprise the natural 
law. They make a fit between the demands of reasonableness, the 
rule of law, and circumstances to which they are responding. In light 
of this, the legal draughtsmen ought to respect «those human goods 
which are the fragile and cumulative achievement of past effort, in-
vestment, discipline etc. are not to be treated lightly in the pursuit of 
future goods»196. 
7.  Christianity  
As outlined above, the dynamic of practical reasoning, which dis-
closes the basic goods, turns on the question: what for? In other words, 
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what is the point of our actions?197 Yet individuals and communities 
experience challenges which demand a final question: is there not a fur-
ther point by which to make sense of it all? «The urgency with which 
thoughtful persons press these questions is amply evidenced by the 
course of human speculation»198. This experience of contingent reali-
ties, including «human persons and their lives, point to a transcendent 
reality: something which is, is not contingent, and is the source of eve-
rything contingent. Only such a source can account for the is of what is 
but need not be»199. 
In the final chapter of Natural Law and Natural Rights, he argues 
that speculative reasoning is capable of postulating an uncaused cause 
that exists in something like the mode of personal life200. But the prin-
ciples of practical reason are not directly derivable from metaphysics. 
Practical reasonableness alone cannot assert the actual reality of God; 
rather, it recognises the necessary role of the search and acknowledge-
ment of the transcendent as an opportunity for human flourishing. It is 
only on the final page that he explicitly maintains that practical reason-
ing is capable of saying that «God is an unrestricted, “absolute” value 
and that harmony with God (religion) is a basic human value»201.  
But, as previously asserted, the basic goods are not commensurable. 
There is no objective order among them and this includes religion. One 
cannot directly choose against the other goods on the basis of religion – 
or vice versa. Instead, the human person’s «way of realising the proposed 
friendship with God builds on all the requirements of practical reason-
ableness in the pursuit of, and respect for, all the basic forms of human 
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good»202. No one final basic good may count as the one ultimate good 
for all; rather it «must involve a plurality of goods, such is the irreducible 
complexity of integral human fulfilment»203. Terence Kennedy observes 
that this moves away from the medieval tradition, which viewed the final 
beatific vision as a single unifying good. Instead of propounding  
the view of the last end of man not as the single good of the contemplation 
of God but as the fullness of life with all its complex and multiple goods in 
the Kingdom […] Instead of the traditional theme of the desire for God as 
the uniting factor in all moral theology he accentuates, in typically modern 
tones, the possibility of a personal relationship with God204. 
An intimate relationship with a God who is personally disclosed is 
briefly sketched according to the analogies of friendship and play. In 
friendship, people enter into a relationship that fosters the well-being of 
each other for the sake of «who» they are rather than «what» they are. 
Although a human being cannot act for the well-being of God who is 
self-sufficient, she can act for the sake of God, favouring and advanc-
ing the concerns and goods of God out of friendship. With no purpose 
beyond its own activity, God’s action may be viewed as a form of play:  
a free but patterned expression of life and activity, meaningful though with 
no point beyond itself, yet in no way frivolous, but rather a glorious mani-
festation of the goodness and the source of all goods whatever. Thus any 
friendship with God must be regarded as a sharing, in a limited way, in the 
divine play […]205. 
Friendship widens the horizon of our actions. Consideration of the 
other as a basic good places the fulfilment of the self within the neces-
sary context of the fulfilment of a concrete individual other and, by ex-
tension, the wider community. The process of integral human fulfil-
ment, then, is not merely a refined form of self-cultivation for «every 
form of genuine friendship relativises our self-love without destroying 
or discrediting it»206.  
Natural Law and Natural Rights briefly and tentatively proposes the 
necessary role of religion. Although similarly placed at the end of the 
text, Finnis, along with Germain Grisez and Joseph Boyle in Nuclear 
Deterrence, Morality and Realism, present the theory and its application 
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within a more explicit account of the Christian faith207. In it, they argue 
that the policy and public discourse regarding the nuclear deterrent in the 
West is justified according to a consequentialist mode of thought that 
subordinates basic and absolute moral principles – in this case, the killing 
(or intention to kill) innocent civilians – to particular ends. In maintain-
ing the deterrent in order to protect itself from others, the west is ulti-
mately undermining itself. They defend their own position: 
Moral purism? Let right be done though the heavens may fall? Perhaps. At 
the heart of what some dismiss as moral purism lies the great truth that, in 
one’s choices, moral rightness is more important than any other worldly 
good208. 
They maintain that this great truth lies at the heart of the western phi-
losophical tradition following from Plato and Aristotle, and more pro-
foundly in the Christian faith209. The Christian vision places moral 
choices that appear to have overwhelmingly negative consequences 
into a new light. Christianity insists that there is no complete foresight 
or complete control over the future – and to think otherwise is to nar-
row the horizon of possibilities210. Finnis stresses, then, the central role 
of providence in Christianity which «if followed to the end, is sure to 
lead to suffering, and likely to lead to disaster in this world as it did for 
Jesus. But any loss required at present by perfect fidelity to the re-
quirements of morality is no waste, but rather the wisest invest-
ment»211. It is in this light that he criticises certain trends of modern 
moral theology as «incoherent with faith in divine providence»212.  
8. Conclusion: Some Observations 
Some final observations may be made to conclude the chapter.  
Firstly, it is a central element of the narrative of this thesis that tradi-
tions of enquiry adapt in response to significant socio-economic and 
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political challenges. Furthermore, they consolidate or change in re-
sponse to being contested by other traditions of enquiry, while trying to 
remain consistent with the resources and models of reasoning which are 
normative with the tradition213. I wish to defend the position that Finnis 
may be regarded as a legitimate moment in this dynamic – despite the 
reservations of some. As proposed previously, Finnis echoes the theo-
rists of the Second Scholasitism (De Vitoria, Suarez and others) in their 
deep desire to return to the sources of the tradition (Aquinas) in order to 
respond to the practical issues of the day214.  
Secondly, our era has seen an explosion of specific rights-claims and 
the ever-widening use of rights-language in moral and political dis-
course. It is important to note for the later dialogue that there are cer-
tain characteristics of our era that are reflected in, and recognised by, 
his theoretical reflections. For instance, the modern emphasis on the in-
dividual in the moral and political order is mirrored in his theoretical 
marginalisation of metaphysics and the subsequent turn to the subject. 
Contemporary pluralism is reflected in the priority of choice and the 
consequent plurality of goods that refuses to endorse any particular 
model or hierarchy. Even much of his wording is attractive to the con-
temporary mind: for instance, the identification of the final good as «in-
tegral human fulfilment». Such aspects make him an ideal conversation 
partner in a dialogue with modernity. Many disagree with such adapta-
tions, as previously outlined. However, I would like to argue that per-
haps the opposite is the case. Instead, he is too self-conscious of such 
criticisms – and therefore does not wish to be seen to concede too much 
ground. Accepting that he can claim a legitimate adaptation of the tra-
dition, I would argue that he does not go far enough. As a result, he 
fails to explore other significant issues central to modernity, and so 
rights, such as power and democracy. Such issues require a more thor-
ough appraisal, if the natural law is to provide a viable alternative to 
supporting many contemporary institutions, as desired by Finnis.  
Thirdly, there is a desire in the work of Finnis to reinstate the origi-
nal typology of objective justice, subjective rights and the law, pro-
posed by the early tradition and identified in Chapter I. A deeper ac-
count of the approach of Finnis will be outlined in a later chapter in or-
der to facilitate a dialogue by way of the four crucial terms of the «lat-
tice-work». At this point, however, they may be briefly highlighted. 
The primary moving idea is «the good», disclosed in the basic reasons 
provided by way of reasonable deliberation. First, therefore, the «com-
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mon good» is the primary mark of justice, identified as the sum of the 
conditions that facilitate the good of the individual. Second, in striving 
for the good, the free choices that are made by a person may be de-
scribed as a purposive freedom. Third, the law is in accord to human 
reason, for it is reason that discloses its necessity in supporting the 
common good. Finally, the state is also a natural necessity that is bound 
by the requirements, and so limitations, of the common good. Human 
rights, then, are conclusionary statements that capture the requirements 
of the common good in supporting the integral human fulfilment of 
each individual.  
Fourthly, the defining feature of «order» identified in Chapter I also 
significantly affects the theory of the New Natural Law. The individual 
and society are conceived of having a natural order that may be dis-
closed by way of reason. Therefore, justice, freedom, law and the state 
will also have their own inherent order, considered to be natural and so 
necessary for the well-being of the individual and society. However, as 
the word «order» has different meanings (structure, harmony, com-
mand), so also the theory is marked by different characteristics. Firstly, 
it has the advantageous claim of objectivity arising form a disclosed or-
der or «structure». Secondly, it implies an attractive «harmonious con-
dition» that results from aligning to the «order». However, and finally, 
it is also open to a paternalistic view of society, implied by its «regula-
tory» meaning. For instance, Finnis’s reflections on specific ethical is-
sues often insist on the protection of the cultural environment or public 
realm – which can narrow the free-space of the individual quite consid-
erably. 
I now turn to present a similar exposition of the second theorist, also 
representative of his respective tradition – Ronald Dworkin and a Lib-
eral Theory of Rights.  
 CHAPTER IV 
Ronald Dworkin: A Liberal Theory of Rights 
1. Introduction  
Ronald Dworkin (1931- ), an American legal philosopher, is a sig-
nificant figure in contemporary jurisprudence, political science and eth-
ics. In Reading Dworkin Critically, Alan Hunt introduces Dworkin as 
«probably the most influential figure in Anglo-American legal the-
ory»1. Justine Burley, in Dworkin and His Critics, begins by asserting 
that his «sophisticated appreciation of the relationship between moral, 
legal, and political philosophy, and of the mutual dependence of these 
branches of inquiry and practical controversy, is unrivalled by his con-
temporaries»2. Judith Wagner DeCew concurs, commenting that in par-
ticular, he «has probably been most influential in emphasising the force 
of rights arguments in moral theory»3.  
Born in Worchester, Massachusetts, Ronald Myles Dworkin studied 
in the United States at Harvard University and in the United Kingdom 
at Oxford University. He became a member of the New York Bar in 
1958 and worked in law until 1962. His academic career began as pro-
fessor at Yale University (1962-1969), where in 1968 he became the 
holder of the Wesley H. Hohfeld Chair of Jurisprudence. In the follow-
ing year, he succeeded H.L.A. Hart as Professor of Jurisprudence at 
Oxford University. Since 1975, he has held in addition the Professor-
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ship of Law and Philosophy at New York University. He currently re-
mains in this position and has assumed the Professorship of Jurispru-
dence at University College, London since retirement from Oxford.  
Throughout his career, he has publicly engaged in many of the con-
troversial social concerns of the time, particularly in the United States: 
issues include civil disobedience against the backdrop of the Vietnam 
War during the 1970s4; the continuing legal struggles regarding abor-
tion and euthanasia in the US Supreme Court5; and the recent alarm re-
lating to the curbing of civil rights in the so-called War-on-Terror6. 
Throughout this time, he has been a regular contributor to the public 
debate through The New York Review of Books7. In the United King-
dom, he was been a strong advocate of the inclusion of a Bill of Rights 
into the British constitutional system8. He is both a member of the 
American Academy of Arts and Science and a Fellow of the British 
Academy9.  
This chapter investigates Dworkin’s account of human rights as a 
means of moral and legal reasoning. It focuses on Dworkin’s general 
theoretical framework; that is, how he defines and establishes in sys-
tematic relation the concepts of justice, rights and law. It takes account 
of Dworkin’s reflections on specific individual right-claims only to the 
extent that it illuminates our general discussion. For instance, the main 
exposition will be followed by an outline of Dworkin’s position on 
abortion. The conclusion proposes a number of pertinent points that 
connect to previous chapters and indicate important issues for later 
chapters. 
2. Situating Dworkin 
Dworkin states, in Taking Rights Seriously, his own intention «to de-
fine and defend a liberal theory of law»10. Liberal theory, however, 
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covers a large number of differing models. In an interview, he accepts, 
«I did say that we [contemporary liberals; namely Rawls, Nozick, and 
Dworkin himself] were all “working the same street”, but I want to 
make plain that we each have very different theories»11. Before further 
outline is given in the course of this chapter, it may be said, as a broad 
characterisation, that Dworkin’s writings present a liberalism marked 
by a central regard for equality, thereby challenging the traditional lib-
eral priority of liberty. Rather than viewing liberty and equality as 
competitive notions, Dworkin claims that his conception of equality as 
meriting equal concern and respect supports and facilitates liberty. 
Among the formerly named contemporary liberal theorists, he diverges 
from the liberalism associated with the weighting of liberty over equal-
ity exemplified by Robert Nozick12, but he shares a similar commit-
ment to equality as advanced by John Rawls13. 
Dworkin’s writings rarely reference central figures in legal, political 
or moral theory, especially those within his self-confessed liberal tradi-
tion. In the preface of Law’s Empire, his first full-length work which 
completed his theory of law, he writes, «I have not tried generally to 
compare my views with those of other legal and political philosophers, 
either classical or contemporary, or to point out how far I have been in-
fluenced by or have drawn from their work»14. It is this feature of his 
thought that makes it difficult to locate Dworkin15. 
Dworkin has claimed two broad categories for his own work. The 
primary, as previously mentioned, is liberal theory. He shares the lib-
eral centrality of the individual and the need to protect the individual 
from government abuses by way of a strong commitment to rights – ar-
chetypal in John Locke16. However, his preoccupation with equality re-
sists any attempt to reduce his position to a simple libertarian dedica-
tion to negative freedom that marked the early liberal tradition from 
Thomas Hobbes17. Rather, the primary concern for equality, distinctive 
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in Dworkin, is a feature of political philosophy since Kant. In an article 
entitled «Liberalism», Dworkin writes, 
What does it mean for the government to treat its citizens as equals? That 
is, I think, the same question as the question of what it means for the gov-
ernment to treat all its citizens as free, or as independent, or with equal dig-
nity. In any case, it is a question that has been central to political theory at 
least since Kant18. 
The contemporary interest in a Kantian-influenced liberalism is 
commonly attributed to John Rawls19. Dworkin utilizes the arguments 
of Rawls – some critically – in the course of his own theorising, which 
shall be outlined in closer detail in the course of this chapter. 
Dworkin’s work may also be delineated by its critique of other ap-
proaches to law and morality; that is, it may be characterised by what 
he claims not to be. He has consistently criticised a positivist account of 
law and its consequences. In particular, H.L.A. Hart, whom he replaced 
in Oxford University, typifies the style of legal theorising against which 
Dworkin is reacting. Of Rawls and Hart – responding constructively to 
the former and critically to the latter – Stephen Guest comments: «The 
milieu of legal and political theorising in which Dworkin writes is 
largely their creation»20. 
Central to Dworkin’s contention regarding the positivist account of 
law is the insistence on the necessary relationship between law and mo-
rality. A positivist approach claims to provide an empirical and purely 
descriptive study of the law, independent of any evaluative, normative 
or moral considerations. However, he insists that morality is essential 
to any thorough account of the actual practices of law. This internal 
connection between morality and law is a fundamental feature of the 
natural law21. Although a fundamental feature of his thought22, this 
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second categorisation has only recently been admitted by Dworkin 
himself. In «Natural Law Revisited», he very broadly defines Natural 
Law as a legal theory with normative (or moral) aspirations. He writes: 
Everyone likes categories, and legal philosophers like them very much. So 
we spend a good deal of time, not all of it profitably, labelling ourselves 
and the theories of law we defend. One label, however, is particularly 
dreaded: no one wants to be called a natural lawyer. Natural law insists that 
what the law is depends in some way on what the law should be23. 
He admits that it is a crude characterisation of the natural law. But 
he concludes, «Suppose this is natural law. What in the world is 
wrong with it»24? At its simplest, Dworkin’s acceptance of the natu-
ral law categorisation is in order to delineate himself apart from le-
gal positivism. As already noted, there are many conceptions of lib-
eralism: equally, there are many versions of the natural law. Writing 
of Dworkin, Brian Bix argues that he is a natural law theorist, «in 
that he denies the conceptual separation of law and morality, and as-
serts instead that moral evaluation is integral to the description and 
evaluation of the law»25. In light of the analysis by Noberto Bobbio, 
the introduction to Chapter II maintained that there are two broad 
traditions of natural law – the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition and the 
Modern Natural Law tradition. Furthermore, it was argued that the 
latter fostered early liberal theory. Dworkin’s own theory represents 
a variant of the tradition of modern conceptual natural law that is 
decisively different from an Aristotelian-Thomist alternative tradi-
tion26. Dworkin’s lack of engagement with the canonical sources 
means that, at times, he fails to take on board the consequences of 
such distinctions27.  
Stephen Guest defends Dworkin’s lack of reference to his influences. 
He writes, 
I think, however, that a search for origins in Dworkin’s case is fruitless. He 
is – as it were – a pure philosopher rather than a scholar. His interest is in 
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problems of law, state and morality. He much prefers to go straight to the 
problem without relentless enquiry into what other people say28. 
The direct route – referred to by Guest – is to focus on the actual 
practices of judicial decision making. In other words, Dworkin is pro-
posing «a phenomenology of adjudication»29. In particular, his atten-
tion centres on the conduct of the legal system and judiciary in adjudi-
cating the actions of state and society; for such social practice is the 
nexus through which the law, politics and morality converge and mani-
fest themselves in a concrete manner. The overall thrust of his project is 
to offer a coherent and normative theory that is capable of guiding the 
reflection of public officials and their decisions in difficult situations.  
Many of his books, Taking Rights Seriously (1977), A Matter of 
Principle (1985), Freedom’s Law (1996) and parts of Sovereign Virtue 
(2000), are collections of slightly modified and mutually supportive ar-
ticles. Law’s Empire (1986) is his most significant book-length presen-
tation on legal, political and moral philosophy. Life’s Dominion (1993) 
concerns the concrete issues of abortion and euthanasia. Many of his 
books, due to their origins as journal or seminar pieces, deny a simple 
chapter-by-chapter logic. It will be necessary therefore to extrapolate 
the general theoretical framework in which justice, rights and law are 
defined by Dworkin30.  
Dworkin’s work typically involves a critical and a constructive 
movement. This chapter proceeds accordingly: first, it outlines the sus-
tained critique that motivates his theoretical project; subsequently, it 
considers the positive construction of his own framework; the concep-
tion of rights advanced by Dworkin is then outlined; finally, the chapter 
places these rights within his political and moral applications.  
3. Critique of Legal Positivism 
In presenting a liberal theory of law, Dworkin is sharply critical of 
what he calls the ascendant model of law. Initially referred to as the 
«ruling theory of law»31, it has two necessarily independent parts. The 
first element focuses on the question of what the law is: it is the theory 
of legal positivism, holding that legal propositions are simply the exter-
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nal rules and procedures adopted by specific social institutions32. The 
second element concerns how the law ought to be shaped: it is the the-
ory of utilitarianism, holding that the law and associated institutions 
should only be guided by the general welfare. He acknowledges that 
both theories originate within the liberal tradition and are generally 
connected with that tradition, but his critique and subsequent construc-
tive theory is motivated by the need to emphasise «an idea that is also 
part of the liberal tradition, but that has no place in either legal positiv-
ism or utilitarianism. This is the old idea of individual human rights»33.  
As an aspect of the liberal tradition, legal positivism may be traced 
back to Thomas Hobbes34. In contrast to the previous tradition, Hobbes 
asserted a fundamental division between right and law, which is paral-
lel to the contrast between liberty and obligation. Rights concern liber-
ties; law refers to obligations. In order to make social order possible in 
a world of conflicting rights and liberties, law and obligation must be 
imposed by a strong authority. It is by the power or will of the legisla-
tive authority that a rule becomes a law. The coercion or imposition of 
the law is justified because it ultimately protects and facilitates natural 
rights or liberties. By doing so, the authority acts justly – for natural 
rights are the final basis of the natural law or justice. 
However, the division between rights and law, embryonic in the 
early modern period, becomes very influential in the later Enlighten-
ment Era. Rights – which interconnected justice and law in Hobbes and 
Locke – were sceptically undermined by Jeremy Bentham. Like 
Hobbes, he treated the law as a body of commands laid down by the au-
thority of the legislative body in a legal system. But natural rights do 
not form the basis for the law. Rather, the law was treated separately. It 
is a social fact resulting from the continual compliance of the popula-
tion and in need of empirical explanation. The division became a deci-
sive gulf, in which the law was isolated from justice. According to Ben-
tham, rights only served to continue confusion between two different 
categorical approaches to the proper exposition of the law: «expository 
jurisprudence», which accounts for the law as actually existing, and 
«censorial jurisprudence», which analyses law from a moral (or more 
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specifically utility) point of view, that is, to identify weakness and pro-
pose reform. From the former category springs legal positivism, and 
from the latter arises utilitarianism in legal and society analysis. For 
Bentham, and followers such as John Austin (1790-1859), the nature of 
the law is primarily a matter of considering rule-following social be-
haviour, based on enacted law and supported by the authority of the 
sovereign – independent of moral concerns. Any moral import was ac-
cording to the principle of utility, which judged the law according to its 
efficiency in maximising the general welfare of the community. As is 
usual in his work, Dworkin does not trace such development, but sim-
ply acknowledges: «Both parts of the ruling theory derive form the phi-
losophy of Jeremy Bentham»35.  
Instead, Dworkin focuses on the contemporary form of legal positiv-
ism36 exemplified by H.L.A. Hart (1907-1992) whom he replaced as 
Professor of Law at Oxford37. Hart’s proposal, which is decisive to 
Dworkin’s critique, is «the simple contention that it is in no sense a 
necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of mo-
rality, though in fact they have often done so»38. Legal positivism, Hart 
argues, can allow for the contingent, historical or local interaction be-
tween law and morality. But there is no necessary connection and mo-
rality is not necessary in order to identify the law.  
Legal positivism identifies valid law as only those rules which are 
derivable from basic conventional criteria of legal validity accepted in a 
particular legal system. Bentham (and Austin) had proposed that the na-
ture of the law is the regular pattern of social practice of rule-
conforming behaviour and that the criteria of legal validity may be as-
certained by empirical description of such practice. Hart argued that 
from the point of view of the participants in the social practice there 
must be a basic rule of recognition which specifies «some feature or 
features possession of which by a suggested rule is taken as a conclu-
sive affirmative indication that it is a rule of the group to be supported 
by the social pressure it exerts»39. The basic requirement of such a rule 
of recognition is to identify and validate a body of rules which will be 
considered the law. Primarily it acts to identify the sources – statutes, 
________________ 
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judicial decisions etc – of our body of rules. A rule then is law if it 
emanates from such a source. Significantly, the rule of recognition will 
be ascertained by the empirical examination of the body of rules or ex-
isting law recognised by the legal system. An analytic conception of the 
law, therefore, can be identified without any reference to normative 
standards outside the law.  
According to Dworkin, herein lies the problem. An analysis of the 
legal system for the rule of recognition is not, in fact, ascertainable by 
pointing to the body of enacted rules and sources. Dworkin asserts that 
when lawyers argue and judges adjudicate in concrete hard cases they 
use standards that are not identifiable as mere rules. Positivism, he ar-
gues, «is a model of and for a system of rules, and its central notion of 
a single fundamental test for law forces us to miss the important roles 
of these standards that are not rules»40. Dworkin is claiming that in the 
actual processes of legal debate and judicial adjudication the partici-
pants justify their claims according to standards that are not strictly en-
acted rules. 
3.1 Principles and Policies 
To illustrate his point, he describes the case Riggs v. Palmer, in New 
York (1889), in which a grandson claimed his inheritance as the named 
beneficiary of his grandfather – having previously murdered his grand-
father. There were no precedents by which to judge the case. The court 
admitted that the will was valid and in perfect accordance with the law 
but rejected the grandson’s petition according to the principle that no-
one should profit from their crimes. Such a maxim, according to 
Dworkin, is different in character from the legal rules.  
Although they both set parameters to particular decisions, a legal rule 
(a will is invalid unless signed by three witnesses) differs from a legal 
principle (a man may not profit from his own wrong) because it is the 
nature of rules to be comprehensively applicable – all or nothing. At 
this level, validity is established by consistently following the rules, 
otherwise no legal obligation can be enforced. However, principles do 
not necessitate a particular decision; rather, they argue in a particular 
direction. According to Dworkin, rules may be functionally important, 
but principles have added weight and importance. 
I call a «principle» a standard that is to be observed, not because it will ad-
vance or secure an economic, political, or social situation deemed desirable, 
________________ 
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but because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimen-
sion of morality41. 
Such principles are embedded in the very concept of law itself. Prin-
ciples are contained within the legal system as expressions of the com-
munity’s political morality. He rejects a duality between morality and 
law, for it creates a division of theoretical spheres to the impoverish-
ment of both42. Importantly, these principles cannot simply be identi-
fied by consulting certain sources, but only by engaging in a moral or 
political discussion of what principles should be invoked to defend the 
fundamental rules of the law.  
Such a defence, or justification of judicial decisions, reveals a further 
set of standards; namely, policies. Dworkin defines policy as, 
that kind of standard that sets out a goal to be reached, generally an im-
provement in some economic, political, or social feature of the community 
(though some goals are negative, in that they stipulate that some present 
feature is to be protected from adverse change)43. 
A true account of adjudication – particularly of hard cases in which 
the rules are unavailable or inconclusive – reveal decisions justified by 
appeal to policy or principle. An appeal to policy is to justify a decision 
by the advance or protection of some common goal, such as a subsidy 
for an aircraft manufacturer in order to protect national defence. In con-
trast, a decision in favour of anti-discrimination laws would appeal to 
principle, such as the right to equal respect and concern44.  
3.2 Principles as Rights 
Dworkin’s contention regarding rights turns on his alternative theory 
of adjudication in the hard cases that appear before a court. According 
to legal positivism, in a situation that is not clearly covered by the rules, 
a judge has discretion to decide the case. By doing so, she has created 
and retrospectively applied new legal rights. According to Dworkin, 
such a model is inadequate because the purpose of the judiciary is to 
discover the rights of the parties involved – not to invent them.  
All public officials, including judges, are obliged to articulate their 
reasons for particular decisions in a consistent manner45. In the main, 
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justification of judicial and political decisions is proposed by arguments 
from principle and/or arguments from policy. Although difficult to de-
lineate clearly, Dworkin basically asserts that,  
Arguments of principle are arguments intended to establish an individual 
right; arguments of policy are arguments intended to establish a collective 
goal. Principles are propositions that describe rights; policies are proposi-
tions that describe goals46. 
Policy arguments tend to justify decisions according to the collective 
goals of a community. Principled arguments, on the other hand, have a 
threshold weight against collective policies. Principles may be distin-
guished from but not subordinated to collective goals offered by de-
mocracy, jurisprudence, utility or economics. Concretely, rights are 
principles defined «so as to express more definitely the weight they 
have against other political aims on particular occasions»47. It is 
through consideration and protection of concrete rights that political or 
judicial decisions are not subordinated to policy or utility. Rather, they 
tend to provide criteria by which the collective goals may be distributed 
fairly; that is, they are expressions of a concept of justice.  
Because they are expressions of a conception of justice, principles 
and their implications provide decisive justification. Judges (as do all 
public officials) have an inescapable duty to provide justification or a 
coherent schema of principles and positive rules. Hard cases are inher-
ently controversial because two standards clash, both of which are nec-
essary to the effective working of the system. Yet the responsibility 
remains. In an article entitled «Hard Cases», Dworkin introduces Her-
cules, an imaginary superhuman judge, who is capable of comprehen-
sively and explicitly doing what normal judges do in a more limited 
and less self-conscious manner48. It is for the judge to justify his deci-
sion in accordance with a law internally consistent and in compliance to 
pre-established principles. Cases need to be consistent with each other 
and with the background legal and political principles. Hercules, there-
fore, must proceed according to a general theory of law and society that 
engages with the political morality of his community. Adjudication, as 
a result, is necessarily ethical and political – by which he does not 
mean party political – and bears a responsibility towards justification, 
application and consistency. Such a theory will necessarily be a com-
plex matrix of principles and rights. According to Dworkin, the rights 
________________ 
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thesis best explains the process of adjudication. Essentially, «Dworkin 
holds that his account of law and adjudication accords more closely to 
our experience than does that of Hart»49. 
These principles and rights have normative authority in guiding judi-
cial decision making: justice (and morality) is inherent in the very op-
eration of reaching adjudication in the legal system. The standards of 
justice are not to be applied with discretion, as proposed by legal posi-
tivists, but are necessary parameters and norms that guide and bind a 
judge’s decision. In this manner, Dworkin justifies judicial activism. 
He denies that he is undermining the constitutional systematic relation 
of powers fundamental to western democracies, in which an independ-
ent judiciary is bound to legislative supremacy. Rather, he is emphasis-
ing the responsibility of the judiciary to assess the relationship between 
the collective commitments of policy and the principles that underlie 
the legal system of that community50. Dworkin is proposing that a 
rights thesis or model is the only alternative because only it is capable 
of providing the soundest theory of law – it fits.  
4. A Theory of Justice 
As noted in an earlier subsection, Dworkin’s reflections on a theory 
of law depart from a critique of H.L.A Hart, and his considerations of 
the nature of justice proceed from a constructive appraisal of John 
Rawls51. As Hart exemplified the legal positivist tradition, so Rawls 
epitomises the contemporary liberal tradition. In «Justice and Rights», 
Dworkin writes of three salient features of John Rawls’ presentation of 
justice published in A Theory of Justice (1971) – reflective equilibrium, 
the social contract, and the original position. According to Dworkin, 
they act as a portal or «a half-way point in a deeper theory that provides 
philosophical arguments for its conditions»52. 
A Theory of Justice imagines a group of men and women who come 
together to create and agree a social contract53. Their original position 
is under a veil of ignorance, that is, they agree without self-awareness 
of their own talents, abilities or resources. From this theoretical starting 
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point, Rawls attempts to show that rational people acting in their own 
self-interest would choose two principles of justice. First: each person 
is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible 
with a similar liberty for others54. Second: social and economic ine-
qualities are just to the extent that they operate to the benefit of the 
least advantaged people of society55. 
The thought-experiment utilises the previously mentioned three im-
portant features. Firstly, reflective equilibrium is the methodology or 
process by which each come to a conclusion regarding the importance 
of these principles. Secondly, the appeal to the social contract is a theo-
retical device in order to appeal to the inherent fairness of the principles 
that are being asserted. Thirdly, the original position, the starting point 
of this theoretical device, protects the posited equality of each individ-
ual. According to Dworkin, each of the three devices presupposes cer-
tain essential moral elements to a theory of justice. The following sub-
sections take each in turn.  
4.1 A Coherence Model of Morality 
The technique of equilibrium is the process by which individuals 
search for consistency or balance between moral intuitions and social 
practices (or institutions). The presupposition of this technique is a co-
herence theory of morality, of which Dworkin sketches two models. On 
the one hand, the natural model proposes an objective empirical moral 
reality to which our intuitions merely point. Accordingly, a theory of 
justice discovers that reality, in a manner similar to the empirical sci-
ences: to act justly is to correspond our actions to that reality56. On the 
other hand, a constructive model is analogous to common law adjudica-
tion. According to this model, individuals have a responsibility to fit 
their intuitions within a coherent program of action. He rejects the for-
mer model because inconsistency will be repressed in the belief that a 
more sophisticated set of principles will be discovered to correspond to 
reality. A constructive model, however, demands that any apparent in-
________________ 
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consistency must never be submerged. In fact, every decision must be 
accounted for within a coherent theory of justice: the technique of equi-
librium is a two-way process in which we move back and forth between 
adjustments to theory and change of conviction until the best-fit possi-
ble is achieved57. He maintains that the technique of equilibrium is a 
characteristic of our everyday moral reflection and is only compatible 
with the constructive model of morality. 
4.2 A Rights Based Morality  
According to the constructive model outlined above, responsible jus-
tification of our actions and institutions requires consistency. Within 
the political sphere, we can say that actions may be justified according 
to three concepts – goals, rights and duties. First: a goal is some state of 
affairs that guides political action and decisions. It may be specific, like 
full employment, or relatively abstract, like creating a utopian society 
or stronger nation. Second: an individual has a right to a particular po-
litical act if failure to provide that act is unjustified. Third: an individ-
ual has a duty to act if the act can be justified within the theory as a 
whole and not simply towards a particular goal – for instance, individu-
als may have a duty to worship God, even though no goal need be 
stipulated. Political theories and theories of justice will differ from each 
other in proportion to the importance attached to particular goals, rights 
and duties and how they interconnect each notion.  
Such a theory might be goal-based, in which case it would take some goal, 
like improving the general welfare, as fundamental; it might be right-based, 
taking some right, like the right of all men to the greatest possible overall 
liberty, as fundamental; it might be duty-based, taking some duty, like the 
duty to obey God’s will as set forth in the Ten Commandments as funda-
mental58. 
With regard to the individual: goal-based theories are primarily con-
cerned with some stipulated state of affairs to which all individuals 
must conform; and right-based and duty-based theories place the indi-
________________ 
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vidual at the centre. But each of these latter two theories places the in-
dividual in a different moral light. Duty-based theories consider the 
moral code to be of the essence of the person. Therefore, it is mainly 
concerned with the standards of behaviour of an individual. However, 
right-based theories treat moral codes of conduct as instrumental. Their 
primary purpose is to protect the independence of the person to act 
rather than creating conformity with a standard59. The social contract of 
Rawls is an example of a rights-based theory because it respects the in-
dividual’s consent and, hence, the freedom and independence of each 
participant. 
Critically, Dworkin maintains that such a rights theory is based on 
the concept of natural rights. Although not arising from an objective 
empirical reality, rights are not mere conventions or the results of legis-
lation. He avoids the use of the term because of its metaphysical conno-
tations – they are not special attributes inherent in an objective reality. 
Instead, he uses terms like «moral rights», «strong sense rights», «fun-
damental rights» and «paradigmatic rights». The constructive model al-
lows Dworkin to assert the independence of rights to which we can ap-
peal in constructing an argument.  
On the constructive model, the assumption that rights are in this sense natu-
ral is simply one assumption to be made and examined for its power to 
unite and explain our political conviction, a basic programmatic decision to 
submit to this test of coherence and experience60. 
Natural rights, therefore, are concrete expressions of the principles of 
a best-fitting general theory of justice.  
4.3 Equal Respect and Concern 
In the Social Contract tradition61, an innovative aspect of Rawls’s 
theory is his description of the original position. The participants to 
the social contract are placed under a veil of ignorance in which they 
are unaware of the talents or resources of each other. Dworkin ar-
gues that this device, like the social contract, is incompatible with a 
goal-based theory because the veil removes all knowledge of future 
________________ 
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states-of-affairs. Uninformed of the future, the participants must 
make very abstract judgements. According to Rawls, the members 
would choose the right to liberty and the right to equality. However, 
Dworkin maintains that the right to equality is necessarily more fun-
damental: the members of the contract cannot but choose to protect 
the right to equality, and liberty is the result of such an arrange-
ment62. The basic sense of equality that is considered fundamental is 
the right to equal concern and respect in the design and administra-
tion of the political institutions that govern them. Therefore, the 
principle of equal concern and respect is the most basic principle of 
any theory of justice.  
We may therefore say that justice as fairness [Rawls’ model] rests on the 
assumption of a natural right of all men and women to equality of concern 
and respect, a right they posses not by virtue of birth or characteristic or 
merit or excellence but simply as human beings with the capacity to make 
plans and give justice63. 
The three presuppositions – a coherence model of morality, rights-
based theory and the principle of equal respect and concern – are 
more than mere characteristics. According to Dworkin they are con-
stitutive of any contemporary theory of justice and the associated 
general theory of law. In particular, they constitute the central meth-
odological axioms of his ethical framework. They appear and reap-
pear throughout his jurisprudential, moral and political reflections.  
5. The Logic of Rights 
As described above, Dworkin’s insights regarding rights turn, in 
part, on the distinction between principles and policies. In the neces-
sary justification of legislative and judicial decisions and actions, 
propositions are put forward that follow two basic lines of reason-
ing: to repeat, «Principles are propositions that describe rights; poli-
cies are propositions that describe goals»64. On one hand, justifica-
tion may be advanced according to principles irrespective of the 
consequences or desired goals of the community. On the other hand, 
justification may be forwarded according to legitimate and identifi-
able community goals. The former need not take the latter into ac-
count.  
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5.1 A Formal Definition: Rights as Trumps 
Propositions are distinguished as principles or policy according to 
how they function within a moral, legal and political reasoning. The 
distinction, therefore, is based not on content but on form – that is, the 
particular mode or manner it operates within a wider discussion or a 
particular political theory65. As such, his theory does not claim to show 
the actual rights of men and women. Rather, it claims to show how 
rights may be identified by their place within the general justification 
(or political theory) of political aims.  
A political aim – a proposal that claims to make a community better 
off as a whole – is a state of affairs advanced by some general political 
justification or theory. Political aims may be divided into individuated 
aims (rights) or non-individuated aims (goals). Whether, a political aim 
may be a right or a goal depends on its place and function within a po-
litical theory66. 
A political right is an individuated political aim. An individual has a right 
to some opportunity or resource or liberty if it counts in favour of a politi-
cal decision that the decision is likely to advance or protect the state of af-
fairs in which he enjoys the right, even when no other political aim is 
served and some political aim is disserved thereby, and counts against that 
decision that it will retard or endanger that state of affairs, even when some 
other political aim is thereby served67.  
It contrasts with a goal or a non-individuated political aim because a 
goal does not propose any specific opportunity or resource for particu-
lar individuals. There are necessary collective goals of a community – 
such as economic efficiency or equality – requiring a balancing and 
trade-off between benefits and burdens. A collective goal requires a 
particular distribution in order to create a balance. 
Rights are in tension with goals. They are those principles that are 
characterised by the fact that they may not be subordinated to the col-
lective goal. «We may define the weight of a right, assuming it is not 
absolute, as its power to withstand competition. It follows from the 
________________ 
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definition of a right that it cannot be outweighed by all social goals»68. 
Accordingly, a right is defined by its capacity to resist competition 
against non-urgent aims. Hence, 
Rights […] are best understood as trumps over some background justifica-
tion for political decisions that states a goal for the community as a whole. 
If someone has the right to moral independence, this means that it is for 
some reason wrong for officials to act in violation of that right, even if they 
(correctly) believe that the community as a whole would be better off if 
they did69. 
The analogy of rights-as-trumps is a formal idea, that is, it concerns 
how they function or how they work within a political theory. It reveals 
its characteristic purpose within a political theory: «it fixes the general 
function of rights within any particular theory that uses the idea at 
all»70.  
5.2 Rights and Utilitarianism  
If rights are to trump, they must trump something, some common 
goals or desired state-of-affairs by which a community organises itself. 
Actual rights then will depend, to a large extent, on what are considered 
the common goals and there are many political theories about what 
makes a community better off on the whole. Therefore, 
To some extent, the argument in favour of a particular right must depend on 
which of these theories about desirable goals has been accepted: it must de-
pend, that is, on what general background justification for decisions the 
right in question proposes to trump71. 
Dworkin maintains that in contemporary Western democracies, the 
most influential background justification is some form of utilitarianism, 
or general welfare, «which takes, as the goal of politics, the fulfilment 
of as many of people’s goals for their own lives as possible»72. Applied 
to this particular background justification, the analogy of «rights as 
trumps» signifies their ability to override considerations of general wel-
fare73. As utilitarianism is the most influential background justification, 
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rights will be experienced in contemporary Western democracies as 
anti-utilitarian.  
If someone has the right to something, then it would be wrong for the gov-
ernment to deny it to him even thought it would be in the general interest to 
do so. This sense of a right (which may be called the anti-utilitarian concept 
of right) seems to me very close to the sense of right principally used in po-
litical and legal writing and argument in recent years74. 
Rights, according to this definition, act contrary to utilitarianism. 
However, Dworkin admits that utilitarianism continues to be attractive 
to political philosophy particularly because of its common link to de-
mocracy75. One model, called preference utilitarianism, argues that a 
policy is to be favoured if it satisfies a greater amount of preferences of 
individuals than alternative policies, despite the fact that it may dissat-
isfy the preferences of some. The basic purpose of government is «to 
provide for the satisfaction of the preferences of individual citizens […] 
the basic purpose is to let people have and do what they want as fully as 
possible»76.  
But Dworkin responds that taking account of the preferences of citi-
zens does not allow for duplicity in the actual preferences held by citi-
zens. Preferences with regard to a particular policy may be either a per-
sonal preference of a person for her own enjoyment of goods or oppor-
tunities, or an external preference for the assignment of goods and op-
portunities to others, or both. Dworkin claims, 
The distinction between personal and external preferences is of great im-
portance for this reason. If a utilitarian argument counts external prefer-
ences along with personal preferences, then the egalitarian character of that 
argument is corrupted, because the chance that anyone’s preferences have 
to succeed will then depend, not only on the demands that the personal 
preferences of others make on scarce resources, but on the respect or affec-
tion they have for him or for his way of life. If external preferences tip the 
balance, then the fact that a policy makes the community better off in a 
utilitarian sense would not provide a justification compatible with the right 
of those it disadvantages to be treated as equals77. 
Such a model is not an acceptable mode of making public decisions 
because it results in a form of double-counting – failing to treat indi-
viduals with equal respect and concern. 
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To take an example: Dworkin imagines a group of people, many 
of whom do not swim, preferring a swimming pool over a theatre 
because they altruistically approve of sport, or morally disapprove of 
plays. If altruistic preferences are counted then the swimmers (who 
have a personal preference for the pool) will be supported by the 
non-swimmers (who have an external preference) – creating a form 
of double-counting. If disapproving preferences are counted, actors 
and audiences will suffer because their (personal) preferences are 
outweighed as they are held in lesser respect. In either manner, not 
all those affected by the decision are held in equal concern and re-
spect by the government. To apply the example: Dworkin argued 
that the segregation policies of Texas during the 1960s should not be 
enforced because the preferences that supported them were either 
distinctly external or inextricably bound to external preferences; 
therefore they corrupted the claim of equal concern and respect. 
Again, if an official has to decide whether pornographic literature 
ought to be prohibited, she is obliged – according to utilitarianism – 
to fulfil the most preferences. But, Dworkin argues that cuts across a 
right that does allow for personal use of pornography78. 
However, at a practical level, the counting of preferences is pre-
cisely how the democratic system operates. Democracy facilitates 
the counting of preferences of all, but it is unable to make the above 
distinction and so implement a reconstructed utilitarianism that 
would be able to account for personal preferences and exclude ex-
ternal preferences.  
Accordingly, Dworkin writes, 
I wish now to propose the following general theory of rights. The concept 
of an individual right, in the strong anti-utilitarian sense […] is a response 
to the philosophical defects of a utilitarianism that counts external prefer-
ences and the practical impossibility of a utilitarianism that does not. It al-
lows us to enjoy the institutions of democracy, which enforce overall or un-
refined utilitarianism, and yet protect the fundamental rights of citizens to 
equal concern and respect by prohibiting decisions that seem, antecedently, 
likely to have been reached by virtue of the external components of the 
preferences democracy reveals79. 
Dworkin deduces that if utilitarianism is «suitably reconstructed so as to 
count only personal preferences, then the liberal thesis [equal respect and 
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concern] is a consequence, not an enemy, of that theory»80. Rights create 
that reconstruction81.  
There is an ambiguity towards democracy in the writings of 
Dworkin. The democratic forum is considered to be primarily guided 
by policy rather than by principle. But if the institutions of democracy 
enforce preference utilitarianism, then rights may be said to be anti-
democratic. In response, Dworkin argues that rights are necessary to 
democracy for they act, in part, as barriers to its own potential prob-
lems. But by considering the judiciary, and legal system, as the forum 
of principle, he does appear to be inverting the normal hierarchy of 
powers in Western democracies82. 
5.3 A Taxonomy of Rights 
Within the formal definition of rights, Dworkin proposes internal dis-
tinctions, creating a kind of taxonomy of rights83. As a formal category, 
the use and emphasis on each category will depend on the political the-
ory in which it operates. Rights may be «absolute» or «less-than-
absolute», depending on the threshold weight which is accorded to a 
right within a political theory. The former can withstand all competi-
tion, but the latter cannot. For example, a theory that posits an absolute 
right to life would exclude any justifications for capital punishment.  
He distinguishes between «background» and «institutional» rights. 
The former are rights that argue towards a state of affairs without par-
________________ 
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ticular reference to the institution that encapsulates that right. Such 
rights may be proposed by a political theory or the common political 
morality but are not, in fact, enshrined in law. An example may be the 
right to steal in dire need. Although background rights may not be 
named in a particular legal system, they do make sense within a politi-
cal theory84.  
Dworkin further distinguishes between «abstract» rights and «con-
crete» rights. Abstract rights are those principles that assert a strong 
stance. They do not indicate the impact intended in particular social 
situations, or how they are to be compromised against other rights. 
Concrete rights, however, are more or less clear on such issues. An ex-
ample of the former is the right to free speech; an example of the latter 
is the right to personal information utilised by the government. 
In practice, it is the institutions of governance that ultimately decide 
on which rights apply, the scope of those rights, and the hierarchy of 
their importance. Throughout his work, Dworkin is trying to explicate 
what is key to a scheme of government that claims principle (encapsu-
lated as rights) to be decisive in particular cases. If so, as in Western 
democracies, «We can insist that it take rights seriously, follow a co-
herent theory of what these rights are, and act consistently with it own 
professions»85. In other words, to take rights seriously is to take the jus-
tification and effectiveness of governance seriously.  
Rights as trumps function by placing limitations and restrictions on the 
pursuit of goals. Although upheld by Governments, they actually restrict 
their ability to advance the goals of society. Therefore, a necessary impli-
cation of rights as trumps is that «citizens have moral rights against their 
governments»86. Crucially, rights trump or restrict the actions of govern-
ment, creating a level of protection for the individual over and against the 
Government87. In accordance with the liberal tradition, rights act as limits 
to authority. A government that claims to take rights seriously therefore 
places limits on itself in the name of the principle of equal concern and re-
________________ 
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spect for its citizens. Is it possible, then, for rights to trump the law, by 
which the Government exercises its authority? Does one have the right to 
break the law88? The question reveals important ambiguities in rights-
rhetoric.  
Dworkin draws an important distinction between two meanings in the 
term «right» used in public discourse89. In the first context, to say that 
someone has a right to do something implies that it would be wrong to in-
terfere (or at least, some special reasons must exist in order to permit any 
interference). Dworkin calls this a «strong sense right». For example, 
I use this strong sense of right when I say that you have the right to spend 
your money gambling, if you wish, though you ought to spend it in a more 
worthwhile way. I mean that it would be wrong for me to interfere with you 
even though you propose to spend your money in a way that I think is 
wrong90. 
A strong sense right therefore is a sphere of action protected from undue 
interference from others, and in particular, the government.  
In the second context, to say that something is the «right» thing to do 
implies a judgment of an individual (or community) to whether it is 
«right» to act according to her principles. The person in the above example 
may have the right to gamble but it may be the wrong thing for her to do91. 
Rights, conceived as trumps, primarily concern the former. Therefore, 
The claim that citizens have a right to free speech must imply that it would 
be wrong for the Government to stop them from speaking, even when the 
Government believes that what they will say will cause more harm than 
good. The claim cannot mean […] that citizens do no wrong in speaking 
their minds92. 
The strong sense of right claims that it would be wrong for a Gov-
ernment to interfere. Importantly, Dworkin does not overemphasize the 
point because there are situations such that may justify overriding a 
________________ 
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right, such as national emergency. To return to the above example, a 
government may force the shutting down of all gambling facilities in 
order to save electricity in time of scarce resources. But such actions 
can never be on minimal grounds because to do so is to render the no-
tion of a strong sense right meaningless.  
Accordingly, Dworkin maintains that there is a right to break the law. 
The right to free speech implies that an individual has the right to break 
any law that interferes with that right. It is not a separate right but one 
that arises from the character of rights themselves. For a law that indis-
criminately interferes with a person’s freedom contradicts the function-
ing of the very rights claimed as important by a Government. To deny 
that implication is to deny rights themselves. Dworkin must conclude 
that any general duty to obey the law is almost incoherent in a society 
that acknowledges rights. It is self-contradictory to hold that rights are 
part of the legal system and to assert that one must follow the law at all 
times. In the last analysis,  
any society that claims to recognize rights at all must abandon the notion of 
a general duty to obey the law that holds in all cases. This is important, be-
cause it shows that there are no short cuts to meeting a citizen’s claim to 
rights93. 
Of course, having the right to break the law in the strong sense leaves 
open the question of whether breaking the law in a particular case is, in 
fact, the right thing to do.  
5.4 The Delineation of Rights 
The issue of which substantive rights there are often divide society. 
However, there are fundamental or paradigm rights that have wide-
spread agreement in clear-cut cases – for example, the right to free 
speech94. Dworkin argues that much of the discussion about the sub-
stance of rights actually revolves around the delineation of such core 
rights. The definition of rights concerns their scope and extent and it is 
the responsibility of the institutions of governments, by way of statutes, 
judicial decisions and administrative application to officially declare, in 
a justifiable manner, the scope of such rights in law. While they should 
not be overly restricted, they should not be overly inflated.  
He outlines two models used to guide the process of demarcation. 
The first proposes a balance to be struck between individual rights and 
________________ 
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the rights of society. Governments ought to steer a middle course lead-
ing to an appropriate balance between the infringement on the rights of 
the individual by the state and the inflation of rights to the detriment of 
the general benefit of society. He rejects this model on the basis that 
«balance» is a flawed metaphor. It mistakes the identification of soci-
ety’s rights with the rights of individual members of a society. It creates 
an unfair weighting that threatens to dilute the individual, thereby de-
stroying rights themselves.  
The second model proposes the central role of the principles of hu-
man dignity and political equality. Human dignity «supposes that there 
are ways of treating a man that are inconsistent with recognizing him as 
a full member of the human community, and holds that such treatment 
is profoundly unjust»95. Political equality 
supposes that the weaker members of a political community are entitled to 
the same concern and respect of their government as the more powerful 
members have secured for themselves, so that if some men have freedom of 
decision whatever the effect of the general good, then all men must have 
the same freedom96. 
Dworkin argues that if rights make sense at all then it is in order to pro-
tect these principles. To do otherwise is to do a grave injustice. The institu-
tion of rights rests on the protection of the individual from such injustice 
and the conviction that it is worth paying the price to prevent it. To in-
fringe on a right is to do a grave injustice but to inflate a right is merely to 
acknowledge a further cost to society.  
Essentially, the latter is the model of the criminal system. The due proc-
ess of law acknowledges that the risks to the individual are high and is so 
willing to pay the appropriate price in order to protect that person – it is 
better that many guilty go free than one innocent person be punished. It 
holds that once a right is acknowledged in clear-cut cases, then the Gov-
ernment should act to limit that right according to a compelling reason that 
is consistent with the presuppositions on which the original right is based. 
A government that fails to extend a right becomes guilty of creating a 
sham of the original right. A right becomes «a promise that it intends to 
keep only until that becomes inconvenient»97.  
In a controversial case, a marginal issue tests the extent of an ac-
cepted paradigm right. First, a marginal issue will be outside the 
________________ 
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boundary of a right if the values associated with the original right are 
not at stake in the marginal issue. Second, a marginal issue will fall 
outside the scope of an accepted right, if inclusion will create a conflict 
with another strong sense right. Third, marginal issues cannot be in-
cluded in the scope of a right if the cost would be of such dispropor-
tionate cost as to create an injustice against the dignity and equality of 
the person98.  
These are «Hard Cases» and are necessarily controversial because 
they involve the continual refinement of the principles that inhere 
within the judicial and legislative system and express the common po-
litical morality. 
5.5 Right to Liberty and Rights to Liberties 
A central component to the early liberal tradition was to re-
conceptualise freedom as a lack of impediment99. Isaiah Berlin charac-
terises such a notion as negative liberty: «The sense of freedom, in 
which I use this term, entails not simply the absence of frustration but 
the absence of obstacles to possible choices and activities – absence of 
obstructions on roads along which a man can decide to walk»100. Con-
sequently, political freedom or liberty was formulated as the absence of 
any unnecessary restriction by a government in the affairs of an indi-
vidual, and governments were to be evaluated accordingly.  
Interestingly however, Dworkin denies that there is any general right 
to liberty101, such as that proclaimed in the American Declaration of 
Independence or the Preamble of the Constitution of the United 
States102. In general public discourse, he argues, a government’s actions 
may be judged to have infringed on an individual’s liberty in two ways. 
First, restrictions of liberties may be a denial of the commodity of lib-
________________ 
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erty. Second, they may be understood as damaging the person in some 
way. But the former is untrue – liberty cannot be perceived as a com-
modity – and the second is too vague. Instead, he argues that infringe-
ments of basic liberties are not an assault on a general right to liberty 
but of the deeper politico-moral principles of justice, namely equal re-
spect and concern.  
In the decision making process, governments may justify their ac-
tions according to principle or to policy – to which Dworkin argues that 
priority must be given to the former. Rights act as principled trumps to 
the necessary role of a policy guided by a democratic utilitarianism. 
Because they trump, they safeguard against a tyranny of the majority. 
Denial of basic liberties, such as the freedom of speech, religion or 
movement, is the denial to take seriously the relationship between gov-
ernment and its citizens and the means by which that relationship is 
concretised – the law. «If the Government does not take rights seri-
ously, then it does not take the law seriously either»103. What is more, if 
a government does not take rights seriously, it does not take political 
morality – justice based on equal concern and respect – that is presup-
posed in the law seriously also.  
The institution or rights is therefore crucial, because it represents the major-
ity’s promise to the minorities that their dignity and equality will be re-
spected. When the divisions among the groups are most violent, then this 
gesture, if law is to work must be most sincere104. 
However, there remains a tension. On one hand, Dworkin admits that 
much of the law is guided by policy. Therefore,  
The bulk of the law – that part which defines and implements social, eco-
nomic, and foreign policy – cannot be neutral. It must state, in its greatest 
part, the majority’s view of the common good.  
Yet, respect and concern of the government must be afforded to all 
its citizens in an equal manner. «It must not constrain liberty on the 
ground that one citizen’s conception of the good life of one group is 
nobler or superior to another’s»105. Dworkin is arguing that in core 
issues the government must remain «neutral on what might be called 
the question of the good life», claiming that this is the core of liber-
alism’s «constitutive political morality»106. Although he maintains 
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that considering everyone with equal respect and concern justifies 
some intervention by government (as in positive discrimination or 
affirmative action107), neutrality plays a bigger part. Again, there is a 
further ambiguity in Dworkin’s work: the one principle appears to 
justify two possible and contradictory reactions of government108. 
The thesis shall return to this issue in course of the comparative 
study109. 
6. Legal Theory 
In Law’s Empire, Dworkin presents his fullest exposition of legal 
theory. From the outset, he asserts the necessary interconnection of 
public morality and justice. 
Lawsuits matter in another way that cannot be measured in money or 
even liberty. There is inevitably a moral dimension to an action at law, 
and so a standing risk of a distinct form of public injustice […] If this 
judgement is unfair, then the community has inflicted a moral injury on 
one of its members because it has stamped him in some degree or dimen-
sion as outlaw110.  
The text offers a reformulation of his theory of law and adjudica-
tion, drawing on the earlier presuppositions outlined above. Accord-
ing to Charles Covell, he develops his position in three respects111. 
First, Dworkin broadens the claim that all judicial deliberation, and 
not simply hard cases, is inevitably bound to moral and political pre-
suppositions. Second, he further deepens his theory of law and adju-
dication to central issues of political philosophy: for example, obli-
gation and legitimacy. Third, he represents his judicial adjudication 
as a theory of interpretation functioning within the legal system. At 
base, the development is a move from analysis of legal practice to 
legal theory as such. «Since it matters in these different ways how 
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judges decide cases, it also matters what they think the law is, and 
when they disagree about this, it matters what kind of disagreement 
they are having»112.  
In The American Language of Rights, Richard A. Primus offers 
the analogy of a game in order to illustrate the functioning of the le-
gal system – after all, law and politics are often embroiled in game-
like competitive situations. However, he points to a critical differ-
ence concerning the relationship between the rules and the play of a 
game, in order to highlight the distinctive dynamic of the legal and 
political system. In games like chess, the rules are pre-established, 
accepted by all and give it definition. We can point to the rules in 
order to identify the game. However,  
In political and legal argument, part of the contest is over how the issue 
in dispute will be characterised and what kind of arguments will count 
as valid or superior […] In legal and political discourse, then, shaping 
the rules is not something that happens before the game is played but is 
itself the subject of a contest, and attempts to shape the rules are not 
preliminaries to the game but moves within the game itself113. 
In the practice of law, the dispute regarding the appropriate rules 
to apply is intimately bound to the question: what is the law to do?  
To present the law as mere rule-application, according to 
Dworkin, is to present the law as plain-fact114. This model portrays 
law in a manner similar to the game of chess. Any disputes in the 
playing of the game are settled by the correct application of an iden-
tifiable law. Theoretical concerns regarding the nature or purpose of 
the practice (of a game of chess or of a legal system) are not neces-
sary. It is a model epitomised by legal positivism. But such a model 
does not reflect the actual game or contest of law and politics, as 
shown earlier by Dworkin. As described by the above analogy, in the 
legal system the purpose of the rules themselves are continually 
questioned in the disputes regarding which rule to apply. To partici-
pate in legal reasoning is to be continually involved in debating its 
purpose, point and meaning, that is, its relation to justice or political 
morality115.  
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6.1 The Right-Answer Thesis 
Dworkin defends the position that there is often a right answer in «Hard 
Cases» or complex questions of law and political morality. Dworkin’s de-
fence of the possibility of right answers is a defence of the responsible 
practice of legal argumentation without reducing the process to either just 
opinion (scepticism): «the no-right-answer thesis is hostile to the rights 
thesis I defend»116. Stephen Guest comments that Dworkin’s  
argument is, and has always has been, purely defensive. He does not pro-
vide arguments to say that there are right answers, over and above his ar-
guments to say what the right answers are. He does not think that any such 
arguments are needed117.  
The legal system is presupposed and moved by the very practice of con-
tinual argumentation and justification and it is Dworkin’s emphasis on ar-
gumentation that moulds his response to scepticism about the possibility of 
right answers.  
He categorises two kinds of scepticism – external and internal. External 
scepticism denies any objectivity to moral judgement. Everything is 
merely opinion. Dworkin denies that such a position is in fact possible. 
More importantly, he argues that it denies the responsibility of taking a 
public stance and offering a justification. If all legal positions are mere 
opinion, then none need to be publicly justified.  
Internal scepticism, however, refers to whether particular or individual 
arguments are mistaken or doubtful but is still committed to the possibility 
that other interpretations of the law may be better. This is the form of scep-
ticism within the legal system as lawyers 
return to their knitting – making, accepting, resisting, rejecting arguments 
in the normal way, consulting, revising, deploying convictions pertinent to 
deciding which of competing accounts of legal practice provides the best 
justification for that practice. My advice is straightforward: this preliminary 
dance of scepticism is silly and wasteful; it neither adds to nor subtracts 
from the business at hand. The only scepticism worth anything is scepti-
cism of the internal kind, and this must be earned by arguments of the same 
contested character as the arguments it opposes, not claimed in advance by 
some pretence at hard-hitting empirical metaphysics118.  
Importantly, his defence of possible right-answers should not be 
equated with a simplistic model that reduces the identification of a 
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right-answer to what can be merely demonstrated in a statute or law re-
port. To do so is a crude form of legal positivism. Although demonstra-
tion is an important part of legal argumentation, it cannot be the main 
criteria of truth.  
Rather, the appropriate criteria of truth are found in a responsible ar-
gumentative process. Judges, lawyers and legislators must «articulate 
consistently». That process places a duty on the participants to justify 
their assertions and to remain coherent in those claims. Truth then is 
marked by coherence, underpinned by reflective equilibrium and a con-
structive model of morality outlined earlier119. As constructive, it is 
open ended. It presents itself as the best possible hypothesis, open to 
further examination, development and evaluation according to two cen-
tral criteria – fit and appeal. 
6.2 Constructive Interpretation 
In legal reasoning and adjudication, questions initially arise for the 
participants (judges, lawyers and other interested parties) because they 
disagree about a specific legal proposition. But, as argued by Dworkin 
(and Primus), their disagreement actually concerns a more fundamental 
disagreement concerning the meaning or purpose of the practice of the 
law itself. Legal argumentation, therefore, is between competing per-
ceived purposes, theories or interpretations of the law and it is for the 
judge to make a final ajudication on which ought to apply by consider-
ing which interpretation fits best or appeals more. The interpretative 
theories are part of the legal argument itself and  
not descriptions that stand outside the game but rather are moves within the 
game. The descriptive and the prescriptive collapse on this model, as theo-
ries about law are seen as attempts to construct law in one way rather than 
another120. 
The interpretative theories are implicitly normative for they guide 
which rules and principles to apply (and how they may be applied). The 
law then is moved and shaped by the interpretative theories that govern 
it.  
Dworkin explains by way of describing the operations of complex 
social practices121. In contrast to a blind acceptance of rules (such as ta-
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boo) or complex social practices (such as the law) are maintained be-
cause the participants presume that they have a general point, value or 
meaning. By accepting that a social practice has value, participants will 
offer interpretations that are constructive or positive. Such «construc-
tive interpretations» put the social practice in its best light and propose 
the best manner by which to maintain the social practice. The practice 
may be adapted to changing conditions in order to fulfil the perceived 
purpose. Accordingly, normative prescriptions are constructed by way 
of reflective equilibrium, that is, a reflection that moves to and fro be-
tween the system and the intuitions and reflections regarding its mean-
ing and purpose122. The methodology imposes form onto the object by 
the interpreter and a derivation of form from the object as the inter-
preter is constrained by the object and cannot impose any interpretation 
willy-nilly. Underpinning «constructive interpretation» is the construc-
tive mode of morality and the process of reflective equilibrium outlined 
earlier123. 
A social practice may simultaneously contain many different inter-
pretations. The best interpretations will satisfy two basic criteria – fit 
and appeal. An interpretation must adequately fit the observations of 
participants of the social practice and it must present an appeal to be the 
best interpretation it can be. Debate between interpretations will then 
centre on the disputes regarding further criteria which test how good a 
fit each interpretation appeals to be.  
When applied to the law, the process of constructive interpretation 
moves as follows: a general legal theory first interprets «the main point 
and structure of legal practice»; the main point aims «to show legal 
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practice as a whole in its best light»; which it does by achieving «equi-
librium between legal practice as they find it and the interpretation of 
that practice»124.  
Dworkin outlines three stages in this process: first, the pre-
interpretative stage is the point at which the basic rules and standards 
are identified; second, an interpretative stage in which a general justifi-
cation is formulated; third, a post-interpretative stage in which the rele-
vant rules and standards are prioritised. The pre-interpretative stage is a 
simple recognition and consensus on the basic practices and does not 
propose any criteria as such. The interpretative stage is the movement 
between the best fit and appeal in which various meanings and pur-
poses are debated. In the post-interpretative stage, previously held no-
tions and practices are revised to more accurately reflect the new inter-
pretation.  
In other words: there is an initial agreement on what counts as law 
such as a constitution, statutes and so on. This agreement is thrown into 
a question by a hard case in need of adjudication. The question is not 
simply a matter of what rules apply but the nature of the practice itself 
in an unprecedented context. One interpretation or general legal theory 
is decided upon by which the rules are revised or applied in one par-
ticular way as against another. Importantly, Dworkin is arguing that 
every piece of judicial adjudication tacitly presupposes general legal 
theory:  
Any legal argument, no matter how detailed and limited, assumes the kind 
of abstract foundation jurisprudence offers, and when rival foundations 
compete, a legal argument assumes one and rejects another. So any judge’s 
opinion is itself a piece of legal philosophy, even when the philosophy is 
hidden and the visible argument is dominated by the citation and lists of 
facts. Jurisprudence is the general part of adjudication, silent prologue to 
any decision at law125. 
6.3 Law as Integrity 
The most commonly accepted general legal theories agree in a 
pre-interpretative manner to the general content of the law – consti-
tutions, statutes, by-laws etc. In practice, lawyers are capable of ac-
cepting what counts as law while proposing differing interpretations. 
At the second stage, a purpose is proposed. At the third stage, rival 
________________ 
 
124
 R. DWORKIN, Law’s Empire, 90.  
125
 R. DWORKIN, Law’s Empire, 90. 
PART TWO: INTERPRETATION 212 
theories can then offer differing explanations to how this purpose re-
lates to the actual practice of law. Significantly, Dworkin maintains:  
Our discussions about law by and large assume, I suggest, that the most ab-
stract and fundamental point of legal practice is to guide and constrain the 
power of government in the following way. Law insists that force not be 
used or withheld […] except as licensed or required by individual rights 
and responsibilities flowing from past political decisions about when col-
lective force is justified126.  
Such a purpose is very suggestive of John Locke and the central con-
cerns of the liberal tradition127. Yet, Dworkin presumes that it may be 
accepted by all as relatively unproblematic. But others, as outlined in 
the later comparative study, disagree profoundly that this is indeed the 
purpose of the law. 
According to Dworkin, the general legal theories utilised by judges 
may be categorised as conventionalism, pragmatism and law as integ-
rity. Each reflects distinctions outlined previously: conventionalism in-
cludes the moral equivalent of legal positivism; pragmatism proposes 
the primacy of policy, including utilitarianism; and law as integrity cor-
responds to Dworkin’s own theory of legal reasoning128.  
Dworkin characterises conventionalism as a theory which identi-
fies the law with identifiable decisions of precedent. According to 
this theory, judges should stick to established convention. The legal 
system gives people fair warning on what circumstances will incur 
sanction: «collective force should be used only in accordance with 
standards chosen and read through procedures the community as a 
whole knows will be used for that purpose»129. Pragmatism offers an 
instrumental theory of law and adjudication based on what best 
serves the needs of the community. The judge obtains the necessary 
justification for coercive law in the beneficence or efficiency of the 
coercive decision itself: «If judges are guided by this advice […] the 
coercion they direct will make the community’s future brighter, lib-
erated from the dead hand of the past and the fetish of consistency 
for its own sake»130. In contrast to the previous theory that justifies 
by way of the past, pragmatism looks to the future.  
As before, Dworkin rejects both theories because they fail to «fit» 
the actual functioning of the legal practice as supported by the par-
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ticipants. His third model is fundamentally different because it is an 
open programme of interpretation. The model of law as integrity is 
the proposal of a political virtue rather than a methodological rule of 
thumb. Integrity, according to Dworkin, is related to, but markedly 
different from, other ideals of the legal and political system, such as 
justice, fairness, and due process131.  
Integrity is both a characteristic of and a guiding principle for a 
judge and a legal system that holds and adheres to a consistent set of 
moral and legal principles. Law as integrity affirms that the norms 
guiding judges are grounded by more substantive principles of jus-
tice and fairness embodied in the political and legal structures and 
doctrine. Constructive interpretations are the accountable manifesta-
tion of the courts’ integrity to their own principles requiring that leg-
islation and adjudication within a legal system be coherent to inter-
nally self-consistent principles of political morality, precedence and 
the needs of the community. Most of all, it is the supreme virtue of 
Hercules whom he re-introduces in order to illustrate how integrity 
is both a commitment to the process of «fit» and «appeal» and a 
guiding principle within the process of interpretation and adjudica-
tion132. 
According to Dworkin, integrity is already inherent within a legal 
system. In a hypothetical situation, justice and fairness could justify 
decisions that have a checkerboard quality – a compromise that per-
mits in one area but declares illegal in another on rather arbitrary cri-
teria133. This type of legislation may exist in practical matters such 
as zoning for city-planning but in matters of principle, such as abor-
tion, such a solution is not accepted by the participants. It may be 
defensible according to justice or fairness, but integrity is valued in 
the law: decisions are expected to be consistent and not to divide the 
public into arbitrary groups. Understood in this way, integrity repre-
sents the virtue associated to the principle of equal concern and re-
spect, and is both demanded and presumed of the actions of the state 
that claim to be guided by such a political morality. 
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6.4 Legal Obligation and Community 
General theories of law unite the law itself (legislation, statutes, 
precedence etc.) with the justification of the enforcement of law (mo-
rality, principles, policy etc.). In other words, «that the concept of law – 
the plateau where argument among conceptions is most useful – con-
nects law with the justification of official coercion»134. As such, 
Dworkin claims that his own model fits better and has greater appeal. 
The law is legitimised by justification (the process of constructive in-
terpretation), and as legitimised, free people accept their obligation to 
the law and coerciveness of the law. 
The classical liberal tradition justified obligation to the law by way 
of implicit consent (Hobbes) or voluntary agreement (Locke). By con-
trast, Dworkin locates obligation within already existing «associative 
obligations» that exist in a community. He considers obligation to be a 
responsibility only possible in a fraternal community. In a manner, this 
is similar to the earlier Aristotelian-Thomist tradition.  
He proposes three idealised models of a political community. «Each 
model describes the attitudes members of a political community would 
self-consciously take toward one another if they held the view of com-
munity the model expresses»135. The first model presents the members 
treating their community as an accident of history or geography. The 
second model, or «the rulebook model», describes members as consid-
ering their community as a general commitment to obeying the estab-
lished rules. The third model is a community of principle which por-
trays the members understanding their own community in a genuinely 
fraternal manner.  
One means by which the attitude of fraternal responsibility is mani-
fested is by way of a general attitude of concern, equal for all136. The 
rule of law, applied according to such a principle, will be accepted as a 
manifestation of a fraternal community – a community of principle. 
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When governed with integrity, citizens are treated as equals, for the 
principles of justice and fairness are applied to everyone; and by being 
governed as equals, citizens are constituted into a community. Dworkin 
writes,  
Here, then, is our case for integrity, our reason for striving to see, so far as 
we can, both its legislative and adjudicative principles vivid in our political 
life. A community of principle accepts integrity. It condemns checkerboard 
statutes and less dramatic violations of that ideal as violating the associative 
character of its deep organisation. Internally compromised statutes cannot 
be seen as flowing from any single coherent scheme of principle; on the 
contrary, they serve the incompatible aim of a rulebook community, which 
is to compromise convictions along lines of power. They contradict rather 
than confirm the commitment necessary to make a large and diverse politi-
cal society a genuine rather than a bare community: the promise that law 
will be chosen, changed, developed, and interpreted in an overall principled 
way. A community of principle, faithful to that promise, can claim the au-
thority of a genuine associative community and can therefore claim moral 
legitimacy – that its collective decisions are matters of obligation and not 
bare power – in the name of fraternity137.  
The law’s ability to obligate citizens is the result of the attitude to-
wards the community held by its members – of the citizens towards 
each other. Law becomes legitimate when a genuine political commu-
nity embodies the law by way of integrity to the very principles pre-
supposed by that very community. Although Dworkin is rejecting a 
methodological individualism of classical liberalism, he continues to 
privilege the role of the individual and continually remains preoccupied 
with the possibility of structural conflict between society and the indi-
vidual138. 
7. Equality and Liberty 
«Equality is a popular but mysterious ideal»139. So begins Dworkin’s 
account of an ethics of equal concern presented in Sovereign Virtue.  
Equality played an essential but ambiguous role in the early modern 
natural law and associated liberal theory. On one hand, the necessary lib-
erty and equality of all are postulated in the state of nature. But on the 
other hand, as the state of nature unfolds, the equal rights of each lead to 
conflict and a resulting inequality. Thomas Hobbes wrote: «From this 
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equality of ability […] they become enemies; and in the way to their End, 
(which is principally their owne conservation, and sometimes their delec-
tation only,) endeavour to destroy, or subdue one an other»140. Although 
beginning with the necessary freedom and equality of all, John Locke ends 
up justifying inequality; «it is plain that men have agreed to a dispropor-
tionate and unequal possession of the earth […]»141. Equality, in the end, 
becomes a casualty of the priority of the liberty of an individual. Such an 
apparent contradiction was identified by Rousseau who argued in his cri-
tique of early modernity that the inequalities of society are due to the priz-
ing of a selfish liberty: «All ran headlong to their chains in hopes of secur-
ing their liberty»142. The guise of liberty to justify inequality became a fea-
ture of the socialist critique of the capitalist system and associated liberal 
rights143. 
The ambiguity concerning the relationship between liberty and equality 
remains within contemporary liberalism. As noted previously, the strands 
of contemporary liberalism may be distinguished to the extent that they in-
terconnect liberty and equality144. As continually argued by Dworkin, 
equal concern is the primary principle of justice and therefore the legiti-
macy of government. 
No government is legitimate that does not show equal concern for the fate 
of all those citizens over whom it claims dominion and from whom it 
claims allegiance. Equal concern is the sovereign virtue of political com-
munity – without it government is only tyranny – and when a nation’s 
wealth is very unequally distributed, as wealth of even very prosperous na-
tions now is, then its equal concern [and hence legitimacy] is suspect145.  
In this recent work, Dworkin proposes a «comprehensive liberalism» 
that rests on two fundamental principles of ethical individualism – that 
________________ 
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is, a political ethics in which normative priority is given to the impor-
tance of each individual and the corresponding equal concern shown to 
him or her by the state. The first is the principle of equal importance: 
«it is important, from an objective point of view, that human lives be 
successful rather than wasted, and this is equally important, from the 
objective point of view, for each human life». The second is the princi-
ple of special responsibility: «though we must all recognise the equal 
objective importance of the success of a human life, one person has a 
special and final responsibility for that success – the person whose life 
it is»146. They echo and reformulate the starting premises of the equal-
ity and freedom of all individuals in the early liberal tradition. The re-
statements have a post-Kantian character, that is, the equality and free-
dom of individuals are not the result of any particular property or qual-
ity of a person but are important in and of themselves147.  
Dworkin however wishes to overcome to some degree the exclusion 
of considerations of the good life in matters of justice that have marked 
the liberal tradition since Kant148. The two principles of a comprehen-
sive liberalism present what he calls a «Challenge Model of Ethics»149. 
The model responds to the question, what does it mean to live a suc-
cessful life? It holds «that living a life is itself a performance that de-
mands skill, that it is the most comprehensive and important challenge 
we face, and that our critical interests consist in achievements, events, 
and experiences that mean that we have met the challenge well»150. Im-
portantly, it is formal – it does consider the substantial issues of what 
would qualify as a successful life. «The challenge model does not as-
sess these views; it is a way of thinking about how we should live, not a 
standard for assessing how we should live»151. Instead, and in accor-
dance with the second principle, it is the responsibility of the person to 
make such considerations. The model, therefore, will focus on the pre-
________________ 
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conditions that will facilitate the personal choice of the good life – for 
instance, matters of justice, education or health. It advocates a limited 
intervention into society in order to create such conditions which may 
be described as a weak paternalism. It may be called «a thin theory of 
the good», for it shuns a substantial account of what the good life might 
be in fear that it may justify a strong paternalism that interferes with the 
freedom of each individual152. According to the liberal tradition, the re-
jection of strong paternalism is the practical implication of the neutral-
ity of state in the personal affairs of the individual153. How then may 
the state justify the interventions it must make?  
7.1 Ethics of Equal Concern 
Each principle makes different demands on a government. The for-
mer requires a «government to adopt laws and policies that ensure that 
its citizens’ fates are, so far as government can achieve this, insensitive 
to whom they otherwise are – their economic background, gender, race, 
or particular set of skills and handicaps». The latter «demands that the 
government work, again as far as it can achieve this, to make their fates 
sensitive to the choices they have made»154. Accordingly, the applica-
tion of justice in distribution must be «circumstance-insensitive» and 
«choice-sensitive». On one hand, distribution should rectify inequalities 
resulting from people’s natural abilities or social circumstances; and on 
the other it should allow for differences that arise due to people’s 
choices. People accrue wealth as a result of different choices, in work, 
leisure, consumption, savings or risk. However, unequal wealth as a re-
sult of circumstances, either socially or in natural talents, is morally ar-
bitrary and therefore unjust. The central intuition is that a person ought 
to be guided by her choices about how to lead her own life and not by 
the circumstances in which they find themselves. Therefore, an indi-
vidual’s choices about how she leads her life – and their resulting 
wealth – ought to be protected and any disadvantageous circumstances 
which limits her choices, opportunities or access to resources ought to 
be negated.  
In this light, Dworkin considers two general theories of distributional 
equality – «equality of welfare» and «equality of resources»155. He re-
jects the former because it fails to fulfil both principles. It has an appeal 
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because it fits the first principle – equal importance. It proposes the 
provision of extra resources for those in need in order to enjoy the same 
level of welfare as others. However, according to Dworkin, it fails to 
accommodate the second principle – special responsibility. At base, 
theories of welfare cannot legitimately distinguish between the ine-
qualities that result from circumstances and those that result from 
choice. 
In response, Dworkin proposes a theory of equality of resources. He 
begins with a thought-experiment in which survivors on a deserted is-
land must share its abundant resources. It is presumed that all the survi-
vors have equal natural talents and abilities. In order to divide the re-
sources, each person is given a hundred clam shells to bid according to 
their own preferences, wants and needs. An auction means that the 
value of the resources will be proportionate to the extent that they are 
desired by the survivors156. The inequalities that arise from this are not 
unjust because they result from choice based on personal preferences. 
To eliminate such inequality would be unfair: some inequality is there-
fore legitimate. According to Dworkin, the economic market is a 
mechanism that best supports an equality that is sensitive to choice and 
responsibility. The initial situation captures both concerns for the 
equality and special responsibility principles. But as the participants of 
the auction carry on with their lives the principles become undermined. 
In particular, inequalities due to natural endowment, such as disability, 
limit the successful choices of some.  
At this point, Dworkin introduces another aspect to his thought-
experiment – the hypothetical insurance scheme. The scheme allows a 
certain amount of clam-shells to be paid in order to insure against un-
foreseen natural inequalities. The survivors are denied information to 
their natural endowments and given the opportunity to purchase insur-
ance against handicaps and unequal skills. All might pay forty of their 
one-hundred clam-shells. Those who fare poorly on the island will re-
________________ 
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ceive compensation. Under such conditions, individuals would be will-
ing to part with some of their clam-shells. A tax system could be estab-
lished as a means of maintaining such a process.  
The thought-experiment is an appeal to the perceived inherent fair-
ness of state intervention to create situations of distributional equality 
in resources. Admittedly, it is a very abstract theory: it does not pro-
pose any specific structure of distribution157. But Dworkin insists that it 
is capable of evaluating and guiding the fairness and justice of actual 
distributive proposals. For example, certain proposals, such as abolish-
ing a health service, may be ruled out as unjust158. 
8. The Sanctity of Life? 
In Life’s Dominion, Dworkin approaches the heated issues of 
abortion and euthanasia: «the argument has always brought us back 
to life, to life’s dominion rather than death’s, to the devastatingly 
important truth that what death means hinges on how and why our 
lives are sacred»159. He argues that the debates regarding abortion 
and euthanasia have become conceptually confused because they are 
too often presented as arguments about rights. The clash of rights is 
not the true source of the controversies. Rather, he insists that it has 
a deeper concern which cuts across the conflict.  
A crucial distinction needs to be maintained between two types of 
familiar arguments made in public discussion. To take the example 
of abortion: the first is to claim that abortion is wrong because it is a 
violation of someone’s right not to be killed. «I shall call this the de-
rivative objection to abortion because it presupposes and is derived 
from rights and interests that it assumes all human beings, including 
foetuses, have»160. The second is to claim that abortion is wrong be-
cause it «insults the intrinsic value, the sacred character, on any 
stage or form of life. I shall call this the detached objection to abor-
tion, because it does not depend on or presuppose any particular 
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rights or interests»161. If this distinction is kept in mind he argues, 
then the correct constitutional response becomes clearer.  
Of the former derivative argument, he claims that a foetus cannot 
claim rights for it has no interests of its own to be protected by rights: it 
cannot have interests of its own unless it has some form of conscious-
ness162. But, he does claim that the right to procreational autonomy is 
integral to the American Constitution. Accepting that such a right is not 
actually present in the document, Dworkin rejects a narrow theory of 
constitutional law based solely on the original intentions of the found-
ing authors. Rather, he argues that the  
Constitution insists that our judges do their best collectively to construct, 
reinspect, and revise, generation by generation, the skeleton of freedom and 
equality of concern that its great clauses, in their majestic abstraction, 
command […] and seek genuine constraints in the only place where they 
are found: in good argument163.  
Accordingly, he argues that the principal of procreational autonomy 
is integral to the coherent interpretative construction of the American 
Constitution, based on the right to freedom based on dignity and indi-
vidual responsibility.  
Dworkin further claims that the detached argument, which asserts the 
sacredness of life, further confirms and indeed grounds the stance of 
the Constitution. Essentially, the view that life is sacred is held by eve-
ryone. Whether it is an explicitly religious assertion held by religious 
denominations or a secular conviction held by everyone164. It is there-
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fore a quasi-religious dispute. In the light of this, the Constitution is 
compelled to remain neutral according to its own basic principles – 
stated in the First Amendment – that forbid the state to favour one reli-
gious denomination or conviction over another165. Therefore, he writes,  
So the popular sense that the abortion issue is fundamentally a religious 
one, and some lawyers’ sense that it therefore lies outside the proper limits 
of state action, are at bottom sound […] They rest on a natural – indeed ir-
resistible – understanding of the First Amendment: that a state has no busi-
ness prescribing what people should think about the ultimate point and 
value of human life, about why life has intrinsic importance, and about how 
that value is respected or dishonoured in different circumstances166.  
Yet the sacredness of life places demands on the government to re-
strict and provide normative guidelines for behaviour. But such judg-
ments ought to be guided with the goal of fostering responsibility rather 
than coercing a final decision. In the end, in modern democracies it is 
for the individual to decide their own conviction vis-à-vis the sanctity 
of life167. 
Dworkin, by re-conceptualising the abortion debate in terms of reli-
gious convictions, may be said to be returning to the sources of the lib-
eral tradition. Religious tolerance has marked that tradition from the 
beginning: a tradition partly born in reaction to religious wars and per-
secutions168. The state claimed neutrality between religious beliefs and 
allowed the free space for each to pursue their own particular religious 
expression. He claims the principle of tolerance still applies to all is-
sues of such deeply held convictions. If what motivates the convictions 
of all in abortion and euthanasia debates are essentially religious con-
victions then the State must remain neutral and ultimately allow each 
their responsible freedom to pursue their own conviction. 
Tolerance is a cost we must pay for our adventure in liberty. We are com-
mitted, by our love of liberty and dignity, to live in communities in which 
no group is thought clever or spiritual or numerous enough to decide essen-
________________ 
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tially religious matters for everyone else. If we have genuine concern for 
the lives others lead, we will also accept that no life is a good one lived 
against the grain of conviction, that it does not help someone else’s life but 
spoils it to force values upon him he cannot accept but can only bow before 
out of fear or prudence169.  
9. Conclusion: Some Observations 
To conclude with a number of observations: 
Firstly, as previously stated this thesis presupposes that traditions of 
enquiry respond to both significant socio-economic and political chal-
lenges and to the interaction (positively or negatively) with other tradi-
tions, while trying to remain consistent with the resources and models 
of reasoning which are normative within itself170. Despite rarely dwell-
ing on the source texts or theorists of his tradition (Locke, Kant), his 
reassertion of the central role of individual rights in political morality is 
a return to the core normative ideas of a posited liberty and equality171. 
Another crucial element of the early tradition appears in his later work, 
namely property. As a result, I would argue that this means he follows 
the early theorists in ultimately justifying systematic inequalities result-
ing from market economics, despite an attempt to moderate its worse 
excesses172.  
Secondly, rights are an integral part of contemporary western cul-
ture. Consequently, an appraisal of rights is often intertwined with 
an evaluation of western society. While they may be viewed as 
moral progress by most, they may also be associated with moral de-
cline by others. A central motivation of this thesis is to defend the 
contention that they are a sign of moral progress. Therefore, a posi-
tive assessment of modernity is implied – or, to be more precise, cer-
tain aspects of its normative traditions (such as individual liberty) 
and its institutions (such as divisions of power). In particular, the 
later dialogue wishes to accept the central functioning of rights in 
placing a principled limit on state power – as proposed by the liberal 
tradition173. This is not, however, to imply a complete approval. Out-
lined in a later chapter, my central criticism, (by way of Dworkin) is 
that modernity lacks a sufficient understanding of the good, thereby 
emptying out our understanding of the human person and our re-
________________ 
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sources for moral reasoning174. Furthermore, this thesis does not 
wish to imply an endorsement for the specific ethical stances of 
Dworkin on abortion and euthanasia.  
Thirdly, a central political principle of the liberal tradition is the neu-
trality of the state on fundamentally religious questions. Dworkin pro-
poses the central liberal value of «tolerance» as an appropriate response 
to many of the contentious moral issues of today, including abortion 
and euthanasia. However, therein lays the challenge. On one hand, tol-
erance is a particularly important virtue in a pluralist society that in-
cludes many races, cultures and religions. However, in order to include, 
there are certain statements, beliefs or actions that ought not to be toler-
ated. How does one draw the line in a consistent manner? It is my con-
tention, that beyond the appeal to equal concern and respect, Dworkin 
lacks any real way of specifying more clearly what is required. I will 
return to this point in a later chapter175.  
Fourthly, Dworkin wishes to re-establish the role of rights in linking 
law and justice. In doing so, he is responding to the scepticism that lead 
to a breakdown of the typology (identified in Chapter I), isolating jus-
tice and law from one another. In order to facilitate a deeper analysis 
and dialogue in a later chapter, I wish to briefly characterize some of 
the central terms of the «lattice-work» - justice, freedom, law and the 
state-society. The deontological model of Dworkin (and modernity) re-
quires that terms be defined according to principles that are independ-
ent of ends, purposes or goals. His primary motivating idea is to estab-
lish principles that will protect and facilitate equal concern and respect 
for all members of the community or, in other words, to foster as far as 
possible the equal freedom of each to pursue their own chosen good. 
Accordingly, the terms of the lattice work may be described as follows. 
First, the equal freedom of all is protected by a system of negative 
rights Even those positive rights defended by Dworkin aim to foster the 
equal freedom of all. Second, freedom primarily concerns the capacity 
to make personal choices about one’s own good. Third, it is the func-
tioning of the law to make principled judgments, and so to positively 
enact what is just. Dworkin, therefore, places a lot of faith in the ability 
of the law to stay true to its own internal principles of justice. Finally, 
the state is viewed somewhat negatively. It needs to be kept in check 
and the definition of rights as «trumps» highlights such a function. Yet 
such a definition is formal and so lacks a means by which it may be 
________________ 
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specified into more substantive principles, beyond another formal or 
procedural account of the workings of the legal system. 
Fifthly, it was proposed in concluding Chapter II that a defining fea-
ture of the liberal tradition is «tolerance». As noted above, tt is also a 
distinctive feature of the deliberations of Dworkin. However, rather 
than a simple and widespread lenience, perhaps it would be more pre-
cise to describe it as an active tolerance. On one hand, it wishes to al-
low as much freedom as possible for each individual to pursue their 
own path, and, on the other, it proposes to modify those structures in 
society that deny some people the same freedom afforded to others.  
I now turn to give a similar account of the third theorist, also repre-
sentative of his respective tradition – Jürgen Habermas and a Critical 
Theory of Rights.  
 
 CHAPTER V 
Jürgen Habermas: A Critical Theory of Rights 
1. Introduction 
Many regard the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas (1929- ) 
as one of the foremost intellectuals of his generation. William 
Outhwaite introduces a collection of Habermas’s readings: «The 
work of Jürgen Habermas is central to many of the most pressing in-
tellectual and practical concerns of the contemporary world»1. In a 
collection of critical responses entitled Habermas: Critical Debates, 
the editors observe that he «has assumed an extraordinary stature 
[…] In view of the relevance and importance of Habermas’s work, 
there is an urgent need for a sustained critical discussion of his 
ideas»2. Most recently, at a public debate with the then Cardinal 
Ratzinger, Dr. Florian Schuller, director of the Katholische 
Akademie Bayern in Munich, presented Habermas as the «most in-
fluential German philosopher since Marx, Nietzsche and Heidegger; 
his role seems even to be that of a public conscience of the political 
culture of the country»3. 
________________ 
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Born in Düsseldorf, Jürgen Habermas (1929- ) finished his doctoral 
studies in 1954 at the University of Bonn and completed the Habilita-
tionschrift at the University of Marburg in 19614. His career began as 
Theodor Adorno’s assistant at the University of Frankfurt’s Institute 
for Social Research (1956-1959). After an associate professorship at 
the University of Heidelberg (1961-1964), he assumed the Chair of 
Philosophy and Sociology previously held by Max Horkheimer at the 
University of Frankfurt (1964). In 1971, he became Director of the 
Max-Planck-Institute for Social Sciences, Starnburg (near Munich) 
before returning to the University of Frankfurt as Professor of History 
of Philosophy (1984). Presently, he is Professor Emeritus of the Uni-
versity of Frankfurt and Permanent Visiting Professor of Northwest-
ern University in the United States.  
In the words of Stephen Bronner, «Habermas has been an exem-
plary public intellectual»5. His first published piece – a newspaper ar-
ticle in 1953 – created a public storm by criticising Martin Heideg-
ger’s (1889-1976) unedited publication of the 1935 lectures, An Intro-
duction to Metaphysics, which supported Nazi ideology6. He contin-
ued throughout his career to confront major issues of the time: re-
sponding to the student protests of the 1960’s7, challenging historians 
who would diminish the Nazi past8, and recently taking a strong anti-
war stance9. In a rare reflection on the relation between his own biog-
raphy and theoretical concerns he concludes,  
on what I believe I have learned about the role of the public intellectual in 
our times – from my own mistakes and those of others. Intellectuals should 
make public use of the professional knowledge that they possess […] in 
other words, they should endeavour to improve the deplorable discursive 
level of public debates [...] For if there is one thing that intellectuals - a 
________________ 
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species that has so often attacked their own kind and declared the intellec-
tual dead – cannot allow themselves then, it is to be cynical10. 
The current chapter presents an analytical exposition of the central 
insights of Habermas on public reasoning (moral and legal) in the pub-
lic sphere – within which human rights play a critical role. Habermas is 
not a jurist and therefore is not primarily concerned with the legal 
workings of specific rights. Rather, he proposes a number of implica-
tions of his ethical and sociological framework for the foundations and 
systematic relationship between the concepts of justice, rights and law 
in the social practices of contemporary western society. After the main 
exposition, the chapter concludes firstly with Habermas’s considera-
tions of religion and a summary of points that relate to previous chap-
ters and point to issues that will become important in later chapters.  
2. Situating Habermas 
In 1994, Jürgen Habermas retired from both the chair of Philosophy 
at the Goethe University in Frankfurt and the directorship of the Insti-
tute for Social Research. On doing so, he became Professor Emeritus 
with the institution and associated school of thought to which his name 
is universally associated – the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory. 
The Frankfurt School of Critical Theory can be loosely identified 
as a group of scholars11, initially inspired by a humanist reading of 
Karl Marx and originally centred on the Institute of Social Research 
of Frankfurt University12. It was commonly categorised as a school 
of thought some thirty years after its founding. Rolf Wiggershaus 
admits «the characteristic attributes of a «school» were certainly 
present, either constantly, temporarily or only from time to time»13. 
________________ 
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However, he argues that the breadth and variety of directions «makes it 
advisable not to take the term «Frankfurt School» too seriously»14. As 
the heading of Frankfurt School is somewhat vague, so also is the title 
of Critical Theory15. David Held writes, «Critical Theory, it should be 
emphasised, does not form a unity; it does not mean the same thing to 
all its adherents»16. However, a common purpose may be discerned and 
attributed to each of the central theorists. He continues: 
The motivation for this enterprise appears similar for each of the theorists – 
the aim being to lay the foundation for an exploration, in an interdiscipli-
nary research context, of questions concerning the conditions which make 
possible the reproduction and transformation of society, the meaning of cul-
ture, and the relation between the individual, society and nature17.  
The movement arose against the backdrop of the First World War 
and the Russian Revolution. Firstly, the war questioned, among other 
things, the identification of technology with progress and science with 
moral development. Secondly, the revolution, according to the histori-
cal materialism of Karl Marx’s Das Kapital (1867), was only meant to 
happen in advanced capitalist societies. Against the subsequent reasser-
tion of the capitalist order in the west and the orthodox Marxist doc-
trines in the Soviet Union, the first generation of the Frankfurt School 
(and others) undertook «a revision of Marxian categories and an anach-
ronistic theory of revolution in order to expose what inhibited revolu-
tionary practice and its emancipatory power»18. Accordingly, all modes 
of domination and oppression were to be identified and critiqued in or-
der to open out the possibilities of emancipation and freedom. Against 
the strictures of economic determinism in the orthodox Marxist inter-
pretation of historical materialism, the Frankfurt School emphasised the 
philosophical and humanist aspects of Marx. Against the alienating im-
pulses of western society, it advanced penetrating forms of ideological 
and cultural criticism (Kulturkritik), arising from an engagement with 
the newly developing social sciences, phenomenology and Freudian 
psychoanalysis. 
________________ 
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The Dialectic of Enlightenment, written by Max Horkheimer (1895-
1971) and Theodor Adorno (1903-1969), may be considered central to 
the canon of Critical Theory, presenting an illustration of some of its 
dominant motifs. It abandons significant axioms of Marxist thought: 
the notion of history in which the proletariat are the primary subject of 
history; that progress inevitably marches towards emancipation; that 
technology needs only to be redirected towards new ends. The dialectic 
of the title refers to the inherent contradiction driving the optimism of 
reason in the Enlightenment Era: «Myth is already enlightenment, and: 
enlightenment reverts to mythology»19. The Enlightenment celebration 
of reason as capable of emancipating people is shown by the authors to 
be a descent into a form of instrumental reason that dominates nature, 
and in turn controls people – ultimately leading to its own destruction 
in totalitarian regimes or in the mediocrity and bureaucracy of contem-
porary culture. In one passage, they write,  
Man imagines himself free from fear when there is no longer anything un-
known. This has determined the path of demythologisation […] Enlighten-
ment is mythical fear radicalised. The pure immanence of positivism, its ul-
timate product, is nothing other than a form of universal taboo. Nothing is 
allowed to remain outside, since the mere idea of the «outside» is the real 
source of fear20.  
As a second generation inheritor of the school, Habermas shows in-
terest in similar themes but advances and widens much of the central 
concerns. As with Horkheimer and Adorno, he is motivated to expose 
the means by which power structures inhibit the freedom of all. In par-
ticular, he shares their interest in modes of reasoning that legitimatise 
contemporary power structures in dominating of the outsider. «For it is 
a central tenet of their thought, as of Habermas’s also, that the process 
of liberation entails a process of self-emancipation [sic] and self-
creation»21. However, in contrast to the founding fathers of critical the-
ory, Habermas takes an optimistic stance towards the emancipatory 
project of the Enlightenment22. Reason does not necessarily lead to 
domination: in fact, it has within its own structures the possibilities of 
freedom. His explication of such emancipatory forms of reason engages 
________________ 
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with the social sciences, establishes normative guidelines to philoso-
phical and political legitimacy and embraces German philosophy (Im-
manuel Kant and G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831)), other philosophical tra-
ditions (primarily Anglo-American pragmatics and linguistic analysis) 
and developments in moral psychology (in particular, the works of Jean 
Piaget (1896-1980) and Lawrence Kohlberg (1927-1987)). 
The result is a re-orientation of critical theory decisively away from 
Marxian categories of class-struggle and towards a radical democratic 
critique of contemporary culture. The central question motivating 
Habermas echoes that of Rousseau and Kant: how can society be non-
coercive, in the sense of non-domineering, in order that emancipation 
may be achieved, that is, that all may legitimately claim to be truly free 
and equal?23 Similarly to Rousseau, he turns to the legitimising role of 
popular sovereignty. Like Kant, he views norms and consequent rights 
as necessary principles of an unfettered reason. Unlike the former, 
Habermas’s theory is not open to totalitarian impulses: unlike the latter, 
his theory attempts to overcome an ahistorical account of pure-reason 
in order that it may be connected to practical and social issues. He does 
so by displacing the general will of Rousseau with a procedure of moral 
justification, called discourse will-formation, which is tied to the rea-
soned argument of those subjected to the norms or law in question. This 
is supported by transferring attention away from Kant’s lone, self-
reflective moral consciousness towards a community of moral and legal 
subjects in dialogue – or in his own words, communicative action.  
Broadly speaking, his own project attempts to retrieve the emancipatory po-
tential of Enlightenment reason, and to instantiate that retrieval at the core 
of communicative praxis […] Habermas emphasises a regulative ideal of 
reason that fosters moral-practical competencies of communicative action. 
He has produced a theoretically complex and extensive body of work that 
has had interdisciplinary reverberations24.  
The primary texts of his extensive body of work include25: The Struc-
tural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962, 1989) which charts 
the rise and fall of the public discourse; Theory and Practice (1963, 
1974) which addresses the central concerns of critical theory; Legitima-
tion Crises (1973, 1976) which maps the crises of contemporary society 
________________ 
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caused by failing to live to the democratic ideal; Communication and 
the Evolution of Society (1976, 1979) which is a collection of essays 
concerning communication theory, moral development and social evo-
lution; his magnum opus, the two volume, The Theory of Communica-
tive Action (1981; 1984 and 1987); Moral Consciousness and Commu-
nicative Action (1983, 1989) which engages with moral psychology; 
Between Facts and Norms (1992, 1996) which is the application of 
communicative theory to matters of democracy and law and his central 
text regarding rights; and The Inclusion of the Other (1996, 1998) 
which applies his model of deliberative democracy to contemporary is-
sues26.  
William Outhwaite describes the above work of Habermas as 
«poised» – that is, poised between «between the critical theory of the 
earlier Frankfurt School and modern social and political theory, be-
tween the critique of modernity and its affirmation as a still valid, in-
deed inescapable project»27. The notion of poised or in-between charac-
terises much of Habermas’s work and is a feature of his argumentation. 
In focusing on a theme, he highlights an inherent duality and proceeds 
to show how his own proposals can create a mutual complimentarity 
rather than a contradiction or unsatisfactory tension. Accordingly, this 
chapter is organised around the central dualities of Habermas’s thought. 
Firstly, it outlines the central themes of Habermas’s work, formulated 
in a theory of communicative action and an associated discourse ethics 
outlined in A Theory of Communicative Action and Moral Conscious-
ness and Communicative Action. Secondly, it traces the implications of 
this theory for a conceptualisation of rights in the social practice of 
contemporary constitutional democracies presented in Between Facts 
and Norms. It refers to other works to the extent that it facilitates criti-
cal exposition – primarily articles from The Inclusion of the Other and 
The Postnational Constellation. It is important to note that an exposi-
tion of a work as abstract as that of Habermas will result in this chapter 
becoming quite abstract also28.  
________________ 
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3. General Theoretical Framework 
Between Facts and Norms is not a work on human rights as such. 
Foremost, it is a study of social integration in modern constitutional 
democracies. Its primary aim is to reconstruct the internal conceptual 
relationship between modern law and democracy in order to assert the 
basic claim that «the rule of law cannot be had or maintained without 
radical democracy»29. To this end, Habermas proposes a discourse-
theoretic conceptualisation of a «system of rights» which acts as a 
bridge in the mutual legitimising relationship of law and democracy.  
The text draws together many themes, some of which have been re-
formulated, others newly applied30. It examines the public structures of 
social interaction that allow for the organisation of contemporary socie-
ties – the state, the judiciary and legislature, and in particular, law and 
democracy. Successful social coordination requires norms of behaviour 
that can be enforced and/or freely accepted to all. Habermas claims 
modern legitimate law is capable of both. At its most simple, he is justi-
fying the thesis that the law is the primary medium of social integration 
in a state – and that democratic discourse is the only means by which it 
can be legitimately and freely accepted by its citizens.  
Immediately identified by the title, the central duality that manifests 
itself in all subsequent dualities is «facticity» (Fakitizität) and «valid-
ity» (Geltung). In the domain of social theory, it expresses itself as 
facts and norms. On one hand, there are historically bound and contex-
tualised facts of social reality that guide behaviour such as enacted 
laws, written rules and customs. On the other, commonly recognised 
norms of behaviour have an inherent universal claim of validity, such 
as the claim that they are just or good or appropriate, which points be-
yond the concrete fact. The duality is sourced in the inherent dynamic 
of all language-communication which facilitates and sustains society 
and individuals. Briefly, language discloses a rationality by which par-
________________ 
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ticipants are able to question the validity of proposed facts, thereby cre-
ating a discourse that ultimately leads to common understanding and an 
agreement to which all are bound. The central intuition which has come 
to dominate Habermas’s thought is: what is true of communication is 
true of society.  
This means that the tensions between facticity and validity built into lan-
guage and its use return in the dynamics of integration of socialised, or at 
least communicatively socialised individuals – and must be worked out by 
the participants’ own efforts31. 
The intuition marks a watershed in his work, for the Habermasian 
oeuvre falls into «two distinct, though not sharply separated, parts»32. 
Habermas considers himself to have superseded the work of pre-
197633. Although there is a change of direction, the later developments 
in his work may be viewed as a deepening and reformulation of similar 
key issues. The significant turn is toward the philosophy of language. 
The essential premise that links the two phases and the many themes is 
the facilitation of communication, that is, to foster a public discourse 
free from all forms of coercion. 
3.1 The Communicative Structures of Social Interaction 
The most complete exposition of the turn to language and the result-
ing general theoretical framework is presented in the two-volume The 
Theory of Communicative Action. In it, social interaction is viewed 
through the lens of language. It examines the structures of linguistic 
and non-linguistic communication that allow competent speakers to 
successfully interact.  
At base, or what Habermas refers to as the ideal speech situation, the 
interaction between two competent speakers reveals two fundamental 
types of rationality34. The first form of rationality is instrumental or 
strategic; it operates towards achieving the successful realisation of the 
private goals of one (or more) of the speaking actors. The resulting in-
strumental actions are modes of social control that realise the ends or 
goals of a few35. The second form is communicative rationality; it is the 
________________ 
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 T. BOTTOMORE, The Frankfurt School, 55. 
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34
 Cf. J. HABERMAS, The Theory of Communicative Action, I, 8-42, 286 ff. 
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 Habermas identifies instrumental-strategic rationality as the basis of the wider 
phenomenon of Positivism – a model of rationality, proposed by the Enlightenment, 
that is based on the deductive, value-free and efficiency methodology of science. Be-
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type of reasoning that attempts to reach common agreement between 
speaking subjects. Consequently, communicative actions are those 
modes of social engagement co-ordinated in the light of mutual under-
standing (Verständigung) – actions guided by agreement (Einigung). 
He defines it as follows: 
The concept of communicative action refers to the interaction of at least 
two subjects capable of speech and action who establish interpersonal rela-
tions (whether by verbal or extra-verbal means). The actors seek to reach an 
understanding about the action situation and their plans of action in order to 
coordinate their actions by way of agreement. The central concept of inter-
pretation refers in the first instance to negotiating definitions of the situa-
tion which admit of consensus36. 
The telos or aim of all communicative action is mutual understanding 
and agreement37.  
Traditional philosophy, by focusing primarily on the individual actor, 
offered a model of rationality constructed from the mechanics of indi-
vidual subjective consciousness. Instead, Habermas is proposing that 
rationality is embedded in language, for all social-coordination claim-
ing to be rational is only possible and effective through language. De-
fended again in the opening chapters of Between Facts and Norms, he 
asserts that communicative reason differs from classically perceived 
practical reason because «first and foremost it is no longer ascribed to 
the individual actor […] Rather what makes communicative reason 
possible is the linguistic medium in which interactions are woven to-
gether and forms are structured»38. Within his proximate philosophical 
________________ 
 
ginning with an early work entitled Knowledge and Human Interests, Habermas con-
tinually attacks a “positivistic self-understanding” of science which claims to be inde-
pendent of any normative commitment. Such a claim to be value-free in fact hides 
ideological impulses when transferred to the social sciences. In the political arena, the 
rationality refers only to the means for carrying out individual and collective ends, 
and not to the ends themselves. Recall also the rejection of such models of reasoning 
by Finnis (consequentialism) and Dworkin (utilitarianism); cf. Ch. II, Sec. 4; Ch III, 
Sec. 5.2. This becomes an important point in a later chapter, cf Ch. VI, Sec. 4. The 
desire to reject and so explicate a fuller model of rationality has motivated the full 
life’s work of Habermas and priortised by him in the agenda of Critical Theory. Cf. J. 
HABERMAS, The Theory of Communicative Action, II, 374-399.  
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 J. HABERMAS, The Theory of Communicative Action, I, 86.  
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 J. HABERMAS, The Theory of Communicative Action, I, 287; ID., Communication 
and the Evolution of Society, 3. He writes, “The goal of coming to an understanding 
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 J. HABERMAS, Between Facts and Norms, 5.  
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tradition, this linguistic turn marks the definitive shift away from Marx-
ian categories and a movement towards an engagement with Anglo-
American philosophy. The primary organizing principle in understand-
ing history and society is no longer labour but language39. He draws 
from the models of language proposed by John Langshaw Austin 
(1911-1960) and John Searle (1932- ) and extracts their wider socio-
logical significance. Entitled «Universal Pragmatics»40, Habermas de-
scribes a general theory of speech actions at the centre of a theory of 
communicative action:  
A general theory of speech actions would thus describe exactly that funda-
mental system of rules that adult subjects master to the extent that they can 
fulfil the conditions for a happy employment of sentences in utterances, no 
matter to which particular language the sentences may belong and in which 
accidental contexts the utterances may be embedded41. 
The theory is the explication of the necessary suppositions involved in 
the standard uses of language in social interaction42.  
Simply put, in an ideal or uncritical communication any sentence may 
make three types of claims for itself (Geltungsanspruche): an objective 
claim of truth, a normative claim to rightness and an expressive or evalua-
tive claim to truthfulness. The first refers to an objective reality of brute 
facts, the second refers to the intersubjective social and external reality and 
the third refers to the inner reality experienced by an individual43. For that 
communication to be successful it must be accepted as valid by the hearer.  
However, each claim is open to question and, being contested, the claim 
(or fact) requires a justification (or validation) by the speaker – giving rise 
________________ 
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 Cf. J. HABERMAS, Theory and Practice, 142-169; S. WHITE, The Recent Work of 
Jürgen Habermas, 44-46. 
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 Cf. J. HABERMAS, Communication and the Evolution of Society, 1-68. The The-
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 On the detailed examination of the ideal speech-act, cf. J. HABERMAS, The The-
ory of Communicative Action, I, 273 ff. More detailed preconditions of competent 
language use or a comprehensible speech-act include: first, the interlocutors must as-
sume that they all mean the same thing; second, they each must be rationally account-
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the process of justifying reasonable arguments. 
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 Cf. J. HABERMAS, Theory of Communicative Action, I, 319-328; ID., Communication 
and the Evolution of Society, 68.  
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to a discourse44. The justification, if it is to be accepted in a non-coercive 
manner, must be accepted by the hearer on the basis of appropriate discus-
sion, leading to a free acceptance of the claim on the basis of a better ar-
gument and good reasons. Accordingly, the three types of validity claims 
will give rise to three types of discourse. In other words, the type of dis-
course will depend on the factual claim to be validated. Claims of objec-
tive truth are validated in reference to objective facts, that is, according to 
theoretical discourse. Claims of normative rightness are established by le-
gitimating social relations or norms, that is, according to moral-practical 
discourse. Finally, claims of truthfulness or sincerity are judged by the dis-
closure of a speaker’s subjectivity, that is, according to aesthetic and 
therapeutic discourses45. The very dynamic of discourse, therefore, is de-
pendent on the tension between facticity and validity.  
The validity basis of speech therefore underpins all communication 
and discourse and because communication is «the means of establish-
ing human relationships, the validity basis of speech is also the basis 
of human relationships»46. As the basis of human relationship, it will 
also mark the mediums by which human society are formed and regu-
lated. The orientation towards reaching mutual understanding regard-
ing validity claims is the constitutive process of social integration be-
cause it grounds shared expectations, means of interpreting situations, 
and modes of behaviour. Habermas asserts that this dynamic and 
commitment to the validitation of factual claims reveals a rational ba-
sis for agreement:  
I would like, therefore, to defend the following thesis: In the final analysis, 
the speaker can illocutionary influence the hearer and visa versa, because 
speech-act typical commitments are connected with cognitively testable va-
lidity claims – that is, because the reciprocal bonds have a rational basis47.  
The resulting project is to identify and promote the pre-conditions by 
which such discourse can be sustained. Therefore, «The task of univer-
sal pragmatics is to identify and reconstruct universal conditions of 
________________ 
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possible understanding (Verständigung)»48. In turn, the preconditions 
of discourse would provide for Habermas the normative guidelines for 
a critical theory49. Critical theory, as a movement, attempts to critique 
forms of domination and foster modes of emancipation. Critical theory, 
as a theory of communicative action, is a reconstruction of the pre-
conditions, and hence norms, by which to judge to society50. Such stan-
dards negatively judge distorted forms of communication which justify 
and construct social integration into modes of domination and offer 
standards for the positive construction of a free society.  
3.2 Modernity: Rationalisation of the Lifeworld (Lebenswelt) 
As observed earlier, Habermas’s theory of society is based on his 
theory of speech. The presumptions or idealisations of communicative 
practice necessarily imply a tension – between claims of facticity and 
questions of validity. Socially, this is a tension between a localised 
concrete de facto social acceptance (soziale Geltung) and the idealisa-
tion of universal validity (Gültigkeit). In principle, all already agreed 
claims within a society are open to further question, thereby opening up 
further discourses. In effect, this threatens the stability of society – ex-
posing it to the «whirlwind of validity claims»51.  
However societies are stable, for most claims are not normally con-
tested. They are an accepted part of the commonly shared background 
knowledge within which action is co-ordinated. Termed the lifeworld 
(Lebenswelt), it may be loosely associated with culture52. Habermas de-
scribes the lifeworld as follows: 
The fundamental background knowledge that must tacitly supplement our 
knowledge of the acceptability conditions of linguistically standardized ex-
pressions if hearers are to be able to understand their literal meanings, has 
remarkable features; it is an implicit knowledge that cannot be represented 
in a finite number of propositions; it is holistically structured knowledge, 
________________ 
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the basic elements of which intrinsically define one another; and it is a 
knowledge which does not stand at our disposition, inasmuch as we cannot 
make it conscious and place it in doubt as we please53. 
The lifeworld is the complete set of convictions within which people 
live. Based on the already-existing assumptions that allow for communi-
cation between individuals to happen, it is composed of the pre-existing 
consensus of «more or less diffuse, always unproblematic, background 
convictions»54. People are socialised into such a lifeworld, providing for 
people their cultural values, normative standards of society and personal 
identities55. Correspondingly, three functions of the lifeworld may be 
identified: first, the lifeworld facilitates the transmission of culture or in-
terpretative schemes by which people understand world; second, it sus-
tains social integration and the legitimate ordering of inter-personal rela-
tionships; third, it moulds the personality of competent participants in the 
lifeworld. As already-existing assumptions that are held by people, they 
are bracketed-out from the claims that are open to being challenged. As 
such, they are the claims that fuse facticity and validity, thereby provid-
ing the stable expectations that make available the basis for secure social 
cooperation56.  
Habermas interprets the development of modern societies as a process 
of rationalisation of this lifeworld57. The commonly accepted convictions 
in many areas of lifeworld come under increased scrutiny – the validity 
of the assumed facts are questioned and in response the facts need to be 
justified or rationalised. Conceptually speaking, facticity and validity are 
split apart, setting in motion the process of societal rationalisation. He 
argues that in this process, the members of society are increasingly 
forced to separate different spheres of validity. For instance, they come 
to distinguish scientific and technical questions from those of faith and 
religion; questions of justice and morality are differentiated from issues 
of the good life and ethics, and so on. Each discourse develops its own 
scope of facts, internal logic and particular tests of validation.  
________________ 
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As society becomes more complex, systems need to be developed 
in order to facilitate social co-ordination. The two primary systems 
are capitalist production (economics) and the functioning of bu-
reaucracy (politics)58. Significantly, the systems are no longer de-
pendent on communicative reasoning but on instrumental-strategic 
reasoning which organises according to the achievement of particu-
lar goals. Because the systems are based on instrumental reasoning 
they split off or decoupled from a lifeworld that is maintained by 
communicative action. The systems take onto themselves the re-
sponsibilities of social-coordination previously sustained by com-
municative action. They function independently of the lifeworld – 
guided according to the steering mechanisms or medium or influence 
of money and power. Crucially, the independently functioning sys-
tems penetrate back into the lifeworld bringing with them their dif-
ferent rationale, often with grave consequences according to Haber-
mas and in line with the tradition of critical theory. Culture, society 
and personality, previously sustained by the lifeworld, are no longer 
sustained by communicative action but are defined and ultimately 
eroded by the systematic interventions of capitalism and bureauc-
racy. What was the consensual domain of communicative rationality 
becomes the exploitable world of instrumental or strategic reason-
ing59. What was in the interests of all becomes focused towards the 
interests of the few – the business and power elites. In Habermas’s 
terminology it leads to «the colonisation of the lifeworld»60. For in-
stance, modern society has seen an increasing «juridification» (Ver-
rechtlichung) of social life – that is, the vast amount of legal regula-
tions used to manage and ultimately control society61. 
In response, Habermas is proposing that the systems of social in-
tegration in modern societies be conceptually and concretely recon-
________________ 
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structed in accordance with the pre-conditions that sustain commu-
nicative rationality62. It replaces coercion with consensus63. 
4. Discourse Ethics 
As identified earlier, social cooperation may be organised according 
to two types of contrasting rationality. An instrumental or goal-
orientated rationality focuses on the question, «What may we and what 
may we not do, to satisfy our desires and preferences»? However, a 
communicative rationality, which involves a more reflective and criti-
cal stance, turns on questions such «Are our values acceptable?» and 
«What collective interests do we have»64?  
The goals that we pursue are shaped in common. Therefore, reflec-
tion or practical discourse on those ends are the identification of genu-
ine common interests that express a common or general will in pursuit 
of those goals. In the moral argumentation that discerns these ends, 
evidence is brought forward to defend or redeem a norm or procedure 
which will reflect people’s needs, interests or «consequences and side 
effects of applying the norm for the fulfilment of accepted needs»65.  
In an important characteristic of the discursive process according to 
Habermas, it is possible for all the participants to take the view of the 
other66. This ability facilitates a common critical reflection by which 
________________ 
 
62
 In a work entitled Legitimation Crisis, Habermas argues that advanced capital-
ism is being undermined because it is no longer able to sufficiently organise society 
without reference to modes of domination. Yet, capitalism appears to be widening as 
testified by contemporary globalisation rather than being eroded. In his later works, 
such as Between Facts and Norms, he seeks a reconstruction of the systems of control 
rather than their demise. In this later work, the issue becomes the proper relationship 
between strategic and communicative rationality.  
63
 This will become an important point in a later chapter, cf. Ch. V, Sec. 6.3. Con-
sensus is the vital undercurrent of all Habermas’s work. Thomas MacCarthey ob-
serves «It is of decisive importance for Habermas’s political theory that he does not 
answer, by negotiating a compromise. This is not that he rejects bargaining […] 
Compromise is, so to speak, a second-best alternative […] but fails to capture the core 
of our sense of justice». T. MACCARTHY, «Practical Discourse», 59. 
64
 Cf. J. BRAATEN, Habermas’s Critical Theory of Society, 30. It is argued by some 
that there is no such thing as communicative rationality, for that all rationality is ulti-
mately strategic becuase some goal is always intended. Cf. F. DALLMAYR, Polis and 
Praxis, 214-217, 240.  
65
 J. HABERMAS, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 65. For further 
distinctions and characteristics of moral argument, which are often drawn upon by 
Habermas, cf. S. TOULMIN, The Uses of Argument. 
66
 A paradigm example for Habermas is the way in which psychology works. A 
client is caught in modes of reasoning in which they are enslaved. By way of a critical 
 
CH. V: JÜRGEN HABERMAS 243 
the needs and interests may be identified as genuinely generalisable. 
Only the most generalisable of interests will appeal to all because only 
a certain few will be defended by all67. Stephen White interprets 
Habermas’s account of cultural interpretation of needs «in a given soci-
ety will be a function of what that culture defines as necessary to the 
flourishing of human life»68. As acknowledged by all, they motivate 
all; in other words, the process results in «discursive will formation»69. 
Habermas has in mind both simple common interests such as nourish-
ment and social interests such as individual liberty and social welfare. 
Moral norms then will act as guides and constraints on social integra-
tion that foster generalisable interests while creating parameters for the 
legitimate pursuit of individual interests70. The project of Discourse 
Ethics is the analyses of how may a society agree on its common and 
social interests and the means by which to achieve them while allowing 
for the individual freedom of each to pursue their own interests; in 
other words, it responds to the question, «What constitutes the moral 
basis of social cooperation»71? 
To return to an earlier distinction in the ideal speech situation which 
underpins his theory: performative statements in communicative prac-
tices may make a claim to either a factual truth, normative rightness or 
to sincerity. The assertion «iron is magnetic» differs from «murder is 
wrong» or «I feel tired». Each belongs to a different referential domain 
and are validated or justified in different ways. The first is a claim of 
objective truth attending to brute outer reality; it may be true or false. 
The second is a claim of normative rightness addressing an intersubjec-
tive social reality; it may be right or wrong. The third is a sincere ex-
pression of subjective feelings; it may be honest or dishonest.  
However, in the general communicative practice normative and theo-
retical statements intertwine72: they are not only intended by the 
________________ 
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speaker to be valid for both interlocutors but for all. The moral asser-
tion, such as «you ought not to kill», is meant to be valid not only for 
those to whom it is addressed but for all; it claims the objective status 
of theoretical assertions. Habermas is arguing that there is an implicit 
assumption in the proposition of a moral norm that it is valid for all 
people. A moral norm is perceived to be somewhat independent of the 
moment of utterance or the individual making the claim73. In other 
words, the justification of a particular moral norm, although bound to a 
particular context as a social fact, assumes validity beyond a specific 
community or time.  
The assertions of morality therefore, as all language, are shot through 
with the tension between facticity and validity. Consequently, as 
Habermas’s general framework argues that all communication pre-
sumes and aims towards understanding and, in the process, reveals the 
preconditions that facilitate a successful outcome, so he makes the 
same argument for morality or the communicative practices that organ-
ise behaviour or make normative claims. He believes, therefore, that 
there is a central core of preconditions that may be discerned at the 
heart of all moral-practical discourse. 
In fact, I am defending an outrageously strong claim in the present context 
of philosophical discussion: namely that there is a universal core of moral 
intuition in all times and in all societies. I don’t say that this intuition is 
spelt out the same way in all societies at all times. What I do say is that 
these intuitions have the same origin. In the last analysis, they stem from 
the conditions of symmetry and reciprocal recognition which are unavoid-
able presuppositions of communicative action74.  
To this end, discourse ethics attempts to unearth the conditions that 
facilitate the validation or acceptance of normative claims within the 
wider context of all communicative action. For instance, the ideal 
speech act, and therefore communicative rationality and discourse eth-
ics, presumes freedom and equality. Firstly, freedom is assumed. In a 
specific moral-practical discourse in order to establish a norm or proce-
dure, acceptance of the proposed norms or procedures by the partici-
pants is on the basis of best arguments. By accepting the best argument 
then, they are rationally motivated, that is, they are moved to act in free 
and uncoerced manner. Secondly, equality is assumed. In engaging in 
________________ 
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an unfettered discourse, it is assumed that all participants will have an 
equal voice in the discussion. The outcome of mutual understanding, 
then, will result in consensus or agreement by all – or at least those af-
fected by the norm or procedure75.  
In Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, Habermas de-
fines the above assumptions into rules of discourse or «presuppositions 
that are adopted implicitly and intuitively»76. He lists the following 
three preconditions: one, any and every speaking subject may partici-
pate in the discourse; two, any participant may question a validity claim 
or offer her own; three, no participant may be prevented «by internal or 
external coercion, from exercising their rights as laid down»77 in the 
previous two. Upon these presuppositions, an unfettered moral dis-
course will orientate itself to mutual agreement and consensus. Haber-
mas is claiming that a consensus in a practical discourse cannot hold 
«Unless all affected can freely accept the consequences and the side ef-
fects that the general observance of a controversial norm can be ex-
pected to have for the satisfaction of the interests of each individual»78.  
This he refines and reformulates into the following principle. 
(U) For a norm to be valid, the consequences and side effects that its gen-
eral observance can be expected to have for the satisfaction of the particular 
interests of each person affected must be such that all affected can accept 
them freely79. 
Termed the universalisation principle (U), it is the underlying princi-
ple of morality. As a result, he claims that anyone who acknowledges 
the rules of discourse must implicitly acknowledge the universalisation 
principle. It captures, according to Habermas, a central intuition of all 
moral philosophy – the generalisability of maxims (that is, the norm is 
valid for all). It is contained in Kant’s formulation of the categorical 
imperative, from which Habermas takes his point of departure. Indeed, 
Habermas presents «a theory of justification for ethical norms that 
stands solidly in the Kantian tradition»80. But he differs in an important 
way. The theory of communicative action is necessarily intersubjective. 
________________ 
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It starkly contrasts to the lone individual willing the universal law of 
Kant81. Without the relational element, the categorical imperative – and 
many other such formulations – relies on a false philosophy of the sub-
ject. In comparison to the intersubjectivity and dialogue presupposed in 
the ideal speech situation, Habermas accuses such rationality of being 
monological and ultimately non-consensual. Modes of practical reason-
ing that are monological or based on the will of the individual are open 
to the distortions of instrumental-strategic reasoning which manipulates 
states of affairs and the wills of others according the desires and will of 
the primary actors. 
Applied into the terminology of discourse, the reformulated principle 
of universalisation becomes the D principle. 
(D) Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with 
the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical 
discourse82.  
U presupposes D83. In effect, the principle of universalisation en-
tails or requires the discourse principle in order that it may be 
worked through by the participants of the discourse. The discourse 
principle is that which guides all norms and procedures by which so-
cial cooperation is enacted. Originally formulated as an aspect of his 
moral theory, it has been broadened out to include all action norms, 
in particular law. The key characteristic of the U and D principle is 
impartiality. It captures the essential feature of a postconventional 
intuition for solving moral argumentation and conflict84. 
In the main, Habermas desists from applying the principle. It is for 
the active engagement of the participants within a discourse to sub-
stantiate the norms by which they coordinate social action. Dis-
________________ 
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course Ethics is uniquely procedural. Habermas is maintaining that if 
the conditions of communicative action or rationality are followed, 
then the participants will be able, in principle, to reach a rational 
consensus on moral issues. The only apparent norm suggestive in his 
work that pre-exists the actual workings of the discourse is freedom 
of communication: re-phrased negatively, no-one is allowed to re-
fuse someone the right to participate in the discussion. As proce-
dural, it makes no presupposing claims whatsoever to any concep-
tion to human good, for such assertions would pre-empt the dis-
course and therefore distort its presuppositions85. In The Tanner Lec-
tures, Habermas writes, 
Ethics orientated to conceptions of the good or to specific value hierarchies 
single out particular normative contents. Their premises are too strong to 
serve as the foundation for universally binding decisions in a modern soci-
ety characterised by the pluralism of gods and demons. Only theories of 
morality and justice developed in the Kantian tradition hold out the promise 
of an impartial procedure for the justification and assessment of princi-
ples86.  
The differentiation of ethics and morality is the result of the ra-
tionalisation of the lifeworld. Habermas is claiming that as different 
discourses, they are structurally different. Substantive ethics (Sit-
tlichkeit) concerns values or goods or appropriateness for particular 
groups or individuals; morality (Moralität) concerns norms that tran-
scend the particularity of contexts and are concerned with universal 
norms of justice87. To be sure, the former provides substantive mate-
rial for practical discourse. But only the latter can respond to the 
modern social integration. Ultimately, questions of justice, under-
stood as procedural by discourse ethics, allow for free spaces 
(Freiräume) needed for the pluralism of conceptions concerning 
«gods and demons» and fulfilling life, while at the same time facili-
tating successful and free social integration. 
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4.1 Justice and the Good 
The strong distinction between justice and the good is a key charac-
teristic of the liberal tradition88. Habermas, however, is claiming that a 
model of society based on the intersubjective premises of communica-
tive action does not fall prey to the accusations of radical individualism 
and social atomism levelled at the theorists of this tradition. Indeed, as 
a critical theorist he joins in condemning such tendencies in modern so-
ciety; they are products of instrumentalist-strategic reasoning that jus-
tify forms of social domination. 
 However, Habermas is not immune from the criticism that such a 
distinction is either possible or desirable. Charles Taylor argues that a 
distinction of domains is in fact impossible89. In a critique of modern 
moral philosophy as a whole, Taylor argues that an evaluative frame-
work is always present in every judgment made in a moral discourse. 
Moral evaluation is based on an ordering of perceived goods organised 
according to a constitutive good, or what he calls a hyper-good. The 
goods are those aims and purposes that provide moral motivation and 
justification90. Without them, we cannot answer the question, why be 
moral91? Human goods are identified in the course of asking such a 
question – disclosing a self-identity. In the terminology of Habermas, 
Taylor argues that the moral domain must be bound to, or even subor-
dinated, to the ethical question of the self-identity of the individual or 
group.  
The charge is that, despite claims to the contrary, a procedural con-
ception of morality which claims to be independent of the good actually 
depends on an unarticulated prior constitutive good. William Rehg, in 
Insight and Solidarity, argues that the Discourse Ethics of Habermas is 
capable of recognising a constitutive hyper-good – rational cooperation 
- without damaging its own premises. The central intuitive point for 
Habermas is that «reaching understanding is the inherent telos of hu-
man speech»92, for reaching understanding is the means by which peo-
ple may live in rational cooperation. Rehg proposes,  
________________ 
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it would seem that the acceptance of that procedure rests on the acceptance 
of argued agreement as a good […] a vision of cooperation among autono-
mous individuals, stands behind this idea. I shall refer to this as the good or 
rational or autonomous cooperation. If one did not value such cooperation 
and the rational agreement upon which it rests, one would probably reject 
discourse ethics altogether93. 
Others accuse Habermas’s universal moral principle of being too ab-
stract and therefore neglecting concrete moral experiences94. It is part 
of the constructive critique offered by Seyla Benhabib. In Critique, 
Norm and Utopia, she argues that the rules, designed to include every-
one in the discursive process, in fact, excludes some. The rules – and, 
indeed, the theory as a whole – are based upon competent speakers. As 
a result,  
By the very way in which it defines those excluded, these rules prejudge 
the content of moral theory. For example, those who cannot speak – chil-
dren, fools, and animals – have no place in this theory, yet would we really 
want to deny that our relationship to these beings is an essential aspect of 
morality in general? This exclusion limits the core of communicative ethics 
to questions of justice, namely to relations between responsible, equal, 
adult participants95.  
As the paragraph above attests, the theory equates questions of 
justice to relations between adults. But this involves further exclu-
sions. In a Different Voice, by Carol Gilligan, is a critique of the 
model of moral psychological development which links the apex of 
moral maturity with the capacity to take the impartial moral point of 
view. She argues that this is to assume as universal what is in fact a 
feature of male moral experience. Women, however, tend to take a 
perspective of care, that is they will make mature moral decisions 
________________ 
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according to the concrete attachments existing between individuals. 
She writes, 
When one begins with the study of women and derives developmental con-
structs from their lives, the outline of a moral conception different from that 
described by Freud, Piaget, or Kohlberg begins to emerge and informs a 
different description of development. […] This conception of morality as 
concerned with the activity of care centres moral development around the 
understanding of responsibility and relationships, just as the conception of 
morality as fairness ties moral development to the understanding of rights 
and rules96.  
Not unlike Taylor and so-called communitarians, she and others in 
feminist philosophy question the prioritisation of justice over the good 
and abstract impartiality97. 
Habermas defends the distinction because of the universal and formal 
demands of a post-conventional morality98. The principles of discourse 
ethics which are universal and formal are revealed as the preconditions 
of moral argumentation aimed towards rational consensus. They are 
always part of the real everyday activity of interactive relationships and 
the pursuit of personal goals. Therefore, they are universal, because we 
have no alternative but to use them. As rules of argumentation, they are 
formal. But the actual «content that is tested by a moral principle is 
generated not by the philosopher but by real life»99. It is not for moral 
philosophy alone to provide unique insight100. The responsibility is for 
everyone – in acknowledgement of their need to rationally cooperate. 
According to Habermas, the possibility of a philosophically defensible 
model of a particular way of life as generally fulfilling – and therefore 
appealing to all – is at best unlikely, if not impossible. 
Yet he argues that justice and good do not form a polarity; to create 
one is to misperceive the basic moral phenomenon. That basic moral 
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phenomenon is the recognition and empathy towards «the specific vul-
nerability of the human species, which individuates itself through so-
ciation»101. Morality is not simply abstract justice but a justice always 
bound to solidarity with others. Both are connected because they are 
always presumed in all communicative interaction.  
These two aspects – the autonomy of inalienable individuals and their em-
beddedness in an intersubjectively shared web of relations – are internally 
connected, and it is this link that the procedure of discursive decision mak-
ing takes into account102.  
Discourse is, in fact, impossible without either aspect. To Habermas, 
the distinction is overstated.  
To cite an example, human rights obviously embody generalisable interests. 
As such they can be morally grounded in terms of what all could will. And 
yet nobody would argue that these rights, which represent the moral sub-
stance of our legal system, are irrelevant for the ethics (Sittlichkeit) of mod-
ern life103.  
It is to his account of human rights that I now turn. 
5. Modern Law: Between Facts and Norms 
To return to Between Facts and Norms: Habermas argues that the 
tension between facticity and validity is inherent to the interaction be-
tween communicatively competent actors. Language is essential to the 
organisation of society. Therefore, the presuppositions implicit in lan-
guage are «enlisted for the coordination of the action of different ac-
tors»104. The tensions that result will manifest themselves in the modes 
by which society organises itself105. Law, then, which according to 
Habermas is the primary medium through which modern society organ-
ises itself, will be characterised by this duality. William Rehg intro-
duces Habermas’s theory: 
If law is essentially constituted by a tension between facticity and validity – 
between its factual generation, administration, and enforcement in social 
institutions on one hand, its claim to deserve general recognition on the 
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other – then a theory that situates the idealising character of validity claims 
in concrete social contexts recommends itself for the analysis of law106.  
Law has taken on the role of managing social interaction in response 
to three complex features of modern society. Firstly, a modern society 
is pluralistic. The lifeworld of commonly held assumptions, or in 
Habermas’s pithy phrase the «always already familiar»107, becomes 
undermined by the variety of diverse groups and sub-cultures, each of 
differing traditions, values and world-views. Secondly, the pluralism of 
modernity has undermined the overarching structure of religious and 
metaphysical systems which informed the lifeworld. Societal institu-
tions, such as family, kinship, taboo and religion, manifest the «com-
plex of interpenetrating cultural traditions, social order, and personal 
identities»108. They provided an unquestioned authority and homoge-
nous world view, thereby fusing facticity and validity. However, in the 
process of societal rationalisation in modern society, outlined earlier, 
facticity and validity became split apart. On one hand, it allowed for 
greater critical appraisal as more was called into question. On the other, 
it became more difficult to justify previously accepted norms of behav-
iour and social orders of the lifeworld. Without this shared basis to sta-
bilise behaviour expectations, conflicts arise demanding ever more ex-
plicit agreement and justification for norms of behaviour. Thirdly, due 
to the rationalisation of society, structural systems have split from the 
lifeworld which require the facilitation of strategic action109. For exam-
ple, capitalism orders social society, not on agreement, but through the 
mechanisms that allow for the strategic fulfilment of personal advan-
tage. Such systems have taken on greater importance in managing so-
cial integration. 
Modern law is attempting to solve issues of social cooperation in the 
context of a diminished lifeworld on one hand, due to pluralisation 
which limits areas of common consensus, and the demands of the sys-
tems on the other that presuppose large areas of freedom for individuals 
to pursue their own goals. According to Habermas, 
The solution to the puzzle is found in the system of rights that lends to in-
dividual liberties the coercive force of law. We can then see, from a histori-
cal perspective, that the core of modern law consists of private rights that 
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mark out the legitimate scope of individual liberties and are thus tailored to 
the strategic pursuit of private interests110.  
Modern law aims towards two things at once, exhibiting a dual char-
acter. On one hand, the law must provide a stable social environment 
(facticity) to allow for the pluralism of world-views and the strategic 
calculative actions of individuals. On the other, the law must be accept-
able to all as legitimate (validity), that is, it must be capable of being 
rationally agreeable. In the face of conditions eroding the fusion of fac-
ticity and validity, modern law is burdened with the problem of trying 
to intertwine them. For Habermas «the only way out of this predica-
ment is for the actors themselves to reach an understanding about the 
normative regulation of strategic interactions»111.  
According to Habermas, the mutual necessity of facticity and validity 
or legality and legitimacy requires the mutual necessity of both phi-
losophy and sociology – or as previously mentioned a «poised» theory. 
On one hand, he attempts to map the relationship between law and 
normative standards without equating the law with morality; on the 
other, he is trying trace the necessity of law for social integration with-
out simply equating law with a means of social domination. The former 
is the association between law and justice; the latter links law and 
power. According to Habermas, a true account of law will pay regard to 
both. It is from this standpoint that Habermas criticises both exclusively 
normative theories and strongly sociological theories of law. Of the 
former, Habermas critiques John Rawls’s Theory of Justice for failing 
to take account of contemporary social facticity – that is, the sociologi-
cal evidence of societal power structures and their potential undermin-
ing posed by multicultural pluralism, bureaucratisation, powerful cor-
porate interests, an apathetic citizenry and so forth112. Of the latter, he 
rejects the systems theory of Nicklas Luhmann for lacking a normative 
content and therefore proposing law in a positivist manner or as a mani-
festation of power113. 
6. Human Rights and Popular Sovereignty 
The central assumption is that the law is suited to bearing the weight 
of social integration, for it can facilitate agreement between conflicting 
lifeworlds on one hand and, on the other, provide for the functional re-
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quirements of capitalist economics which entail strategic actions or 
«decentralised decisions of self-interested individuals in morally neu-
tralised spheres of action»114. In discourse theoretic terms, the law must 
intertwine a demarcated social space for strategic action and, at the 
same time, facilitate the practices of communicative action. 
In order to stabilise a social integration that accounts for both, the 
law must facilitate the validation of the norms that it proposes. Accord-
ing to Habermas, this can only take place through the process of mutual 
understanding between communicatively acting subjects. The legal 
structure, therefore, is obliged to provide a consensual validation proc-
ess that is capable of providing validity or, in politico-legal terms, le-
gitimacy. The essential duality of facticity and validity becomes in a 
socially integrative legal system the tension of legality and legitimacy. 
In the vocabulary of political theory, related to the former are subjec-
tive liberties and to the latter rights of participation in the political 
process: in other words, private autonomy and public autonomy, or 
human rights and popular sovereignty.  
Contemporary democratic regimes justify the rule of law by way of 
the rhetoric of rights. Binding the notion of human rights to that of pri-
vate autonomy (and, therefore, the social space to pursue one’s own 
private goals), Habermas sums up the modern conception of rights as,  
the concept of liberty or individual freedom of action: rights («subjective 
rights» in German) fix the limits within which a subject is entitled to freely 
exercise her will. More specifically, they define the same liberties for all 
individuals or legal persons understood as bearers of rights115. 
Essentially, rights refer to a sphere of freedom of choice for an indi-
vidual that can be delineated in and through the law so as to be com-
patible with the freedom-to-act of others. The resulting issue then, re-
ferred to in a similar manner a number of times during the course of the 
relevant chapter in Between Facts and Norms is the discernment of «the 
rights citizens must accord one another if they want to legitimately 
regulate their common life by means of positive law»116. 
The issue is framed in light of the duality of private and public auton-
omy. Subjective rights maintain legal and normative parameters within 
which a person is entitled to exercise her freedom and pursue her own 
goals and «leave open the motives for conforming to norms»117. She may 
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simply follow the law because she forced to do so, her behaviour being 
regulated by the punitive enforcement of positive law. But alone, the fact 
of the law and its consequent power cannot grant legitimacy to the rule of 
law. It must make a normative claim for itself. It must provide, with justi-
fication, a means by which she may follow the law out of respect. She 
views the law as a set of standards or norms by which people ought to live, 
that is, a reflection of the internal ought felt by individuals. He writes, 
modern law can stabilise behaviour expectations in a complex society with 
structurally differentiated lifeworlds and functionally independent subsys-
tems only if law, as regent for a «societal community» that has transformed 
itself into civil society, can maintain the inherited claim to solidarity in the 
abstract form of a believable claim to legitimacy118. 
As disclosed in communicative practices, the best argument is pro-
posed and agreed to justify a particular action. This in turn creates a ra-
tional obligation on all the participants. The same process is also true of 
the law. In the practice of its own justification, the law demands obedi-
ence. 
6.1 Between Liberalism and Republicanism 
The development of the above distinction between private and public 
autonomy is associated by Habermas with the modern era. In pre-
modern societies, reflected in the classical Aristotelian and Christian 
Natural Law traditions, private and political autonomy (facticity and 
validity) were considered one and the same. However, as previously 
charted, «in the rationalisation of the lifeworld, this clamp sprang 
open»119. One result was a division among discourses. 
The modern ideas of self-realisation and self-determination signalled not 
only different issues but two different kinds of discourse tailored to the lo-
gics of ethical and moral questions. The respective logics peculiar to these 
two types of questions were in turn manifested in philosophical develop-
ments that began in the late eighteenth century120.  
As noted earlier, the two discourses distinguished two spheres of re-
flection: issues of what is good for the individual became separate from 
that which is just in society. Ethics took upon itself a new subjectivistic 
sense concerned with issues of self-realisation; which, in turn has fos-
tered an individualism in pursuit of personal life projects and a plural-
________________ 
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ism of different collective identities. Morality, on the other hand, re-
ferred to issues of justice, free from all personal perspectives and based 
on the equal respect for all. It is orientated towards self-determination 
or participation in the creation of a just society. In so far as moral and 
ethical questions have been distinguished, he writes «the discursively 
filtered substance of norms finds expression in the two dimensions of 
self-determination and self-realisation»121.  
Habermas does not claim that there is strict parallel between human 
rights and self-realisation on one hand and popular sovereignty and 
self-determination on the other. However, he does identify a certain 
affinity reflected in contemporary political theory. He equates the 
«liberal» tradition as that which conceives human rights as the expres-
sion of moral self-determination and «civic republicanism» as that 
tradition which interprets popular sovereignty as the expression of 
ethical self-realisation. On one hand, the liberals fear a «tyranny of 
the majority» and therefore appeal to the priority of human rights in 
order to guarantee freedom122. They view rights to be a moral given, 
imposing themselves on our moral insight and an impersonal law that 
protects the liberty of all. On the other hand, «civic republicanism» 
highlights the binding character of a political community that gives 
expression to an historical tradition. This gives precedence to partici-
pation in the body-politic in order to give authentic expression to the 
goods in which the person ultimately finds fulfilment. In terminology 
of moral and ethical discourse, «in the one case, the moral-cognitive 
moment predominates, in the other, the ethical-volitional»123. The two 
approaches, liberal and republican, tend to stress one or other form 
autonomy as the basis of legitimacy for law. The first grounds legiti-
macy in the protection of individual liberty or private autonomy, 
specified in terms of rights. The second grounds it in public autonomy 
or the sovereignty of the people.  
In the history of political theory, Thomas Hobbes assumed the valid-
ity of law promulgated by the sovereign authority. By contrast, Rous-
seau and Kant maintained that the law must be legitimate if it is to be 
asserted and accepted obedience over society124. Habermas leans to-
wards the second tradition: «enacted law cannot secure the basis of its 
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legitimacy simply through legality, which leaves attitudes and motives 
up to the addressees»125. The law, or the normative regulation of strate-
gic actions, must be based on a common understanding and a common 
will built between the subjects of the law. 
In the Hobbesian model and subsequent liberal tradition, rights are 
held prior to the entry into society, based on the private autonomy of 
each individual126. Based on such presumptions, the social contract jus-
tified the system of rights according to an enlightened self-interest in 
protecting subjective liberties. But such a model, according to Haber-
mas, was appropriated from private contract law which regulates ex-
change relationships between independent individuals127. In the act of 
creating such a contract «the subjects make their decisions from the 
perspective of the first-person singular»128. However, a line of the 
modern tradition, critical of the early liberal tradition and represented 
by Kant and Rousseau, resisted the derivation of rights solely from sub-
jective rights129. Instead and for them, the social contract is structurally 
different from an economic contract for it necessarily implies that the 
participants  
have at their disposal the social perspective of a practical reason that tests 
laws. On the basis of this reason, they have moral – and not just prudential 
[enlightened self-interest] – grounds for their move out of the conditions of 
unprotected freedom [that is, the state of nature]130. 
Habermas is asserting that the preconditions of communicative ac-
tion reveal exactly this – that rationality is necessarily intersubjective or 
social or other-orientated. The liberal and republican traditions  
miss the legitimising force of a discursive process of opinion- and will-
formation, in which the illocutionary binding forces of a use of language 
orientated to mutual understanding serve to bring reason and will together – 
________________ 
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and lead to convincing positions to which all individuals can agree without 
coercion131. 
Conceptually, Habermas is denying that rights and sovereignty may 
be hierarchically ordered, one over the other. He writes, 
On the contrary, as elements of the legal order they presuppose collabora-
tion among subjects who recognize one another, in their reciprocally related 
rights and duties, as free and equal citizens. The mutual recognition is con-
stitutive for a legal order from which actionable rights are derived. In this 
sense «subjective» rights emerge co-originally with «objective» law 
[…]132. 
To Habermas, they are co-original. They require each other: the le-
gitimate rule of law and democracy, according to his theoretical theory, 
are explicitly circular133. 
The central intuition, similar to Rousseau and Kant, is that legitimacy 
derives from self-legislation. Communicative practices that aim towards 
mutual understanding place an obligation on the participants to follow the 
commonly justified norms. The norms are freely followed because they 
are the result of a common endeavour – that is, a discursive will formation. 
The norms that demarcate private autonomy result from the active enter-
prise of citizens or the exercise of public autonomy. Importantly, the prac-
tices that make communicative action politically realisable (popular sover-
eignty or democracy) are possible only by way of the law. Public auton-
omy requires the medium of law – for only the law is able to guarantee a 
stable social interaction which is the basis of public autonomy. Yet as we 
have seen, in modern societies the law successfully functions as a medium 
of integration because it is able to protect subjective liberties. Private and 
public autonomy or human rights and popular sovereignty, therefore, mu-
tually constitute one another.  
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So the sought-for internal connection between popular sovereignty and hu-
man rights lies in the normative content of the very mode of exercising po-
litical autonomy, a mode that is not secured simply through the grammati-
cal form of general laws but only through the communicative form of dis-
cursive processes of opinion- and will-formation134. 
The very act of political autonomy presupposes a normative content. 
Presupposed in the act of political autonomy, it is the recognition of the 
other as a genuine person and not a means to a strategic end. Commu-
nicative rationality presupposes and acknowledges the dignity, freedom 
and equality of the other, that is the subjective liberty of the other. The 
act of political autonomy is also the active concrete recognition of sub-
jective liberties; and the active demarcation of the parameters to protect 
such subjective liberties that make up specific human rights. Modern 
law, understood as a system of rights, is the institutional recognition of 
such preconditions. 
Consequently the sought-for internal relation between popular sovereignty 
and human rights consists in the fact that the system of rights states pre-
cisely the conditions under which the forms of communication necessary 
for the genesis of legitimate law can be legally institutionalised […] The 
substance of human rights then resides in the formal conditions for the legal 
institutionalisation of those discursive processes of opinion and will forma-
tion in which the sovereignty of the people assumes a binding character 135.  
The system of rights is not an actual listing of particular rights. There 
are no pre-givens or natural rights prior to the self-determination of the 
citizens. Rights are necessarily social or political from the beginning. 
They are not held by individuals prior to social interaction. Rather they 
are recognised as the presuppositions of the intersubjective relations of 
citizens who are regulating their common life by way of positive law. 
In sum: the system of rights is an implication – a statement in legal 
form of the conditions of communicative rationality. As a result, it sup-
ports the process by which validity or legitimacy is bestowed on the 
law. It is for the process of popular sovereignty and the process of law 
to give shape to the system of rights, thereby creating actual positive 
rights or giving them legal factual status. Validity and facticity, there-
fore, come together in the modern law by way of a system of rights that 
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institutionalises and thereby guarantees communicative rationality in 
complex societies.  
6.2 Between Law and Morality 
As outlined earlier, the rationalisation of the society has created vari-
ous distinct forms of discourse136. Discussion of the law, then, may 
pass through a number of the different discourses, each with its own 
form of validation. For instance, apart from the previously mentioned 
moral and ethical discourses, pragmatic discourses are those which 
weigh up the merits of alternative strategies for achieving particular 
goals. Much of the law may be justified at this level137.  
In the process of the differentiation of discourses, modernity has dis-
tinguished between moral and legal discourses in which «legal and 
moral rules are simultaneously differentiated from traditional ethical 
life and appear side by side as two different but mutually complemen-
tary kinds of action norms»138. At one level, moral and legal discourses 
refer to similar issues: how interpersonal relationships can be ordered 
legitimately and conflicts are resolved according to justified norms. But 
at another level they differ, for they refer to such problems in different 
ways. Legal norms, therefore, are not to be taken as simple copies of 
moral norms.  
Hence we must not understand basic rights or Grundrechte, which take the 
shape of constitutional norms, as mere imitations of moral rights, and we 
must not take political autonomy as a mere copy of moral autonomy. 
Rather, norms of action branch out into moral and legal rules139.  
All legitimate norms of action are those resulting from common prac-
tical reasoning – or communicative rationality concerning claims of 
rightness. As previously explained, the discourse principle is the test of 
the validity of those norms because it embodies the post-conventional 
requirement of justification, specifically the requirement of impartial-
ity140. In Between Facts and Norms, Habermas offers a slightly different 
formulation of the discourse principle: «D: Just those action norms are 
valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in 
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rational discourses»141. The discourse principle is neither specific to mo-
rality or ethics or law – it undercuts all. It refers to procedure rather than 
content. As an impartial justification of norms in general, it is conceptu-
ally prior to either morality or law. The discourse principle which guides 
all norms of action branches out into moral and legal norms. «We might 
say that these various rules of argumentation are so many ways of opera-
tionalising the discourse principle»142. Moral and legal discourses are 
separate in that they relate to differing questions at issue, internal logic 
and the scope of justification.  
On one hand, in the justification of moral norms, the discourse prin-
ciple is articulated in the form of an impartial universalisation principle. 
On the other, in the domain of the law-making, the operation of the dis-
course principle becomes what Habermas calls the democratic princi-
ple. It states: «only those statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet 
with the assent (Zustimmung) of all citizens in a discursive process of 
legislation that in turn has been legally constituted»143. Based on dis-
cursive practices, the former principle measures the validity of moral 
norms and the latter measures the legitimacy of positive law. In effect, 
Habermas has transposed the relationship between morality and law 
into the discourse-theoretic relationship between the principle of uni-
versalisation and the principle of democracy – mediated by the system 
of rights.  
On the premise that rational political opinion- and will- formation is at all 
possible, the principle of democracy only tells us how this can be institu-
tionalised, namely, through a system of rights that secures for each person 
an equal participation in a process of legislation whose communicative 
practices are guaranteed to begin with144. 
Habermas further outlines of the relationship between morality and 
law in a sociological manner. He maps their inter-relationship accord-
ing to how they function in modern society. Modern societies are 
marked by a pluralism that no longer provides a common ethos which 
supports a binding morality. A post-traditional morality cannot meet all 
the requirements in regulating and organising highly complex societies, 
which demand high levels of strategic freedom. As a result, the func-
tioning of moral norms is incapable of fostering the necessary modes of 
behaviour to stabilise social expectations. Habermas, therefore, de-
________________ 
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scribes the law’s complementary relationship to morality in terms to the 
latter’s functional limitations. In effect, he is describing how the law 
supplements morality. In order to facilitate social integration, weak-
nesses in the post-conventional morality are supplemented by modern 
law in three functionally necessary ways, which in turn identify the 
three essential formal features of law145. 
The three basic weaknesses of morality are cognitive indeterminacy, 
motivational uncertainty and accountability. Correspondingly, the form 
of law is positive, coercive and reflexive. Firstly, the law is positively 
enacted and as such augments a cognitive indeterminacy. Modern so-
cieties face highly complex issues that require justification and applica-
tion according to very abstract principles, creating difficulties for indi-
viduals in deciding which norms are appropriate. The law provides 
firmness. Secondly, the law is coercive and as such counteracts a moti-
vational uncertainty with regard to morality. Individuals may not be 
motivated to follow moral norms. The enforcement of the law adds a 
coercive element which allows for the stabilisation of behavioural ex-
pectations. Thirdly, the law is reflexive and as such creates a system of 
accountabilities. Moral responses to complex issues in contemporary 
society require institutional organisation beyond the capacity of any in-
dividual. The system of rules that create an organisation to fulfil moral 
needs may in turn be reflexively applied to itself. The law, then, can 
create a system of accountabilities by which to judge its actions and 
meet its goals. Earlier, the legal medium was identified by its ability 
demarcate parameters of strategic freedom. To this basic assumption 
that the legal medium acknowledges general subjective liberties, 
Habermas adds the above characteristics. The legal medium then, in-
volves the recognition of subjective liberties, positivity, coerciveness 
and accountability.  
It is the interaction of this legal medium (law) with the discourse 
principle (morality) that constructs the system of rights146.  
6.3 The System of Basic Rights 
In light of the sociological pressures of pluralism, the central 
question of social integration is: in a post-traditional society, how 
can people be free to pursue their own goals and yet still be bound to 
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common norms that oblige certain modes of behaviour? How can 
society act as one and allow each to act alone? Transferred to dis-
course-theoretic terms: what is the potential structure that success-
fully allows for both strategic action and communicative rationality 
under law?  
According to the procedure of discourse ethics, in order to discern 
the required principles – or legal code – there may no appeal to any-
thing beyond the actual working through of issues by the people 
themselves. As competent speakers, this implies the discourse prin-
ciple: as citizens who are proposing legal norms, it implies the legal 
medium. Therefore, nothing can be given prior to «the citizen’s 
practice of self-determination other than the discourse principle, 
which is built into the conditions of communicative association in 
general, and the legal medium as such»147. These two aspects are in-
dispensable because successful social cooperation in a post-
traditional society necessarily requires both. People have no choice 
but to use them.  
Firstly, to take the legal medium: it presupposes a general right to 
liberties in so far as it demarcates «the freedom of choice of typical 
social actors; that is, they define liberties that are granted condition-
ally»148. Recognising subjective liberties of each, the law seeks to 
establish and protect parameters of individual freedom of choice. 
Actors are free to act according to their own goals, irrespective of 
the wider common goals of society. In discourse-theoretic terms, it 
frees the individual from demands or obligations of justification in 
discourse; «Communicative action involves obligations that are sus-
pended by legally protected liberties»149. Communicative action nec-
essarily presupposes that the participants are willing to commit 
themselves to coordinating action on the basis of a consensus arising 
from the justification and acceptance of validity claims. But actors 
are free not to do so – actions may be justified according to individ-
ual reasons without reference to acceptance by others. According to 
Habermas’s framework, therefore, private autonomy is essentially 
the ability to act without giving publicly acceptable reasons for those 
actions. 
Legally granted liberties entitle one to drop out of communicative action, to 
refuse illocutionary obligations; they ground a privacy freed from the bur-
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den of reciprocally acknowledged and mutually expected communicative 
freedoms150.  
The creation of a legal code then is, in part, the provision and en-
actment of those rights that shelter legal subjects from the demands of 
communicative practices.  
Secondly, to take the citizen’s practice of self-determination or self-
legislation: it is the common regulation of social life and in so far as it 
conforms to the pre-conditions of communicative action, it regulates 
freely. People enter into discursive practices from which arise norms of 
behaviour. The discursive practice, in turn, places obligations on the 
participants in a process of discursive will formation. In a post-
traditional society these norms of behaviour may be tested according to 
the discourse principle which is a principle of impartiality testing the 
validity of all action norms. When it is institutionalised into the sphere 
of law making, it becomes operational as the democratic principle.  
Finally, to take the two aspects together: their interaction is the mi-
lieu out of which rights are constructed. In his own words,  
The key idea is that the principle of democracy derives from the interpen-
etration of the discourse principle and the legal form. I understand this 
interpenetration as a logical genesis of rights, which one can reconstruct in 
a stepwise fashion151.  
The interaction firms and gives shape to the right to general liberties 
posited by the legal form (legality, facticity) and the process of self-
legislation which presupposes the discourse principle, and thereby con-
fers validation to norms (legitimacy, validity). Therefore, «The logical 
genesis of rights comprises of a circular process in which the legal 
code, or legal form, and the mechanism for producing legitimate law – 
hence the democratic principle – are co-originally constituted»152. By 
co-originally constituted, Habermas is referring not so much to an ac-
tual historical process as to the theoretical reconstruction of modern 
law (based on sociological insights) that allow for private and public 
autonomy. As argued earlier, private and public autonomy mutually 
constitute each other. There can be no demarcation of a social sphere 
for strategic action without the medium of law. Equally, there can be no 
communicative action in modern society without the medium of law. In 
complex western societies citizens are not free in the medium by which 
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they actualise that autonomy. «The idea of self-legislation must be real-
ised in the medium of law itself»153. The genesis of rights therefore is 
in the justifications and applications of a «legitimate» law, in which the 
legal medium is tested according to the democratic principle. In effect, 
rights provide the necessary conditions for institutionalising (legal 
form) the democratic process (discourse principle) in law and politics. 
The reconstruction is the application of the discourse principle, based 
on impartiality, to the legal form, that is, to the assumption of general 
subjective liberties and the necessary functional qualities of positivity, 
coercion and reflexivity. The latter provides factual status; the former 
provides the test for normative validity.  
Based on the four characteristics of the legal medium, the interpen-
etration implies four broad categories. A further fifth is implied154. 
Firstly, the medium of law presupposes subjective liberties and im-
plies that each is entitled to the greatest possible measure of equal liber-
ties. But the legal form, of itself, cannot judge which liberties are le-
gitimate. It is only in light of the discourse principle that people can ac-
cept what is owed to each. So only those norms which are compatible 
with the equal rights of all are legitimate. These are the so-called clas-
sical liberal rights: rights to personal dignity; to life, liberty, and bodily 
integrity; to freedom of movement; to freedom in the choice of one’s 
vocation, and to property. 
Secondly, the medium of law is positive. Therefore, it is necessarily 
concrete and factual and so limited to a particular historical moment and 
social space. It must therefore determine a particular scope of citizens. By 
testing impartiality, the discourse principle will imply that this legal form 
becomes rights of membership; rights to protection from unilateral depri-
vation of rights, and right to renounce membership of a particular state.  
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Thirdly, the medium of law is coercive. This implies that there must 
be remedies available to those who feel that their subjective liberties 
have been violated. In this context, the discourse principle, which im-
poses a test of impartiality, will justify the basic rights of due process: 
the rights to equal legal protection; equal protection before the law; 
double jeopardy and ad hoc courts.  
These three categories protect private autonomy. The first three cate-
gories are the basic negative rights, membership rights, and due process 
rights: together they guarantee private autonomy or the individual free-
dom of choice to pursue their own goals. They are not to be understood 
as liberal rights against the state (Abwehrrechte) for the system is based 
on what would be granted by citizens to each other – they firstly imply 
a horizontal relationship than a hierarchical one. Of them, Habermas 
writes, 
In summary, we can say that the general right to equal liberties, along with 
the correlative membership rights and guaranteed legal remedies, estab-
lishes the legal code as such. In a word, there is no legitimate law without 
these rights155. 
Fourthly, the medium of the law is reflexive or accountable. It im-
plies that the law is open to critical and moral evaluation by the citizens 
themselves. The law itself, therefore, must make room for the discur-
sive practices in which critical and moral evaluation may take place. 
The law must facilitate the discourse principle – in practice, the citizens 
must self-legislate. The law must protect the processes by which this 
can take place. These are the basic rights to participation and guarantee 
public autonomy or communicative freedom. In modern society, social 
institutions that conform to communicative practices, which are legally 
institutionalised as democratic procedures, will enjoy a presumption of 
legitimacy. This final category enjoys a certain status for Habermas, 
and the Critical Tradition, for it is the expression of these rights that 
help underpin all other categories of rights156.  
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The fifth concerns the material conditions required for the ability to 
sustain the first four. They are the basic social and economic rights re-
quired in so far as the previous categories of civil and political rights 
depend on basic social and material conditions being fulfilled. 
Together, the five categories that make up the system of rights, there-
fore, may be seen as place-holders or legal principles that guide the 
framers of law. 
6.4 The Duality of Human Rights 
Habermas’s system of rights results from the theoretical interpen-
etration of the legal medium with the discourse principle. Corre-
spondingly, actual human rights will have both the structure of the 
legal form and the justifications provided in discursive practices – 
particularly the moral discourse that aims towards justice. In an arti-
cle entitled «Kant’s Idea of Perpetual Peace», Habermas identifies 
human rights as Janus-faced, «looking simultaneously toward moral-
ity and law»157.  
There is an inherent duality to human rights. On the one hand, 
human rights, in common with moral norms, claim universal valid-
ity; they refer to all human beings rather than simply localised citi-
zens. But more importantly, both human rights and moral norms are 
justified according to moral discourse and its principles of justice. 
The same arguments for moral norms are also used to justify basic 
rights. Legal norms may be justified according to ethical or prag-
matic considerations but only basic rights are justified by moral ar-
guments. They are «equipped with a universal validity claim because 
they can be justified exclusively from a moral point of view»158. Ba-
sic rights are not simply consistent with self-understanding or set 
aside by pragmatic considerations. Rather, they, 
regulate matters of such generality that moral arguments are sufficient for 
their justification. These arguments show why the implementation of such 
rules is in the equal interest of all persons qua persons, and thus why they 
are equally good for everybody159.  
Rights are legal norms proposed and justified in the form of moral 
arguments – that is, their implementation is in the interest of all.  
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On the other hand, human rights are not simply moral rights, for they 
belong structurally to the legal order and therefore share its characteristics 
as positive, coercive and accountable and in their recognition of general 
subjective liberties160. They do not have sole «origins in morality, but 
rather bear the imprint of the modern concept of individual liberties, hence 
of a specifically juridical concept»161. Rather, it is a functional compliment 
to morality in a modern pluralist and systems-bound society. 
Human rights are established and identified by its legal structure and the 
moral justifications which are brought to bear. Neither law nor morality 
can constitute a right on its own. It requires a morally valid claim within a 
legal framework of legal recognition. The basic constitutional rights, such 
as the Basic Law of Germany or the Bill of Rights in the United States are 
the only rights that fully realise the duality. Beyond this level, human 
rights «remain only a weak force in international law and still await insti-
tutionalisation within the framework of a cosmopolitan order that is only 
now beginning to take shape»162. 
The emphasis on legality does not make Habermas’s theory one of legal 
positivism, for morality necessarily enters in the legal system in order that 
it may gain legitimacy and therefore acceptance. Moral arguments cannot 
but be made if the law is to be able to claim validity. It is, therefore, an ab-
solute requirement in the logical genesis of the system of rights. However, 
as a procedural principle of universalisation it does not presuppose any 
particular pre-legal moral rights.  
Of course, they cannot produce basic rights in abstracto but only particular 
rights with a concrete content […] Only when they are confronted, we say, 
with the intolerable consequences of the use of physical violence do they 
recognise the necessity of elementary rights to bodily integrity or freedom 
of movement163.  
Yet without the law, human rights suffer from the same weaknesses 
outlined in the sociological evaluation of morality. It is only in and 
through law (and the discursive practices bearing on the law) that rights 
may be said to have force.  
7. Deliberative Democracy and Law 
The system of rights expresses in institutional form a reconstruction 
of the mutual requirements of private and public autonomy. Between 
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Facts and Norms proposes a deliberative paradigm of the law which 
can take account of both aspects. It is proposed in the context of a con-
temporary legitimation crisis, arising from the tension between a liberal 
paradigm and a social-welfare paradigm of the law. «Here «paradigm» 
refers to the basic assumptions about society that inform efforts to real-
ize constitutional-democratic ideals»164. The failure of a paradigm is 
due to its failure to explain. According to Habermas, this is particularly 
urgent for the law because it needs rational explanation or justification 
if it is to claim legitimacy. There is a legitimation crisis because «Both 
views lost sight of the internal connection between private and civic 
autonomy, and thus lose sight of the democratic meaning of a legal 
community’s self-organisation»165.  
Habermas views a legitimate legal system – legislature, judiciary, en-
forcement, and so forth – as an institutionalisation of an unfettered dis-
course. Law, then, is «the medium for transforming communicative 
power into administrative power»166. Legitimate law, therefore, will 
share the features of those communicative practices that lead to mutual 
understanding and rational cooperation. It will, as first outlined in his 
discourse ethics, recognise the freedom and equality of the other, be 
universal and be formal. In legal form, it is transformed into a proce-
duralist presentation of law and democracy characterised by an inter-
subjective dialogical method of legal argumentation; a priority of deon-
tologically conceived basic rights in contrast to other values; and a non-
paternalistic understanding of the role of the Supreme Court in safe-
guarding legislative decision making167. 
The deliberative paradigm proposes that law, as necessary for social 
integration, becomes illegitimate by being an unresponsive independent 
system or too subservient to particular interests groups that bypass the 
democratic process. Therefore, this model places great responsibility on 
________________ 
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the polity, or the social movements and associations that facilitate the 
democratic process and the communicative aspects of social integra-
tion168.  
8. Religion 
In the spirit of open and free argumentation that lies at the heart of 
discourse theory, Habermas regularly responds to the invitations and 
challenges of philosophers and sociologists169. Rarely, however, does 
he engage with theologians. Instead, he maintains, «A silence on the 
grounds of embarrassment would […] be justified, for I am not really 
familiar with the theological discussion, and only reluctantly move 
about in an insufficiently reconnoitred terrain»170. On the other side of 
the dialogue, many theologians have been able to appropriate and in 
turn critique many of the insights of Habermas171.  
Introducing a selection of Habermas’s writings on religion and reli-
gious belief, Eduardo Medieta argues that Habermas may be interpreted 
in a complimentary manner as a sociologist of religion and a philoso-
pher of religion. Accordingly, he reconstructs Habermas’s account of 
the «rise and transformation of religion but not the demise of religion 
[…] in order to dispel the misconception of an unambiguous Haberma-
sian rejection of religion»172.  
The misconception that Habermas forthrightly rejects religion is, 
perhaps, due to a simplistic reading of his sociological account of mod-
________________ 
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ernisation in The Theory of Communicative Action173. To recall: the ra-
tionalisation of the lifeworld that underlies the dynamic of societal de-
velopment is the differentiation of the domains of reason – objective, 
social and subjective domains of discourse and their corresponding 
propositional, normative and expressive claims. In pre-modern socie-
ties, religious and/or metaphysical world views provided a means by 
which all domains were intertwined and mutually supported each other 
in the lifeworld, thereby creating social solidarity174. In such societies, 
the sacred symbols that constitute a religious group are continually as-
similated and ultimately transformed by the communicative practices of 
the group.  
The disenchantment and disempowering of the domain of the sacred takes 
place by way of a linguistification of the ritually secured, basic normative 
agreement; going along with this release of the rationality potential in 
communicative action. The aura of rapture and terror that emanates from 
the sacred, the spellbinding power of the holy, is sublimated into the bind-
ing/bonding force of criticisable validity claims and at the same time truned 
into an everyday practice175.  
On one hand, the development of religion is a historical source of 
communicative practices: theological discourses created a space that 
allowed for the questioning and justification of social norms and per-
sonal identities176. On the other hand, communicative practices decoup-
led from religious world views creating a new public domain of con-
sensually validated norms that now bears the burden of social integra-
tion once borne by religion and sacred authority. This is only possible 
by way of common moral effort, for «neither science nor art can inherit 
the mantle of religion; only a morality, set communicatively a flow and 
developed into a discourse ethics, can replace the authority of the sa-
cred»177. In turn, religious experience, belief and religiously grounded 
norms develop into an aspect of the private expressive world of self- 
and group-identity178.  
________________ 
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Modernisation, then, is a process of secularisation. However, 
Habermas is not proposing an end of religion. He characterises his gen-
eral theoretical framework as involving a «methodological atheism»179. 
The supposition of God is not required; it is neither presumed nor de-
nied. As a philosopher of religion, Habermas acknowledges the con-
tinuing role of religion in providing sources of symbols, concepts, 
norms and personal identities. It too is capable of transformation in 
light of rational self-critique and continual justification180. Indeed it 
must do so, if it is not to succumb to modes of domination. Habermas 
recognises and praises such a dynamic in the work of Johannes Baptist 
Metz and others. A theology that remembers and is moved by the «es-
chatological drive to save those who suffer unjustly connects up with 
those impulses towards freedom which have characterised modern 
European history»181.  
In Legitimation Crisis, he acknowledges that a discourse ethics may 
provide norms but that it is incapable of solely providing existential 
meaning – on the basis of discourse alone, we must face the world dis-
consolately182. In this regard, he concedes in Postmetaphysical Think-
ing that as long as religion can say something that philosophy cannot 
then it cannot be replaced or repressed183.  
9. Conclusion: Some Observations 
To finish with some significant points: 
Firstly, implied by the argument of this thesis is the contention that 
traditions of enquiry respond to both socio-economic and political con-
texts and to the challenges of other traditions, while attempting to re-
main consistent with the resources and models of reasoning which are 
normative within that tradition184. I contended in Chapter II that its ini-
tial sources are found in the criticism of modernity, by using many of 
________________ 
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the conceptual categories of modernity185. Habermas represents a con-
temporary moment in that dynamic. He desires to defend modernity but 
also wishes to stand in critical relation to it in order that it may not suc-
cumb to some its negative impulses.  
Secondly, while Habermas is an explicit defender of modernity, he is 
also wary of its totalitarian impulses. Such power may be by way of the 
mechanisms that organise society (such as economics and bureaucracy) 
or the modes of reasoning that support it (such as utilitarianism or posi-
tivism). In response, he wishes to emphasise other elements of moder-
nity such as the commitment to a principled universal justice, the rule 
of law and, most of all, democratic procedures – all of which intertwine 
in an effective rights-regime. Of his proposals, I wish to accept and re-
spond to the intimate connection between the acceptance of rights-
language and the fostering of democracy as normative for state 
power186.  
Fourthly, secularisation is a distinctive feature of modernity. In the 
discourse analysis of Habermas, it is marked by a priority of discourses 
that respond to questions of justice over questions of the good. The 
former is associated with the widest civil and public forum and the lat-
ter is reduced to either private or group convictions. The next chapter 
will challenge this distinction, for it marginalises crucial answers (to 
questions concerning the good) from the wider public discourse. It is 
my contention that such a distinction empties moral reasoning of the 
reasons that, in fact, inform discourse187. However, the later considera-
tions are also critical of the proceduralism of Habermas188. As Dworkin 
placed his faith in the integrity of the law, so Habermas lays his faith in 
people. Although very conscious of the abuses of power, he presumes 
that if the procedures are free, inclusive and fair, then people will come 
to a reasonable and agreeable conclusion. The emphasis, therefore, is 
on procedures rather than on substantive outcomes.  
Fifthly, the sociological analysis of Habermas reveals crucial forces 
in contemporary society that act against the commonly shared «life-
world» that stabilises behaviour. The challenge therefore is to provide a 
means of controlling behaviour to the benefit of all without resorting to 
naked coercion. His response is to propose a legal system, made legiti-
mate by being infused with rights and informed by democracy. The 
________________ 
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same sociological challenges are also present for theology and dis-
courses of the good. It too must develop awareness and sociological 
models of guiding human behaviour without resorting to inappropriate 
coercion.  
Sixthly, Habermas, as the previous theorists, wishest to re-establish 
the connection of law and justice by way of rights. Rights are «janus-
faced» looking to both law and justice, that is, a universal morality. It is 
in response to the general tendency of modernity to positivism, includ-
ing legal positivism, and so to modes of domination. In order to aid the 
forthcoming comparative study, I wish to briefly outline Habermas’s 
understanding of the central ideas of the «lattice-work» – justice, free-
dom, law and state-society. The deontological model of Habermas (and 
modernity) requires that terms be defined according to principles that 
are independent of ends or goals. His primary motivating idea is to es-
tablish those principles that allow for everyone to partake in the ongo-
ing functioning of the political order, so that all members of society 
may come to agree on the freedoms they equally recognise in each 
other. Accordingly, the terms may be described as follows: first, justice 
is marked by inclusion – particularly of those over whom particular 
norms will be binding. There is a priority therefore of the rights of par-
ticipation. Second and as a result, freedom is primarily a political 
autonomy that in turn protects the personal autonomy to make personal 
choices about one’s own good. Third, law is only legitimate, and so 
just, if it arises out of and adheres to democratic deliberation. Finally, I 
would argue that in line with his tradition, Habermas views the state 
quite ambiguously. While it may be a positive force in binding society, 
it is also vulnerable and continuously open to becoming an instrument 
of domination. Rights and particularly participatory rights are the 
means to protect the individual from the abuse of power – similarly to 
the other theorists.  
Seventhly, it was proposed in concluding Chapter II that a defining 
feature of the critical tradition is «participation». For Habermas, it is 
fundamental. To exclude people from participating in the common de-
liberation towards agreement is to distort the system in such a way that 
it can too easily become domineering. Primarily, it is a response to the 
abuse of power. It holds the powerful and the systems that allow them 
to be powerful to account, by insisting on inclusion. It is this aspect of 
modernity that needs to be taken into account.  
I now turn to the next stage of this thesis – a comparative study. It 
begins by identifying point convergence before charting paths of diver-
gence. Its goal is to facilitate a dialogue, dialectic or encounter between 
the traditions and theorists.  
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 CHAPTER VI 
A Comparative Study 
1. Introduction  
Up to this point, this study has been primarily expository and ana-
lytical. It concentrated on presenting a clear and critical account of 
three traditions of enquiry and their representative theorists. It focused 
on John Finnis, Ronald Dworkin and Jürgen Habermas, each offering a 
justificatory framework for human rights and representative respec-
tively of a Natural Law tradition, a Liberal tradition and a Critical tradi-
tion. 
Finnis, Dworkin and Habermas all seek to identify the essential na-
ture of a human right but do not limit themselves to a descriptive analy-
sis that identifies its distinguishing conceptual characteristics within the 
workings of the legal system. Instead, they try to explain rights within 
the wider context of the normative principles that are already inherent 
within the successful rule of law. At the most basic level, they share a 
common purpose: to defend the principles of justice and political mo-
rality, which are consistent with the rule of law and capable of provid-
ing a sure foundation and an effective means of employing human 
rights. Of course, they remain in disagreement over the means by which 
human rights may be justified.  
To recall a methodological distinction outlined in the introduction: 
moral reflection may categorised as normative or meta-ethical1. Norma-
tive questions concerning a term, such as a «right», may be described 
________________ 
 
1
 Cf. Intro, Sec. 1. 
PART THREE: DIALECTIC 278 
as guiding and justificatory. Meta-ethical questions may be described 
as conceptual. The distinction is not sharp; nor can it be sustained. 
From an appraisal of the normative frameworks in which rights have 
meaning, the course of this present chapter moves to higher levels of 
abstraction and so towards a meta-ethical level, «in that it seeks to ex-
plore our very ability to arrive at ethical judgements using the category 
of human rights»2.  
The previous two parts of this thesis, namely History (Chapter I-II) 
and Interpretation (Chapter III-IV), are two methodological categories 
of Bernard Lonergan’s exposition of method. The subsequent category, 
which concerns the process of comparison and evaluation, and is the 
present part of this thesis, is Dialectic3. It is the purpose of this section 
to explore points of convergence and paths of divergence by way of a 
comparative study between the theoretical frameworks, and thereby 
provide an evaluation of their proposals.  
2. A Comparative Study  
The categories of History and Interpretation were presented respec-
tively as expositions of traditions and theories. The scope of each tradi-
tion and theorist – issues of concern, means of justification, standards 
of justice, accepted authorities, conceptions of the person and its good, 
and so on – may be termed «the horizon». Lonergan writes: 
As our field of vision, so too the scope of our knowledge, and the range of 
our interests are bounded […] In this sense what lies beyond one’s horizon 
is simply outside the range of one’s knowledge and interests: one neither 
knows nor cares. But what lies within one’s horizon is in some measure, 
great or small, an object of interest and of knowledge4.  
A horizon at once encapsulates the resources of interests and knowledge 
attained by a person or community and also indicates the boundaries that 
limit those interests and knowledge. Such resources are structured by past 
achievements. However, knowledge gained may also be put to innovative 
use in response to new needs: «All learning is not mere addition to previ-
ous learning but rather an organic growth out of it»5. 
Traditions act as community horizons. In brief, traditions act as guid-
ing patterns6. Edward Shils observes: 
________________ 
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Constellations of symbols, clusters of images, are received and modified 
[…] As a temporal chain, a tradition is a sequence of variations on received 
and transmitted themes. The connectedness of the variations may consist in 
common themes, in the contiguity of presentation and departure, and in de-
scent from a common origin7. 
They provide normative patterns, either implicitly or explicitly, of 
thought and social interaction8. Theories may be described as individ-
ual moments in the reception and transmission of such a tradition. 
Theories therefore capture, but may often change, the connectedness of 
the guiding pattern.  
Horizons of traditions and theories may differ, as testified to by the 
traditions and theories outlined thus far. Lonergan maintains that such 
differences in knowledge may be complementary, genetic, or dialecti-
cal9. Differences of the first two may be bridged. Dialectic however 
concerns conflict. The full process of mapping horizons therefore rec-
ognises both points of convergence and paths of divergence, each based 
on the appropriate material and assembly of apt points. The process 
aims towards the development of positions and the repudiation of 
counter-positions. Ultimately, however, the dialectic may reveal a di-
vergence so great it requires nothing less than conversion in order to be 
bridged10.  
The comparative study of this chapter is a dialectical encounter 
between the three central theorists. On one hand, it highlights by 
way of reduction, classification and selection, the similarities and 
differences, convergence and divergence, between the selected theo-
ries. On the other, it attempts to move beyond a mere listing of the 
pros and cons. A dialectical study that identifies positions and 
counter-positions should not be considered a final breakdown of 
contradictory approaches. Instead, «They must be understood con-
________________ 
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cretely as opposed moments in an ongoing process»11. This thesis, 
then, may be viewed as a contribution to the ongoing process to-
wards clearer understanding.  
3. Situating the Present Discussion 
3.1 Social Context 
The latter half of the twentieth century, as outlined at the closing 
stages of Part One, witnessed a proliferation of rights-rhetoric into 
many areas of public discourse12. Today, the process of continued 
propagation of rights-declarations, international institution-building 
based on rights, and the proliferation of advocacy groups persists, and 
indeed, prospers13. Undoubtedly, its near exponential expansion is mo-
tivated by moral outrage to extensive human wrongs, such as genocide, 
sexual discrimination, economic exploitation, political oppression and 
racism.  
However, many moral philosophers, jurists, theologians and private 
citizens are suspicious or critical of this development. Commonly, the 
proliferation is viewed as analogous to economic inflation which de-
values currency. Too many claims to human rights discredit genuine 
claims.  
For instance, Maurice Cranston warns:  
A human right is something of which no one may be deprived without a 
grave affront to justice […] Thus the effect of a Universal Declaration 
which is over-loaded with affirmations of so-called human rights which 
are not human rights at all is to push all talk of human rights out of the 
________________ 
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clear realm of the morally compelling into the twilight world of utopian 
aspirations14. 
Others comment that over-dependence on rights-claims have a det-
rimental effect on society as a whole. Mary Ann Glendon, speaking of 
the United States, observes a growing aggressive individualism and de-
pendence on legal institutions, with a corresponding weakening of 
community responsibility, due to the preponderance of thinking 
through issues in terms of rights15. She further argues that allowing for 
ambiguity leaves human rights open to misunderstanding and manipu-
lation16.  
Such an ambiguity was present at the beginning of the latest expan-
sionary period. The initial foundational United Nations documents 
made no attempt to provide a comprehensive basis for rights-claims 
beyond a common «faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity 
and worth of the human person»17. Throughout public discourse, many 
of those asserting the necessity of rights – politicians, lawyers, and ad-
vocates – often fail to provide sufficient justificatory reasons for why 
such rhetoric is appropriate. Indeed, some have thought that providing 
for the grounds of rights is unnecessary or counter-productive18.  
In common, critics complain that relatively few attempts are made to 
provide sufficient public justification. In response to the various prob-
lems associated with rights, they assert the need for discussion and de-
liberation19. This is the commitment shared by the three theorists of this 
dissertation. They enter into the debate in order to ensure that human 
rights may be justified and appropriately applied. 
3.2 Political Context 
Finnis, Dworkin and Habermas are citizens of western constitutional 
democracies. They are moulded, in part, by the ideological struggles of 
the twentieth century that have shaped these political systems. In par-
________________ 
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ticular, they have opposed pressures perceived to threaten constitutional 
democracy – either from without or from within. Yet, they never of-
fered an unquestioning defence of western political regimes.  
Dworkin is the most confident in accepting the philosophical liberalism 
that has underpinned much of the western constitutional system. However, 
he is continually and consistently critical of the kind of ideological empha-
sis on liberty that undermines the equality, and therefore the constitution-
ally guaranteed rights, of each citizen. Ultimately, he argues, any law or 
government action that fails to treat all with equal respect and concern 
leads to the detriment and emasculation of the political order itself. The 
political and legal order is based on integrity to this very principle concre-
tised as respect for individual rights20. 
Finnis and Habermas, who do not associate themselves explicitly with 
the liberal philosophical tradition, are more critical of many of the underly-
ing assumptions that support the system. Finnis, for example, argues that 
the nuclear deterrent, admittedly born of a duty to defend the western po-
litical order, is morally unjustifiable by the very common morality that 
supports that order. The nuclear deterrent represents a moral corruption 
that potentially undercuts that which it aims to protect: «the wickedness of 
the laws or policies in question […] undermines the very legitimacy of the 
state itself – a legitimacy founded on justice, not on calculations of advan-
tage in which the lives of innocents might be directly sacrificed in the in-
terests of others»21.  
Habermas, in particular, is keenly aware of potential totalitarian im-
pulses within the western political order. He has moved from humanist 
Marxian categories towards an assertion of the essential role of democracy 
in legitimising and limiting political and legal power. Legitimacy must be 
based not only on the protection of individual liberties but on the fostering 
of participatory rights. Hence, he was critical of how the process of Ger-
man unification was undertaken, for it lacked a widespread discussion that 
would foster both civil life and democracy in Eastern Germany22. 
________________ 
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3.3 Intellectual Context 
Reflection on rights in the early twentieth century concentrated on 
clarification of terms, exemplified by theorists such as the previously 
mentioned W.H. Hohfeld. In the main, the analysis of rights retreated to 
the field of jurisprudence, without due regard to the wider issues of 
substantive ethics, political philosophy or theology from whose inter-
connection rights-rhetoric first gained impetus. Jurisprudence, as other 
fields of study, was greatly influenced by the positivist outlook of Ben-
tham and others which sought to bracket out ethical judgements, be-
cause they were considered unscientific23. A scientific reason, it was 
claimed, cannot make normative statements: it says how things are not 
how people ought to live. Therefore it remained unconcerned with the 
justification or foundations of rights. 
Belatedly, theoretical reflection has turned to the justification of 
rights. The near exponential expansion of rights-claims in political dis-
course, allied with new socio-economic challenges, such as economic 
globalisation, initially motivated this renewed attention. Intellectually, 
it has been facilitated by a turn away from meta-ethical reflection and, 
consequently, towards a greater interdisciplinary approach24. Finnis, 
Dworkin and Habermas represent this development. Indeed, taken his-
torically, the central texts may be said to mark stages in this ever wid-
ening approach. Taking Rights Seriously (1977) is primarily a work of 
legal theory. Natural Law and Natural Rights (1981) is principally a 
moral account of the law. And finally Between Facts and Norms (1994) 
places both the law and ethics within an interdisciplinary sociological 
study. 
4. The Typology: Justice, Rights and Law 
At the outset of this thesis, a typology of a rights theory was outlined, 
which was formed of three central components: an objective right or 
justice, subjective or individual rights, and the law25. Firstly, a rights 
________________ 
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 Cf. Ch. I, Sec. 4.1.2. 
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 M. FREEMAN, Human Rights, 77-78. He writes: «Before the 1970’s almost all 
academic work on human rights was done by lawyers, and most articles were pub-
lished in law journals. A survey of journals published between the early 1970’s and 
the mid 1980’s conducted by the UN Economic, Social and Cultural Organisation 
(UNESCO) found that almost all human rights journals were predominantly legal, and 
that the social sciences contributed little to other journals that carried articles on hu-
man rights […] Human-rights law has social and political origins, and social and po-
litical consequences and legal analysis cannot help us to understand these».  
25
 Cf. Ch. I, Sec. 1.  
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theory relates to justice: it focuses on the ordering of social relation-
ships and individual lives in a just manner. Secondly, it emphasises the 
ability or power of an individual person to make specific claims by vir-
tue of the fact that she is worthy as a person. Finally, it is bound to is-
sues of the law, and associated structures of governance, in its capacity 
to guide human behaviour.  
The history of rights was traced, in part, according to the develop-
ment of these aspects and their mutual interrelationship. The genesis of 
the second element is acknowledged by many historians of ideas to be 
in the medieval era. Others conceive subjective rights to be instrumen-
tal in the passing of the medieval era and birth of modernity. Although, 
differing in the actual moment, commentators often agree to the same 
dynamic. Before the inception of a rights theory, justice and law were 
irrevocably bound. They were considered to be analogous aspects of 
the same normative guide to behaviour26. Afterwards, justice (or moral-
ity) and law became disjointed and rights came to play an intermediary 
role. What resulted in time was that natural rights became the standards 
of justice to which the law, viewed primarily as the command of au-
thority, had to conform27.  
But the tripartite structure was undermined by the sceptical chal-
lenges of the Enlightenment Era. Natural rights could not be defended 
against the scrutiny of a positivist scientific reasoning. The typology 
broke down, isolating justice and law from one another28. The disjunc-
tion between justice (or morality) and the law became a gulf without a 
bridge. What unites Finnis, Dworkin and Habermas is the common 
conviction that rights play a crucial role in re-mapping the internal in-
terconnection between law and justice. Partly motivating this is their 
common abhorrence of the forms of moral reasoning that have sup-
ported the distinction between law and morality.  
4.1 Critique of the separation of justice and law 
The decoupling of law and morality was and is supported by two 
dominant models of legal and moral reasoning, namely legal positivism 
and utilitarianism. Legal positivism is associated with legal reasoning: 
its underlying methodological assumption is that a descriptive analysis 
of the law and legal institutions can be made without reference to the 
normative concepts of justice and morality. It concerns the description 
________________ 
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 Cf. Ch. I, Sec. 3.3.2; Ch. I, Sec. 6. 
27
 Cf. Ch. I, Sec. 1; Ch. II, Sec. 2.4.2 
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 Cf. Ch. I, Sec. 4.1.2. 
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of positive law as it is. Utilitarianism is related to issues of justice and 
morality: its underlying methodological presumption is measurable 
empirical data for normative proposals can be provided. It concerns the 
evaluation of positive law as it ought to be. Taken together, the nature 
of the law is defined as a rule following social behaviour according to 
enacted positive law supported by the authority of the sovereign. Moral 
considerations are external to the law. Any moral import is according to 
the principle of utility which evaluated the law according to its effec-
tiveness in maximising the general welfare of the community.  
In contrast, Dworkin most effectively demonstrates that the actual 
functioning of the law consistently makes use of principles that are 
never stated in a positivist fashion and continually counters utilitarian 
proposals. This is because the law exhibits a public morality within its 
own functioning: the division of law and morality, then, is false29. 
Logical positivism and utilitarianism, therefore, provide impoverished 
accounts of how reasoning operates within a legal system that claims to 
be acting justly.  
Finnis agrees: in fact, he goes further. Utilitarianism, for example, is 
part of a family of theories that may be termed consequentialism30. 
Characteristic of this form of reasoning is that judgements are made ac-
cording to that which will bring about the best state of affairs. He ar-
gues that this in fact is impossible to ever reason through and measure 
all the possible consequences31.  
Of course, consequences or considerations of general utility or wel-
fare have to be considered by individuals and society but they should 
not be the final and deciding factor. To do so, is to succumb to a form 
of pseudo-technical reasoning. The critique of a pseudo-technical rea-
soning has been central to the Frankfurt School and the life’s work of 
Habermas. In an early work, entitled Knowledge and the Human Sci-
ences, he links such impoverished reasoning to the wider positivist ten-
________________ 
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 Cf. R. DWORKIN, Freedom’s Law, 1-45; Ch. IV, Sec. 3 ff.  
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 He writes, «Consequentialism is an approach – or rather, a family of approaches 
– to moral decision-making. The various versions of utilitarianism are members of the 
consequentialist family […] According to a simple, direct from of consequentialism, 
moral reflection in each situation should guide choice and action toward bringing 
about the best (or least bad) overall state of affairs that can be realised in that situa-
tion». J. FINNIS – J. BOYLE – G. GRISEZ, Nuclear Deterrence, 177-178; cf. Ch. III, 
Sec. 5.2. 
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 Finnis asserts: «The task of commensurating the goods and bads involved in al-
ternative options – where this commensurating is proposed as governing, not gov-
erned by, moral principles and norms of responsibility – is well beyond human rea-
soning power to encompass». J. FINNIS, Moral Absolutes, 42. 
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dency – evident in legal positivism – in the post Enlightenment Era. 
Positivism, arising from the optimistic belief in science, portrays itself 
as based on facts and therefore objective and value-free. However, it 
actually hides ideological impulses that protect particular interests – for 
instance, technocrats or those with expertise knowledge reinforcing bu-
reaucracy at a state level and vested interests at a social level32.  
Central to the critique of all three theorists is that the pseudo-
technical thinking at the heart of utilitarianism and legal positivism is a 
kind of reasoning that inevitably avoids taking account of the intrinsic 
value of an individual. It is a form of reductionism, which views the 
human person as bits of data within the wider social problems that need 
to be solved. The resulting outcome is a social order that at minimum 
fails to appreciate the full value of an individual or at worst considers 
an individual as dispensable to a perceived greater goal33. Either way, it 
is an abuse of power and a distortion of society.  
4.2 The necessary relationship of justice and law 
In jurisprudence, the separation translates into a distinction between 
descriptive and normative analysis of the law. In the functioning of the 
legal system and institutions of governance, it refers to the distinction 
between legality and justice. By contrast, Finnis, Dworkin and Haber-
mas are all committed to the necessary relationship between the rule of 
law and morality. This is so because they recognise no absolute distinc-
tion between description or analysis of the law and the evaluation of its 
meaning and purpose from the critical perspective provided by moral 
and political philosophy34. In the words of Finnis, they are proposing: 
________________ 
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 Cf. J. HABERMAS, Knowledge and the Human Sciences, 63 ff. 
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 The turn away from meta-ethics is characterised by William Edmundson as an 
opposition to «the utilitarian tradition that had lain, dormant but undisturbed […] in 
the snowbank of indifference that had covered substantive moral philosophy». 
W. EDMUNDSON, An Introduction to Rights, 107-118, 109.  
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divided into three categories: first, is an ontological natural law associated with the 
traditional interpretation of Aquinas; second, is a deontological natural law, which 
makes no appeal to any metaphysical ontology, but posits fundamental goals and val-
ues; third, is a methodological natural law, which is derived from a deontological ver-
sion but emphasises those procedures which are inherent in, or at least naturally suit-
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«the state of affairs in which a legal system is legally in good shape»35. 
To support this assertion, all three would agree to the following points 
– but, for brevity, each point is associated with one author. 
At a theoretical level, Finnis argues that a methodologically aware 
jurist must necessarily take account of her own standpoint, for a de-
scriptive analysis is already constructed according to some implicit or 
explicit claim of a practical or normative viewpoint: «Unless some such 
claim is justified, analytical jurisprudence in particular and (at least the 
major part of) all the social sciences in general can have no critically 
justified criteria for the formation of general concepts»36. 
At a legal level, Dworkin argues that the law already functions ac-
cording to a critical and normative perspective. Legal argument in the 
process of judicial adjudication turns on a final judgment that rests on 
the best interpretation of what the legal code is supposed to achieve. In 
legal practice, what the law is turns on what the law ought to be – the 
descriptive and the normative then are part of the one process37. 
At a social level, Habermas argues that the law plays a vital role in 
the social integration of modern society. On one hand, the law is coer-
cive: but on the other hand, it requires the free acceptance of people, if 
it is to remain true to its claim not be oppressive. Legality therefore is 
intimately bound to legitimacy – which in turn is bound to continual 
justification of and within the procedures of the legal system. The last 
line of Between Facts and Norms reads «The paradoxical achievement 
of law thus consists in the fact that it reduces the conflict potential of 
unleashed individual liberties through norms that can coerce only so 
long as they are recognised as legitimate on the fragile basis of 
unleased communicative liberties»38. 
Taking the points together, they hold in common that a purely de-
scriptive account of the law or society negates the critical standpoint of 
moral and political philosophy, thereby facilitating the abuse of power 
by means of legal and government structures. 
4.3 Human Rights 
At this point, two observations with specific regard to rights may be 
made of the common ground between the three theorists. Firstly, each 
________________ 
 
able to human freedom. Cf. L. WEINREB, Natural Law and Justice, 116-118. Finnis 
may be identified with the second and Dworkin with the third. 
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 J. FINNIS, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 270; cf. Ch. III, Sec. 3. 
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 J. FINNIS, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 18. 
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 R. DWORKIN, Law’s Empire, 49-53; cf. Ch. IV, Sec. 6.2. 
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 J. HABERMAS, Between Facts and Norms, 462. 
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holds that rights are principles that act in contra-distinction to forms of 
pseudo-technical reasoning that neglects the worth of the individual and 
therefore can justify abuses of power39. Secondly, rights at their broad-
est may be described as ethico-juridical categories. They exist at the in-
tersection between the practice of law and the requirements of justice. 
To say this much is to simply make a formal statement about rights: it 
describes their function and place rather then their grounds or sub-
stance. 
Dworkin’s proposal that rights act as «trumps» is based on the above 
two observations. «Rights […] are best understood as trumps over 
some background justification for political decisions that states a goal 
for the community as a whole»40. To recall: as in a game of cards, they 
act as any card in the trump suit that takes the trick over every card in 
the other suits. The analogy captures rights functioning in a political or 
legal theory. Human rights, or in Dworkin’s terminology, «strong sense 
rights», are distinctive because they protect fundamental human inter-
ests against all other considerations in political decision-making and 
judicial adjudication. They gain their force by being considered above 
any aggregative calculus of goals, including legitimate ones.  
Finnis describes human rights or natural rights as having conclusion-
ary force. They reflect in formulaic fashion the end-results of our re-
flections on justice. They claim an absolute priority – in the sense of 
exceptionless – over all other consequences and considerations. The 
rights law form, «No one shall be subjected to […]», is the legal ex-
pression of the demands of justice, both orientated towards and facili-
tated by the common good41.  
Habermas analogously refers to human rights as Janus-faced: «simul-
taneously looking towards morality and the law»42. On one hand, they 
have (or aspire to have) legal form, but on the other, they are justified 
and validated by moral discourse, that is, according to the universality 
of justice. The moral discourse includes everyone, thereby countering 
the strategic reasoning that is at the heart of pseudo-technical reason-
ing. 
What they commonly hold – the two observations at this formal level – 
may be said to be what is intuitively held by all who use rights language. 
________________ 
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 Pseudo-technical reasoning is categorised by Finnis as consequentialism, 
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 R. DWORKIN, Taking Rights Seriously, 92; cf. Ch. IV, Sec. 5.  
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 J. FINNIS, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 210; cf. Ch. III, Sec. 5.2. 
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 J. HABERMAS, «Remarks on Legitimation through Human Rights», 118; 
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Taking the two observations together, it may be said that the point of 
rights in general is to counter abuses of power in the name of justice and 
with the backing of the law. Human rights refer to the important central 
core of these rights without which the individual is demeaned or denied. 
Rights then are not ends in themselves but necessary conditions of a just, 
and as a consequence a lawful, society. Rights arising from the intersection 
of law and morality may be analogously described as the intersection be-
tween two circles of a Venn diagram, commonly termed «the lens» for it 
resembles a contact lens for improving sight. Human rights are «the lens 
between law and morality». They intersect between the spheres of law and 
morality and provide a means to view the law in the critical terms of mo-
rality and morality in the social and positive terms of the law. 
Some important nuances are required at this point. The intersection is 
not meant to point to a strict equation of morality and law. To do so would 
be to reduce morality to a legal minimalism or use the law to enforce every 
moral requirement. Equally, the intersection does not capture all that may 
be termed human rights. For instance, there may be moral rights that are 
not enshrined in constitutional law and there may be legal rights that are 
not considered to be of much moral significance. Furthermore, they may 
contradict one another – a legal right may not have any moral justification 
or force at all. While outlining these distinctions, Thomas D. Williams 
concedes, «Despite their essential differences, moral and legal are not two 
disparate categories but two distinct realms that exert a considerable mu-
tual influence on one another»43. 
5. Theoretical Frameworks 
The two formal observations above may be characterised as negative 
and positive. Rights may be negatively defined by their reaction against 
pseudo-technical reasoning that undermines the value of the human 
person or positively described as an ethico-juridical category. However, 
such basic assertions on the meaning of rights are neither conceptually 
refined nor of sufficient substance. A wider justificatory framework is 
required, particularly if human rights are to provide a satisfactory 
means of responding to practical social issues.  
Frameworks map the wider «lattice work of language»44 or the «con-
ceptual neighbourhood»45. Theoretical frameworks are comprised of 
whole complexes of associated terms. They are interacting networks of 
________________ 
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terms and ideas, mutually informing and supporting each other. They 
hang together – with various degrees of consistency. The terms are 
structured according modes of reasoning and congregate around central 
core values and virtues. A particular term will be delineated and de-
fined by its place within the larger framework, that is, by its correlation 
or equivalence to other terms. Therefore, to ascertain the reason, justifi-
cation or rationale of a term requires the charting of the theoretical 
framework in which the term is employed.  
The expository and analytical accounts of traditions and theories in 
the first two parts of this dissertation were organised, in part, according 
to the important terms that make up the frameworks. They included the 
central typology of justice, rights and law and other influential terms, 
such as nature, authority, legitimacy and property. For the purposes of 
charting difference, this thesis focuses on justice, freedom, law and so-
ciety-state46. Together, they provide a moral and political anthropology 
– that is, a vision of the person from the critical standpoint the terms of-
fer. 
The patterns are structured, and so the terms described, according to 
models of reasoning. Each of the theorists proposes detailed normative 
accounts of moral and legal reasoning which justify their use of terms 
in particular ways. The models – practical reasonableness of Finnis, 
constructive interpretation of Dworkin and communicative action and 
discourse ethics of Habermas – were outlined in their respective chap-
ters. Certain important characteristics may be highlighted by placing 
the terms of the framework in comparison. 
5.1 Justice/Good 
The two chapters comprising Part One are divided along a fault line 
in the history of ideas, between the medieval era, which appropriated 
Greek philosophy and Roman law within an overarching Christian the-
ology, and a secular modern era, inspired by new scientific advances 
and models. The division between the eras may be illustrated by the 
priority accorded to «goodness» or «justice» and so, in turn, help chart 
out the lines of the contemporary debate. 
The former, epitomised by Aristotle, Aquinas and Plato, derives an 
account of justice and rights from a deeper account of what counts as a 
________________ 
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good or excellent way to live. In the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition, 
terms and their corresponding reality are identified and described in re-
lation their telos, purpose or end to which they orientate themselves. In 
the so-called human sciences, reasoning begins with an account of 
goodness, excellence or the kind of life that is worth living. Human be-
haviour and the social order (moral and political reflection) are evalu-
ated according to the ways in which such a good may be realised in in-
dividual lives and the community at large. As outlined in his respective 
chapter in Part Two, Finnis gives priority to the good47. He holds that 
there are certain objective goods that constitute human flourishing or 
«integral human fulfilment». Justice in society, therefore, may be 
evaluated according to its ability to foster such flourishing.  
The Liberal tradition and the Critical tradition48, by contrast, pro-
poses to establish the principles of appropriate behaviour and social or-
ganisation independently of a pre-established model of what a good life 
may be (thereby prioritising and delineating rights in different ways). 
Terms are defined according to principles independent of substantial 
considerations of the good or worthy life. Importantly, they are left to 
the individual to choose. The principles therefore are bound to the con-
ditions that provide for freedom – that is, the equal freedom of each to 
pursue their own goals. The latter is exemplified by Hobbes and, in par-
ticular, Kant. Priority, then, is given to justice. Dworkin and Habermas 
also assert the important distinction between questions of justice and 
questions of the good. For instance, Dworkin argues that the govern-
ment must remain «neutral on what might be called the question of the 
good life», claiming that this is the core of liberalism’s «constitutive 
political morality»49. Habermas goes further: he considers a commit-
ment to justice, separate from the good, to be a defining characteristic 
of a modern rational society50. 
________________ 
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It is important to keep in mind that this distinction – that issues con-
cerning justice and the good can be kept apart – is within morality. 
Dworkin and Habermas are not neutral on the issue of morality: justice 
after all is essential to the right functioning of law and governance. 
They recognise that the law and structures of authority cannot be neu-
tral in how they affect society. The crucial point, rather, is that the 
structures of society must act, be evaluated and most importantly, be 
continually and publicly justified in terms of justice rather than the 
good. For Dworkin, final justification is according to principle: justice 
is expressed in the principled actions of governments that are acting out 
of the fundamental principle of equal respect and concern for all. 
Rights, then, are the ethico-juridical commitments of a principled and 
just society. According to Habermas, the final justification of actions 
can only take place with the fullest possible participation and accep-
tance of the decision by all affected. Justice is procedural, the outcome 
and protection of sustained practical discourse. Questions of the good 
do have a necessary role for they help provide the content of the practi-
cal discourse51.  
The distinction may be criticised for being either impossible or unde-
sirable (or, indeed, both). The first objection rejects the idea that justice 
may be considered completely independently from the good, for there 
will always be some good or fundamental value that motivates the im-
plementation of justice. For instance, the analysis of Habermas noted in 
Chapter V observed such a critique52. The second objection is that the 
refusal to commit to a conception of the good allows for an unrestricted 
relativism, leading ultimately to society’s moral breakdown. Certainly, 
Dworkin and Habermas refute the second objection. They do so be-
cause the commitment to justice is itself an ethical commitment. They 
both also reject the first objection. Neither claims that justice and the 
good are separated by an unbridgeable gulf. They agree that a commit-
ment to justice is motivated by a sense of solidarity or fraternity53. Fur-
thermore, they both base their theoretical frameworks on what they 
conceive to be centrally important about being a human being – and 
that society ought to be structured accordingly. What they reject is that 
________________ 
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a framework that comprises of the principles of justice ought to pre-
judge what may be worthy of pursuit, excellence or good. Justice, 
therefore, may be characterised as a particular scheme of co-operation: 
one that allows and helps individuals to follow different (and often 
competing) conceptions of what is good. 
This is especially true of Habermas. Indeed, his theory is particularly 
abstract because it refuses to contemplate or pre-judge conceptions of 
the good. Instead, his discourse ethics outlines the conditions which al-
low for rational consensus on the norms by which people coordinate 
social action and affirm or prohibit human behaviour. Social coopera-
tion in the modern world is the core issue of his sociological studies. 
And in order that it may be just, it must be based on the ethics inherent 
in discourse – that is, it must be open to democratic impulses that allow 
for the people themselves to conceive of their own good, as individuals 
or a society.  
Dworkin does allow for some conception of the good, or what may 
be described as a thin theory of the good54. He claims that it is impor-
tant that a liberal theory can propose a conception of a life lived wor-
thily. Based on what he calls the two principles of comprehensive lib-
eralism – equality of opportunity and freedom of individual responsibil-
ity – he proposes «a challenge model, which supposes that a life is suc-
cessful insofar as it is an appropriate response to the distinct circum-
stances in which it is lived»55. In order that such a life may be success-
ful, it requires that society be organised to allow for the goods that re-
spect equal opportunity and foster the freedom of individual responsi-
bility. Examples would include open access to education, certain forms 
of reverse discrimination, a basic social welfare system, freedom of 
speech etc. However, it is a thin theory of good because it is an articu-
lation of the goods that are required as a condition for successful living 
without giving any consideration or pre-judging what the appropriate 
personal objectives for a person may be.  
In comparison, Finnis is offering a substantive account of the good 
that asserts the self-evident goods which comprise the objectives of ful-
filling human action. The objective goods are recognised and brought 
about in the exercise of practical reasonableness, that is, the reasoned 
judgment and active control over our lives. Furthermore, practical rea-
soning, and its principled requirements, is guided by the goods. Justice 
________________ 
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– the eighth requirement – concerns the concrete implications of foster-
ing the common good. Justice then is instrumental to the facilitation of 
all the goods. Finnis recognises the contemporary emphasis placed on 
the responsibility of each individual in directing their own lives. Jus-
tice, therefore, primarily concerns external regulation of the responsi-
bilities and dependencies arising from the kind of common life de-
manded by the requirements of facilitating the good life for each indi-
vidual. The structures of society, in the law and state, act justly when 
they provide a scheme of co-operation in which people can responsibly 
achieve human fulfilment.  
The substantive account of the good is provided through a discern-
ment and deliberation that discloses the basic goods. There is an impor-
tant manner – unexplored by Finnis – in which all the goods are not ba-
sic but instrumental. He inclined to present the basic goods as separate 
from the person. However, the basic goods are such because they are 
fundamentally good for a person. In some sense, therefore, they are all 
instrumental to the person herself. At a more fundamental level, the one 
most basic good of all, is the person. 
5.2 Freedom  
A conception of justice that is not articulated according to an initial 
account of the good life but allows for the freedom of the person to 
choose and pursue their own perceived good must turn on an account of 
freedom. The central problem of the modern era may be described as 
how to build a schema of justice that allows for the equal free choice of 
all, without leading to breakdown of society or the exploitation of its 
members56. The response to this central problem has structural ele-
ments that are held in common by the theorists of liberal and critical 
traditions; notwithstanding their wide variety of substantive features. 
Of the characteristics, the critical elements are the conception of the in-
dividual as free and equal and that civil society results from a conven-
tion (or social contract) between free and equal individuals57. 
Although sharing such a schema, the liberal tradition (Hobbes and 
Locke) and the critical tradition (Rousseau) offer different models by 
which free people may successfully coexist with one another in a just 
________________ 
 
56
 Chapter II charted a number of historical reasons for this new priority: for in-
stance, the breakdown of old conceptions of the good life due to religious wars, new 
models of reasoning based on scientific advancements, demands for free pursuit self-
interest in the new capitalist economic system, among others.  
57
 Cf. Ch. II, Sec. 1.  
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manner58. The former begins from a conception of freedom as the abil-
ity to pursue one’s own goals without interference from others, de-
scribed by Isaiah Berlin as negative freedom59. Freedom is independ-
ence. The principle of non-interference underpins the liberal values of 
tolerance, pluralism and diversity. The latter begins from a conception 
of freedom as active in the common creation of society. The principle 
of political activity underpins the critical tradition’s emphasis on the 
primary value of the participation of all in the creation of society’s 
structures. Such a brief sketch does not capture the full breath and 
depth of the canon of each tradition. However, it does encapsulate a 
central normative element of the tradition, which reoccurs in the central 
theorists.  
Dworkin, for instance, may ground his liberalism on the basic princi-
ple of equal concern and respect and argues against any general right to 
liberty as such. However, the principle of equal respect and concern 
which binds the actions of government and the legal system views the 
individual as independent, and whose choices regarding the good ought 
to be respected. To treat citizens as equals, according to Dworkin, is the 
«same question as the question of what it means for the government to 
treat all its citizens as free, or as independent, or with equal dignity»60. 
At a social level, the centrality of the individual as equal and free re-
quires the government to be «circumstance-insensitive» and «choice-
sensitive»61. Circumstance-insensitive requires the provision of those 
goods identified by a thin-theory of the good. But a thin theory, as 
noted above, attempts not to pre-judge the choices of the individual but 
only to provide for all choices. Therefore, although the principle of 
equal concern and respect has two corollaries, it is the second that has 
priority. Government should be guided and limited by the freedom of 
the individual to pursue their own lives.  
Habermas grounds his critical theory on the normative requirements 
of communicative action. Just social integration, if it is to allow for the 
freedom and equality of all, must be guided by the principles of unfet-
tered discourse that provide for the conditions that allow for mutual 
consent to the best argument by all those affected. Transferred to the 
political level, this prioritises participation, political activity (by which 
he does simply mean party-political), or deliberative democracy. He ar-
gues that in the modern world, it is only by way of political autonomy 
________________ 
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that personal autonomy may be secured. Personal autonomy is the free-
dom to act in a strategic manner towards one’s own chosen goals. It is 
through common consensus – at least at the level of appropriate proce-
dures of decision making – that the limits of personal autonomy may be 
accepted by all rather than arbitrarily imposed by authority.  
What they hold in common is that rights, in some sense, demarcate 
and protect the choices of individuals. Rights demarcate spheres of 
freedom. Habermas defines modern rights as follows: «Fix the limits 
[…] within which a subject is entitled to freely exercise her will. More 
specifically, they define the same liberties for individuals or legal per-
sons understood as the bearer of rights»62. Dworkin argues that a strong 
sense right is a sphere of action protected from undue interference from 
others, and particularly the government. Rights are justified by func-
tioning to protect and foster individual autonomy63. 
Such a conception of freedom underpins the «Choice» or «Will» 
conceptualisation of rights. Based on the point that rights recognise and 
respect an individual’s choice, balanced against the choices of others, 
the model prioritises elements of Hohfeld’s taxonomy: rights act either 
negatively by not interfering (liberty) or by giving legal status and 
moral backing to it (claim-right or power)64.  
As outlined in the respective expository chapter, Finnis explicitly rejects 
this model in favour of the «Benefit» or «Interest» Model65. Beginning 
with a thorough account of the good of the individual, justice turns not on 
neutrality with regard to the good (and hence the freedom of each to pur-
sue their own conceived good) but on a proper ordering of social relation-
ships, in order to allow for the human flourishing of each (or the common 
good). Rights are the claims made in support of the good of each individ-
ual – or what is in their fundamental interest. Finnis is not claiming a sim-
ple relation between rights and goods66. Rather, right-holders are the bene-
ficiaries of what is owed in justice allowing for the full complexity of real-
ising common good. Rights assert the implications of a just relationship 
from the «the viewpoint of the ‘other(s)’ to whom something (including, 
inter alia, freedom of choice) is owed or due, and who would be wronged 
if denied that something»67.  
________________ 
 
62
 J. HABERMAS, Between Facts and Norms, 82. 
63
 It provides the basis for his justification of socially active government policy. 
Such policies provide the conditions in which individuals may truly be said to be free.  
64
 Cf. W.H. HOHFELD, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, 23-64; Ch II, Sec. 5.2. 
65
 Cf. Ch. III, Sec. 5.1. 
66
 For instance, one could not say that I have a right to a particular friendship al-
though friendship is a basic good or element of human fulfilment.  
67
 J. FINNIS, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 205. 
CH. VI: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 297 
Finnis is claiming that the interest model can allow for freedom of 
choice. Indeed, freedom to deliberate, choose and stay committed to 
that choice is fundamental to practical reasoning. In turn, practical 
reasoning is itself a basic good, experienced as authenticity, integrity 
and personal commitment. According to this model, freedom is pur-
posive. Free choices aim towards particular goods and in achieving 
those particular goods, a person, in a sense, becomes freer. Inability 
to achieve the goods limits a person’s attainment of fulfilment, and 
therefore limits the person herself and her freedom.  
The benefit theory preserves the rights of individuals to control 
their lives only to the extent that it is deemed to be a fundamental 
good. The Benefit Model of itself, therefore, does not provide a way 
to demarcate the lines of freedom of choice independent of the 
deemed goods. To take an example: something may be deemed good 
for Jack such that he has a right to it. Jill may therefore consider her-
self duty bound to ensure that Jack receives what he perceived to be 
entitled to, even though Jack does not want it, or, more importantly, 
conceives it not to be in his own good. As Peter Jones argues, it 
opens a way to the creation of a model of the human condition, 
«which can be imposed upon people in the name of their rights […] 
The doctrine of human rights could then become a vehicle for the 
imposition of a highly authoritarian, paternalist and dogmatic ideol-
ogy»68.  
In response, a goods-based justification of rights can provide a 
stronger foundation for those rights that are accepted. In contrast to 
Dworkin, Finnis argues that there are inalienable rights that may 
never be overridden in certain circumstances. The exception-less 
quality of these rights protect the individual against any other ideo-
logical justification – for instance, the right not to be tortured, even 
in a perceived national emergency. As observed by N.E. Simmonds: 
To think of a division between «liberal» and «non-liberal» theories can be 
dangerous, if it is taken to suggest that theories of the latter type are neces-
sarily oppressive in their implications or fundamentally hostile to individ-
ual liberty. Whether they are so oppressive or hostile is a matter for sub-
stantive debate and is not to be settled in advance by an appeal to conven-
ient labels that are inevitably crude and undiscriminating69. 
The issue is further linked to conceptions of the law and society.  
________________ 
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5.3 Law/Legitimacy 
The three theorists are united on certain basic contentions regard-
ing law. Firstly, and to state the obvious, they assert the necessity of 
law. Secondly, and as noted above, they agree that there is a neces-
sary relationship between law and political morality or justice. 
Thirdly, they agree that law, informed by justice, is an essential ele-
ment in the successful functioning of society. Finnis and Dworkin 
chart this connection by way of jurisprudence.  
Uniquely among them, Habermas offers a sociological analysis of 
the law in a modern western society. In summary: modern society 
requires a means of social integration because of what may be de-
scribed as centrifugal forces acting against it. Pre-modern societies 
were homogenous, sharing a common lifeworld of shared assump-
tions. Modernity, however, contends with three forces acting against 
this source of social solidarity. Firstly, the shared assumptions, such 
as religions or metaphysical ideas, have been called into question 
and are no longer secure. Secondly, the homogeneity has been bro-
ken into a pluralism of often competing communities of diverging 
shared assumptions (or lifeworlds). Finally, modern society is 
marked by the demands of social systems, such as capitalism and bu-
reaucracy, which act as means of social integration but in a manner 
often destructive of social solidarity and leading to forms of domina-
tion70. Allowing for these developments, how may modern society 
solve issues of social co-operation while respecting the equal free-
dom of each? Essentially, Habermas is providing a sociological ac-
count of the same question identified above as the central problem of 
modernity.  
He answers: in modern society the law is the primary means of so-
cial integration, in the face of the breakdown of the common ethos 
that supported a binding morality. The functional characteristics of 
the law – coerciveness, positivity and accountability – provide a 
complimentary support to the weaknesses inherent in the binding 
force of modern morality71. The law therefore carries the burden of 
social integration while also allowing space for pluralism with re-
gard to the good and strategic actions of self-interest. 
Although Habermas laments the lack of interpenetration between so-
ciology and jurisprudence, both Finnis and Dworkin also contend that 
________________ 
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the law functions as a means of social co-ordination72. In practice, the 
law is the means by which authority is exercised in guiding social co-
operation. Authority then is also justified by necessity. But in common 
they argue that the actions of authority by means of the law are in need 
of constant justification. Neither the mere fact of authority or legality, 
nor the brute force of power provide for its own legitimacy. Authority, 
and the law, must make a normative claim for itself. In other words, if 
authority and law are not to become arbitrary, they need to reasoned 
through in a public manner and therefore be open to being held to ac-
count.  
In the discourse-theoretic terms of Habermas, the factual demands of 
the law require validation, that is, the strategic operations of the law 
and institutions of authority require communicative discourse that fa-
cilitate common consensus. In the terms of Dworkin, legislative and ad-
judicative practices entail a procedure of constructive interpretation in 
which every decision, guided by integrity, is justified by aiming to-
wards coherence between statutes, precedence and public morality. In 
the Thomist terms of Finnis, the law is justified according to the means 
by which it brings about the common good, which itself is discerned by 
the common exercise of practical reasoning.  
It is only by justification(s), that the law will be accepted by free 
people as binding on their behaviour, and therefore acceptable in its 
claim of obligation. It is in this process that law and authority are be-
stowed with legitimacy. Legitimate law therefore is primarily based on 
reason and not on the will of the sovereign (as maintained by legal 
positivism). Furthermore, by insisting on the continual process of de-
liberation and justification, albeit according to differing models, they 
share a dynamic view of the law. Basic, strong sense or natural rights 
play a key role in the process of legitimising law; for they are embed-
ded and share the structural strengths of the law and yet they are ex-
pressions of moral reasoning that provide the legitimacy to the law. 
5.4 Society/State  
 In contrast to the moderns, a different question guides the thinking 
of a just schema in the classical era: what is required to live a happy, 
good or fulfilled life73? The resulting problem is to construct the condi-
________________ 
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tions or social order that facilitates the good life. Again, the response 
has structural elements that are shared by the theorists of this tradition. 
The important common characteristic that cuts across the elements is 
the importance of the social relationships74. In a striking contrast to the 
self-sufficient independence of natural man as described by the early 
modern theorists, the natural condition is to be social. According to this 
tradition, the individual is constituted by social relationships and finds 
its fulfilment in and through the perfect association, that is, civil society 
and the public state.  
Finnis follows the latter line of reasoning. On one hand, the basic 
good of sociability or friendship is fulfilled by way of relationships: on 
the other, attaining all the other basic goods that contribute to integral 
fulfilment requires harmonious and common life. The community’s 
purpose, therefore, is to facilitate the good of each of its members or 
the common good. In the complex relationships of a society, it is the 
state or the political and legal institutions that are best able to provide 
the conditions that allow for each citizen to realise themselves. The 
state, then, is a natural necessity in accordance with practical reasoning. 
Indeed, the state is the sphere in which the principles of practical rea-
soning, which aims at the proper ordering and facilitation of the goods 
for all, are required most of all. The state, therefore, is an extension of 
the moral living of a society ordered towards the good and gains le-
gitimacy from the extent to which it is facilitated. 
The last point can be made of Dworkin. He too considers a legitimate 
state to be an extension of a moral community. The principled political 
morality that informs a legal system and state governance will be de-
rived from society’s own perception of itself as well as the functioning 
of the system. A genuine political community or state will respect both 
aspects and their principles; thereby, creating the conditions for what he 
describes as moral membership of a community. To respect the sets of 
principles is to allow for opportunities to participate in collective deci-
sion making and treatment with equal concern and respect. The former 
creates a part in the running of society; the latter creates a stake in it for 
its members. However, he asserts one final condition – the importance 
of moral independence. In commitment to liberal values (and the dis-
tinction between justice and the good), 
A genuine political community must […] be a community of independent 
moral agents. It must not dictate what its citizens think about matters of po-
________________ 
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litical or moral or ethical judgement, but must, on the contrary, provide cir-
cumstances that encourage them to arrive at beliefs on these matters 
through their own reflective and finally individual conviction75. 
Accordingly, the moral community, in tolerance, allows for the divi-
sions within it. Dworkin argues that rights are imminently suitable in a 
society that is divided: «The concept of rights, and particularly the con-
cept of rights against the Government, has its most natural use when a 
political society is divided, and appeals to co-operation or a common 
goal are pointless»76. His account corresponds to the sociological diag-
nosis outlined by Habermas. Dworkin emphasises the rights that are 
held against government and state because he argues that an appeal to a 
common good, that may order just relationships between people, is no 
longer possible. The burden then is placed on the state and its institu-
tions to provide for justice. But it does create a distance between state 
and society. Many criticise this division for producing an atomistic so-
ciety that may leave the individual cut adrift77. Although Finnis’s the-
ory does make room for sociology, his model does presume quite a 
homogenous society.  
Finnis and Dworkin may be said to represent a wider debate con-
cerning the place of the individual in society. Broadly speaking, 
Communitarians view the human person as primarily comprised by 
the community and its received traditions and the Liberals view the 
human person as constituted somewhat by their independence78. 
Habermas claims that the theory of communicative action overcomes 
this division. The conditions of discourse show that the person is pri-
marily social and created by the social practice of communication. 
However, the practice of discourse necessarily respects the otherness 
of the individual – the social and the individual mutually constitute 
each other. 
________________ 
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At a social-state level, the concerns that motivate the distinctions be-
tween justice and the good, and conceptions of freedom (between bene-
fit and choice theories of rights), may be described as paternalism. Lib-
erals fear that models derived from substantial accounts of the good 
may justify domination. Yet the question remains: if the state, and the 
institutions of the law, has a critical role in the just ordering of a society 
of free people, to what extent can it actively guide individual lives? Joel 
Feinberg, in a collection of essays entitled Social Philosophy, distin-
guishes between strong and weak paternalism.  
According to the strong version of legal paternalism, that state is justified 
in protecting a person, against his will, from the harmful consequences 
even of his fully voluntary choices and understandings […] According to 
the weaker version of legal paternalism, a man can rightly be prevented 
from harming himself (when other interests are not directly involved) only 
if his intended action is substantially non-voluntary or can be presumed to 
be so in the absence of evidence to the contrary79.  
Paternalism concerns the extent of authority. Limits are placed on 
authority, primarily by rights in the liberal tradition and participation 
in the critical tradition. 
Habermas would argue that, in ideal conditions, a radical democ-
racy would diminish paternalism altogether. Dworkin argues that 
rights, conceived as demarcations of spheres of freedom, necessarily 
entail a weak paternalism; a government may only interfere to the 
extent that it follows and fosters the principle of equal concern. Out-
lined in the expository chapter, he distinguishes between «having 
rights» to «doing what is right». Ordinarily, they do not contradict 
each other. But sometimes they do. For instance, Jack and Jill may 
have the right to free speech, but Jack may say many things that are 
morally reprehensible such as spreading of false or spurious infor-
mation. The question then may be rephrased: does one have the right 
to do wrong? According to Dworkin, a government based on rights 
will not interfere with a strong sense right in order to force the per-
son do what is right80. 
The model proposed by Finnis, on one hand, may encourage a 
strong paternalism. In Natural Law and Natural Rights, he com-
ments:  
‘I wish someone had stopped me from …’; if this can rationally be said (as 
it can), it follows necessarily that even the most extensive and excessive 
________________ 
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programme of paternalism might be instituted without denial of equal con-
cern and respect to anybody81. 
But on the other, authority is necessarily circumscribed by the moral 
principles and norms that «can well be articulated in the relatively 
modern language of truly inviolable rights[…]»82. Furthermore, author-
ity may be limited by the principle of subsidiarity in which collective 
decision making ought to be kept to the lowest level. If authority is to 
be legitimised by the common good, it must be guided by the require-
ments of the common good. Finnis, and the New Natural Law Theory, 
consider the common good to be an instrumental good83. Accordingly, 
the state is at the service of creating the conditions for personal fulfil-
ment. Its main concern is matters of justice. It should legislate for «le-
gal arrangements supervising not the truly private conduct of adults but 
the public realm or environment»84.  
The above frameworks may be described as the outlines of different 
ethico-political anthropologies – that is, they provide different visions 
of the human person form the standpoint which the terms offer. 
6. Specifying Rights 
The appeal to human rights functions as an important means of justi-
fying positions in contemporary moral debates and the resulting politi-
cal and legal decisions. As proposed by Habermas, power in the con-
temporary Western democratic and legal order claims legitimacy and so 
loyalty because of these rights85. However, theoretical cautions apart, 
much of the social and democratic debate regarding rights revolves lit-
tle around the existence of rights as a whole. Instead, it concentrates on 
which specific rights are applicable. As pointed out by Dworkin, the of-
ten passionate disputes that are associated with hard cases, hinge on 
which specific rights are applicable in particular concrete situations – 
and why? 86 For example, the abortion issue is commonly presented as 
a conflict between the right to life and the right to choose.  
Because rights are ethico-juridical categories87, their specification 
will necessarily depend on both law and morality. As further outlined 
by Habermas, the law provides a technical precision backed by coer-
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cion that is lacking in contemporary morality and morality, in turn, 
provides an acceptable and so legitimatising justification for law’s au-
thority88. The specification of rights involves both aspects. Otherwise, 
rights may be only legal (and so potentially coercive) or they may be 
only moral (and so potentially ineffective).  
This thesis primarily focuses on normative models rather than spe-
cific rights, as outlined in the Introduction89. Yet each model argues in 
a particular direction in the process of specifying rights. It is at this 
level that the paths of divergence between theorists become most ap-
parent. Each theorist has taken public stances in many particular ethical 
debates that involve human rights. At the heart of such heated discus-
sions on which specific rights apply, lie two challenges – both of which 
are capable of threatening rights themselves.  
6.1 The Authentication of Rights  
As noted previously, the contemporary era has witnessed a prolifera-
tion of rights that may be compared to inflation in the economy. Hyper-
inflation dangerously cheapens the value of money. Similarly, the pro-
liferation of rights may devalue, and so threaten, a set of core human 
rights90. Restraining the indiscriminate application of rights-language in 
the public forum requires a means of imposing a limitation or a distinc-
tion between what is authentic and what is erroneous – while allowing 
for legitimate growth and adaptation.  
A moral theory may be divided into base and superstructure. The 
base of a moral theory consists of its fundamental principles and the 
superstructure contains all the elements (further norms, rules, codes of 
conduct, policies) that may be derived from those basic principles. A 
moral theory concerning rights will be able to authenticate all and only 
those rights that can be derived from its basic principles. In other 
words, the basic principles act as the litmus test, delineating between 
genuine and ingenuous claims to a specific right. In this way, a check 
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on the proliferation of rights can be maintained. Two sorts of control 
are possible – external or internal91.  
Firstly, rights may be externally controlled if the assessment of au-
thenticity is by way of basic principles which are not themselves rights. 
According to this rationale, rights are a derivative, rather than a basic 
moral category. To be authentic, a right must be consistent with a fur-
ther base principle. The natural law method of Finnis matches this pro-
file92. Human rights articulate, protect and facilitate the basic human 
goods. The litmus test of authenticity, therefore, is whether a particular 
right-claim can be consistent with the basic human goods and their re-
alisation as proposed by the requirements of practical reasonableness.  
The specific ethical positions taken by Finnis follow this model quite 
strictly. In particular, he emphasises the seventh requirement of practi-
cal reasonableness which demands that every basic good should be re-
spected in every act – or negatively worded, do not intentionally act 
against any of the basic goods93. For instance, he disallows certain 
rights to homosexual partnerships on the basis that it counters the good 
of marriage and family94. His rejection of abortion and contraception 
turns on ther assertion that such acts intentionally denying of the good 
of life. However, such issues need not be considered with reference to 
rights because the model provides reference to other more basic princi-
ples or values95.  
Secondly, rights may be internally controlled if the appraisal of au-
thenticity is by way of consistency to the functioning of rights them-
selves. In this situation, rights constitute both a derivative and a basic 
moral category. Dworkin corresponds to this approach. Core rights are 
accepted: the application or specification of such a core right into other 
rights must be consistent with the original intent of the core right96. To 
impose a strict limitation or generate a hyper-inflation of a right creates 
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a sham, fraud or deception of the original right and is therefore inau-
thentic. As a result, Dworkin must appeal to the commitment and sin-
cerity of society and government. He can only appeal that we take them 
seriously97. Indeed, his later theory of law-as-integrity and a principled 
community is an attempt to unpack the requirements of such gravity.  
To take a practical ethical stance defended by Dworkin. Similarly to 
Finnis, he argues that a clash of rights is not the true source of the con-
troversy regarding abortion98. Rather, he argues it is due to two re-
sponses to the sacredness of life. As I argued in the expository chapter, 
his final stance in allowing abortion is based on a consistency or integ-
rity to the right to liberty (or core right) based on the liberal tradition’s 
priority of tolerance and non-interference by the state in matters of faith 
– including a kind of secular faith in the sacredness of life – central to 
the American Constitution99.  
The model proposed by Habermas fits less easily. The litmus test for 
the validity of proposed norms – such as rights – is a consensus arising 
from a free and rational deliberation that includes all interested parties 
(in turn, based on the ideal speech situation). The principles of dis-
course that underlie such a deliberation provide the criteria for the iden-
tification of both the primary principle of justice and democratically le-
gitimised law100. Such a litmus test may be said to be external and in-
ternal. Theoretically, the principles may be proposed as an external 
standard by which to classify and specify rights. However and practi-
cally, such criteria are actually a part of, and so internal to, the common 
project of identifying and delineating rights. 
In a collection of articles, entitled The Future of Human Nature, 
Habermas considers some specific ethical issues in biotechnology. In 
particular, he rejects genetic engineering on the basis that it cannot 
comply with the central intuition of discourse ethics, namely that there 
is an inherent reciprocity in communication that respects the freedom 
and equality of the other, which ought to be respected. He writes, 
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With genetic programming […] a relationship emerges that is asymmetrical 
in more than one respect – a specific type of paternalism […] The program 
designer carries out a one-sided act for which there can be no well-founded 
assumption of consent, disposing over the genetic factors of another in the 
paternalistic intention of setting the course, in relevant respects, of the life 
history of the dependent person. The latter [the person genetically pro-
grammed] may interpret, but not revise or undo this intention. The conse-
quences are irreversible because the paternalistic intention is laid down in a 
disarming genetic program instead of being communicatively mediated by 
a socialising practice which can be subjected to reappraisal by the person 
«raised»101.  
In other words, there is no possibility of communicatively establish-
ing moral norms or, in a democratic legal order, legitimate mutually 
conferred rights. The desire to reject forms of paternalism, which may 
justify the abuse of power, motivates his argument (and much of the 
Critical tradition). However, the freedom that he wishes to protect is 
quite close to the model of freedom as self-determination free from in-
terference that is quite close to the liberal tradition102.  
6.2 The Conflict of Rights  
The second challenge around the specification of rights is the con-
flict that arises between two accepted authentic rights. The historical 
experience of these apparent dilemmas has supported a cynicism that 
may threaten rights. Such scepticism may be either conceptual or 
normative103. Conceptual scepticism doubts the veracity of an idea or 
term, while normative scepticism is suspicious its social function-
________________ 
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ing104. Of the former, Judith Wagner DeCew notices, «The problem 
of rights conflicts and the inability to rank rights have led many 
theorists in philosophy and law to reject the notion of “absolute 
rights”, or rights which must be upheld under and circumstances»105. 
Of the latter, Martin McKeever observes,  
In contemporary cultures the lobbies, which represent the interests of vari-
ous groups, have become very important in the political and legislative 
process. In view of this, there is a real danger that a new version of the 
classical political dynamic of might is right will prevail: those who have the 
strongest lobby will be able to claim rights which weaker lobbies are not in 
a position to claim106. 
One manner of overcoming such a conflict is to deny the status of 
one or other claim to be a true right. Therefore, «the conflicts between 
them are to be resolved by determining which is really a right, and 
which are not rights at all in the conflict situation»107. A resolution, 
therefore, turns on the previous challenge to specify authentic rights. 
However, in what Dworkin identifies as hard cases, situations often 
arise in which accepted authentic rights collide108. In these circum-
stances, the reality of one or other right cannot be simply denied. To do 
so is to deny the basis of all rights.  
Conflicts between accepted rights may be placed in two catego-
ries: «intra-right conflicts, that is, conflicts between different in-
stances of the same right; and inter-right conflicts, that is, conflicts 
between particular instances of different rights»109. An example of 
an intra-right conflict is the clash of many people asserting the same 
right-claim to medical treatment in a situation of scarce resources. 
Expanding the example reveals an inter-right conflict – the more that 
is spent on hospitals to meet the right to medical treatment, the less 
that can be spent on the police in protecting the right to personal se-
curity.  
Society is continually involved in a working through issues like 
these. Indeed, as recognised by the theorists, authority and law, and 
so the State, are necessary in order to manage complex situations 
that arise from common life. Yet, as Jeremy Waldron writes,  
________________ 
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When hard choices arise, it is less easy to see how they should be resolved. 
The idea that all rights should be put on a par seems implausible. Though 
we may think that any rights should have precedence over considerations of 
ordinary utility, we may think also that some rights are more important that 
others. Maybe the right to life is more important than the right to free 
speech, which is more important, in turn that the right to privacy, and so 
on110.  
Inevitably, there are losses and gains – each to be traded off against 
one another. But do rights, therefore, re-enter the market place to be 
also traded, one against the other? If one right is measured, weighed 
and calculated against another to create the greatest possible advantage 
for any many people as possible, does the ghost of utilitarianism return 
(in spite of the fact that rights counter such reasoning111)?  
While they all accept that consequentialist (Finnis), policy (Dworkin), 
and strategic (Habermas) considerations must be taken into account, the 
three theorists refute such a charge. They each assert that human rights 
must be take precedence over a crude consideration of the greatest hap-
piness for the greatest amount of people. However, they each lack crite-
ria by which to lexically order and so judge between conflicting rights 
– in fact, they refuse to provide them.  
Finnis, for example, maintains that the basic goods are incommen-
surable. They cannot be measured one against the other in creating a 
hierarchy of values. In turn, the rights that facilitate and protect the ba-
sic goods must also be incommensurable. Instead, he can only point to 
the constant reflection on human experience in the light of practical 
reasonableness guided towards integral human fulfilment112. Dworkin’s 
definition of rights is formal and so lacks any real criteria. Wagner De-
cew criticises his formal definition of rights for failing to «answer sub-
stantive questions about what rights we do have (or the specification of 
rights). Dworkin is well aware of this. He also admits that he gives no 
explanation of how to deal with rights conflicts»113. His later reflections 
on law-as-integrity may be seen as an attempt to deal with this issue by 
asserting the necessity to be consistent with certain core and paradig-
matic rights. Finally, Habermas desists from providing a lexical order-
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ing of rights for issues in which conflict occurs can only be legitimately 
resolved by a free and equal deliberation by the participants them-
selves114.  
Does this lacuna present a serious problem? At one level, it points to 
a problem of effective application. At another level and in the defence 
of the three theorists, the reasoning for not providing a thorough lexical 
ordering of rights is born of the desire not to impose a particular and 
strict model on society. To do so is to justify an overly authoritarian 
model that restricts the responsible freedom of the members of soci-
ety115. The lack of a preset list, in turn, motivates their emphasis on the 
role of authority. Instead of a final list, they each provide general crite-
ria for judgment or adjudication. 
7. Encounter between Theorists and Traditions 
Above is a sketch of affinities and differences between theoretical 
frameworks. Although according to Lonergan, history and interpre-
tation «make data available, they clarify what was meant, they nar-
rate what occurred. Encounter is more. […] encounter is the one way 
in which self-understanding and horizon can be put to the test»116. 
This part of the thesis develops this encounter in order to test hori-
zons, that is, the frameworks of knowledge – either explicit to a the-
ory or implicit within a tradition – within which a vocabulary of 
rights are justified. An encounter is a meeting of horizons in order to 
challenge and be challenged, to defend and to refute, to question and 
to respond to difficulties on the basis of resources within their own 
horizon. The encounter is made of the challenges made by the se-
lected theorist to the other; and the ability of each to respond out of 
and in faithfulness to the resources of their own theory and tradi-
tion117.  
________________ 
 
114
 There is a sense, however, that each of the three models argue in a manner that 
prioritises social rights, liberty rights and participatory rights. This point will be made 
in a later chapter; cf. Ch. VII, Sec. 8.3.  
115
 This point shall be drawn upon again later in this chapter; cf. Ch. VII, Sec. 5 ff; 
Ch. VII, Sec. 8ff.  
116
 B. LONERGAN, Method in Theology, 247. He continues, «It is meeting persons, 
appreciating the values they represent, criticising their defects, and allowing one’s liv-
ing to be challenged at it very roots by their words and by their deeds». 
117
 An encounter between theorists may be intra-traditional or inter-traditional. 
Critiques of defects and challenges may occur between theorists who each acknowl-
edge the same tradition. Such intra-traditional differences and challenges were out-
lined in the exposition of each theorist. Cf. Ch. III, Sec. 2; Ch. III, Sec. 5; Ch. IV, Sec. 
2; Ch. V, Sec. 2. The dialectic of this chapter, however, is inter-traditional.  
CH. VI: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 311 
Evaluation requires criteria of judgement. A comparative study of 
theories within the one tradition is easier for the protagonists will share 
similar criteria: for instance, the theoretical methods, the priority of 
some values over others, common authorities and so forth. However, 
evaluation between traditions is deeply problematic because the criteria 
of judgment may be radically different. For instance, what is valued by 
one may be rendered insignificant or even dangerous by another, or 
methods are drastically different. Some argue that this necessarily leads 
to a situation of incommensurability – without criteria, measurement 
and therefore judgment of one over another is impossible. In response, 
H.P. Glenn argues that the proponents of incommensurability «would 
ultimately have to establish is the impossibility of human communica-
tion, radical untranslatability, and this is denied by all human experi-
ence, and possibly by the very idea of being human»118. But Glenn goes 
on to argue that all criteria of judgement must be necessarily tradition 
bound. Therefore, «There is no view from nowhere, no possibility of 
judgement from without a tradition, […] We compare them with crite-
ria drawn from themselves, with internal criteria. This is where the ac-
tion is. There is no tertio comparationis […]»119.  
This section turns to consider internal criteria by which to consider 
the three theorists.  
7.1 The Need for Reasons 
Rights are clearly contentious. There are sceptical challenges from 
without and intransigent disagreements within. Such problems demand 
measured theoretical responses. To the question «Why Theory?», Mi-
chael Freeman writes, 
We need reasons to support our human-rights actions, both because it is of-
ten not clear which actions human-rights principles require and because 
opponents of human rights can support their opposition with reasons. We 
must understand whether our reasons are superior, and, if so, why120.  
Freeman’s appeal to the necessity of reasons is in critical reaction to 
the position of Richard Rorty. Rorty argues that because there is no 
theoretical foundation for any belief, there can be no theoretical foun-
dation for human rights. Indeed, he insists that it is not necessary for 
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their success. Rather, what is required is a form of education that cre-
ates a sympathy that would motivate the moral outrage which under-
pins the successful implementation of human rights121. In response, 
Freeman charges Rorty of confusing motivation and justification. One 
may be motivated to act in sympathy but whether a particular action is 
justified depends on the reasons for the action. In turn, reasons require 
an evaluation, that is a mode of reasoning and final judgement as to 
which is the appropriate course of action122. 
7.2 Internal Structures of Deliberation 
To take rights seriously is to take reasons and reasoning seriously. 
This is the most striking similarity between the central theorists123. 
In common, it motivates their practical contributions to public dis-
course on specific issues. But it is also the primary shared feature of 
their theoretical reflections: they each are trying to explicate the in-
ternal structure of deliberation towards decision making and action 
at a social level. They are claiming that the internal structure of de-
liberation provides the normative guide to right-decision making and 
therefore right-action. In particular, they are concerned with public 
deliberation in civil society and the authoritative and legal structures 
through which public decisions are made and enforced. To recall: 
Finnis’s account of the natural law is an account of practical rea-
soning or «thinking about what (one ought) to do»124. In pursuing 
courses of action, a person (or community) invokes reasons for those 
actions. Further reflection, in response to the question «What for?», 
discloses basic values at the heart of those reasons and the means by 
which they can be attained. But among all the possible reasons, «Can 
one, in truth, identify really good reasons for action»125? Finnis be-
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lieves so. The very thrust of practical reasoning itself, or the process 
of deliberation in the lived experience of ordinary lives, reveals the 
ultimate or objective reasons for choice and action and how they 
may be achieved; namely, the basic goods and so requirements of 
practical reasonableness. At a social level, the actions of state and 
law find justification in these basic reasons. 
Dworkin’s legal theory turns on the actual procedures of judicial ad-
judication: the ways in which a judge (and the legal system) deliberates 
towards a decision. In hard cases, they justify their decision by arguing 
and asserting matters of principle, which they claim to be inherent in 
the law itself. Legal reasoning is to be «continually involved in debat-
ing its point and meaning, that is, its relation to justice or political mo-
rality»126. Reasons for action are deliberated. It is in a process of con-
structive interpretation, that good reasons are developed. Good reasons 
provide a coherent rationale between legal materials (statutes, prece-
dence etc), society needs and inherent principles. In other words, they 
place the law in its best moral light.  
Habermas’s theory of communicative action is a theory of rationality 
or the process by which two people come to mutual understanding in an 
ideal speech situation. It provides an account of the necessary structure 
of intersubjective deliberation. In the sphere of social integration, his 
model of discourse ethics outlines the necessary preconditions by 
which mutual understanding and agreement may be made on norms of 
behaviour. The central core, then, is that moral norms should be estab-
lished through common deliberation or a process of argumentation. The 
best argument will be accepted; thereby, rationally motivating the par-
ticipants. By gaining the approval by all or common consensus, the best 
arguments are universal. Applied to social institutions, it creates a 
model of deliberative democracy127.  
Anthony Lisska describes this common element as «the “good-
reasons” approach to moral language and argument»128. What is crucial 
is that a justification be provided for moral-decision making, beyond 
the fact of the decision itself. At a social level, justification is required 
other than the mere fact or coercion of authority or positive law. In 
common, the theorists argue that the recognition of good reasons arises 
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from the practical lived experience and the process of theory construc-
tion itself, that is, the actual dynamic of moral and legal reflection and 
discourse. By doing so, they claim the process itself reveals its own 
conditions and standards. The proposal and acceptance of reasons, in 
the practice of deliberation, provides the markings of a rationally justi-
fied theory. A good-reasons approach will disqualify bad reasons as an 
inappropriate justification. For instance, their common critique of utili-
tarianism and legal positivism is that they are inappropriate accounts of 
the process of moral and legal reasoning. They provide bad reasons for 
decision-making, being «impoverished», «impossible», «domineering», 
or all three.  
7.3 Adequately Justified Reasons 
What, therefore, constitutes an adequately justified reason? Lisska 
proposes that «Rational justification through consistency is the central 
feature indicating a good reason»129. Consistency is a necessary ele-
ment but, as testified in the expository chapters, it does little to capture 
the complex theories of rational justification of the central theorists. 
Rather, there are more specific characteristics of a rational justification 
– namely, objectivity for Finnis, coherence for Dworkin and consensus 
for Habermas. Finnis identifies good reasons as those that are irreduci-
ble and so self-evident. They are objectively good as they provide the 
universal set of reasons that underpin all reasons and reasoning. 
Dworkin identifies good reasons as those that provide coherence in the 
elements of legal reasoning and judicial adjudication. The resulting 
right answer is the one that exhibits integrity to the central principles 
that express a «single and comprehensive vision of justice»130. For 
Habermas, the better argument is the one accepted as valid by all under 
ideal conditions. Good reasons therefore are those that build consensus.  
The theoretical framework of each theorist is based on the explica-
tion of the internal structures of deliberation. In common, they hold that 
appropriate reasons are those which are consistent to the structures of 
the actual dynamic of moral and legal reasoning and deliberation. 
However (and to state the obvious), the characteristics of what counts 
as an appropriate reason differ because each theorist explicates the in-
ternal structure of deliberation differently. Previously, the theoretical 
frameworks or the lattice-works were compared according the claimed 
distinction between questions of justice and questions of the good. 
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Critically, the distinction influences what reasons matter in the modern 
society’s common deliberation towards just organisation.  
For instance, a comparison may be made between the rejection of 
utilitarianism and legal positivism with the dismissal of substantive 
theories of the good life. For both Dworkin and Habermas, the reasons 
proposed for decision-making by the former set of theories are strongly 
refuted. However, reasons that are offered according to particular vi-
sions of a good life are simply bracketed out. Granted, Dworkin and 
Habermas do provide reasons for why they insist that strong visions of 
the good life need to be restricted in the public sphere: most notable is 
the desire to protect the freedom of the individual from the imposition 
of an ideal of the human condition. But this confines the well-spring of 
reasons, as it were, that may be offered. In effect, what happens is that 
they narrow the reasons for common action. By doing so, they are thin-
ning and ultimately emptying deliberation of the concrete reasons that 
actually do occur.  
As explications of the structures of deliberation, all three theories are 
procedural. However, the greater the assertion on the distinction and so 
bracketing out reasons, the more the theory becomes dependent on pro-
cedure. The procedural emphasis is explicitly maintained by Habermas 
who scrupulously avoids prejudging what is involved in living a worthy 
or good life for what is proposed as necessary for the good life must be 
left to the participants of the discourse131. In Dworkin’s work, it is a 
strong element, albeit implicitly, for he recognises a thin theory of the 
good132. The less willing to engage with the concrete reasons actually 
used by people, the more they are obliged to depend more on explicat-
ing procedure.  
Practical reasoning is procedural according to Finnis. But he begins 
from the very concrete reasons that people make, as individuals and as 
a society, to justify their actions. All reasons are to be considered: 
many to be refuted in light of the discussion and the experience of life. 
It is by way of the deliberation on actual and real reasons in lived ex-
perience that the ultimate reasons or basic goods come to light. Not tak-
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ing reasons seriously enough is the common critique he holds against 
both Dworkin and Habermas – and by extension to much modern moral 
reflection.  
7.4 Taking Reasons Seriously 
Finnis agrees with both Dworkin and Habermas that deliberation or 
argumentation is constitutive of social action and the phenomenon of 
law. They concur that the process discloses an internal structure of 
norms or principles by which it may be guided. Finally, they agree on 
taking justification, that is, the provision of reasons, seriously. Finnis 
writes: 
For jurisprudence has progressed mainly by attending, not merely to the ex-
ternals of structure, practices, or even feelings, but rather to the characteris-
tic reasons people have for acting in the ways that go to constitutive dis-
tinctive social phenomena, such as law and the various sorts of legal rule, 
standard, and institution. Jurisprudence attends to types of justifications for 
decision133. 
But he disagrees with both on a number of moral and legal issues and 
underlying the path of divergence is Finnis’s insistence on the transpar-
ency of reasons. Practical reason, or the structure of deliberation that 
ends in action, offers  
expressions and recognitions of the directive claims that our intelligence 
makes upon us because of the goods (and other truths) which intelligence 
makes evident and thus available to us. What I have emphasised at the end 
of the preceding sentence is the transparency of reason134.  
Transparency concerns the topic, content or subject of assertions 
made in the process of argumentation and deliberation towards decid-
ing what to do. In deliberation, the to-and-fro of discourse, a person or 
people will make assertions of the type, «I think that […] (is true or 
good)» or «I believe we should […] (undertake a particular course of 
action)». An external observer may distinguish between the person who 
is making the statement and the statement itself. However, and most 
importantly, the person herself does not. From the internal perspective 
of the person who makes the assertion, «I think that […]», she is not 
thinking of herself but of the content of the assertion. Finnis concludes: 
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«Thus the “I think” in assertions for the former kind is transparent for 
the real subject-matter of the assertion; my thinking is not part of that 
subject matter at all; it is simply not the topic»135. In other words, when 
people deliberate, they are discussing the content of their arguments or 
the claims that there is truth in what they say. The implication of this 
transparency is «that in making any affirmation, reaching any conclu-
sion, answering any question one is “relying at the deepest level on 
what [one oneself] believes”»136.  
Transparency allows for practical reason to fade to the background 
and facilitates the basic reasons that motivate action to come to the 
foreground. In Fundamentals of Ethics, the failure to account for this 
basic feature of practical reasoning underlies Finnis’s critique of Kant, 
and by extension, much of Kantian influenced morality, including 
Dworkin and Habermas. The criticism is that by not appreciating the 
transparency of reasoning it has led to the exaggerated and undue con-
centration on the structures of deliberation to the detriment of the intel-
ligible reasons that inform them.  
Of Kant, he observes that such an account is impoverished to the ex-
tent that his «understanding of understanding (reason) overlooks the in-
telligible goods […] and seeks to make do with the reason’s ‘a priori’ 
power of universalising»137 and exaggerated to the extent that «he 
makes practical reasonableness not only an intrinsic ‘good in itself’, but 
the ‘condition of every other good’, but also ‘the supreme good’»138.  
Of Dworkin139, Finnis acknowledges and commends the aspect of 
constructive interpretation that continually deliberates on the purpose 
of law. As such, it exhibits the essential aspect of Finnis’s own model 
of practical reasoning, «lending power and illumination to his account 
of the interpretative attitude and its role in relation to the law»140. But 
Dworkin fails to appreciate the transparency of the arguments that are 
actually held by those involved in real deliberation: «the fact of one’s 
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agreement with an assertion is no ground for agreeing. In the logic of 
argumentation, only the content of my knowledge or beliefs is relevant, 
not the fact that I possess them»141. By failing to seriously take account 
of the content of arguments, beliefs or preferences, Dworkin creates an 
overly formal account of constructive interpretation that misconstrues 
actual discourses. For instance, Dworkin’s definition of rights turns on 
judicial principle drawn from political morality that is capable of 
trumping decisions made by government policy or majority preference. 
However, it does not account of the fact that principle (the beliefs, con-
victions etc), to a large extent, informs policy and the preferences held 
by majorities. In actual discourses, rights may not trump simply be-
cause there is a majority of preferences to be trumped. The characteri-
sation made by Dworkin makes for a distinction between the courts as a 
forum of principle and the legislatures and democracy as forums of pol-
icy or power. But constructive interpretation, Finnis argues, is too lim-
ited to judicial practices without attending to the wider issues of «for-
mally or structurally good law-making»142. It does not take seriously 
the reasons that are offered, deliberated, rejected and accepted in the 
public arena, outside the judiciary. «Arguments from principle are the 
very stuff of many arguments proposed to and in legislatures, especially 
on the matters indicated in bill of rights»143. Finnis, therefore, con-
cludes that there is no division.  
Interestingly, Habermas comes to the same conclusion about 
Dworkin. In Between Facts and Norms, Habermas also recommends 
aspects of Dworkin’s theory144. But he too argues that the process of 
constructive interpretation is overly dependent on the judiciary, creat-
ing a solipsistic or monological theory of law145. In such a theory, it is 
for the judge alone, albeit guided by integrity, to assert the purpose of 
the law. In response, Habermas proposes that the ideal structure of de-
________________ 
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liberation – or in discourse-theoretic terms, the conditions of communi-
cative rationality – is necessarily intersubjective and therefore takes the 
perspective of all involved.  
Anyone serious about participating in a practice of argumentation cannot 
avoid pragmatic presuppositions that require an ideal role taking, that is, 
presuppositions that require one to interpret and evaluate all contributions 
from the perspective of every other potential participant146.  
The guarantor of right decision making is not primarily the Hercu-
lean efforts of the judge but the strict adherence to discursive practices 
throughout the legal process147. The successful rule of law in modern 
society is to be placed within the wider discursive practices of a democ-
ratic and civil society. 
Of Habermas, Finnis’s criticisms also turn on the failure to appreci-
ate the transparency of practical reasoning. Although he never uses the 
term, the thrust of his critique is that Habermas does not fully attend to 
the intelligible reasons that inform actual discourses or «truth seeking 
dialogue, discussion or discourse, and meditation or reflective delibera-
tion»148. To recall, Habermas argues that one may distinguish between 
moral and ethical discourses or between questions of justice and ques-
tions of the good. Finnis sources this distinction in the failure of Kant 
outlined above: it is, he notes, «a curious relic, as it seems, of Kant’s 
oversight of the basic reasons for action»149. Habermas asserts that so-
cial integration in a pluralist situation requires that contentious issues 
be deliberated at the level of the moral rather than the ethical. In other 
words, each must transcend the view of what I or we may consider my 
or our good and take «the perspective of every other potential partici-
pant»150. By doing so, they move to a more abstract level on which they 
can attain consensus. It requires, therefore, that some reasons in public 
discourse be put to one side, as merely our or my perspective. In effect, 
this is not to engage but rather to bracket out some reasons. But in the 
actual discourse on both sides of a contentious issue, the reasons that 
are offered are not considered by the participants to be what is «for my 
or our good»151. Rather, all propose what they believe to be true or right 
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on the basis on concrete reasons considered important independent of 
the person proposing them. It 
turns out to be not merely a kind of category mistake […] he cuts himself 
off from the very meaning of the discourse of his partners in discourse, or 
at least so radically misconceives their views that civil conversation with 
them is substantially obstructed152.  
The distinction in fact misconstrues concrete deliberation or dis-
course. Habermas ends up actually limiting the discourse that he him-
self so earnestly wishes to expand and protect – thereby contradicting 
the central proposed principles of Discourse Ethics.  
With regard to contentious issues, Finnis further argues that it is in 
fact impossible or «incoherent» to rise to a higher level of discourse 
that takes the perspective of all because the conditions of discourse eth-
ics are not in fact widespread. The principles of discourse ethics – most 
notably reciprocal perspective taking – are idealised apart from actual 
discourses. But «Many of the participants in actual discourse-
communities, not least (and not most) in wealthy democracies, do not 
meet those conditions»153. In actual discourses, there are many perspec-
tives that are held uncritically or in the interests of the powerful. And,  
Perspectives such as these should, not be adopted but rather rejected, for 
the sake of discourse (not demagoguery), truth (not mendacious or myth-
ridden propaganda), friendship (not self-seeking flattery), and the real in-
terests of all (including those wrongly interested in adhering to and acting 
upon their immoral perspectives)154. 
Of Dworkin and Habermas and in sum: Finnis argues that what they 
hold to be the identifying characteristic of rational justification (or a 
right-answer or better argument) is merely the mark of the truth, rather 
than the proper criterion of the moral truth. Abstract coherence in the 
adjudication of the law, as proposed by Dworkin, and consensus arising 
from public discourse, as proposed by Habermas, may be outcomes of 
common deliberation; but on their own, they cannot provide the verifi-
cation or guarantee that the moral truth has been arrived at. He agrees 
that moral truth can only be arrived at through question and answer and 
________________ 
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coherent and consistent reflection and not otherwise, but and crucially, 
such reasoning is content-filled. The process is filled and guided by in-
telligible reasons for action. Given sustained attention in proper condi-
tions, he maintains irreducible or basic reasons and consequent moral 
truths are disclosed. To Finnis, Dworkin and Habermas do not take rea-
sons seriously enough. 
8. The Natural Law Response 
The purpose of this thesis is to offer an investigative study of human 
rights in relation to three theorists and their respective traditions. Accord-
ingly, it traces the history of each tradition of enquiry, proposing their dis-
tinguishing characteristics and core values. It provides a close and critical 
reading of a leading contemporary representative of each tradition. By way 
of a comparative study, points of convergence and paths of divergence be-
tween them are identified; contending that the paths of divergence could 
be marked out according to the attention paid by each author to the fun-
damental question of the good or worthwhile life.  
By implication, this thesis is marked by a judgement in favour of the 
importance and value of this very criterion. The precedence allocated to 
the question indicates my commitment to a particular tradition of enquiry 
– namely, the Aristotelian-Thomist account of the Natural Law. For, as 
observed earlier, there are no neutral standpoints outside of a tradition of 
enquiry that offer independent criteria of evaluation155. In the words of 
Alasdair MacIntyre:  
There is no standing ground, no place for enquiry, no way to engage in the 
practices of advancing, evaluating, accepting, and rejecting reasoned argu-
ment apart form what which is provided by some particular tradition or 
other156. 
Indeed, to attempt to provide one is to succumb to the positivist 
temptations of the Enlightenment to search for value free judgments, so 
vigorously challenged by the three central theorists157.  
Part One – History – outlined the embryonic growth of subjective 
rights within the natural law tradition of the medieval era. Despite the 
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protestations of many that rights are a later innovation, «it is difficult to 
deny some connection between the scholastic concept of natural law 
and modern doctrines of human rights»158. The natural law tradition of 
the medieval era, including the specifically Thomist interpretation, 
proved itself adaptable to the exigencies of the time. Rights were nei-
ther foreign nor incompatible with this tradition. Finnis represents a 
contemporary moment in the dynamic of the natural law tradition and 
theory: albeit, after centuries of disregard.  
A theory which more than one generation of thinkers had dismissed as an 
ancient and exploded fallacy kept alive only as the theological dogmatics of 
an authoritarian Church was rescued from a whole complex of misunder-
standings and misrepresentations. At the same time, it was exhibited as 
thoroughly challenging account of the law, fully capable of standing up to 
the theories which were regarded as having refuted and superseded it, while 
taking into account and accepting into its own setting some to the main in-
sights or discoveries of these theories159.  
Neil MacCormick is commenting upon Finnis’s re-articulation of the 
central principles and the model of reasoning that make up the natural 
law. They are, at once, true to the tradition and yet critically and con-
structively responsive to other traditions and theories. My basic argu-
ment of this thesis is that rights illuminate this point. 
Finnis is responding to the challenge as posed by Ralph McInerny: 
«If there is to be any conjunction of the natural law tradition and natu-
ral or human rights, the latter are going to have to be grounded in the 
same things as the former: the way it is – with the world, with man, 
with his destiny»160. Finnis is claiming that «the way it is» is disclosed 
in the intelligible reasons that people offer for their actions. Presuming 
the free choice of individuals, actions are done for the sake of some-
thing or for a purpose. Reflection and deliberation on such purposes re-
veal the basic goods or basic reasons why such purposes are worth-
while in pursuing. The destiny of the person is, therefore, discernable – 
integral human fulfilment. Such a destiny is part of the «way it is» be-
cause the goods that make for a worthwhile or fulfilled life are objec-
tive or self-evident, not as mere intuitions, but as confirmed by (but not 
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derived from) the results of considered attention to the natural disposi-
tions of a person, theoretical and practical wisdom and experience161. 
Moral norms then, are the requirements essential to achieve a person’s 
objective destiny.  
The theory turns, as noted above, on the reflecting deliberating per-
son. To this extent, it is broadly marked by the turn to the subject 
commonly associated as the primary characteristic of modernity162. 
However, Finnis and his collaborators acknowledge two specific and 
influential adaptations of the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition. Crucially, 
it is my central contention for this thesis that these innovations provide 
the basis for the natural law’s response to the challenges of other tradi-
tions of enquiry: namely, to account for the possibility to freely choose 
one’s own good within a framework of justice (Dworkin and liberal-
ism) and to account for participation in the deliberation of the norms of 
justice (Habermas and Critical Theory). 
8.1 Natural Law and Liberty Rights 
Firstly, 
The centrality of free choice in moral theory explains not only why our ac-
count of practical and moral principles diverges from some contemporary 
views, but also why it departs in some respects from classical models to 
which it is in other ways indebted. […] the reality of free choice in incom-
patible with the supposition – for instance, of Aristotle – that there is a sin-
gle natural end of human life163.  
As previously detailed, they maintain that there is no one single end 
to life. Rather, there is a plurality of goods that facilitate human flour-
ishing. The objective goods are the irreducible basic reasons for action: 
they may not even be reduced to one another. Instead, they are inc-
ommensurable – no one particular good way of life can be said to be 
measurably better than another. Significantly, the assertion of the in-
commensurability of the goods is the affirmation of the experience and 
significance of free choice. «Free choice is understood by reflection on 
the experience of deciding between two intelligible goods»164. Of 
course, moral choices are not arbitrary, for 
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basic values can be identified by intelligence, and as thus identified provide 
the principles of all choices however, basic. Basic commitments shape our 
response to, our participation in, basic values – in the form of choices of ca-
reer, of marriage, of forms of education, of preference for wealth as against 
leisure or liturgy, or for speed of communication as against safety165.  
It is by way of actual acted-out choices that people achieve their in-
telligible advantages or purposes. In committing themselves to particu-
lar courses of actions, they allow themselves to be guided by their val-
ues or what they perceive to be good for them. By instantiating the ob-
jective goods – and not merely perceived goods – that are discerned 
through rational reflection, they achieve their final purpose of integral 
human fulfilment. Choices, therefore, constitute the human person166. It 
is by choosing to act in certain ways that life is fulfilled, and a person’s 
character developed; by choosing otherwise is to limit or hinder one’s 
own potential for a happy or worthwhile life167. Practical reasoning, 
which bears itself on one’s choices, is itself a basic good. It shapes the 
character and future of a person by guiding the choice to affirm or limit 
the basic goods. It is experienced as order, inner peace, authenticity or 
self determination. 
The objective goods that comprise human fulfilment are recog-
nised and instantiated or brought about in the exercise of practical 
reasonableness, that is, the reasoned judgment and active control 
over our lives. As a basic good, the self-determination of each per-
son ought to be respected in the ordering of the common good in so-
ciety. Human fulfilment cannot be imposed – it can only be dis-
closed and freely chosen. Rights, Finnis claims, are the sketches that 
outline the common good. Therefore, they will also acknowledge, 
include and protect the freedom to choose, albeit within moral pa-
rameters168. In turn, the structures of society in the law and state act 
justly when they provide a scheme of co-operation in which people 
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can responsibly choose between the various possible good lives that 
are open to them. By implication, a natural law tradition, as adapted 
by Finnis, may take account of liberalism’s concern for the funda-
mental value of the individual’s freedom in pursuing their own good, 
within the parameters of justice.  
8.2 Natural Law and Participatory Rights  
Secondly,  
The theory we defined [Finnis, Grisez and Boyle] also departs from classi-
cal models – at least, as many have understood them – by taking full ac-
count of the fact that the moral ought cannot be derived from the is of the 
theoretical truth – for example, of metaphysics and/or philosophical an-
thropology169.  
As previously detailed, they deny the possibility of deduction from a 
pre-existing schema recognisable by theoretical reasoning. Instead, the 
emphasis is placed on the intelligible reasons that are used in the proc-
ess of practical reasoning. Finnis therefore argues that the natural law 
tradition has never been anything other than a sustained deliberation, or 
a «disputatio grounded in reasons»170.  
The disputatio, as all human action, is ordered by the purpose of its 
practice. The natural law therefore implicitly proposes a discourse 
ethic. By way of an analysis of Plato’s dialogue, the Gorgias, Finnis 
proposes that the conditions of discourse may be reduced to the human 
goods of truth (and knowledge of it) and friendship (good will towards 
other human persons). As a result, the disputatio, and the content that 
informs it, ought to be guided by their requirements. Therefore, he ar-
gues that the natural law has always been an appeal to acceptable pub-
lic reasons,  
that would command a universal consensus under ideal conditions of dis-
course and meanwhile are available to, and could be accepted by, anyone 
who is willing and able to give them fair and adequate attention, including 
those people whose immediate and practical interests (real or supposed) 
would be more or less damaged, and some or many of whose actual present 
beliefs would be negated by accepting and action upon those reasons as 
true. It has never been other than a theory which aspires to ensure that the 
content of its theses coheres with and illuminates the natural, logical, tech-
nical (including linguistic-pragmatic), and moral conditions under which 
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those theses can be rationally adopted, affirmed in discourse, and acted 
upon in other forms of action171. 
At an individual level, continual deliberation is crucial in the iden-
tification of the basic goods and the requirements necessary to 
achieve them172. At a social level, continual public deliberation is 
necessary for the discernment of the common good that facilitates 
and fosters the basic goods. The public forum is, above all else, an 
arena of practical reasoning. There can be no fixed theoretical mod-
els from which to deduce answers or measure states of affairs. The 
legislative authorities should not «pretend to be infallible or to si-
lence further rational discussion or to forbid the reconsideration of 
the decision»173. Rights, therefore, must acknowledge, include and 
protect the freedoms of participation in public deliberation; albeit 
guided by the parameters of morality. By implication, the natural 
law tradition may take account of the democratic concerns of 
Habermas and the Critical Tradition.  
8.3 Responsibility and Rights 
To restate the basis of my argument: both the liberal and critical 
traditions fear of an authoritarian imposition of what is perceived to 
be the good life but ideologically masks particular vested interests. 
In order to counter-act such a possibility, the liberal tradition fo-
cused on the limitation of power by way of a principled tolerance of 
the freedom of the individual – encapsulated in the so-called first 
generation rights – to pursue their own perceived interests. The 
Critical tradition focused on the limitation of power by way of the 
participation of all in the structures of authority – encapsulated in 
second generation rights – in order that it may be guided in facilitat-
ing the interests of all. I argue that a sound model of practical rea-
soning in line with the natural law tradition may be so read as to be 
capable of responding to this challenge. 
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The model may be said to turn on responsibility. First and foremost, 
there is responsibility of justice174. In this model, rights are primarily 
explained as the fruits of justice from the point of view of those who 
benefit from a just ordering of social relationships. Rights are bound 
therefore to the duty or responsibilities of all, particularly in those en-
trusted with authority, to act according to the requirements of justice or 
the common good. This is faithful to the central claims of the natural 
law tradition – power must be guided, and therefore, limited by the 
moral responsibilities of the common good.  
Second, there is the responsibility of each individual. The common 
good provides the conditions for the integral human fulfilment of each. 
The goods can only be realised through the responsible free choice and 
action of each person. Justice therefore demands the recognition of the 
fundamental freedom of all to pursue one of the many kinds of life that 
will concretise the goods for each175. It acknowledges that responsibil-
ity primarily lies with the individual. Indeed, by doing so it is fostering 
the sixth basic good – practical reasonableness. It is out of respect for 
this basic good in the lives of all that authority and society ought to re-
spect the freedom of conscience. A just society can only provide condi-
tions and safeguards, required by the above responsibilities of a life in 
common. As a result, power is limited by a principled respect of indi-
vidual responsible freedom – resonating with the liberal tradition.  
Third and finally, there is the responsibility of deliberation. It is by 
way of practical reasoning reflecting on its own actions that the basic 
goods and the requirements to achieve them disclose themselves. Intel-
ligible reasons provided for actions, tested against common experience 
and common deliberation (a disputatio grounded on reasons), reveal 
basic or objective reasons in the interests of all. As a result, the com-
mon good requires that society allow a public space for the provision, 
defence and discernment of common goals.  
Furthermore, the common good requires continual deliberation be-
cause the basic goods, being incommensurable, provide no hard-and-
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fast models to apply176. A just society, therefore, requires structures that 
allow for continued deliberation and justification (that is the provision 
of reasons) for common action. Power will be guided or limited by the 
access of all to such structures. Conceived in this manner, democracy is 
not simply majority rule but the fostering of strong civil and public fo-
rum for deliberation – resonating with the critical tradition.  
To the three orders of responsibility correspond three categories of 
rights – status positivus, status negativus and status activus. To «the re-
sponsibility towards another in justice» corresponds the claims to social 
rights to a minimum of conditions, such as commodities, peace and or-
der, respect and equality before the law, that facilitate human flourish-
ing (status positivus). To «the responsibility of each individual to pur-
sue the good in freedom» corresponds to the rights of liberty against 
undue intervention, particularly by the state, in certain areas of private 
life (status negativus). To «the responsibility to continually justify ac-
tions and deliberate upon the good and its achievement» corresponds 
the rights of participation in the formation of political opinion and gov-
ernance (status activus).  
As testified to by this dissertation, political theories may be identified 
according to the «decisive importance […] attached to the question of 
whether and to what extent one particular right can be seen as a prereq-
uisite for the possibility of enjoying another particular right»177. The 
explanatory priority of the good in the justification of rights, to which 
this dissertation commits itself, argues in favour of the primacy of the 
first category. Importantly however, the three categories mutually sup-
port and constitute one another because the conditions that encourage a 
common human flourishing are impossible to achieve without a com-
mitment to each aspect. As Thomas Hoppe further points out, each de-
pends in some manner on the others178. Opportunities for acting on de-
mocratic rights of participation in the political order considerably de-
pend on maintaining a minimum social and economic standard. For ex-
ample, a person who must daily struggle for her family’s survival will 
have few resources, or perhaps little interest, to engage or support free-
doms of the speech or the press. As a result, securing basic social and 
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economic rights must be a condition for any individual possibly being 
able to freely flourish. The same may be said in reverse. Successful im-
plementations of the conditions that sustain the well-being of an indi-
vidual require the acknowledgement of her choices and her contribu-
tions to the ongoing shaping of society. For example, a person may be-
come over dependent on social welfare to the detriment of their own 
capacities to contribute, by way of the good of work, to their own ful-
filment and the betterment of society. 
The differing orders of responsibilities and rights mutually support, 
rather than exclude, one another. Understood in this way, the Aristote-
lian-Thomist tradition of natural law is capable of taking account of the 
priorities of other traditions while remaining true to the resources and 
models of moral reasoning found within its own tradition.  
8.4 Consistency with the Tradition 
However, some disagree. Tracey Rowland, in Culture and the 
Thomist Tradition, makes the case that such an accommodation is im-
possible. Furthermore, it is directly levelled at Finnis and the New 
Natural Law project. She argues from a historical perspective, drawing 
upon an account of three traditions of enquiry proposed by Alasdair 
MacIntyre179. The Liberal tradition and the Thomist tradition are not 
simply incompatible. They are necessarily in conflict because the for-
mer, of which rights plays a key part, is sourced in the denunciation of 
Thomism and its theological moorings. She concludes: 
How can it be anything else when the genealogy of the rights project begins 
as an attack on classical Thomism and is then adopted as part of an ideo-
logical project to reach a political consensus in circumstances in which 
there was no commonly agreed upon anthropology? […] It is not merely 
Liberal rhetoric to which Liberals are attracted, but a whole package of val-
ues about the good, the person and the cosmos180. 
Rights, she argues, are ideological. The dominance of the Liberal inter-
pretation in popular discourse means that people, whose knowledge of 
concepts such as rights is tacitly acquired, come to think within a Liberal 
framework. In the end, it leads to the corruption and further social margin-
________________ 
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 Cf. A. MACINTYRE, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry. MacIntyre charts 
three traditions; the Aristotelian-Thomist, the Liberal, and the Genealogical. He pre-
sents the traditions of enquiry as necessarily in conflict. His account is more culturally 
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A. MACINTYRE, After Virtue; ID., Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 
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alisation of the Thomist tradition181. Ultimately, she charges Finnis with an 
ambivalent attitude towards liberalism182.  
Finnis does support the western political order and the institutions that 
arise from the liberal tradition but provides an alternative grounding by 
way of an adaptation of the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition. In an article en-
titled «The Catholic Church and Public Policy Debates in Western Liberal 
Societies», he begins by dismissing the term liberal as having «no core 
meaning sufficiently stable and clear for use in a general political philoso-
phy or theory»183. He then proceeds to praise Aquinas for being the «first 
Whig»184 for he 
insisted that the proper functions of the state’s laws and rulers do not in-
clude making people morally all-round good by requiring them to abstain 
from immorality. The role of state government and law, according to Aqui-
nas, is to uphold peace and justice; the requirements imposed, supervised, 
and enforced by state government and law concern only those sorts of 
choice and action which affect other people185.  
In effect, to be a «Whig» is to refrain from unduly imposing in an au-
thoritarian manner, by way of the law and state structures, one particu-
________________ 
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 Charles Covell makes a similar observation. Writing of Finnis among others, he 
writes: they were «simultaneously defenders of the Enlightenment, by reason of a 
common, if frequently unacknowledged, allegiance to the public values embodied in 
the legal and constitutional organisation of modern Liberal society. The basic fidelity 
of the theorists to these values was in no way qualified by their shared conviction that 
the political morality of secular liberal constitutionalism could no longer be supported 
in terms of the specific ideologies constructed during the actual historical period of 
the Enlightenment». C. COVELL, In Defence of the Natural Law, 234. 
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 J. FINNIS, «The Catholic Church and Public Policy Debates», 261. He maintains 
that we should do «our general critical political reflection without attempting to em-
ploy «Liberalism» as a framework category». Elsewhere, he maintains that liberalism 
has no place in a critical theory of jurisprudence, cf. J. FINNIS, «On the Critical Legal 
Studies Movement» 21-42. In another place he writes, «It is, I think, a mistake of 
method to frame one’s political theory in terms of «liberal» or «non-liberal» […] 
character». J. FINNIS., «Is Natural Law Theory Compatible with Limited Govern-
ment?», 9. In this thesis, the term liberalism is tied to the works of particular indi-
viduals and a tradition who claim the term.  
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lar concept of the good life. Aquinas, according to Finnis, admits this 
position. However, according to Rowland, «A spirit of generosity to-
wards those who are still imperfect in virtue does not make one a 
«Whig» or a «Liberal» […]»186. In turn, Finnis is claiming that the 
limitation of authority and the refusal to apply paternalistic laws is not 
a matter of benign leadership but one of principle187. The issue echoes a 
central question in the earlier encounter – the extent to which the insti-
tutions of governance, by way of the law, may or may not legitimately 
intervene in the lives of individuals188. It was then maintianed that a 
central characterstic of rights is to limit (that is, those acts that are not 
acceptable) and legitimise (that is, those acts that are acceptable) state 
authority.  
In response the central contention that I argue in this thesis is that 
reasoning according to the natural law may take account of the criti-
cisms and key elements of the other traditions while remaining faithful 
to the resources of its own tradition189.  
To recall: the first principles of the natural law are differentiated ac-
cording to a recognition, by way of practical reasoning reflecting on its 
own actions, of a plurality of goods, and the modes of responsibility 
that instantiate those goods and make up integral human flourishing. 
Implicit and necessary in this process is the free choice of each individ-
ual to pursue how they instantiate those goods in their lives. Further-
more, and also inherently in the process, is the need for common delib-
eration in order that the goods and the means to achieve them may be 
recognised and followed. Contemporary natural law can so account an 
individual responsibility of free choice and a common responsibility to 
deliberate on shared issues, while prioritising a responsibility to the 
other according to a just order. Furthermore, the three planes mutually 
constitute one another. Therefore, and in order for human flourishing to 
exist at all, all three responsibilities must be allowed to flourish: to 
deny any aspect of each is to diminish people’s possibilities for attain-
ing the good in their own lives. Consequently, a responsible govern-
________________ 
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 Of course, the limits on government and political authority are varied. For in-
stance, authority is limited by positive law, local customs and moral principles. He 
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by care for others». J. FINNIS, «Is Natural Law Theory Compatible with Limited Gov-
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ment must be guided by the standards of justice (the first plane), respect 
for the freedom of the individual (the second plane) and a deep civil 
democratic culture of deliberation on how the human good may be con-
cretely realised (the third plane). By being normatively guided by such 
principles, it is limited by such principles. Therefore, the limitation of 
authority according to the natural law and natural rights is not simply 
benign but a necessary requirement of the responsibilities of govern-
ance according to the principles of natural law. 
Corresponding to each responsibility are the different categories of 
rights – status postivus, status negativus, status actus. In practice, such 
rights insist that political authority and state-structures, communities 
and individuals live up to their responsibilities; thereby, being guided 
and so limited by the norms that facilitate integral human flourishing. 
Rights may have many sources outside the Aristotelian-Thomist tradi-
tion of natural law but they are not necessarily incompatible or incon-
sistent with natural law models of moral reasoning. In effect then, hu-
man rights may continue to function similarly to the older natural law. 
To paraphrase the words of Michael Bertram-Crowe: 
Not to labour the point, the doctrine of natural [and human] rights in many 
ways played, in the nineteenth century [and today], the part played by the 
natural law doctrine of former ages. That part might be described as the 
placing of a curb on the exercise of power in the political sphere (this is the 
particular force of the teaching on human rights) and the setting of objec-
tive standards of good and evil of individual conduct190. 
Rowland makes the kind of mistake identified by Henrich Rommen 
over fifty years ago. He warns against condemning elements of moder-
nity, such as rights and the associated social structures of modern de-
mocracy, because they may have roots in an unacceptable political phi-
losophy. He writes: 
We must avoid the mistake of [some] Catholic writers […] These writers 
attribute a kind of original sin to these political institutions, forgetting that 
what matters is not an admittedly wrong theoretical justification of a sound 
political institution, but its actual service to the common good under con-
crete conditions191.  
Such «a kind of an original sin» is the point of departure of Row-
land’s criticism. However, what must be recognised is that rights do 
________________ 
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J.J. Rousseau as an example of an objectionable political philosophy to «Catholic 
writers of political romanticism».  
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play a vital part in the concrete advancement of the common good. To 
her question are rights inherently incompatible with the natural law tra-
dition and the associated Catholic moral tradition, this thesis argues no. 
Importantly, human rights are not simply compatible: they may be 
viewed as important additions to the models of moral reasoning pro-
posed by the natural law. In the words of Finnis: 
If its logic and its place in practical reasonableness about human flourishing 
are kept in mind, the modern usage of claims of right as the principal 
counter in political discourse should be recognised (despite its dubious sev-
enteenth-century origins and its abuse by fanatics, adventurers, and self-
interested persons from the eighteenth century until today) as a valuable 
addition to the received vocabulary of practical reasonableness (i.e. to the 
tradition of ‘natural law’ doctrine)192. 
9. Conclusion: Unresolved Questions  
Far from being incapable of supporting rights, natural law theory is 
able to provide a comprehensive framework and mode of reasoning for 
their use. More importantly, it is able to provide a foundation and nor-
matively guide the social and political associations that have come to 
sustain rights – namely, constitutional democracy. As observed by 
Charles Covell:  
In one sense, then, Finnis was manifestly an assailant of modern liberalism 
[…] Yet in another sense, evident particularly in Natural Law and Natural 
Rights […] he ultimately agreed with other theorists […in this case, 
Dworkin and Habermas] about the form of social and political organisation 
[constitutional democracy] which most faithfully answered to the aspira-
tions of the common morality of Western civilisation193.  
Admittedly, the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition of natural law has not 
been at the forefront of the development of democracy. It may be said 
that when it came to accept the constitutional democratic political order 
as appropriate for the common good it was perhaps, to paraphrase 
Winston Churchill, because it is the best system of a bad lot194.  
________________ 
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However, I argue that contemporary natural law is capable of provid-
ing a foundation for the very functioning of constitutional democracy 
and associated individual rights. More exactly and a key implication, 
contemporary natural law argues that the principles of constitutional 
democracy adhere to the very presumptions of practical reasoning. The 
natural law can, therefore, provide a grounding and normative guide for 
the functioning of the contemporary political order. Such a develop-
ment may be viewed as example of what Finnis regards as the tradition 
working «itself pure, or is somewhat closer to having done so»195.  
But this points to a lacuna in the work of the New Natural Law theo-
rists. They rarely turn their attention to an analysis of contemporary 
democracy. I suggest that this may be due to a lack of consideration to 
the concept of power and how it functions in society, particularly to the 
benefit of some over others. It is a vital issue for it distorts deliberation 
and justification in favour of powerful – whether they are established 
elites or well-organised social movements or lobby groups – and there-
fore interferes with the process of practical reasoning in society.  
As argued by all three theorists, there is a responsibility at a social 
level on all those who hold positions of authority to continually justify 
their actions on the basis of good (or coherent or consensus-building) 
reasons. They must hold themselves open to question so that in the 
________________ 
 
citizens. The second is the principle of subsidiarity. Used extensively in Catholic So-
cial Teaching, “Subsidiarity, understood in the positive sense as economic, institu-
tional or juridical assistance offered to lesser social entities, entails a corresponding 
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pendium of Catholic Social Doctrine, 185. Cf. PAUL VI, Octogesima Adeniens, 22, 
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 J. FINNIS, «Natural Law and Discourse Ethics», 371. He writes, «On these 
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common and continual deliberation the best reasons come to the fore. 
Such responsibility may be described as answerability, or at a social 
level, accountability. Accountability, I put forward, is a potential 
counter-point, and so a normative principle, to which power must ac-
cede, if it wishes to become legitimate authority and sustain ongoing 
deliberation. This lacuna, I propose, is best filled by a greater dialogue 
with contemporary sociology. 
 I now turn to the final part of this thesis in which the considerations 
of this chapter are placed within a theological horizon.  
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 CHAPTER VII 
Theological Deliberations  
1. Introduction  
Thus far, this thesis has moved through distinct phases, namely His-
tory (Chapter I-II), Interpretation (Chapter III-V) and Dialectic (Chap-
ter VI). Briefly sketched in the Introduction, the stages provided a heu-
ristic structure: «method offers not rules to be followed blindly but a 
framework for creativity»1. Each presupposed and built upon the results 
of the former and, implicitly, each aimed towards the subsequent stage 
and a final goal2.  
The movement may be characterised as a progression from exposi-
tion (History and Interpretation) to evaluation (Dialectic). The course 
of the evaluation committed the thesis to a specific viewpoint or tradi-
tion of enquiry – the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition of natural law – or, 
in Lonergan’s terms, a particular «horizon». The present methodologi-
cal category of Foundation takes a further step. It completes the pro-
gression from exposition and evaluation towards a stance on «the added 
foundation needed to move from the indirect discourse that sets forth 
the convictions and opinions of others to the direct discourse that states 
what is so»3. 
________________ 
 
1
 B. LONERGAN, Method in Theology, xi; cf. ID., «Metaphysics as Hori-
zon», 202-221.  
2
 Cf. Intro, Sec. 4. ff; Ch. 6.1.  
3
 B. LONERGAN, Method in Theology, 267. 
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2. The Theological Horizon 
Lonergan contented that at «its real root» the functional specialisa-
tion of Foundation occurs in the human experience of deliberation, 
evaluation and decision. At one level, deliberation, evaluation and deci-
sion provided the heuristic structure or form of the project undertaken 
in this thesis. But at another, they pointed to its very content – the in-
ternal structures of deliberation and justification that provide norms or 
principles for evaluation and correct decision making according to three 
theorists representative of three traditions of enquiry. It may be said 
therefore that this whole thesis has been concerned with the study of 
Foundations. 
In the comparative stage some similarities between the theorists were 
observed: for instance, a common personal commitment to enter the 
public debate; a shared purpose in defending rights and the contempo-
rary political order; a critique of some perceived failures in the political 
order and of positions hostile to rights; and similar internal dynamics of 
their theories4. But there are also differences. To return to Lonergan’s 
terms, such differences may be genetic, complimentary or dialectic5. 
The process of comparison in the last chapter revealed dialectical dif-
ferences between horizons. At base, what is considered intelligible, true 
or good for one is considered un-intelligible, false or bad for another: 
for example, their disagreement on the fundamental nature of practical 
reasoning and the corresponding explanation of what counts as a good 
and just reason for action. 
Differences between them at this level are so great that they may 
only be bridged by conversion. To move to a new horizon dialectically 
opposed to another requires a conscious decision, an about face or new 
beginning. A conversion between horizons may be intellectual, moral 
or religious. The first turns towards reality and objectivity; the second 
changes the criteria of decision making; the third is the affirmation of 
self-transcendence. According to Lonergan, «Foundational reality, as 
distinct from its expression, is conversion: religious, moral, and intel-
lectual […] It is a fully conscious decision about one’s horizon, one’s 
outlook, one’s world-view»6. 
________________ 
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The course of the Dialectic, in the previous chapter, overtly commit-
ted this thesis to the natural law tradition of enquiry, and its adaptation 
to accommodate rights-language. The thesis argues for the central role 
of the good in substantive moral reasoning and in guiding the political 
order, epitomised by this model. The Aristotelian-Thomist tradition of 
natural law and theory provides the horizon for the thesis as whole, in-
fluencing it from the beginning; for instance, the attention paid to the 
medieval origins of rights.  
But implicit is a further horizon – the theological. For example, 
both the tradition and the theorist are associated with the Roman 
Catholic theological tradition of moral enquiry. Although Natural 
Law and Natural Rights is a work of philosophical jurisprudence, 
John Finnis explicitly refers to «the Roman Catholic Church’s pro-
nouncements on natural law, because that body is perhaps unique in 
the modern world in claiming to be an authoritative exponent of natu-
ral law»7.  
It is the theological horizon that provides the foundational reality 
for this thesis, as described by Lonergan above. It is its most basic and 
fundamental horizon. Considered in this manner, this dissertation has 
always been a theological thesis; albeit, one that commits itself from 
the beginning to take the philosophical debate seriously. In light of 
the progression of this thesis, Lonergan is worth quoting in length:  
Neither the converted not the unconverted are to be excluded from the re-
search, interpretation, history, or dialectic. […] Such different histories, dif-
ferent interpretations, and their underlying different styles in research be-
come the centre of attention in dialectic. There they will be reduced to their 
roots. But the reduction itself will only reveal the converted with one set of 
roots and the unconverted with a number of different sets. Conversion is a 
matter of moving from one set of roots to another. […] It is a process that 
may be occasioned by scientific inquiry. But it occurs only inasmuch as a 
man discovers what is unauthentic in himself and turns away from it, inas-
much as he discovers what the fullness of human authenticity can be and 
embraces it with his whole being. It is something very cognate to the Chris-
tian gospel, which cries out: Repent! The kingdom of God is at hand8. 
This section is the explicit consideration of the implicit commitments 
to a theological horizon. The aim of the Chapter as a whole is to place 
________________ 
 
static. Instead, the wider meaning aims at «decreasing darkness and increasing light 
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the natural law grounding of human rights outlined in the previous 
chapter within and consonant to a Christian theological vision.  
3. Situating the Theological Discussion 
As the widest horizon of the thesis, Part One – History – turned par-
tially on the role of Christian theology, and in particular Roman 
Catholic theology9. It began by charting the rise of rights from the ini-
tial systematisation of canon law and the subsequent jurisprudence of 
church lawyers in the twelfth century. It finished with an analysis of 
the assertion of a variety of rights, related to the duties of each ac-
cording to the common good, made by Pope John XXIII in Pacem in 
Terris (1963). Furthermore, the two chapters that comprised this Part 
were divided at the beginnings of modernity, characterised as that 
point in the mid-seventeenth century which discarded the core of what 
went previously. «In this decisive moment of amnesia, theology – or 
the rejection of it – played a central part»10. 
It was in response to this aspect of modernity that Roman Catholi-
cism rejected the newly prominent rights-rhetoric11. As a result, it 
downplayed the role of an inherent rights language within its own 
scholastic and natural law tradition, which is only being fully ac-
knowledged by scholarly research today12. The negative response to 
modernity had both socio-political and intellectual dimensions. John 
Langan writes about the political inclinations of the Church: «Ca-
tholicism’s institutional sympathies during most of the nineteenth cen-
tury were with a conservatism which had its roots in the ancien ré-
gime. It is important neither to conceal not to overstate these sympa-
thies»13. But there were also deep intellectual differences14. For in-
________________ 
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 I concede that there are variations in approaches to rights between various de-
nominations. For instance, «Protestant opposition to rights language was not as strong 
or perduring [sic] as Catholic opposition». C. CURRAN, «Churches and Human 
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stance, theology viewed with scepticism the turn to the subject and the 
decline of metaphysics15.  
According to E. Martinez-Fernandez, the movement from rejection 
to accommodation may be charted in three phases. The first began 
with hostility and condemnation (1789-1878); the second was a stage 
of transition and cautious interest (1878-1958); the final period moved 
towards an acceptance of their significance and continues to this day 
(1958 - )16.  
The primary catalyst for the appropriation of rights-language was 
the developing social teaching of the church. Although social teaching 
was always present in the tradition, by engaging with modern social 
dilemmas, Catholic social teaching took a new explicit form in the 
declaration of Rerum Novarum (1891)17. Initially, the language of 
church teaching in this area did not consist of individual subjective 
rights18. Rather, the justice for workers and the poor it wished to af-
firm was viewed as the necessary result of the duties of all under the 
natural law. Subsequent documents continued to engage with chang-
ing socio-economic and political issues in light of the experiences of 
the church and the demands of the Gospel. The encyclical Pacem in 
Terris (1963) was the first to be explicitly expressed in rights-
language. Of this document, Langan claims that it represents, along 
with the experience and documents of the Second Vatican Council, a 
________________ 
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resolution of Catholicism’s «long struggle with modernising and 
secularising culture of the West»19.  
Allowing for particular socio-political interests, the motivation for 
the social teaching of the Church has been primarily inspired by its 
pursuit of its religious mission, and as a consequence, the desire to 
protect the Church’s freedom to do so20. As Gaudium et Spes (1965) 
declared, «In virtue of the Gospel entrusted to it, the Church pro-
claims the rights of man: she acknowledges and holds in high esteem 
the dynamic approach of today which is fostering these rights all over 
the world»21.  
Among the many documents of Church social teaching, important 
elements may be discerned which have underpinned the church’s use of 
rights22: the priority of the social commitment; the assertion of the dig-
nity of the human person; the preferred place of the poor; the common 
good; solidarity and subsidiarity23. The use of rights-language has be-
come extensive throughout the official teaching documents, the state-
ments of local Episcopacies, the reflections of theologians and the ac-
tions of lay Christian advocacy groups24. Today, the Catholic Church 
and the Papacy are considered by many to be significant upholders of 
many human rights, both at a local and global level25.  
________________ 
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3.1 A Challenge 
The above all too brief charting of the historical ecclesial move-
ment towards rights-rhetoric is made at this point in order to raise an 
important challenge, critical to a theological reflection upon rights. 
Joan Lockwood-O’Donovan warns against a common pitfall associ-
ated with the simple placing of rights language within a theological 
framework. The caution she raises is this: if rights substantially 
evolved outside a theological vision, as claimed by some in Chapter 
II, the appropriation of rights may necessarily entail the adoption of 
an alien framework incompatible with that vision. The necessity of 
an in-depth historical section to begin this thesis takes further sig-
nificance in light of her challenge.  
The challenge is similar to the one posed by Tracey Rowland in 
Chapter VI. She maintains that the use of rights by the New Natural 
Law is contradictory for it admits a liberal ideology that is necessar-
ily in conflict with the Thomist tradition26. In response, it is argued 
by this thesis that this is not the case: the tradition has resources 
within itself to respond the challenges of other traditions without 
admitting an alien conceptual framework27.  
Yet, as Lockwood-O’Donovan rightly points out, the dominant 
model of rights in the contemporary Western world is that of the lib-
eral tradition28. Similar to the observations made thus far in this the-
sis, she argues that the central conceptual content of this tradition are 
property rights, contractual relationships and freedom of choice29. 
The anthropological vision that this implies is of an individual 
«paradigmatically engaged in disposing, using, exchanging, com-
manding and demanding»30. Therefore,  
________________ 
 
Ann Glendon, a professor of Harvard Law School, writes, «the Church has emerged 
as, intellectually and institutionally, the single most influential champion of the 
whole, interconnected, body of principles in the Universal Declaration». 
M.A. GLENDON, «Rights Babel», 623. Of course, it is important to admit that there 
are many who would disagree and consider the Catholic Church to be a significant 
obstacle in the path of the implementation of many rights.  
26
 By ideology is meant «a smoke screen to conceal vested interests». 
Cf. J.M. LOCHMAN, «Ideology or Theology of Human Rights?», 15. 
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 Cf. Ch. VI, Sec. 7. 
28
 Cf. App. C. She cites Thomas Hobbes (cf. Ch. II, Sec. 2.2), John Locke (cf. Ch. 
II, Sec. 2.4), Immanuel Kant (cf. Ch II, Sec. 3.4) and contemporary liberals such as 
Robert Nozick and John Rawls (cf. Ch. V, Sec. 4). 
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 Cf. Ch. II, Sec. 2.2.4; Ch. VI, Sec 5. 
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 J. LOCKWOOD-O’DONOVAN, «Historical Prolegomena», 64.  
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the equality of individuals is economic before it is political: behind the 
multitude of naturally self-governing individuals, whose sovereign collec-
tive will government serves, is a multitude of naturally self-owning indi-
viduals […]31.  
But such a politico-philosophical anthropology, she argues, is op-
posed to a theological vision, sourced in scriptures, the early Fathers or 
the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition. She warns that theologians should 
not uncritically «adopt a child of such questionable parentage as the 
concept of human rights»32. Theologians and Christians may be overly 
optimistic in their belief about rights. Such optimism, she contends, en-
courages the deployment of a counterproductive language that under-
mines an authentic Christian vision (which is given further considera-
tion later in this chapter). As a result, an uncritical embrace of rights 
can inhibit Christianity itself – that is, the building of the Kingdom. She 
offers a condemning evaluation of much of the contemporary theologi-
cal assimilation of rights: «My impression is that theologians are fre-
quently engaged in a naïve and facile appropriation of the language of 
rights»33. Her alarm is not unique. Others urging vigilance include pre-
viously mentioned Tracey Rowland and Ernst Fortin34 and others such 
as Kenneth Craycraft35, James Schall36, Stanley Hauerwas37.  
Kieran Cronin, in Rights and Christian Ethics, observes two main 
types of scepticism – conceptual and moral – which broadly coincide 
with the meta-ethical and normative distinction38. The first claims that 
________________ 
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rights have no logical or epistemological coherence or grounding39. 
Many theologians who accept rights, he laments, presume the basic 
logical respectability of the concept40. Instead, any moral-theological 
opposition to the language of rights tends to be normative. Examples of 
such critique include: rights foster individualism and egoism to the det-
riment of social solidarity41; they create an adversarial culture counter-
acting social harmony and peace42; or they obstruct a deep trust in the 
providence of God43. 
Lockwood-O’Donovan represents this latter type of scepticism. 
Rights act as a Trojan horse – to accept them is to accept unwelcome 
propositions about society and the human person that contradict and ul-
timately undermine more important values and the means to protect 
those values. To a degree, she is reflecting the critique and caution to-
wards rights made by Burke, Marx and the nineteenth-century Popes44. 
Despite the extensive acceptance of rights by the teaching authorities of 
the Catholic Church and other Christian denominations, Lockwood-
O’Donovan still doubts that a successful adoption is possible:  
Christian political thought (both Catholic and Protestant) that is not wholly 
complacent with this fabric [of democratic, pluralistic, technological liber-
alism] recognises the need to divest the concept of rights of its offensive 
theoretical material, but when it attempts to rescue conceptual threads from 
the fabric the result inevitably falls short: either too much of the fabric ad-
heres to the threads or they lose their coherent texture45.  
The challenge is worth recounting because it cuts to the central ques-
tion of this thesis – what is at stake in the use of rights? According to 
Lockwood-O’Donovan and others what is at stake is too much to risk. 
For theological defenders of rights-rhetoric what is at stake is such that 
human rights are an important, if not necessary, aid in the advancement 
of the theological vision. 
A historical prolegomena also provides further theological chal-
lenges. For instance, the historical chapters of this thesis and the ob-
servations of Lockwood O’Donovan draw attention to what is ab-
________________ 
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sent. Rights – understood as possessive claims or entitlements predi-
cated to the individual subject – are not immediately evident in the 
Scriptures or the early Tradition. In fact, they are not present at all. 
As Barnabas Mary Ahern attests «It would be anachronistic to try to 
match details of this highly developed doctrine [human rights] with 
precise provisions and explicit statements in the books of the Bible 
which belong to an entirely different age»46. How then may a Catho-
lic theology and the Magisterium interpret these two primary sources 
of Revelation (scripture and tradition) in order to provide a founda-
tion for rights that is consonant with those sources and so not fall 
foul of the above danger?  
3.2 Methodological Approaches 
Concisely, the contemporary theoretical foundation by Catholic the-
ology of human rights, and their defence and propagation, is twofold – 
in line with its commitment to the fundamental compatibility of nature 
and grace. As observed in the working papers of the Roman Catholic 
International Theological Commission: 
The example of the 2nd Vatican Council and of recent popes is interesting 
for methodology. Although first appealing to human experience and human 
reason, they have then looked as well to both the doctrine of creation (im-
age of God; supernatural destiny) and to Christ and the Gospel for addi-
tional supports of human dignity and human rights47.  
Rights may be supported according to two pillars; the dictates of rea-
son and the truths of revelation. Of this twofold method, David Hollen-
bach observes that it is a fundamental commitment of Catholic theol-
ogy to both reason and faith in moral and dogmatic reflection which 
creates one of the deep biases of the catholic tradition to respond to is-
sues with a both/and rather than either/or48. Evident throughout the 
documents of the Magisterium, it is captured by the first section of 
Pacem in Terris. Firstly,  
Any human society, if it is to be well-ordered and productive, must lay 
down as a foundation this principle, namely, that every human being is a 
person, that is, his nature is endowed with intelligence and free will. By 
virtues of this, he has rights and duties of his own, flowing directly and si-
________________ 
 
46
 Cf. B.M. AHERN, «Biblical Doctrine», 301. He continues, «No sacred writer 
would have thought of using the term ‘human dignity’».  
47
 Cf. W. PRINCIPE, «The Rights of the Human Person», 392 ff. 
48
 Cf. D. HOLLENBACH, Justice, Peace, and Human Rights, 93 ff.  
CH. VII: THEOLOGICAL DELIBERATIONS 349 
multaneously from his very nature, which are therefore universal, inviola-
ble and inalienable49.  
That is immediately followed by the statement 
If we look upon the dignity of the human person in the light of divinely re-
vealed truth, we cannot help but esteem it far more highly; for men are re-
deemed by the blood of Jesus Christ, they are by grace the children and 
friends of God and heirs of eternal glory50.  
Walter Kasper has described this methodological approach as an 
ascending argument of natural law supplemented by a «descending 
specifically theological argument»51. For instance, a paper intended 
to foster the reflection upon and advocacy for human rights pub-
lished by the Pontifical Commission on Justice and Peace, entitled 
The Church and Human Rights, organises much of its material ac-
cording to the plane of reason (art. 36-39) and the plane of faith (art. 
40-44)52.  
Within an implicit theological horizon, this thesis has thus far fo-
cused largely on the elaboration of human rights according to phi-
losophers, historians, sociologists and jurists – the first pillar. The 
present chapter turns to the specific claims and insights of Christian 
theology – the second pillar. Its most fundamental presupposition, 
then, is faith. In the words of the International Theological Commis-
sion reflecting on the rights and dignity of the human person, 
Even if Jesus Christ may be seen as the culmination of all human longing 
for union with God, the Incarnation and the Saving Work of Jesus Christ 
are the mysteries unattainable by unaided human reason and unprovable by 
reason once they have been revealed; they can be investigated only within 
faith53.  
Firstly, the following chapter will further trace the implications 
this bi-directional approach. Secondly, it will trace a movement be-
tween the theological reasons offered for the dignity of the human 
person and a consonant model and employment of human rights. 
________________ 
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4. The Relationship between Faith and Ethics 
At base, the scepticism of Lockwood-O’Donovan turns on the rela-
tionship between models of faith and ethics – the vision of the former is 
threatened by the presumptions of the latter. In Faith and Ethics, Vin-
cent MacNamara surveys the debates and developments of Roman 
Catholic moral theology of the past hundred years in light this relation-
ship. It reveals a «situation usually characterised as a clear division be-
tween the autonomous ethic and the Glaubensethik»54. In admittedly 
crude terms, the «Autonomy» school rejects any specific Christian 
moral norms beyond what may be discerned by reason alone and the 
«Glaubensethik» (Faith-Ethic) school claims that some content of mo-
rality may be revealed and so specific to Christianity. Both schools of 
thought do claim the distinctiveness of Christian ethics: the former ar-
gues that faith provides a unique motivation for moral action; the latter 
claims that faith provides both motivation and some distinctive norms 
to guide moral action55. 
Of the former, «Most uncompromising of all is the position of 
Gerard Hughes»56. Hughes writes, «We stand on essentially the same 
footing as secular moralists […] Our Christian faith cannot supplement 
the knowledge of ethics which is available to us apart from Christian 
revelation»57. Therefore, «We should not use Scripture or Tradition as 
the ultimate authority for deciding any moral issue»58. Instead, faith 
makes available to moral action a motivation that marks the Christian 
different from a person of good will.  
In a two-part article entitled, «Reflections on an Essay in Christian 
Ethics», Finnis agrees with Hughes’s starting point that a credible 
basis for ethics may be provided outside of Revelation59. But he re-
________________ 
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jects Hughes’s conclusion (and by association, much of the Auton-
omy school). In the first of the two reflections, he argues that 
Hughes misunderstands the claims of authority made for Revelation 
(transmitted by way of Scripture, Tradition and Magisterium) in 
Catholic moral theology, for he «slides back and forth between two 
quite different senses of ‘ultimate’»60. The first sense is «exclusive» 
or «exclusionary»; the second meaning is «conclusive», «with cer-
tainty» or «of convincing force». Understood in this latter way, 
Revelation can claim ultimate authority without being the only or 
unique court of appeal in considering moral issues. It does not over-
ride antecedent rational argumentation, as implied by the former 
sense. The appeal to Revelation’s authority, therefore, is not an at-
tempt to circumvent independent moral reasoning but to clarify, cor-
rect, guide and support moral beliefs and practices61. Rather than 
mere motivation towards moral action, Revelation provides a re-
source to moral reflection for the Christian that supplements, and not 
substitutes, the partial justifications of a person of good will. 
4.1 Theological Reasons for Action  
A central aspect of the dialectical encounter of the previous chapter 
concerned the provision of intelligible reasons in the justification of 
moral norms and action62. At that point, an initial distinction was made 
between motivation and justification. Vincent MacNamara observes 
that the above debate also revolves, in part, on this distinction. The 
Autonomy school, he notes, confusingly uses the term «motivation». 
Motives may be described as intelligible reasons for action. 
But motives are particular kinds of reason, or reasons under a particular as-
pect. All motives are reasons, but not all reasons are motives. We are inter-
ested in moral reasons and one may have a moral reason for doing some-
________________ 
 
60
 J. FINNIS, «Reflections on an Essay in Christian Ethics. Part One», 52. He con-
tinues: «(A) x is ultimately authoritative if, and only if, it provides an answer to a 
[moral] question in the absence of any other considerations supporting either that an-
swer in particular or the authority of x in general. (B) x is ultimately authoritative if, 
and only if, it constitutes a conclusive argument for a certain answer to a [moral] 
question, even though there are other arguments or considerations supporting that an-
swer in particular and/or the authority of x in general […] Catholic theology […] con-
siders that God’s will as revealed in scripture (interpreted by tradition) is ultimately 
authoritative in sense (B) but not in sense (A)».  
61
 Cf. J. FINNIS, «Reflections on an Essay in Christian Ethics. Part One», 55-58. 
62
 Cf. Ch. VI, Sec. 6.1-6.4. 
PART FOUR: FOUNDATION 352 
thing without thereby having a motive […] reasons for action can be inde-
pendent of motives63.  
Although difficult to clearly distinguish, motives may be said to ex-
plain behaviour from a pragmatic, psychological or causal point of 
view. But on their own, they do not necessarily provide a justification 
for a moral act. Justification provides reasons for why an act is deter-
mined, evaluated or judged to be good or beneficial or right. A justify-
ing reason is «a consideration which entitles one to say that to act thus 
is to act morally. A motive […] does not»64.  
MacNamara criticises the Autonomy school for ambiguity. He argues 
that the resources of Revelation do supply reasons to the Christian that 
make certain choices intelligible and allow certain actions to be judged 
as morally appropriate. Such reasons do not merely provide a motiva-
tion but also a framework and a final ground of their judgments. In 
turn, such reasons will determine some specifically Christian moral ac-
tions – for example, choosing to be poor, commitment to virginity or 
celibacy, not to take up arms or to bear suffering with dignity. 
What is involved here is the determination of the moral response. It is diffi-
cult for human beings to determine its extent. The Christian allows belief in 
Christ or in the Father to fill out his or her understanding. What is in ques-
tion, therefore, is not the arousing of desire to implement a moral judgment 
already arrived at; it is not motivation but understanding of the moral de-
mand65.  
The assertion is drawn upon by Kieran Cronin: «What MacNamara is 
saying, […] is that one must take a step back beyond motives to the jus-
tifying reasons which move people. And […], one will find reasons 
based on religious beliefs, which distinguish the actions of Christians 
from those of non-Christians»66. Importantly, asserting reasons on reli-
gious grounds does not mean that reasons on other grounds are insig-
nificant, may be ignored or are automatically wrong. As noted above, 
Catholic moral theology maintains that Revelation supplements rather 
than substitutes moral reasoning. He continues,  
I am claiming that religious beliefs provide ultimate justifying reasons for 
acting morally without contradicting the fundamental natural law reasons. I 
use two different terms - «ultimate» and «fundamental» - to qualify the dif-
________________ 
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ferent kinds of reasons here, because I want to maintain their complemen-
tary roles in moral reasoning within Christian ethics67.  
It may be said that Cronin’s use of the term «fundamental» may be 
paralleled to Finnis’s «basic goods». Moreover, his use of the term «ul-
timate» corresponds to that of Finnis. Revelation provides for Chris-
tians an authoritative source of reasons that justify their moral actions. 
Theologically informed reasons for action are those justifications of-
fered for action according to the central tenets of belief (such as dogma 
or the creed), texts (such as the scriptures), symbols (such as the lit-
urgy) and traditions (such as types of spirituality). From the point of 
view of belief, actions are judged as morally good to the extent that 
they reflect the truth perceived in faith. It is in this manner that «theo-
logical reasons for action» provide the explication of the final ground 
or foundation for Christian moral activity.  
4.2 Taking Theological Reasons Seriously 
As previously outlined, the second pillar of the Roman Catholic 
foundation for rights is based on theological reasons. Not all who con-
sider rights do so naively; taking such reasons seriously is important for 
believers, wider society, and theology itself68. 
Firstly, such reasons are critical for believers because, as Cronin con-
tinues, «the moral focus will be on patterns of action which reflect the 
truth about human life in this world. And central to this truth is the ex-
istence of a God in whom one lives and moves and has one’s being»69. 
Christian belief bears an imperative to consider and justify one’s ac-
tions in the light of faith. At a social level, it compels the Christian 
community to attempt to bring the conceptual categories of theology to 
bear on societal life and common enterprise; or in this case, on the cor-
rect ordering of justice, the employment of rights and the theory and 
practice of the law. On one hand, theology may critique systems of jus-
tice, rights and law that are considered incompatible with its central 
truths. On the other, it may constructively engage with other disciplines 
focused on these areas, such as jurisprudence, in order to constructively 
correlate their central questions and concerns. 
________________ 
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But, and secondly, how can theologically informed reasons for action 
inform the wider debate about rights outside a specific Christian com-
munity? It is still largely dominated by the secular theorists; a situation 
reflected in this thesis70. As already outlined, this is partly due to his-
torical reasons; rights gained momentum when severed from their 
original theological moorings. Indeed, some theorists, such as Leo 
Strauss, argue that reflection on human rights «should be kept inde-
pendent of theology and its controversies»71. However, as brought out 
in the expositions and comparative study of the contemporary debate, 
there is no value-free means (as proposed by legal positivism) to ana-
lyse the law, justice and human rights. In contemporary society, the le-
gitimate rule of law based on rights must be continually informed by 
understandings of the good, according to Finnis, principles of political 
morality, as observed by Dworkin, or engagement by the participants in 
the process of deliberative democracy, as proposed by Habermas. The 
rule of law is value-ladened. There is a responsibility on everyone, and 
particularly on the holders of authority, to take account of and provide a 
continual clarification and justification for the values or goods that in-
form the rule of law72. Theology has a valid part to play in that process 
– either, as noted in the previous paragraph, in the form of ideological 
critique or by a constructive engagement that proposes a common cor-
respondence between the implications of the central tenets of theology 
and the concerns of jurisprudence, sociology, political science and 
other human sciences. Indeed, theology may offer a counter-balance to 
some extremes in the secular debate. 
Thirdly, theology reflecting on rights needs to take its own reasons 
seriously. As will be argued in the next section, a simple appeal to their 
appropriateness is not enough. In fact, such a straightforward assertion 
by theologians can lead to potential dangers. To return to the challenge 
of Lockwood-O’Donovan: 
Across denominational boundaries there is a quite a predictable argument 
from the creation of human-kind in God’s image to the unique dignity of 
persons in community to their universal possession of rights […] there ap-
________________ 
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pears to be a consensus about the unproblematic nature of the move from 
human dignity to human rights once the theological «foundation» or «anal-
ogy» is prepared73.  
In allowing for her concerns, the next sections of this chapter dwell 
on the «logic» that moves from the dignity of the person – as proposed 
by natural reason or revelation – to human rights.  
5. From Human Dignity to Human Rights  
The assertion of human dignity plays an important role in contempo-
rary rights declarations and their political protection and promotion74. 
The Preamble of the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights 
(1948): «Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal 
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foun-
dation of freedom, justice and peace in the world […]»75. The more re-
cent Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000) af-
firms as its first article: «Human dignity is inviolable. It must be re-
spected and protected»76. Furthermore, it is used widely in the advo-
cacy of rights by non-governmental organisations. Observing such a 
tendency, Oscar Schactner writes,  
References to human dignity are to be found in various resolutions and dec-
larations of international bodies. National constitutions and proclamations, 
especially those recently adopted, include the idea or goal of human dignity 
in their references to human rights. Political leaders, jurists and philoso-
phers have increasingly alluded to the dignity of the human person […] No 
other ideal seems so clearly accepted as a universal good77. 
Yet despite such a prominent place, he also notes that there is no 
«explicit definition of the expression “dignity of the human person” in 
international instruments or (as far as I know) in national law»78. Per-
________________ 
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haps the observations made of rights during the process of drafting the 
UNDHR may be applied also to dignity – all are unanimous on its im-
portance provided nobody asks why?79 
Moreover, scholarly reflection on rights gives relatively little consid-
eration to the concept. To take an apt example, the three central theo-
rists of this dissertation rarely refer to human dignity – as testified to by 
the central expository chapters. The index of Natural Law and Natural 
Rights refers to dignity three times and points the reader to the term 
personality. It does not appear at all in the index of Taking Rights Seri-
ously. The index of Between Facts and Norms merely directs the reader 
to the term integrity. To these authors, a simple appeal to dignity as the 
source of human rights is inadequate for a full explication.  
The etymological root of dignity is dignitas or worth. In the context 
of the above Declarations and Instruments of International Law, it re-
fers to the intrinsic worth or value of the human person. But the docu-
ments (and indeed, much of the advocacy of assertions by political and 
NGO groupings) offer no answer to two important questions identified 
by Martin McKeever: «how do we come to know the dignity and worth 
of the human person and how this knowledge leads to the recognition 
of the rights subsequently listed […]»80. Instead, the former (dignity) is 
often presumed and the latter (rights) is simply asserted to arise from it.  
Although often taken for granted, there is no simple logical or 
straightforward move from human dignity to human rights81. In this re-
gard, Lockwood-O’Donovan is right. To take a practical example, it is 
possible to assert the human dignity of oneself or many by forfeiting 
rather than claiming one’s own human rights in an act of self sacrifice. 
M.J. Meyer concludes that «having human rights – though they are at 
times well suited to the expression of our dignity – does not capture 
everything that is significant about human dignity»82. To take a schol-
arly example, it is possible for a journal issue to be dedicated to the 
________________ 
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concept of dignity without being committed to any consequent ex-
tended analysis of rights83.  
Instead of a simple logical derivation from the former to the latter, it 
is the contention of this thesis that the two arise from the same dynamic 
of practical reasoning84. As outlined and accepted by this thesis, the ba-
sic reasons for action are those justifications understood by the actor to 
be those purposes considered to be most worthwhile or good. On the 
one hand, the assertion of the dignity or worth of the human person is 
the recognition that each person can and ought to live in a worthwhile 
way85. On the other, the subsequent listings of rights are those norms 
that protect, foster and facilitate the good or worthy lives of all. In the 
terms of the natural law, knowing that each person is worthwhile (or 
possesses dignity) is to recognise and allow each to pursue the goods 
that make each life worthwhile (protected by the core of human rights). 
In a manner, the two questions identified by McKeever do not logically 
follow one from the other but are mutually dependent on each other. 
The dignity of the human person is a value-assertion of practical rea-
soning. Importantly, it cannot be deduced from any facts regarding the 
human person offered by the other sciences86. This is not to disregard 
the important role of theoretical reasoning in deepening our common 
understanding of the human person87. Information from philosophy or 
the human sciences, such as metaphysics, anthropology, psychology or 
sociology, do inform the deliberation of practical reasoning. In turn, 
values which are recognised by practical reasoning inform the under-
standing, organisation and application of the information offered by the 
theoretical sciences concerned with the human person. The movement, 
________________ 
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therefore, operates in both directions in the process of deliberation. In 
the words of Finnis, 
there is thus a movement to and fro between, on one hand, assessments of 
human good and of its practical requirements, and on the other hand, ex-
planatory descriptions (using all the appropriate historical, experimental, 
and statistical techniques to trace all relevant causal interrelationships) of 
the human context in which human well-being is variously realised and 
variously ruined88. 
Ethics, or a reflection upon practical reasoning towards action, is es-
sential to the pursuit of understanding of the human person. Ethics is 
not a derivative discipline – it does not provide prescriptions following 
from a pre-apprehended abstract knowledge. Rather, it contributes to a 
complete understanding of the human person by discerning the pur-
poses, goals or integral fulfilment to which the human person aspires 
and the means by which they may be achieved. It is a central and con-
stitutive part in all human reflection89.  
6. A Theology of Human Dignity and Human Rights 
The same may also be said of moral theology. Moral theology is not 
a derivative discipline to the speculations on revealed truths. Rather, it 
is central to and constitutive of theology as a whole for it contributes to 
a complete understanding of the human person – who is the subject of 
salvation. In specific regard to rights, therefore, there can be no strict 
deduction of such norms from the assertion of the theological fact of 
the dignity of the person: «such a foundation is possible neither deduc-
tively – i.e. by a priori deduction from given theological premises – nor 
still less inductively – i.e. by a purely positivistic a posteriori ap-
proach»90. To do so is to neglect the complex historical and social con-
________________ 
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figurations bound to particular times and places – and potentially fall 
into the trap identified by Lockwood-O’Donovan. Instead, 
The assertion and defence of human rights in the name of Christ and the 
Gospel must, it seems, be based not so much on theological deduction of 
specific rights from his saving work as on (1) a constant insistence on the 
enhanced personal dignity that derives from Christ’s revelation and effec-
tive presence, and (2) a Spirit-inspired prophetic judgment by Christians 
condemning evils that appear for the first time or that, having existed, are 
now seen to be incompatible with the human dignity of any existing human 
being because each person is affected by Christ’s saving work91. 
Theological reflection on rights involves a «to and fro movement» 
between points (1) and (2). The method then is not of strict deduction 
but one of inference, clarification, substantiation, and corroboration 
guided by sound reasoning. It moves between the theological categories 
by which revealed truths are comprehended and the practical reasoning 
of Christians in the living through the truths of their faith. 
To conceive of method in moral theology in such a manner, moves 
moral theology to the centre of theology. Ethics is not secondary to 
faith. Rather, there is a mutually informing relationship, implying two 
consequences. Firstly, it is a dynamic view that allows for the historical 
development of both dogma and moral norms – as testified to by the 
move from hostility to acceptance of rights observed above. Secondly, 
it becomes incumbent on systematic or dogmatic theologians who offer 
theological justifications for rights to take the anthropologies proposed 
by ethical reflection seriously.  
In light of the above methodology, the chapter now turns to provide a 
presentation of a theology of rights consonant with the Catholic tradi-
tion – particularly in light of the theological loci of the Scriptures and 
the Magisterial teaching of the Second Vatican Council92. It will move 
back and forward between the loci, while being informed by the insight 
of integral human fulfilment, so that they may mutually enrich each 
other. It does so in order to answer the proposed questions of C. Wack-
enheim: «In the language of the Council what does the expression iura 
hominum embrace? How is the current proclamation linked to the Gos-
pel?»93. It is a creative process that moves back and forth between the 
________________ 
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theological loci – with a continued awareness of the moral presump-
tions to which they align themselves. Of the cluster of moral ideas that 
gather around rights, I wish to focus on freedom, before unpacking the 
theological categories that act as the foundation or analogical equiva-
lent to the assertion of human dignity. I admit that it is not the only 
model that may be discerned94.  
6.1 The Theological Employment of Rights 
It is conceded that the cautionary counsels of Rowland and Lock-
wood-O’Donovan, among others, need to be taken seriously95. They are 
correct to say that slack employment of rights by the Magisterium, 
theologians or Christian advocates may lead to counter-productive con-
sequences. For instance, the pronouncements often fail to discern be-
tween differing fundamental types of rights, as identified by Hohfeld 
and contemporary jurisprudence96. In the eagerness to assert the impor-
tance of rights, other pronouncements can underplay the foundational 
role of the good in their eagerness to assert the importance of rights. 
Finally, a lack of implementation or the perceived lack of commitment 
to rights within the internal organisation of the Church ultimately un-
dermines its witness to human rights in the world97.  
It is not however a leap-into-the-dark98. It is the central contention of 
this thesis that the natural law tradition has the resources to adapt and 
adopt rights-language while remaining faithful to its means of moral 
reasoning that prioritises the good99. Parallel is the claim that rights are 
________________ 
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consistent to the moral, intellectual and theological tradition of Catholi-
cism. While conceding that rights-rhetoric involves a risk, it is a risk worth 
taking. As Finnis observes  
Along with this goes […] an old Christian ambition: to baptise certain pro-
fane concepts, to despoil (plunder) the Egyptians […] This picking-out of a 
word form the great babble of human intercourse involves risks that Chris-
tianity has, from the very beginning, been willing to run […]100. 
Importantly, it is not a gamble to be taken unconditionally – a point 
further argued by Finnis in an article, entitled «Catholic Social Teach-
ing Since “Populorum Progressio”». It was published in 1982 in a col-
lection of articles on the theme of Liberation Theology101. The main 
concern of that time was the infiltration of a Marxist ideology into 
theological reflection. The theological experience of liberation was re-
duced to a mere socio-political concept of freedom which is ultimately 
incompatible and so in conflict with central Christian tenets102.  
Interestingly, the thrust of the argument mirrors the same disquiet of 
Rowland and the others. In the aftermath of the decline of Marxism-
Leninism as an ideological force, a focus has turned to those aspects of 
liberalism – out of which rights gained impetus – that oppose a Chris-
tian vision. The risk of contamination is too great, they argue, because 
it admits to a form of freedom that is alien and ultimately corruptive of 
an authentic Thomist and theological tradition. Rowland writes,  
The idea that a classical Christian mode of self-formation takes the form of 
a participation in the life of the Trinity wherein a person receives a vocation 
as a gift of grace is difficult to assimilate to a principle which holds that 
human dignity rests upon the capacity for autonomy and self-creation103.  
At base, her argument turns on the concept of freedom, conceived as 
«autonomy and self-creation». Aided by a counter-productive employ-
ment of rights, the theological experience of freedom, they argue, is be-
ing reduced to an economic and individualist concept. The concerns of 
Rowland and others regarding ideology turns on the notion of «free-
________________ 
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dom». In a manner, it parallels the concept of «liberation», around 
which the debate turned in the previous generation. Of the latter term, 
Finnis wrote: «it seems to be right to take a relaxed attitude to the con-
cept, provided one is clear about the conditions on which one is using 
it»104. He subsequently proceeded to identify conditions inherent to 
Catholic Theology which may «bracket» the term or provide an appro-
priate framework for its use.  
6.2 The Theological Employment of Freedom  
I wish to contend that a further six conditions may be adapted and 
applied to the employment of the concept of freedom, understood as ei-
ther personal and political autonomy, in order to bracket the term from 
the ideological abuses of liberalism105. They are suggested as potential 
sign-posts in a continued deliberation which aims at disclosing a theol-
ogy of human rights. 
To momentarily recall the traditions of moral enquiry: freedom is an 
integral part of all three traditions’ understanding of the human person 
and the consequent organisation of society. The natural law tradition 
links freedom to making purposeful decisions; the liberal tradition con-
ceives of freedom as autonomy or independence; and the critical tradi-
tion emphasises the political aspect of freedom. For each tradition, such 
notions of freedom are normative, requiring society to be organised ac-
cordingly. It was argued that the natural law tradition may take account 
of the latter two without betraying its own resources. By doing so, it 
placed personal and political autonomy within the deeper moral pa-
rameters entailed by human fulfilment.  
To briefly outline a theological model of freedom given greater at-
tention in the latter parts of this chapter: freedom is an essential aspect 
of salvation in Christ, for it is Christ who, as the truth incarnate, sets 
free (Jn 8: 31-32). Freed from the bonds of sin, death and the law, the 
believer is freed for God, for the other, and the good to which they are 
called. It may also be described as a purposive freedom in which the 
person lives out their human dignity in accordance with the dignity be-
stowed by God. Such a vision of purposive freedom, allows the theo-
logical tradition to align itself with the model of freedom offered by the 
natural law tradition.  
Added to the parameters provided by the quest for human fulfilment 
as proposed by the natural law (the basic goods and requirements of 
________________ 
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practical reasonableness), I wish to offer six conditions inherent to the 
theological vision and capable of directing the appropriate use of free-
dom in a theology of human rights.  
First: the final goal of freedom is communion with God. Freedom is 
the result of salvation and cannot be solely identified with it. Therefore, 
a theology of human rights may not conceive freedom as an end in it-
self but as a necessary condition for the achievement of further goal. 
Second: freedom is linked to continual conversion. It is a vocation to 
be lived out in accordance with the person’s dignity. This feature of 
freedom highlights the important of personal responsibility and behav-
iour. Therefore, a theology of human rights cannot reduce freedom 
solely to the outcome of appropriate social structures. 
Third: conceiving freedom to be fulfilled by way of the other, a the-
ology of human rights cannot dilute the importance of the social aspect 
of the human person. Therefore it must resist those aspects of any ide-
ology which would further privatise the individual: for example, an in-
sistence that religion remains out of the public realm. 
Fourth: the provision of freedom does not, of itself, solve all the 
problematic issues beset in morality. Therefore, a theology of human 
rights that emphasises freedom must also respect the goals and princi-
ples evident in other branches of moral theology, such as bioethics, 
sexual ethics, among others.  
Five: as purposive, freedom aims towards some positive state of af-
fairs. A theology of human rights, therefore, cannot limit itself to at-
tending to only those negative aspects of the individual and society that 
hinder freedom. Rather, it must also attempt to contribute a substantive 
account of the goals and principles that enhance the freedom of the in-
dividual and in society.  
Sixth and arising from all of the above: a theology of human rights 
must humbly refuse to single out, and so idolise, the idea of autonomy 
or political freedom. For instance, of the latter, politics is not an end in 
itself. Instead, it must charge them with the fullest moral force by as-
serting their validity for all, while at the same time, insisting on the vi-
tal moral import of discerning and fostering in each individual the free-
dom to live for the good.  
Accommodating such a model of freedom, the rest of the chapter 
concentrates on the theological reasons for human dignity and human 
rights – moving back and forth creatively, in a mutually clarifying and 
mutually supporting manner, between the theological loci of the scrip-
tures and the Magisterium. The tradition will be drawn upon in a 
lesser way.  
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7. Theological Reasons for Human Dignity and Human Rights  
As pointed out previously, the concept of human dignity plays an 
important role in the justification of rights in international and national 
law, political discourse and by advocacy groups. Similarly, human dig-
nity is also a focal point in the theological appropriation of rights and 
its ongoing justification by theologians106 and by the Magisterium: re-
call the opening the lines of Pacem in Terris107. Observing the signs of 
the times in Gaudium et Spes, the Second Vatican Council praised the 
deepening awareness of the «sublime dignity of the human person, who 
stands above all things and whose rights and duties are universal and 
inviolable»108. In particular, John Paul II continued to repeat such ob-
servations in many documents of social teaching and pastoral letters 
and visits109. To give but one example here, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis 
comments on  
the full awareness among large numbers of men and women of their dignity 
and of that of every human being. This awareness is expressed, for exam-
ple, in the more lively concern that human rights should be respected, and 
in the more vigorous rejection of their violation110. 
Three points arising from the previous reflection on dignity relate to 
the present discussion111. First, the concept of dignity refers to the 
worth or value of the human person. Such a notion is predictably attrac-
________________ 
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tive to theology. It has a transcendent referent that conceives of the 
human person as more than a mere object and so resists reductionist 
definitions of the human person – and the modes of moral reasoning 
that support such models112. However, and as a second point, a straight-
forward appeal to the concept of the dignity of the human person is in-
sufficient on its own for the foundation of rights and their consequent 
delineation. Similarly, a simple appeal to whatever acts as the theologi-
cal analogical equivalent to human dignity is inadequate on its own – 
and, as previously observed, it is open to underlying problems113. 
Therefore, and as a third point, a fuller anthropology is required – that 
is, a vision of the human person, as a whole – in order to respond to the 
pitfalls associated with the previous point. As Patrick Hannon asserts, 
When anyone speaks of a human right, there is implied some idea of what 
«human» means […] it is of utmost importance to know what is to count as 
human. And the answer which any of us will give to that question will de-
pend ultimately on our vision of life, and on what we make of the project of 
human being in the world114.  
It is the importance of the wider issue of what it is to be human that 
holds most appeal for Christian theology115. In particular, it has become 
a characterising concern of the contemporary era116. The two docu-
ments quoted at the beginning of this section provide ample evidence of 
such a focus. For instance, in discerning the church’s and humanity’s 
vocation, Gaudium et Spes begins by proposing that, 
Believers and unbelievers are almost at one in considering that everything 
on earth is to be referred to humanity at its centre and culmination.  
But what of humanity? […] the church can offer an answer to them which 
describes the true human condition, provides an explanation for its weak-
ness and recognises its dignity and calling117.  
John Paul II, in Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, writes that the main aim of 
the Church’s social doctrine, and by inference the appropriation and 
theological understanding of rights, is, 
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to interpret these realities [of human existence, in society and in the interna-
tional order, in the light of faith and of the Church’s tradition], determining 
their conformity or divergence from the lines of the Gospel teaching on 
man and his vocation, a vocation which is at once earthly and transcen-
dent118. 
The need for a deeper anthropology provides a space by which theol-
ogy can make a contribution to the wider debate. For instance and as 
previously mentioned, theology can and does insist on the transcendent 
aspect of the human person and this commitment rejects any attempt of 
reductionism of the human person. Indeed, the assertion of human dig-
nity is to oppose such approaches, for the person is of such unique 
value that any attempt to reduce the person to a thing, a means or a 
number is violation of the person itself. In the words of David Hollen-
bach:  
The imperative arising from human dignity is based on the indicative of the 
person’s transcendence over the world of things. The ability of persons to 
think and to choose, their hopes that always outrun the historical moment, 
and the experienced call to discriminate between good and evil actions – all 
these indicate that persons are more than things. This warrant for the foun-
dational principle of Catholic rights theory is held to be accessible and 
plausible apart form the particularist doctrines of the Christian faith119. 
But the warrant for human dignity is two-fold: it is made known by 
way of the dictates of reason (and in particular in practical reasoning) 
and in the disclosure of Revelation. He continues,  
The Christian faith does provide however a second explicitly Christian war-
rant for the principle of human dignity. The beliefs that all persons are cre-
ated in the image of God, that they are redeemed by Jesus Christ, and that 
they are summoned by God to a destiny beyond history serve both to sup-
port and to interpret the fundamental significance of human existence120. 
The rest of this section focuses on the doctrines of the Christian faith 
– particularly as disclosed through the sacred scriptures. It is divided 
into sub-sections – the order of creation and the order of redemption. 
The former concerns the theology of creation and specifically the crea-
tion of humanity in the image of God. The latter considers the dynamic 
of salvation-history culminating in the redemption of humanity by Je-
________________ 
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sus Christ and humanity’s subsequent mission. This division is to facili-
tate the structuring of ideas but, as will be argued, they are mutually in-
terconnected.  
7.1 The Order of Creation 
7.1.1 «Let us make Mankind» (Gen 1:26) 
To the above question «what is humanity?», Gaudium et Spes imme-
diately responds that «humankind was created “in the image of God” 
with the capacity to know and love its creator»121. The assertion that 
humanity is created in the image of God is the theological reason or 
warrant most commonly offered for the dignity of the human person. 
Of such a starting point, Lisa Sowle Cahill, in an article entitled «To-
wards a Christian Theory of Human Rights», observes, 
The explicitly religious and theological corollary of «human dignity» is 
«image of God», the primary Christian category or symbol of interpretation 
of personal value. The person is created in God’s image and it is this image 
which is distorted by sin and restored to wholeness in Christ122.  
She identifies two significant interpretations of the image of God. The 
first considers the image of God to be intrinsic to the person, resulting 
from being God’s creature and the second deems the image, and so the 
dignity of the person, to be graced, conferred or attributed to the person by 
the sovereign God. In common, they assert that the value or worth of the 
human person is ultimately dependent on God. They consider the dignity 
of the person to be the result of «God’s gracious providence». The former 
is associated with the Catholic tradition and the latter with the Protestant 
tradition123.  
The development of the first model of rights, which stresses the inherent 
image of God in the created person, may be traced in Chapter I124. Fre-
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quently, the theological debates in history that advanced rights turned on 
what was inherent to the person after the Fall or being in a sinful state, that 
is, removed from the grace of God. The resolutions to those crises commit-
ted this theological approach to the essential dignity or worth of each per-
son in spite of the fact that they are finite and sinful because the person is 
said to be «like God, e.g. as intelligent, free, communal, and loving. This 
resemblance is intrinsic and is not destroyed by sin. Thus even in a fallen 
creation, certain rights are grounded in the essential worth of the per-
son»125. I wish to propose two aspects to this theological warrant – being 
created and being in the image of God126.  
Firstly, being created refers to dependence. The theological insight is 
that the very created-ness of humanity is gift and grace. Accordingly, 
the claim of human dignity is the assertion of the value and worth of 
humanity because it is created in an act of grace and gift by a sovereign 
God evaluates creation, and humanity, to be good. Creation is bestowed 
with a positive value127. Importantly, it has a value that is intrinsic to 
the act itself and to that which is created. In the scriptures, it is in the 
context of creation that being in the image of God is first mentioned. 
The creation account of Genesis forcefully asserts, by way of repeti-
tion, that all that is created is evaluated by God to be «good»128 (Gen 
1:1-31). In particular, humanity «made in the image of God» is consid-
ered to be «very good» (Gen 1: 31). Considered in this manner, human 
dignity is dependent and resultant of God’s gracious providence. It can 
therefore incorporate the concerns of the Protestant models that wish to 
emphasis the sovereignty of God and humanity’s complete dependence. 
However, it also marks the point of departure for the Catholic tradi-
tion’s confidence in the created order and humanity. If there is an in-
trinsic dignity to what is created, then aspects of creation may be ex-
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plored as expressions of and pointers towards the Creator from whom 
that dignity originates.  
An important corollary arises from this aspect, particularly in the 
Catholic tradition. Being dependent on God, all of creation is consid-
ered to be directed towards God. It not only has an intrinsic dignity: it 
also has an intrinsic structure. Creation, including humanity, is inher-
ently ordered towards the transcendent. It is an order that is bestowed 
by God as part of the same act of grace that is the act of creation. Im-
portantly, it is discernable. Humanity is capable of identifying that 
which constitutes a creation ordered towards God and what is required 
to live by it.  
7.1.2  «In the image of God» (Gen 1:27) 
Secondly, being in the image and likeness of God refers to resem-
blance. Humanity is viewed to share certain characteristics with the 
Creator or is capable of sharing in the purposes of the Creator (capax 
dei). For example, the capacities to know and love are of value because 
they are God-like or are the appropriate responses to God. Humanity, 
therefore, is of value or dignity because it corresponds or is capable of 
response to the value and dignity of its Creator. The difficulty arises in 
trying to precisely locate what characteristics of being human are in the 
image of God. James Childress, in an article in the New Dictionary of 
Christian Ethics, observes, 
Although the image of God is often construed as reason and free will, it has 
also been interpreted as spiritual capacities, such as self-transcendence or 
the capacity for and the call to relationship with God, and as excellences, 
such as righteousness129.  
Arising from Catholic doctrine’s confidence in the created order and 
humanity’s capacity to understand the purposes inherent within it, 
Pacem in Terris locates human dignity as follows: 
God also created man in His own «image and likeness», endowed him with 
intelligence and freedom, and made him lord of creation, as the […] psalm-
ist declares in the words: «You have made him little less than the angels, 
and crowned him with glory and honour, You have given him rule over the 
works of your hands putting all things under his feet»130. 
The endowment with reason and free will as markings of being made 
in the image of God facilitates the theological warrant that supports the 
________________ 
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first pillar for rights, identified above131. It permits and justifies reflec-
tions on human experience – such as those of the document, or those 
that comprise the central conversation of this thesis. It supplies an as-
surance for models of reflection that may not be immediately apparent 
or referred to in the Revealed sources of theology. The confidence is 
supported on the corollary of the previous aspect – that creation, and 
humanity, has an inherent and discernable order. Models of reflection, 
including those of ethics, may be judged appropriate to the extent that 
they are capable of recognising and responding to the inherent order of 
creation. The same may be said of models of rights, their subsequent 
listing, and the manner in which they are advocated and applied. It is 
this important point that permits Finnis, for example, to state that there 
is, 
no foundation in Catholic theology of the «fundamental human rights» to 
which such constant appeal is nowadays made, other than the foundation 
affirmed in the first pages of Pacem in Terris, viz., the principles of order 
divinely inscribed in the inclinations and capacities of our created nature, 
discernible more or less clearly by out practical intelligence, and crystal-
lised with the moral force of our conscience132.  
Such an order helps ground the claims of universality for such mod-
els, while remaining consonant to the specific claims of Christian Reve-
lation. As belonging to all, rights based on an already existing created 
order are capable of being reasonably recognised by all. And, as ulti-
mately resulting from the act of grace that is creation, such rights will 
be consonant with God’s gracious providence.  
Pacem in Terris further associates another feature of being human to 
the belief of «being in the image of God»; namely, lordship. Although 
the document quotes Psalm 8, it is a significant motif of the Creation 
narrative. God is sovereign over all creation. To be in the image of God 
is, to some degree, to share in such lordship. Genesis tells of the ani-
mals being brought forward to be named (Gen 2:19-20). Biblically, 
naming is a significant act that bestows meaning. But, in the context of 
the Genesis story, it indicates that humanity participates in the ongoing 
act of creation. Furthermore, humanity is commissioned «to go forth 
and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it» (Gen 1:28). An obliga-
tion, and hence responsibility, is given to continue the work of creation. 
Humanity is the co-creator with the Creator: it is co-sovereign with the 
all-sovereign God. Human dignity, therefore, rests in sharing both the 
________________ 
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characteristics of God and in sharing in the divine plan or ongoing 
work of creation.  
The issue of lordship was critical in the theological debates concern-
ing rights of Medieval Era sketched in Chapter One. At base, the de-
bates concerned the scope or parameters of individual dominion or sov-
ereignty – the extent to which it was possible to be «the lord or domi-
nus of one’s own relevant moral world»133. Theologically speaking, 
such dominion is not separate from or in distinction from the dominion 
of God but turned on the manner and extent to which humanity shared 
in the sovereignty of God134.  
7.1.3 «Because you have done this» (Gn 3:14-19) 
As a result, the autonomy and freedom that this implies is firmly 
placed within the wider context of humanity’s dependence as creatures 
and the pursuit of its responsibilities as co-creators. God is always 
greater. To attempt to be or become God or to usurp divine sovereignty, 
or even to become God’s equal, is presented in the initial narratives of 
Genesis as rebellions against God and the correct and original ordering 
of creation. For example, the serpent in the Garden of Eden tempts by 
offering an equal status to God (Gen 3:5). God also recognises this at-
tempt by man and so the original dependent relationship is broken and 
humanity is alienated from God (Gen 3:22). Kieran Cronin points to 
this rebellion as «the original sin»135. Other initial narratives include the 
Tower of Babel which recounts the humanity’s motivation to reach the 
heavens. Instead, it ultimately leads to strife and miscommunication 
(Gen 11:1-9). Such acts result in the initial and further corruption of the 
original image of God, or original dignity, and points towards the need 
for its renewal or recreation. Take for example the narrative of the The 
Flood (Gen 6:5-9:17)136.  
Humanity is not God’s equal. The relationship has a proper order, as 
all creation has an inherent order. But the important supposition of this, 
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and previous points (humanity’s dependence on God, the sovereignty 
of God, endowment with freedom and intelligence etc), is that God has 
in fact entered into a relationship with humanity. The relational aspect 
of the human person is fundamental to a theological anthropology. God 
initiates and sustains the original relationship between humanity and 
God and within humanity itself «male and female he made them» (Gen 
1:27). Furthermore, a right relationship is sustained between humanity 
and created order (Gen 1:15). Breakdown in all three relationships re-
sult from the original rebellion. The initial narratives of Genesis that 
form the history before the Call of Abraham (Gen 12:1) tell and retell 
the rupture and renewal of right relationship. As will be further out-
lined, it is because of this experience of sin allied with the hope of re-
demption that rights are of theological concern.  
Being created in the image of God, therefore, is to acknowledge the 
God-given (created-ness), God-like (resemblance) and God-responsive 
(relationship) nature of the human person. All three constitute theologi-
cal sources of the human person’s dignity. Yet because of original sin, 
the created order is in need of recreation, the image of God is obscured 
and need of new disclosure and relationships need to be redeemed.  
7.2  The Order of Redemption 
7.2.1  «new creation» (2 Cor 5:18) 
The above reflections focus on a theology of creation, from which 
theological deliberations regarding rights «usually begins»137. By and 
large, the point of departure is the doctrine of the image of God before 
moving on to the events of salvation-history138. Yet, such a simple 
move can miss an important line of reasoning. It is through the prism of 
the latter that the former comes to light or, at least, more clearly so. To 
give a biblical example: Barnabas Mary Ahern, in an article, entitled 
«Biblical Doctrine on the Rights and Duties of Man» points out «The 
story of the Bible really begins with the book of Exodus»139. It is the 
experience of liberation from slavery and the establishment of the 
covenant between God and his chosen people, recounted in book of 
Exodus, which directs the biblical writers’ account of creation. To take 
a more nuanced theological model: Kieran Cronin argues that «Crea-
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tion in God’s image can be understood with the help of the covenant 
model, with the suggestion that man’s creation is the first covenant he 
experiences»140.  
The order of creation is interpreted according to the order of redemp-
tion. The latter, therefore, has some precedence or primacy. In this way, 
it may be said that the events of salvation-history are the true theologi-
cal foundations of rights. Critically, it is more than a mere conceptual 
priority. It is also based on an existential priority. Human rights con-
cern the concrete and historical struggles of people. This is also the 
arena of salvation. Salvation takes place in history or in the experiences 
of God’s salvific will and the struggles of God’s people to live accord-
ingly. It is brought about in the historical context of human events. And 
because the salvific journey happens through history, human rights are 
of theological concern141.  
Furthermore, there can be no dichotomy between salvation and secu-
lar history. Salvific events happen in history and the full sweep of sal-
vation-history is brought to light through such interpretative works of 
God as the Exodus. To return to a biblical example: exegesis can reveal 
the large extent how the newly forming Israelites took to themselves 
the law of the surrounding cultures. Although developed outside of 
their historical experience, such law codes were interpreted and applied 
in light of their own central salvific experience – the Exodus-event. 
This central interpretative work of God was brought to bear on the his-
torical experience of early society building by the Israelites which ap-
propriated the new law code. The process often moulded the old code 
into new form, with new content and, most significantly, a new justifi-
cation. As C. Villa-Vicenzo observes:  
Sometimes laws and customs were simply taken over. Often they were 
modified, and in other situations rewritten. The single theological concern 
was the same. It was to use the resources available in any given situation 
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and in each changing situation to give expression to the central liberating 
message of the Exodus – the specific way of life associated with the wor-
ship of Yahweh. […] The task of law-making in the Bible has always been 
a creative act of putting together the necessary ingredients in fulfilment of 
the covenant promise of God to God’s people142.  
Creation, as noted previously, was also interpreted in the light of sal-
vation-history. The biblical authors shaped their (often borrowed) ac-
counts of Creation according to the purposes revealed in the salvific 
works of God, namely the events of the Exodus culminating in the es-
tablishment of the Covenant between God and people. This covenant-
pact was the primary symbol in the Old Testament of the «the justice of 
God» and, as Ahern notes, «It is the same Covenant theme which finds 
eminent expression in the story of Creation»143. Justice, therefore, was 
intimately linked to creation by the biblical writers. There is an order, 
reflected in both. And as noted above the early stories of Genesis tell 
and retell that rebellion unleashes a disorder to both. Through these 
narratives, a pattern is established. The pattern is the dynamic of sin 
and redemption played out in salvation-history. Disorder results from 
disobedience to the given order of God and it is by way of God’s be-
neficent justice that creation is renewed, «by which God sought to re-
new his image in the people of Israel and to restore the human dignity 
which he intended for mankind in its very creation»144. Living accord-
ing God’s justice – that is, returning to the original dependence on God 
– is the means by which human dignity is fostered and restored.  
The dynamic of sin and redemption played out in salvation-history – 
that is, in the concrete struggles of a people attempting to respond in 
faithfulness to the graciousness providence of their God – not only 
stamps itself in the origins of history but also points to history’s con-
clusion when all of creation is restored. In the Hebrew experience, it 
points to the end time. But it also points to the event and person who 
would help usher in God’s final justice and new creation – the Messiah. 
For Christianity that event has happened in Jesus Christ. Through Jesus 
Christ the person and the community and the whole cosmos becomes, 
in the phrase of St. Paul, a «new creation» (2 Cor 5:17; Gal 6:15). It is 
through the personal and communal experience of salvation that the 
cosmos is disclosed to be in need of and brought to salvation by the 
Christ-event.  
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7.2.2 «the last Adam» (1 Cor 15:45) 
If, as argued above, the events of salvation history have pre-
eminence in the theological foundations of rights and, as asserted by 
Christianity, Jesus Christ is the «climax of salvation»145, then «The real 
theological foundation, […] is placed at the Christological level»146.  
The source of sin – identified above as the rebellion against the 
proper order established in creation and the covenant relationship – is 
overcome in Christ through the establishment of a new everlasting 
covenant147. Sin debases (but does not destroy) the human dignity con-
ferred in the gracious gift of creation and restored in the gift of the 
Covenant. But such a tarnishing, by personal and social sin, «is over-
come in principle and at least in an incipient way for individuals and 
human society by Christ’s saving work of freeing from sin and recon-
ciling all to the Father»148. Because of the obedience of Jesus to the will 
of the Father, God re-bestows for a final and enduring time, the un-
qualified evaluation of the goodness of creation, and in particular, of 
humanity (1 Cor 15:20-45). But it is more than a mere distant apprecia-
tion. God actively responds to the self-offer of Jesus: love responds to 
love and overflows to embrace all. In light of the Christ-event, human 
dignity or worth takes on a deeper meaning than provided by a theol-
ogy of creation or philosophy149. At its most fundamental level, human-
ity is considered to be of inalienable worth because it is loved by God: 
«Is it Christ Jesus, who died, yes, who was raised from the dead, who is 
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at the right hand of God, who indeed intercedes for us? Who shall sepa-
rate us from the love of Christ?» (Rom 8: 31-35). 
On one hand, Christ’s saving work, culminating in the Paschal Mys-
tery of his death and resurrection, re-establishes human dignity through 
the overcoming of sin. But on another, the very person of Jesus unveils 
the depths of human dignity. The image of God – tarnished by sin – is 
both restored and fully revealed by Jesus. In the process of restoration, 
a «new creation» (as identified in the previous section?) is initiated: in 
the unfolding of revelation, a «new Adam» is disclosed (Col 1:13). To 
return to the words of Gaudium et Spes: «Christ the new Adam, in the 
very revelation of the mystery of the Father and of his love, fully re-
veals man to himself and brings to light his most high calling»150. The 
image of God bestowed on each in creation comes to clearer light in 
Christ (2 Cor 4:4). To live in accord to that image therefore is to live in 
imitation of Christ and to instantiate his message (Col 3:11). 
The Christ-event imposes itself and is accepted by Christians in the 
same manner in which the Exodus-event acted in the experience of the 
Jewish people. The example provided in defence of this point in the 
previous section is particularly suitable. A direct parallel may be 
drawn. The early Israelites appropriated a foreign law code and reinter-
preted it according to the central liberating experience of the Exodus. 
For Christianity, the central liberating experience is in Jesus Christ and 
Christianity also appropriated (in acts of adoption, modification, elimi-
nation and justification) from the surrounding culture in accordance 
with the demands of this central experience. The opening sections of 
this thesis, concerning the discipline of jurisprudence and Aristotelian 
philosophy in the twelfth century, testify to this dynamic. With regard 
to rights, the same dynamic continues in contemporary Christianity. A 
rights focused law code was, in part, developed in secular environ-
ments. Contemporary Christianity is now appropriating such a code and 
language into its ethical and theological reasoning. Yet the theological 
concern remains the same. Rights are appropriated, structured, content-
filled and justified by Christianity in accordance to its central salvific 
experience – the Christ-event.  
As argued above, this process takes place in a two way movement 
between the commitment to the dignity of the human person as re-
vealed in Christ and the prophetic judgements of Christians in confront-
ing historical events and evils. In other words, rights are interpreted in 
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light of Christ and, in turn, made into instruments of Christ’s salvific 
work. Rights become instruments of Christ’s saving work when placed 
in service of the dignity that is restored in Christ and originally be-
stowed by God in creation. 
7.2.3 «children of God» (1 Jn 3:1)  
The Christian doctrine of the image of God proposes that the dignity 
of humanity is bestowed in creation and restored in Christ. Yet, the 
original stain of sin still scares the human experience, placing the per-
son within the continued «struggle, and a dramatic one, between good 
and evil, between light and darkness»151. The person itself, and hence 
its dignity, is at the heart of this struggle, for «It is man […] who must 
be saved; it is mankind that must be renewed […] body, soul, heart and 
conscience, mind and will»152. In other words, salvation extends to 
every aspect of the person, «the total subject; societies of many kinds; 
the cosmos; all of them in their entire historical dimension»153. 
By his saving work, Christ redeems all that was damaged by original 
sin. Sin’s source was identified above as a rebellion against the proper 
ordering of humanity’s dependence on the Creator and its resultant re-
sponsibilities as co-creators, and hence a breaking apart of the Cove-
nant relationship154. In Christ, this covenant relationship, which also 
marks the created order, is re-established «once and for all» (Heb 10:1-
22, 10). Right relationship, therefore is renewed – between God and 
humanity, between people, and between people and creation.  
This renewed relationship is marked by intimacy and connectedness. 
Yahweh is revealed as «Our Father» (Mt 6:9). All become adopted sons 
of God155 by virtue of their faith in Christ – the only Son (Gal 3:26; 
Eph 1:5). Yet it is more than a mere instruction of Jesus156. Rather, 
adoption is due to participation in the Son-ship of Christ. Adoption is, 
therefore, participation into the triune God – into the very relationship 
of Father and Son overflowing in the Spirit. It is brought about and sus-
tained by the Spirit (Rom 6:4), and instantiated in the sacrament of bap-
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tism (Gal 4,5 ff; Rom 8: 14-17). Through baptism, the Christian is in-
corporated into the body of Christ – the church. But this presupposes 
true conversion (Tt 3:5; 1 P 1:3; 2:2) by which Christians are called to 
reproduce in themselves the image of the only Son (Rom 8:29). How-
ever, they are still treated as adopted children, even if they fail to live in 
accordance with the requirements of imitating Christ (Heb 12: 5-12).  
The human person is the subject of salvation, yet the salvation of-
fered in Christ is marked by the eschatological truth of already-but-not-
yet. So also is the associated dignity: it is graciously given by the initia-
tive of God and revealed in the person and actions of Christ, but be-
cause of sin, it is still in need of full appropriation and so constant cul-
tivation. To return to the initial reflections referred to earlier on what it 
is to be human, Gaudium et Spes later continues,  
Man gains such dignity when, ridding himself of all slavery to the passions, 
he presses forward towards his goal by freely choosing what is good, and, 
by his diligence and skill, effectively secures for himself the means suited 
to this end. Since human freedom has been weakened by sin is only by the 
help of God’s grace that man can give his actions their full and proper rela-
tionship to God157. 
To the dignity that is given (creation) and the dignity that is restored 
(salvation in Christ), may be added the dignity that is realised (conver-
sion-vocation) by each Christian in conforming, by way of grace, to 
Christ and the natural order of creation. The former is endowed or 
gifted and the result of the initiative of God: the latter is achieved or at-
tained and the result of the lived response of the person. Human dignity 
is as much gained as it is graced, which is in accordance with the 
Catholic commitment to the mutual necessity of good works and grace 
which must two go hand in hand.  
These two aspects of dignity – dignity as achievement and dignity as 
endowment – correspond to the two ways in which the doctrine of the 
image of God is generally used in the theological justification of rights. 
Roger Ruston, in Human Rights and the Image of God, characterises 
the two functions as active and passive. The active sense, he maintains, 
was emphasised by early Christian theologians and was «concerned 
with its implications for the way in which a person should conduct his 
or her life on earth»158. On the other hand and in the passive sense, 
which he argues is a modern interpretation, «the image says something 
________________ 
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about how persons bearing the image ought to be treated (or should 
not) be treated by others»159. 
Both modes of operating may be identified in Chapter I. The former 
provided a justification for rights as requirements of following the natu-
ral law and the Gospel: the latter widened the scope of what it means to 
be human160.  
In the contemporary justification of rights by the Magisterium, both 
are operative. To take a lengthy example: the declaration on religious 
freedom at the Second Vatican Council, Dignitatis Humanae, states,  
It is in accordance with their dignity as persons – that is, beings endowed 
with reason and free will and therefore privileged to bear personal respon-
sibility – that all men should be at once be impelled by nature and also 
bound by a moral obligation to seek the truth, especially religious truth. 
They are also bound to adhere to the truth, once it is known, and to order 
their whole lives in accord with the demands of truth.  
However, men cannot discharge these obligations in a manner in keeping 
with their own nature unless they enjoy immunity from external coercion as 
well as psychological freedom. Therefore, the right to religious freedom 
has its foundation, not in the subjective disposition of the person, but in his 
very nature161.  
On one hand, humanity’s dignity is endowed: on the other hand, it 
requires that life ought to be lived in accord or harmony with its re-
quirements – in this case, with the religious truth. The two are con-
ceived as mutually constitutive in the very nature of what it is to be 
human. As a result, it is incumbent on society to ensure the consequent 
right to religious freedom. To treat the human person in a coercive 
manner is not simply to deny their (endowed) dignity but also to deny 
them the possibility of conducting their lives with (achieved) dignity by 
living in pursuit of the truth. In turn, providing the conditions that allow 
for each person to pursue that which is in accordance with their dignity, 
that is, the common good and human rights, is to act in a manner that 
respects the (endowed) dignity of all. The two aspects operate together 
by way of a «to and fro» movement – identified earlier as the funda-
mental methodology in a theological justification of rights162. This in-
teraction is the concern of Christian ethics and Christian spiritualities of 
justice. Reflection develops according to the constant assertion of the 
________________ 
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graced dignity of each and the consistent concrete judgements on the 
conditions and requirements necessary to realise human dignity – par-
ticularly and most of all, in the face of the real injustices and evils 
which demean it163. Consequently, it is the historical struggle of the 
Christian people to confront injustices (eg economic exploitation, ra-
cism, gender discrimination, authoritarianism etc) that is the immediate 
context for Christians participating in the ongoing delineation of spe-
cific rights and deliberation on their foundation and appropriateness. 
As pointed out earlier, history is also the arena of salvation. On one 
hand, the offer of salvation is the restoration of those relationships de-
based by sin, by way of God’s forgiveness and mercy offered through 
Christ. On the other, 
Salvation is indeed the freeing-from the evil of sin, but it is also something 
positive, a freeing-for, a freeing-for the good, an enabling to be good per-
sonally and to do good, especially a good beyond what unaided human 
power can achieve, whether this be an individual or social good164.  
In the pithy phrase of Donal Murray, «Sin, in fact, is the opposite of 
freedom, the destruction of freedom: “Everyone who commits sin is a 
slave” (Jn 8:34)»165. In the same article entitled, «The Theological Ba-
sis for Human Rights», Murray firstly proposes a phenomenology of 
freedom, in which the internal logic of freedom is mapped. Freedom, in 
order to be true to its own internal logic, must be linked to responsibil-
ity, equality and participation. For example, he writes,  
The logic of freedom is that, in order to be free, I have to be respecting the 
freedom of the other. Human rights are, therefore, a condition of genuine 
freedom not only for those whose rights are respected but also for those 
who are called to respect them166.  
Secondly, he considers freedom in the light of faith, outlining three sig-
nificant enslavements from which we are saved – the Law, Death and Sin 
– for «it fills in the picture in a dramatic way […] This is now the solid ba-
sis of freedom: “For freedom Christ has set us free” (Gal 5:1)”»167. Free-
________________ 
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dom in Christ is to be freed from mere legalism and free to live for justice 
and solidarity: it is to be freed from the absurdity of death and free for a 
life with meaning; and it is to be freed from sin in order to be free to live 
for the other in a new relationship, which in turn, is to live a life of fulfil-
ment. It is to live for the kingdom of God. 
8. Conclusion: Pertinent Points 
Paralleling points made in previous chapters, I wish to propose a 
number of observations. 
Firstly, as one of the theological loci of Revelation, Tradition in 
Catholic thought is more than a tradition of enquiry. However, it does 
share the comparable dynamic. And, similarly to the philosophical tra-
ditions of enquiry, it is the central contention of this thesis that the 
Catholic theological tradition may change, in response to socio-
economic challenges and to other traditions, while remaining faithful to 
its own resources and mission. Encountering other traditions and mod-
els of reasoning requires vigilance. But, more importantly, it also in-
volves the very dynamic of a tradition. By definition, a tradition of en-
quiry, if it is to remain vibrant, must test the consistency of its own re-
sources, unpack its implications, purify its own internal contradictions 
and be capable of responding to and posing challenges to other tradi-
tions. It was in this historical process that rights-language initially grew 
within a theological framework – and it is within the same process that 
rights may be re-appropriated.  
Secondly, the re-appraisal of rights language is part of the wider re-
evaluation of modernity in Roman Catholicism. The encounter is 
marked by the dynamic observed in the previous point. Therefore, the 
characteristics and institutions of modernity are not accepted without 
qualification. For example, the turn to the subject that characterises 
modernity is incorporated into a new humanism that respects the tran-
scendental openness to Revelation and to the other. This chapter fo-
cused on the concept of human dignity which has a central normative 
claim in our contemporary era. Two particular impulses are worth not-
ing – personal autonomy and political autonomy (democracy). I would 
argue that theological reflection requires further engagement with these 
issues.  
Thirdly, the Catholic theological tradition commits itself to two mu-
tually supportive warrants for the dignity of the human person. Effec-
tive moral reasoning recognises the value of each person and the means 
by which it may be realised. In turn, Revelation provides a further af-
fective source in unpacking the meaning of dignity. The prophetic 
judgements of the community help demarcate the demands of such an 
endowed dignity. Human rights therefore, being such claims, become 
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instruments in the realisation of the full dignity of each person before 
God.  
Fourthly, a central element to the thesis is the rights-typology con-
sisting of justice, rights and law with associated terms of freedom and 
state-society. Bringing theological categories to bear: justice is dis-
closed as an inherent order in creation and in the person. Crucially, it is 
fundamentally independent of the individual, even if its demands 
change over time. The covenant is the primary symbol that cuts across 
both justice and the law, implying that both are expressions and so re-
quirements of the correct ordering of the divine-human relationship. In 
particular, I singled out the notion of freedom for attention. Rights are 
decisively linked to personal and political freedom implying the need 
for particular care in providing the guidelines for a theology of free-
dom. Finally, the state supports and provides the conditions that allow 
and foster the above to happen for the good of each individual and the 
common good of all. 
Fifthly, as it did with its associated natural law tradition, the theme of 
«order» echoes throughout the above theological reflections. Rights are 
norms that protect and foster the dignity of the human person – a per-
son that is ordered towards God, to another, within itself, and in crea-
tion. Rights, therefore, act as a basic standard of what is worthy of man 
and so necessary for his development and progress168. As a result, and 
in the words of John Paul II,  
the concept of faith makes quite clear the reasons which impel the Church 
to concern herself with the problems of development [and hence human 
rights], to consider them a duty of her pastoral ministry, and to urge all to 
think about the nature and characteristics of authentic human development. 
Through her commitment she desires, on the one hand, to place herself at 
the service of the divine plan which is meant to order all things to the full-
ness which dwells in Christ (cf. Col 1:19) and which he communicated to 
his body; and on the other hand she desires to respond to her fundamental 
vocation of being a «sacrament», that is to say «a sign and instrument of in-
timate union with God and of the unity of the whole human race»169. 
 
  
________________ 
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Almost nobody knew his name. Nobody outside his immediate 
neighbourhood had read his words or heard him speak. Nobody knows 
what happened to him even one hour after his moment in the world’s liv-
ing rooms. But the man who stood before a column of tanks near Tianan-
men Square – June 5, 1989 – may have impressed his image on the global 
memory more vividly, more intimately than even Sun Yatsen did. Almost 
certainly he was seen in his moment of self-transcendence by more people 
than every laid eyes on Winston Churchill, Albert Einstein and James 
Joyce combined1. 
This moment, recalled in Time Magazine, is one of the persistent 
images of the many popular political movements of 1989. Unlike 
Eastern Europe, the student protests in China were brutally repressed 
invoking a wave of revulsion and condemnation throughout the on-
looking world.  
There are many complex issues simplified and possibly distorted 
by this image. Yet similar events to those of Tiananmen Square pro-
voke universal denunciation. The conviction that such events are in-
tolerable demands the very real question: Why is it wrong to drive a 
tank over a crowd of unarmed students? To this very question, Mar-
tin McKeever writes that there are a myriad of possible answers. 
One reaction is to declare that such actions are against human rights. 
He continues, 
In such a response, human rights discourse is being used as an ethical cate-
gory in the sense that the action is classified as morally wrong on the basis 
of a set of criteria supplied by or implicit in the idea of human rights. Such 
a manner of discussing moral issues, particularly of a social nature, has be-
________________ 
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come so common that we tend to take it for granted; perhaps overlooking 
the fact that it constitutes yet another way of doing ethics2. 
To use human rights is to be involved in the ethical enterprise. It is to 
share in the purpose and aim of ethics as a whole, which is to develop 
the standards or identify the presuppositions for answering practical 
moral questions for the betterment of the person. Human rights can 
provide an important framework to the urgent question, why is it wrong 
to drive a tank over a crowd of unarmed students? 
To revisit the thought-experiment that guided our initial reflections: 
Stephen Lukes asked, «what way of thinking does accepting the princi-
ple of defending human rights deny and what way of thinking does it 
entail»3? In other words, what is at stake? In using the language of hu-
man rights, I have argued that what is at stake is nothing less than jus-
tice, freedom and democracy. In summation:  
This thesis was an exploration of that framework or, to be more pre-
cise, three proposed frameworks by three theorists, each representative 
of a different tradition of enquiry (History). It presented the respective 
theorists in their own terms (Interpretation) before providing an evalua-
tion by way of a comparative study (Dialectic). It took a stance in fa-
vour of an adapted natural law tradition, and its model of moral reason-
ing, which is capable of supporting human rights. What was revealed in 
the course of the study is that by amending itself in order to provide a 
basis for human rights, the tradition was capable of accounting for the 
challenges of other traditions while remaining true to its own resources.  
While defending the priority of an objective justice linked to the sub-
stantial good of the human, the tradition can account for personal free-
dom or autonomy – as defended by the liberal tradition – and political 
freedom or deliberative democracy – as defended by the critical tradi-
tion. All three requirements are presented by the traditions as necessary 
to respond to and protect the dignity of the human person. However, I 
argue, that that all three are mutually constitutive when personal free-
dom and political freedom are grounded in the wider moral considera-
tions of objective justice. Respecting and fostering the dignity of each 
person demands that society, and specifically the state, must be organ-
ised accordingly. Primarily, it must be directed by its responsibility to 
the common good in providing the just conditions for integral human 
fulfilment of each. Consequently, it must allow a certain freedom for 
each individual to responsibly choose their good. Furthermore, it must 
________________ 
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foster the responsibility of all to deliberate, thereby discerning the good 
and how to achieve it.  
Some further observations may also be drawn from this study, which 
parallel, in part, the conclusions of previous chapters. First and fore-
most, what is at stake is the individual itself. The intimate association 
of human rights to the dignity of the person is in order to link rights to a 
value, transcendent of any measure or reduction. In moral and legal 
reasoning, they counter reasons that may justify, in political and social 
discourse, the exploitation or discrimination of the person (or group).  
Furthermore and secondly, a more substantive account of what it is 
to be a person is at stake. There is a to-and-fro reflection on the dignity 
of the person and the judgements of practical reasoning that specify 
human rights. In particular, this thesis argues that this method opens a 
space that allows for theological reasons and discourses orientated to 
the good, or the natural law, to inform our shared understanding. 
As a result and thirdly, the development of the natural law is at stake. 
Natural law is unique in claiming to provide a substantive account of 
the human person (by way of the good) and moral reasoning (by way of 
the principles of practical reasoning). It therefore has much to offer. 
However, it is very much at risk of becoming ghettoised and irrelevant 
if it does not adapt to take account of a rights-language that gained 
much impetus independent of the natural law tradition. To do so, is to 
encounter other traditions, which in turn, is to engage and incorporate 
elements of other traditions.  
Consequently and fourthly, a range of issues are at stake. For in-
stance, issues of justice, freedom, law and the state-society which were 
identified as a cluster of associated ideas that help define the concept 
and functioning of rights. In particular, the notion of freedom is crucial, 
for it is personal and political freedoms that are fostered and protected 
by the traditions of modernity most allied to rights. Placed within a 
natural law and a theological model of reasoning, freedom is conceived 
as purposive – aiming towards a personal and transcendent good. Con-
nected to a purposive freedom, I argue that human rights find a more 
thorough foundation that enables a stronger assertion of their inaliena-
bility and a greater means of specifying genuine rights. In turn, this 
provides an internal protection against being undermined by prolifera-
tion and manipulation.  
Fifth and practically, what are at stake are the institutions of the 
western political order. In order to defend rights, I was also required to 
defend the principle of a limited government that respects the personal 
of individuals and the principle of deliberative democracy that respects 
political autonomy. I wish to contend that the natural law can provide a 
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model of reasoning that can be manifested in, and so ground, the civil 
and political institutions of constitutional democracy. 
Sixthly, what is at stake in the use of human rights is moral reasoning 
itself. Perhaps, the deepest commitment shared by the three theorists of 
this dissertation is to the practice of reason – and its ability to provide 
the standards for a just, lawful and free society. Human rights are an 
expression of that faith in reason.  
Finally, the mission of theology itself is at stake. This study was 
placed within a wider Christian appraisal (Foundation). I argued that 
the Catholic theological tradition, similarly to the philosophical tradi-
tion to which it is closely associated, is capable of supporting rights 
language while remaining true to its own resources. These two pillars 
are mutually supportive: taken together, the former asserts the endowed 
dignity of humanity, in its creation and salvation by God, and the latter 
helps guide the realisation that dignity in each. Human rights bear a 
moral and theological imperative. By demarcating the demands of dig-
nity, they become instruments in the building of the kingdom.  
The dignity of the unknown rebel, who faced the tanks in Tiananmen 
Square, is in his courage to the point of forfeiting his right to life. It is 
by the sacrifice of his own rights that he asserted the dignity of all and 
so the basic rights of all – and by implication justice, freedom and de-
mocracy. Yet, it is also to point to an aporia. The dignity of the human 
person is always more. Rights on their own cannot capture all that it is 
to be human. Yet, they do capture the fundamental requirements that 
facilitate the person to be all that they are called by God to be.  
 APPENDICES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND MORAL REASONING 388 
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